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Karl Rahner, responding to the problems raised by Kant's critical philosophy, sought to 
present a Thomistic metaphysics of realism in a modern thought-form through a 
reduction of the interrogative thrust of the intellect to its possibility conditions, and so, 
like Marechal before him, attain an absolute affirmation of Being. Rahner's 
transcendental system, however, would seem to have been overtaken by a more 
existential stress in phenomenological thinking. 
Emmanuel Levinas, with his thought of the Other and his attempt at an excendence from 
Being, would seem at first glance to sit uncomfortably alongside Rahner's system, yet, 
a closer reading of both unearths a remarkable convergence in their thinking. The deeper 
phenomenological reduction which Levinas undertakes to reveal the inter-subjective 
context of consciousness helps to humanise Rahner's approach. This thesis attempts a 
fruitful confrontation of both thinkers by, firstly, indicating the tension between 
Rahner's own philosophical propaedeutic and his theological writings, particularly on 
grace, mystery and the love of God and neighbour, where he affirms that human 
existence is ultimately reductio in mysterium and that human fulfilment is to be found 
in a personal relationship with a human Other. A second purpose is to show how these 
same theological themes can be developed from within Levinas' own thought, and how 
his own philosophy can provide a worthwhile context for Christian theology. 
The thesis unfolds by considering the various methods - metaphysical, 
transcendental and phenomenological - which surround both thinkers (Chapter 1) and 
then proceeds to outline their various philosophical influences (Chapter 2). Since the 
notion of Being as self-presence is fundamental in Rahner, and since Levinas refuses 
a philosophy of presence, Chapter 3 questions the privilege of presence. This will lead, 
in its turn, to a rethinking of the notion of subjectivity: the subject is not to be consider 
as presence-to-self but as a relationship with the Other (Chapter 4). This relationship is 
experienced in Desire (Chapter 5) and in the responsibility experienced before the face 
of the Other (Chapter 6). The relation between ethics (the good) and Being is pursued 
in chapter 7. Finally, the notion of mystery is indicated as the theme which inspires the 
work of both Rahner and Levinas (Chapter 8). Rahner's unmastered mystery will 
become Levinas' incomprehensible infinity in the presence of which the subject is called 
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INTRODUCTION XI 
'Theology has always caused me 
a lot of trouble. The more I 
ponder and delve into it, the 
darker and mistier it seems to me 
to be. It is certainly no science for 
subtle invention, and without love 
it would be no good at all. But I 
love it because it values love 
above all else; and grace is never 
lacking where love comes first.' 1 
0.1 Rahner and Levinas: The Possibility and Necessity of the 
Confrontation. 
This thesis attempts to confront fruitfully the theological thinking of Karl Rabner 
and the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Any confrontation, or even comparison, 
presupposes a certain convergence or contiguity of interest. Dialogue demands a certain 
coming together, which nonetheless still respects the differences and distance between 
the interlocutors. If this were not so, the communicative power of language would soon 
disintegrate into the confusion and closed circle of the same. Thought may assimilate 
the strange and foreign in terms of the same and familiar, yet the ultimate failure of this 
quest for comprehension and comprehensivity is the possibility and guarantee of 
thinking's continual movement beyond its present. 
The way of convergence, however, is a narrow one; writing, as Derrida notes, 
is 'the responsibility of angustia: the necessarily restricted passageway of speech against 
which all possible meanings push together, preventing each other's emergence.'2 The 
anguish of the act of writing means that what can be written is always suppressed by 
what is actually written. Hence, Levinas can write in his own Preface to Humanisme de 
l'autre homme, 
Lady Study to the Dreamer in Wm Langland, Piers the Ploughman. 
Book X. Study and Leaming, (London: Penguin, 1966), pp 117-18 
2 Jacques Derrida, Force and Signification, in Writing and Difference, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.9 
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'L'avant-propos, toujours ecrit apres le livre, n'est pas toujours une 
redite en termes approximatifs, de l'enonce rigoureux qui justifie un 
livre. II peut exprimer le premier - et !'urgent - commencement, le 
premier "c'est-a-dire" - qui est aussi le premier dedit - des propositions 
ou, actuelle et assemblee, s'absorbe et !/expose, dans le Dit, 
l'inassemblable de l'un-pour-l'autre, signifiant comme Dire. 13 
Xll 
Like speaking, writing is difficult because, not saying enough, too much is said. The 
task of this essay is to advance Karl Rahner and Emmanuel Levinas along the narrow 
way of convergence, and for two principal reasons: 
Firstly, in order to grasp afresh what Rahner is saying. Is such a task necessary? 
It is on account of the conviction that Rahner's theology remains relevant but requires 
a new Denkform that the task is made necessary. The notion of Denkform is found in J 
B Metz who, in his Christliche Anthropozentrik, understands it as the fundamental form 
which a philosophical reflection takes. He writes that '[t]hat which most characterises 
a way of thinking is not primarily what is explicit in it, but the dominating horizon 
presupposed in each expression, not what is thematically stated, but the dominating 
direction of the statement... not the statements themselves, but the way one looks upon 
them.'4 Gerard McCool comments: 'The Denliform, even though it seldom, if ever, 
reaches the level of conscious explicitation, is a thinker's fundamental understanding of 
his own self and being in general. Thus his Denkform is the horizon against which his 
reflections constantly proceed, and which, in consequence, influences his interpretation 
of every object which falls under his philosophical investigation.'5 Rahner, by 
E Levinas, Humanisme de l'autre homme, (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 
1972), p.11 
4 J B Metz, Christliche Anthropozentrik: Uber die Denkfonn des 
Thomas von Aquin, (Munich: Kosel-Verlag, 1962), p.34 
JOrg Splett, in his article on Thought-Forms, (Sacramentwn Mundi, Vol. VI, 
London: Burns & Oates, 1970), pp.255-257, locates the introduction of the expression 
Denkform into philosophical discussion in H Leise gang's Denkfonnen (1951 ). A 
'thought-form' is a paradigmatic way of thinking against a particular Weltanschauung 
which predominates in that perspective. Splett notes that the notion of Denkform was 
transposed to ontology by J B Metz and employed by him to mean 'man's 
comprehensive understanding of being and of himself, the horizon that encompasses all 
events, and gives its essential nature to an epoch in the history of the spirit' (ibid., 
p.256). It is 'never merely a form' for it cannot be adequately distinguished from its 
content, nor can it be clearly exposed for it proceeds 'from the transcendental experience 
which the finite spirit has of beings and of itself (ibid.). 
G McCool, Philosophical Pluralism and an Evolving Thomism, m 
Continuum, II, 1 (1964), p.11 
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confronting Thomas and Kant, sought to provide theology with a modern Denkform 
which would better equip it to dialogue with contemporary philosophical thinking. 
Recognising the anthropocentric Denkform of Thomas, he appreciated that Thomas' 
thinking, although framed in Aristotelian categories, was modern, not mediaeval, in that 
it adopted an anthropocentric rather than a cosmocentric viewpoint.6 In addressing the 
problems raised by Kant for the possibility of metaphysics, Rahner attempted to 
translate Thomas into a modern post-Kantian Denkform. Unfortunately, contemporary 
philosophy has developed beyond Kant, and Rahner's own transcendental response to 
the Kantian problematic seems largely to have been overtaken in philosophy. Yet, 
Rahner's extensive theological enterprise remains influential for theological thinking; 
if it is to continue to make a relevant contribution to theological debate then what he 
writes needs to be able to dialogue with a thinking which has long passed by the way 
of transcendentalism. Is ·such a task possible? Splett notes that, on account of the 
transcendental origin of a particular Denkform and its historical expression, '[a] thought-
form may develop new possibilities and a fuller life as freedom becomes aware of itself 
and as stimulating contacts are made with other forms.' 7 It is my conviction that the 
philosophical insights of Emmanuel Levinas provide a new context or philosophical 
Denkform for a re-reading and deepening of Rahner's transcendental Denkform. 
Secondly, to pursue Levinas philosophy into the realm of Christian theology to 
see how it can be fruitfully developed and contribute to the ongoing reflection on 
fundamental Christian doctrines. It is my conviction that Levinas' style of doing 
philosophy can have a positive influence on, for example, the theologies of grace and 
the sacraments, and Rahner's philosophical anthropology, by an ethical redemption of 
the ontological which is so prevalent in Rahner's thought. 
What is to be avoided, however, is a too simple identification of Rahner with 
Levinas, such that Rabner becomes Levinas, or Levinas becomes Rabner. Both are 
different, and any attempt to interpret each reductively in terms of the other would 
preclude the further possibilities which reflection on their work might offer. All we seek 
to do is show how, despite their differences, and perhaps because of their differences, 
one can hear themes in each which are consonant with the other, and, having heard, 
6 See J B Metz, Christliche Anthropozentrik: Ober die Denkform des 
Thomas von Aquin, p.23 
7 J Splett, art. cit., p.257 
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open avenues by which each can be advanced into areas where they might otherwise not 
go. 
Undertaking such an enterprise involves a re-reading, or, what has come to be 
called a deconstruction. This is not, however, to be understood as a negative enterprise 
which violently and systematically takes what an author wrote apart. Rather, as 
Druscilla Cornell points out,8 deconstruction is a 'philosophy of the limit' which operates 
by 'refocussing attention on the limits constraining philosophical understanding' and 
'exposes the quasi-transcendental conditions that establish any system,' thereby avoiding 
the reduction of the philosophical tradition to 'an "unreconstructable" litter.' 
Such a re-reading which draws attention to framework limits so as to go beyond 
them is in-keeping with both Rahner and Levinas. It is to attempt what Rahner himself, 
deconstructively, attempted in Geist in Welt, where, confronting Thomas and Kant, he 
wrote of the need 'to salvage the eternal in a philosophy from the irrelevance of merely 
what has been.'9 In his Introduction to Geist in Welt, Rahner writes that 
'[i]f it is absolutely necessary, then, to begin with the starting point given 
by Thomas and to abandon one's self again and again to the dynamism 
of the matter itself so that historically accessible fragments of his 
philosophy can really become philosophy, it is naturally inevitable that 
such starting points given by Thomas will be pushed further by one's 
own thought.' 10 
He goes on to say, by way of defence against commentators of Thomas, that his work 
will not be a simple historical commentary on Thomas, but will try 'to relive the 
philosophical event itself in Thomas' .11 The approach of Levinas is similar for in his 
8 D Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, (London: Routledge, 1992), p.1 
9 K Rahner, Spirit in the World, Wm Dych (tr), (London: Shlted & Ward, v\ 
1968, p.li) 
10 ibid., p. l 
11 ibid., p. Ii 
J B Metz, in his foreword to Spirit in the World, stresses that Rahner's work, 
though faithful to tradition, is not a 'repristination, a merely invigorated repetition of 
historical findings' (xiv) but 'mediates itself precisely through its own origin' (xiv). 
Rahner himself distinguishes his task from that of the commentators, when he writes, 
'This work intends to present one part of the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge .... By 
the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge we mean the tea~hing of Thomas Aquinas 
himself. We presume the right, therefore, to try to understand him from his own 
writings, without appealing to his commentators and the testimony of his school, and 
without going into the historical origins of his doctrine' (xlix). Whether or not Rahner 
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own doctoral thesis on the Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, he writes 
that he 'would like to study and present Husserl's philosophy as one studies and presents 
a living philosophy,' 12 immersing himself in it in order to come face to face with the 
same 'things' which Husserl addresses. Derrida perhaps suggests the same when, 
quoting Merleau-Ponty, he writes, 
'Communication in literature is not the simple appeal on the part of the 
writer to meanings which would be part of an a priori of the min~ 
rather, communication arouses these meanings in the mind through 
enticement and a kind of oblique action. The writer's thought does not 
control his language from without; the writer is himself a new kind of 
idiom, constructing itself.r1 3 
The event of writing, says Derrida, i~ inaugu.ral, for 'it does not know where it is going, 
no knowledge can keep it from the essential precipitation towards the meaning that it 
constitutes and that is, primarily, its future.' 14 Taking Rahner, as writer, as 'a new kind 
of idiom,' the task is to try to relive the inaugu.ral philosophical event itself in Rahner. 
Derrida, justifying his own method, provides some initial methodological 
guidance. '[T]he writer writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system, laws 
and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely.' 15 In a critical reading, 
therefore, one must recognise the governance of the system within which writing occurs 
is faithful, as Metz maintains, to the 'teaching of Thomas Aquinas himself is another 
question. When Geist in Welt was presented as his doctoral thesis at Freiburg in 1936, 
it was rejected by M Honecker, his promoter, as not representing the authentic thought 
of Aquinas. For a fuller treatment, see Cornelio Fabro's La svolta antropologica di Karl 
Rabner, Milan 1974 which views Rahner as a radical deformer of Thomas (deformator 
thomisticus radicalis). However, whether or not Rahner properly gains the philosophical 
event in Thomas which he seeks is not the question here. Geist in Welt marks the initial 
articulation of Rahner's own philosophical thinking; it is this thinking which calls for 
scrutiny. 
12 E Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology. Andre 
Orianne (tr.), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. xxxiii 
13 Jacques Derrida, Force and Signification, in Writing and Difference, 
Chicago, 1978, p.11; (from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'An Unpublished Text', tr Arleen 
B Ballery, in 'The Primacy of Perception', ed James M Edie (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964), pp.8-9. Text first published in Revue de metaphysique et 
Morale, Oct-Dec, 1962) 
14 ibid., p.11 
15 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (tr), 
(London: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 158 
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for '[t]he person writing is inscribed in a determinate textual system,' 16 and one 'must 
always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he 
commands and what he does not command of the patterns of language that he uses,' 17 
in order to produce the 'signifying structure.' To produce a signifying structure is not to 
reproduce 'by the effaced and respectful doubling of commentary, the conscious, 
voluntary, intentional relationship that the writer institutes in his exchanges with the 
history to which he belongs.' 18 Although such a 'doubling commentary' has its place in 
critical reading, it 'has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading.' 19 Yet, one 
must remain within the text, for it is the only referent to which we can legitimately 
relate. 'There is no outside text (ii n'y a pas de hors-texte)'20 which acts as a vantage 
point from which to understand the text. '[R]eading must be intrinsic and remain within 
the text.'21 What commentary aims at is not simply the preservation of the self-identity 
of the text; it also 'leaps over the text towards its presumed content in the direction of 
the pure signified. '22 
With regard to Rahner, the task is firstly, therefore, to recognise the language 
and logic which provides the context for Rahner's own particular discourse, but which, 
as con-text not only provides a supporting framework for his theological enterprise, but 
also a limit within which his thought is constrained. It is to recognise that Rahner 
operates with a transcendental philosophy, founded on a variety of ontological and 
epistemological presuppositions, which, in large degree, dictate the direction and 
manner in which his thought proceeds. The human subject is conceived as an 
intellectual dynamism towards the horizon of Being which presents itself in its inherent 
knowability to a knowing subject. The model is thus one of a centrally situated ego 
cogito surrounded at each turn by an ontological horizon against which objects are 
perceived and understood and in terms of which they derive significance. 
16 ibid, p.160 




21 ibid., p.159 
22 ibid. 
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However, remaining within the text, it is also to recognise elements within 
Rahner's thought which strain against the constraint of his structure and place it in 
question. For example - and negatively - , although a titular concern in Spirit in the 
World, it seems that the significance of the world, even though a positive determination 
of finite spirit, gets passed over. Just as Heidegger criticised the metaphysical tradition 
which preceded him for its tendency to understand the phenomenon of the world either 
in terms of 'the ontical depiction of entities within the world or in terms of an 
'ontological Interpretation of their Being, and so 'passed over' the phenomenon of 
worldhood, Rahner seems to operate with an ontical understanding of the world, 
neglecting its pre-ontological existentiell signification, and so the ontologico-existential 
concept the worldhood of the world seems similarly to be passed over.23 Rahner's world 
seems to be merely notional, and there is little trace or taste of what Levinas will term 
the 'elemental' world of enjoyment, far less any significance attached to it. More 
significantly, however, the world of Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word seems 
sadly an un-peopled, impersonal world. Against this background, Rahner's later 
reflections on mystery and the fulfilment of the human person in a loving relationship 
with his neighbour seem to be excessive with respect to his own transcendental system, 
grounded as it is within an ontological framework. 
Returning to the notion of Denkform, H Egan, in his consideration of The 
Spiritual Exercises and the lgnatian Mystical Horizon24 speaks of the mystical horizon 
which informs Ignatius' way of reflection, and situates Rahner within such a horizon. 
In so doing, there is the implicit acknowledgement that, insofar as lgnatian spirituality 
informs Rahner's way of thinking, it provides a wider Denkform within which Rahners 
ontological and transcendental Denkform is situated, and thus Rahner might be said to 
be already beyond his own framework. Rahner himself speaks of the wider influence 
of Ignatius of Loyola on his thinking, 
'I do think that in comparison with other philosophy and theology that 
influenced me, Ignatian spirituality was indeed more significant and 
important... I think that the spirituality of Ignatius himself, which one 
learned through the practice of prayer and religious formation, was more 
significant for me than all learned philosophy and theology inside and 
23 See M Heidegger, Being and Time, J McQuarrie & E Robinson (trs.), 
(London: Harper & Row, 1962), pp 91-94 
24 See H Egan, The Spiritual Exercises and the lgnatian Mystical Horizon, 
(St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1976), p.14-17 
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outside the order.'25 
In fact, acknowledging the work of H Egan just mentioned, he remarks that, besides his 
"transcendental theology", one of the ideas which is very important to him is 'the logic 
of concrete individual knowledge in Ignatius Loyola' which is 'basically and typically 
Jesuit' but which the traditional type of fundamental theology written by Jesuits 
neglected. '[T]he scholastic Jesuit theologians did not use the greatest and most 
important riches from the Spiritual Exercises to fertilise their own theology. Instead, 
they presupposed some sort of essential and rational theory of knowledge as the only 
possible one and didn't realise that Ignatius had taught them something entirely 
different.'26 Rahner recognised in Ignatius the attempt to express thematically, 
systematically and formally a thought and logic which was not the profane logic of 
Aristotelian philosophy, but what Egan terms a 'lived supernatural logic' which is 
implicit in the lives and actions of all people insofar as human life is ultimately an 
experience of transcendence towards a,P( term or an alterity which is excessive to the self C\ 
and which disturbs and disrupts that profane logic which accompanies everyday living. 
If one might advert to Levinas, it is a logic which cuts across 'the logic of contradiction' 
'where the other of A is the non-A, the negation of A, but also across dialectical logic, 
where the same dialectically participates in and is reconciled with the other in the Unity 
of the system.'27 The logic of unquenchable Desire which regulates the relationship with 
Infinity is othetwise. With regard to Ignatius, Rahner asks whether there is 'for Ignatius 
a fundamental evidence and certainty which is presupposed by the various rules and 
techniques for the Discernment of Spirits and which performs the same function as the 
first principles of logic and ontology do for the rest of knowledge and which, distinct 
from the rules, makes them possible, so that they are the application and regulated 
putting into practice of this fundamental certitude? The rules would thus represent as 
25 K Rahner in an interview with Leo O'Donovan, Karl Rahner at 75 years 
of Age, for America Magazine, 10 March, 1979, in Karl Rahner in Dialogue: 
Conversations and Interviews 1965-1982, (New York: Crossroads, 1986), p.191 
26 ibid., p.196 
27 E Levinas, T·otality and Infinity, A Lingis (tr.), (The Hague: M Nijhoff, 
1979), p. l 50 
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it were a supernatural logic and themselves refer back to their own "first principle" .'28 
Key to this supernatural logic is consolation without previous cause (consolaci6n sin 
causa precedente),29 which is outwith 'the rest of knowledge' grounded in the first 
principles of logic and ontology, and which has its own intrinsic evidence. The point is 
that thought has its own context or horizon within which it unfolds, and its own point 
of departure from which it proceeds. For Ignatius, his thinking was in the context of a 
mystical horizon, 'an utterly basic experience which became ever more explicit and 
active throughout his life,' namely 'the intrinsic link between his own mystery as man 
and the mystery of God in Jesus Christ.'3° For the lgnatian Denkform, consolation 
without previous cause constitutes the key experience within this mystical horizon. But, 
what does consolation without previous cause mean? Ignatius himself writes in Exercise 
330: 'without any previous perception or knowledge of any object from which such 
consolation might come to the soul through its own acts of intellect and will',31 which 
Rahner interprets as 'without conceptual object.'32 Egan comments, 
'We maintain, therefore, that if a consolation is given in such a way that 
it was not previously asked for, that it is out of proportion to "what I 
want and desire," that it transcends the grace expected from the 
meditation at hand, and draws the exercitant wholly into God's love, then 
we have the consolation without previous cause .... God alone enters, 
renders the specific meditation at hand transparent (hence, "without 
conceptual object") and draws the exercitant beyond what he wants and 
desires, entirely into His love. We understand the Ignatian "without 
previous cause," therefore, to mean a consolation which totally 
transcends the "what I want and desire" of a particular meditation, a 
disproportionate consolation which God alone can cause.'33 
28 K Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, Burns & Oates, London, 
1964, p.130 (Originally, Das Dynamische in der Kirche, Herder, Freiburg) 
29 Cf. Exercises, 336, where Ignatius writes, 'It belongs to God alone to give 
consolation without previous cause, for it belongs to the Creator to enter into the soul, 
to leave it, and to act upon it, drawing it wholly to the love of his Divine Majesty. I say, 
without previous cause, that is, without any previous perception or knowledge of any 
object from which such consolation might come to the soul through its own acts of 
intellect and will.' · 
30 H Egan, op. cit., p.29 
31 See K Rahner, Dynamic Element, p.132 
32 ibid., p.133-4, n.28 
33 H Egan, op. cit., p.35 
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In other words, the key lgnatian experience and an experience from which Rahner's 
thought takes its origin is the experience of the Absolute who, excessive and 
disproportionate to any subjective power, draws close with the consolation of his grace. 
What I hope to be able to indicate is that such elements within Rahner's writing 
can act as a 'blind spot' (tache aveugle) or scotoma34 and can provide a point of entry as 
well as un point de depart for his thinking other than the philosophical propaedeutic of 
the transcendental framework outlined in Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word 
which usually provides the initial chapters of works which consider Rahner and which 
is presented as the foundation of his other works. One need only note the way in which 
works on Rahner unfold from an initial consideration of the structure and method of his 
thought in Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word and then move on to a 
consideration of specific theological themes. While this may be perfectly 
understandable from a methodological point of view, it carries the danger of allowing 
the structure of Rahner's thought to dominate and act as the backdrop or horizon of 
understanding for whatever else he has written to the neglect of the fact that the actual 
method or style often subverts methodology, as Charles Reed in his work on method in 
Levinas indicates.35 What is being advocated here is a counter movement which would 
indicate the way in which specific elements in his thought, such as the concept of 
mystery and the love of neighbour, loosed from their structural confinement, enable a 
more fruitful reading of Rahner. 
A brief survey of the more accessible presentations of Rahner's thought in 
English serves to illustrate the point. For example, Louis Roberts states quite bluntly 
34 In a chapter entitled, ' ... That Dangerous Supplement ... ' in Of 
Grammatology, Derrida views the notion of 'supplement' in Rousseau's writing as 'a sort 
of blind spot' around which his text is organised. 'In certain respects,' he writes, 'the 
theme of supplementarity is certainly no more than one theme among others. It is in a 
chain .. . But it happens that this theme describes the chain itself. ... [f]he concept of the 
supplement and the theory of writing designate textuality itself in Rousseau's text...' 
(p.163). The notion of the 'blind spot' finds its counterpart in transcendental thinking 
also. B. Lonergan, in Insight. A Study of Human Understanding, London, 1973, 
employs the notion of scotosis for the unconscious aberration which occurs in human 
understanding, and the resulting blind spot a scotoma (pp.191-92). 
35 See C W Reed, The Problem of Method in the Philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas, Ph.D thesis, 1983, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International), and 
Levinas' Question in Face to Face with Levinas, R Cohen (ed.), (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1986), pp.73-82 
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that 'to understand Rahner's hermeneutics is to understand his theology'36 for his 
hermeneutics 'really do knit the scattered published works of this theologian into a tight 
system' and 'it is almost impossible to separate philosophical principles from theological 
conclusions.'37 Further, '[u]ltimately, any theology will only be as valid as the 
philosophy that gives rise to it.' Francis Fiorenza, in his Introduction, sees Spirit in the 
World as providing 'the unifying principle and presupposition of Rabner's whole 
theology'38 and the 'source' of Rabner's theological synthesis39 which becomes the 
concrete and practical development and application of the 'formal outlines and abstract 
structures' of Spirit in the World, and which 'can only be adequately understood when 
Spirit in the World is understood.'4° Karl-Heinz Weger adopts a similar approach, saying 
that the transcendental method, more than his anthropological approach, clearly 
determines his thinking, that the transcendental method 'can always be found in 
theology,'41 and that future theology will be 'even more explicitly a transcendental 
theology.'42 The same development in presentation is given by George Vass, who 
outlines the flow of the chapters in the first volume of his book on understanding 
Rabner: 
'a concise statement of Christian faith as proposed by Rabner (1 ), the 
subsoil of which is, and is meant to be, a philosophical theology (2). 
From this the knowing subject (3) is opened up to its preeminent object 
( 4-5) whose eventual revelation he is obliged to hear (6). In this new 
36 Louis Roberts, The Achievement of Karl Rabner, (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1967), p.8 
37 One would want to argue, on the contrary, following Maurice Blanchot's 
question on the nature of a fragment, that the great value of Rahner's work is the 
scattered and fragmentary nature of so much of it, and the fact that he has turned away 
from an attempt at systematisation. See Maurice Blanchot, L'Entretien Infini, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1969), p.451 ff. 
38 Francis Fiorenza, Introduction to Spirit in the World, 'Karl Rahner and 
the Kantian Problematic,' (London: Sheed & Ward, 1968), p.xix 
39 ibid., p.xlv 
40 ibid., p.xx 
41 Karl-Heinz Weger, Karl Rahner: an Introduction to his Theology, 
(London: Burns & Oates, 1980), pp.17-18 
42 ibid., p.18 
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awareness he is called to believe in the Mystery that is God' (7).43 
Vass begins with Rahner's statement of faith and, following an ontological excursion 
through Being, ends up in the affirmation of Mystery. Yet, while Vass is right to situate 
Rahner's philosophical enterprise in the context of his formulations of Christian belief, 
and while he acknowledges that 'Rahner's philosophy cannot be treated in 
isolation ... [but] ... is integrated into the entirety of his thought to the extent that much of 
his later theological position can only be understood in the light of his philosophical 
work, and vice versa, '44 he nevertheless sees the thinking of Spirit in the World as a 
philosophical prolegomena to Rahner's overall project, failing to give due consideration 
to the fact that Rahner's formulae of faith are by way of response to the mystery which 
has already and always drawn close to the human person in the experience of grace. His 
thought seems to be presented as an intellectus which ends up in _fides, rather than a 
fides quaerens intellectum. 
The very first line of Thomas Sheehan's doctoral thesis presents itself as an 
investigation of 'subjectivity and transcendental method as the two bases of Karl 
Rahner's theological anthropology.'45 Later, in Karl Rahner: The Philosophical 
Foundations, 'a critical examination of [Spirit in the World] with a particular focus on 
Rahner's debts to and arguments against the thought of Martin Heidegger,'46 Sheehan 
exhaustively and somewhat exhaustingly presents Rahner's philosophical foundations 
almost solely in terms of Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word with little attempt 
to show that reflections on specific themes throughout Rahner's many articles might 
have any philosophical significance in his thought. Throughout the entire book, 
Sheehan's only direct references to Rahner's other works are drawn almost exclusively 
43 George Vass, A Theologian in Search of a Philosophy: Understanding 
Karl Rahner, Vol. 1, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1985), p.xiii 
44 ibid., p.19 
Vass, unfortunately, does not address the significance of vice-versa. 
45 T J Sheehan, Subjectivity and Transcendental Method as the 
Fundamental Groundwork of Karl Rahner's Theological Anthropology, Ph.D. thesis, 
Fordham University, 1971, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms) 
46 idem, Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1987), p. l 
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from 'The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Heidegger.'47 There is a further quote, 
referring to Heidegger, taken from 'The Passion and Asceticism.'48 a single reference to 
both 'Aquinas: The Nature of Truth,'49 and 'Theology and Anthropology,'50 and two 
references to 'Thomas Aquinas on the Incomprehensibility of God,' 51 dealing, in part, 
with philosophical scepticism. 
Sheehan interestingly, in the context of this latter article, speaks of Rahner's 
'movement beyond the ontological... to the theological... - a strategy that stays within 
the parameters of ousiology,'52 a philosophy of substance, and notes that Rahner's 
'retrieval of the unsaid in Aquinas puts some pressure on the ousiological seams of the 
transcendental garment in which Rahner wraps the Angelic Doctor,'53 which 'gives rise 
to the question about pressure on the ousiological seams.' 54 Thus, Sheehan can ask 
'[d]oes Rahner tear the garment and surpass ousiology?'55 Unfortunately, Sheehan does 
not really develop this question other than in the final pages when, quoting from 
Foundations of Christian Faith, he writes that 'Rahner's later shift from the language of 
beingness to that of mystery seems to me to represent far more than a rhetorical 
strategy; it is rather a rending of the ousiological garment, a surrender of its language 
and viewpoint in order to attempt to find words adequate to an insight that transcends 
the metaphysical experience. Rahner's break with metaphysics is, to be sure, neither 
47 K Rahner, 'The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Heidegger,' A 
Tallon (tr.), in Philosophy Today, 13 (1969) (First published in French in Recherches 
de Sciences Religieuses, 30 (1940), pp.152-71) 
48 idem, 'The Passion and Asceticism' in TI, III 
49 idem, 'Aquinas: The Nature of Truth', in Continuwn II (1964) 
50 idem, 'Theology and Anthropology' in The Word in History T P Burke 
(ed.), (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966) 
51 idem, 'Thomas Aquinas on the Incomprehensibility of God', a lecture 
delivered at the University of Chicago, Nov 8, 1974 
52 T J Sheehan, Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations, p.227 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid., p.228 
55 ibid. 
INTRODUCTION XXIV 
clean nor consistent.' 56 Sheehan point, out that Rahner does speak of 'infinity' or 'infinite (>J 
actuality' in reference to the 'mysterious incomprehensibility of the God of faith,' but 
asks whether 'these [are] the careless slips of a theologian who is not fully aware of 
when his philosophy edges beyond ousiology, and when it falls back into it?' 57 Again, 
the question is not answered, nor is its possible significance for Rahner's philosophy 
addressed. 
While accepting the methodological convenience of first presenting the 
framework and then applying it to the wider interests of Rahner's theology, what is 
being argued in this thesis is that such an approach is blind to the deeper significance 
of Rahner's theology, namely that it is not so much a maieutic which, beginning with 
the subject, finally arrives at incomprehensible mystery, but rather is, like human 
existence itself, a response to that mysterious other, which Levinas will speak of as 
'otherwise than being,' 'otherwise than knowledge,' which has always and already drawn 
close to the subject as grace and glory. I use the term 'blind' in two regards; firstly, 
insofar as it indicates something seen but not recognised, a sight frustrated by the 
structure of vision; secondly, however, blind in a more positive sense which gives 
attention to the paradox of proximity, whereby the Other, escaping any focal point, is 
both too close and too distant. If sight is 'contact at a distance'58 and belongs to a 
philosophy of presence and possession, then a 'blind spot', when sight fails, gives a way 
beyond an ontology of understanding towards a metaphysical relationship with the 
Other.59 
56 ibid., p.313 
57 ibid. 
58 Maurice Blanchot uses the phrase 'contact at a distance' in The Space of 
Literature Anne Smock (tr.), (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p.32, to 
describe the relationship between subject and object in terms of vision. Levinas, in 
Existence and Existents, Alphonso Lingis, (tr.) (The Hague: M Nijhoff, 1978) employs 
the phrase 'possession at a distance', thereby stressing the appropriating tendency of the 
subject with regard to objects which fall under its gaze (p.46). 
59 Levinas distinguishes ontology and metaphysics. Ontology, 'a reduction 
of the other to the same by the interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures 
the comprehension of being,' has been the feature of western metaphysics, and, to the 
extent that Rahner's theory is 'theory as comprehension of being', he remains within the 
ontological tradition. Levinas proposes, in place of ontology, a metaphysics which does 
not reduce alterity to the same, but, with critical intention, respects exteriority and calls 
into question the appropriating power of the same. Such a critique is metaphysics, 
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Now, thought as an excessus beyond ontology towards what is other than the 
world of Being is the dominant theme in the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas, 
in his preface writes that Totality and Infinity 'presents itself as a defence of 
subjectivity .160 This is achieved, however, not by an original consideration of the self 
and its consciousness which thereafter opens on to exteriority, but by asserting the 
'philosophical primacy of infinity'61 or the priority of the Other. This is not to abandon 
philosophy and its historical concerns of subjectivity, knowledge and truth; rather it is 
to found them in the already given and lived experience of the relationship with the 
other. It is to affirm exteriority as the basis of subjective interiority. 'The ethical relation, 
opposed to first philosophy which identifies freedom and power, is not contrary to truth; 
it goes unto being in its absolute exteriority, and accomplishes the very intention that 
animates the movement unto truth.'62 It is precisely in the relationship with the other 
person that philosophy is confounded, and yet enabled to go beyond its limits, by being 
attentive to its proper origin. Henceforth, the situation in which 'the subject is origin, 
initiative, freedom, present'63 is reversed such that subjectivity is to be appreciated as 
'welcoming the Other, as hospitality. 164 
But this is to re-think the task of philosophy. If, formerly, philosophy's proper 
task was viewed as the return to the origins of the self within consciousness, now 
philosophy's proper task is its reflection on what is other. Thought is not to be viewed 
in terms of adequation to an object. Consciousness is no longer to be defined in terms 
of an intentionality which is fulfilled in the possession and representation of the object. 
Signification is not in the gift of the subject. The essential relationship with alterity is 
'transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same ... the ethics that accomplishes 
the critical essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, metaphysics 
precedes ontology' (TI, pp.42-43). Further, insofar as the relationship with Being is 
always by way of an (ethical) relationship with an existent other, 'ontology presupposes 
metaphysics' (ibid., p.48). 
What is being argued here is that Rahner's real intention is not so much an 
ontology, as Levinas understands it, but a metaphysics in Levinas' sense of the term. 
60 E Levinas, Tl, p.26 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid., p.47 
63 idem, OB, p.78 
64 idem, Tl, p.27 
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pre-eminently a non-adequation in which what is thought is always in excess of the 
capacity of thinking. But '[t]o contain more than one's capacity is to shatter at every 
moment the framework of a content that is thought, to cross the barriers of immanence'65 
into an exteriority which is its own signification and sense, into a transcendence which, 
with respect to the subject, maintains itself as absolute and other. 
Now, this need, which Levinas recognises, to leave behind the confinement of 
the island of interiority and affirm the philosophical primacy of exteriority has parallels 
with the transcendental project undertaken by Joseph Marechal and pursued by Karl 
Rahner who comments that in the experiences of everyday life 'man is forever occupied 
with the grains of sand along the shore where he dwells at the edge of the infinite ocean 
of mystery.'66 Responding to the Kantian Critique of the possibility of metaphysics and 
the seeming impossibility of affirming an objectivity absolute with respect to the 
subject, that is, the impossibility of the ontological affirmation of the object, Marechal, 
by considering the dynamism inherent within the intellect, seeks to attain a 
transcendental deduction of the ontological affirmation, saying that, unless this 1s 
possible, 'nous demeurons, de droit confines a l'interieur du sujet comme tel, nous 
sommes emmures dans le "relatif', et aucun artifice de demonstration ne nous permettra 
de ''Jeter un pont" vers l'exterieur et l'absolu. '67 In other words, subjective interiority, 
as Levinas will want to show, finds its foundation and defence in the absolute exteriority 
of alterity. For Marechalian realism, the affirmation of the ontological reality of the 
object is essential, for it is the a priori which conditions all acts of affirmation, 
preceding thought and action, although known only a posteriori through reflective 
analysis. Unless there is an ontological affirmation of the object, the subject remains 
hopelessly bound up within the confines of its own interiority, and from this follows the 
Cartesian problematic of bridging the gap between a thinking subject and an external 
world. If the Absolute has not already 'placed its mark on the basic tendency of our 





K Rahner, The Experience of God Today, p.159 
J Marechal, Le Point, I, p.12; V, p.14 
68 idem, A propos du sentiment de presence chez !es profanes et chez !es 
mvstiques, in Etudes sur la psychologie des mvstiques. Tome fer, (Paris and Bruges: 
Editions Universelles, 1924), p.120 
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absolute being, truth and goodness is without foundation. For Marechal, then, the 
absolute reality of the object is not simply a postulate of theoretical reason, but 
'intervenes, as internal condition of possibility, in the same constitution of the object 
necessary to our knowledge.'69 Rahner, building on Marechal and employing a 
Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge recognises the subject-object divide as a false 
problematic. The problem 'does not lie in bridging the gap between knowing and object 
by a "bridge" of some gap: such a "gap" is merely a pseudo-problem.'70 Before any 
knowledge - the mark of subjectivity - there is the situation of always and already 
finding oneself in the exteriority of the world in sensibility. 'It is not [therefore] a 
question of "bridging" a gap, but of understanding how the gap is possible at all.'71 
Now, for Marechal, the absolute exteriority of the other - the ontological 
affirmation - is attained by a consideration of judgement as affirmation; for Rahner, it 
is reached through a consideration of the interrogative impulse of the finite spirit. In 
both, however, the absolute is affirmed in terms of Being. What is lacking in the 
transcendental framework employed both by Marechal and Rahner - a lack or lacuna 
acknowledged by Marechal - is the personal other in the presence of whom, as 
interlocutor, questions are raised, and before whom judgement has significance. With 
Van de Wiele one can ask 'si l'etre-au-dehors-de-soi-meme, l'etre-au-monde, en un mot 
la 'transcendance', ne constituent pas le propre de /'esprit fini en tant que tel.'72 Such 
an understanding of the human subject which would recognise the intersubjective, 
relational and finite nature of human existence would be more in-keeping with the thrust 
of contemporary philosophy which stresses that it is this 'being-with-others', where 'the 
other' is appreciated as a 'personal other', which represents 'une structure totalement 




idem, Le Point, III, p.306; Cf. Le jugement, p.281 
K Rahner, SW, p.75 
K Rahner, SW, p.75 
72 J Vande Wiele, Metaphysique et pensee contemporaine: etude critique, 
in Revuephilosophique de Louvain, 61 (1963), p.107 
73 ibid., p.106 
One should note that the intersubjective dimension was recognised by Marechal 
himself towards the end of Cahier V of Le point de depart de la Metaphvsique when he 
identified certain lacunae in his work, namely, the 'metaconceptual' and 'irrepresentable' 
aspects of human experience, and the personal dimension of life. He wrote, 'L'etre 
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pr~ferable de rechercher l'Absolu par la mediation d'une description complete et 
minutieuse de !'esprit humaine dans sa totale densite et dans ses rapports avec le monde 
et avec autrui.'74 It is in Levinas that absolute exteriority is personalised in a relation 
which is first and foremost ethical, and in respect of which the language and logic of 
Being is neither adequate nor appropriate. It is this fact which is key to understanding 
the development of this present work: in Levinas the absolute is an ethical absolute. 
This ethical absolute is not attained by way of Being as the fruit of a further ontological 
reflection, as if there were first ontology and then ethics. Ethics is always and already 
otherwise than being or beyond being. It is not farther away than Being, as if one could 
describe the arc of Being, beyond which knowledge cannot travel, but rather, being's 
other, or otherwise than being, an ethical other dimension outwith the three-dimensional 
ontological structure within which thought operates, an other which thereby contests the 
privilege of ontology. 
intellectuel est une "personne" et ne peut satisfaire d'une Fin supreme qui serait 
seulement "Chose" d posseder: si Dieu est notre Fin derniere, ii semble devoir l'etre en 
tant que ''personnel". Mais, de personne d personne, la seule relation susceptible de 
comb/er !es aspirations profondes est le don reciproque et fibre de l'amitie (p.607-608). 
Rahner, too, throughout his theological writings speaks of the centrality of the 
personal; other in human development. Human nature is 'a multidimensional, dynamic 
reality, realising itself only when turning lovingly to another person' (The 
Commandment of Love in relation to the Other Commandments, in TI, 5, p.441), and, 
'a priori openness to the other human being belongs essentially to man's 
transcendentality' (Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of 
God, in TI, 6, p.23 7). 
The important point is not that the intersubjective dimension to human existence 
is neglected by Rahner, or by Marechal for that matter, but that, within the 
transcendental structure of their thought, it appears as secondary, if not accidental, to 
the intellect's relation to absolut~ being. 
74 Vande Wiele, op.cit., p.104 
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0. 2 Biographical Details 
As the principal thinkers in this thesis may well be new and unfamiliar to the 
reader, some biographical details will serve to situate them: 
Joseph Marechal 
Joseph Marechal was born on 1st July, 1878 at Charleroi, Belgium, where he 
received his schooling at the Jesuit College du Sacre Creur. After entering the Society 
of Jesus in 1895, he began his philosophical studies at the Jesuit Scholasticate in 
Louvain in 1898. Rather than continue philosophical studies for a fourth year, he turned 
his attention to biology, completing a Ph.D in that subject at Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, Louvain. Marechal was ordained in 1908 and began thereafter, in 1910, to teach 
biology and experimental psychology at the Jesuit scholasticate in Louvain. While a 
refugee in England during the war years with some Jesuit students, he began work on 
the various Cahiers of Le Point de depart de la metaphysique, which continued 
following his return to Belgium in the autumn of 1915. Work was also begun then on 
his Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics. Cahiers L IL and III were published during 
1922-23, and the influential Cahier V, Le Thomisme devant la philosophie critique, 
which confronted Aquinas and Kant, appeared in 1926. Cahier IV was published 
posthumously. 
Marechal died, aged 66, at Louvain on December 11th, 1944. 
Karl Rahner 
Karl Rahner was born on 5th March, 1904 at Freiburg im Breisgau, West 
Germany, where he received his primary and secondary school education at the 
Rea/gymnasium. In 1922, he entered the Society of Jesus at the Jesuit Novitiate in 
Feldkirch/V oralberg, Austria. From 1924-27, he pursued his philosophical studies at the 
Jesuit philosophates at Feldkirch and Pullach (near Munich), spent 2 years teaching at 
the Jesuit house of studies in Feldkirch-Tisis, before undertaking theological studies at 
the Jesuit theologate in Valkenberg, Holland, from 1929-1933. On July 26th, 1932, he 
was ordained a priest. After a final year of Jesuit formation, he began his doctoral 
. studies in philosophy in l 934at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau, where, under 
the direction of Martin Honecker, he wrote and defended his thesis, Geist in Welt, in 
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1936. The thesis was rejected as not being a true interpretation of Thomas. He continued 
doctoral studies in theology at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, and in December 
of 1936, received the degree of Doctor of Theology from the University of Innsbruck. 
Following his Habilitation, he began his university teaching career as lecturer in 
dogmatic theology at the University of Innsbruck. Various academic positions followed. 
From 1939-44, he lectured in Vienna; from 1945-48, he was professor of 
dogmatic theology at the Jesuit theologate in Pullach, before returning, in 1948, to the 
theology faculty at Innsbruck where, in 1949, he became professor of dogma and the 
history of dogma. Recognition of his theological value was recognised when he became 
a peritus at the Second Vatican Council. In 1964, he moved to the University of Munich 
to become professor of Christian Philosophy and the Philosophy of Religion, and, then, 
in 1967, professor of dogma and the history of dogma on the Faculty of Catholic 
theology at the University of Miinster/Westfalen. 1969 saw him become a member of 
the Papal Theological Commission. 
Karl Rahner died soon after his 80th birthday on 30th March, 1984, m 
Innsbruck. 
Rahner's publications are many and varied, perhaps the most well-known being 
the sixteen volwne Schriften zur Theologie, spanning 1954-1984, translated as 
Theological Investigations in 22 volwnes. The reader is referred to the list of 
abbreviations and bibliography for a full list of works used in this work. 
Emmanuel Levinas 
Emmanuel Levinas was born on January 12th, 1906 in Kovno, Lithuania into an 
orthodox Jewish family. During the First World War, the family emigrated to Karkov 
in the Ukraine. In 1923, he went to Strasbourg, France, where he began his 
philosophical studies, and where he met Maurice Blanchot. Like Rahner some six years 
later, he spent 1928-1929 at Freiburg-im-Breisgau to follow courses offered by Husserl 
and Heidegger, and where, in 1930, he completed his thesis on The Theory of Intuition 
in the Phenomenology of Husserl. Also in 1930, he became a French citizen. During the 
war years, he was a prisoner in a German prisoner of war camp, and, although Jewish, 
was protected by his French uniform. Following the war, he was part of the circle which 
gathered around le College philosophique, which had been founded and was animated 
by Jean Wahl, the significance of which Alain Finkielkraut describes in La sagesse de 
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/'amour: 
'Au lendemain de la Liberation, Jean Wahl jonde, d Paris, rue de la 
Montaigne-Sainte-Genevieve, le College philosophique. Cette 
institution, aujourd'hui completement oubliee, fut, pendant quelques 
annees, le lieu de la pensee vivante en France. S'y donnaient d entendre, 
en effet, des discours non academiques, des recherches nouvelles, des 
prospections risquees qui n 'avaient leur place ni dans l'Universite, ni 
dans /es grandes revues de plus en plus mobilisees pas le combats du 
temps. 
II faut que representer ce college comme une sorte d'espace 
preserve de tous /es conformismes, une enclave soustraite d la tyrannie 
naissante de la politique en meme temps ~u'ajfranchie d'une tradition 
philosophique pusillanime et somnolente ... '7 
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It was in such a philosophicc:..l climate that Levinas emerged, though, as 
Finkielkraut points out, outwith this circle, his words found hardly an echo in the post 
war philosophical debate, and it was some 30 years later, that this 'discrete and 
demanding philosopher' was more generally known. In 194 7, Levinas was named 
director of L'Ecole Normale Israelite Orientale. In 1961, he became a professor at the 
University of Poi tiers, and in 1967, professor at the University of Nanterre. In 1973, he 
was named a professor at the Sorbonne. 
Levinas outlines the various influences which formed his own thinking, making 
the point that '[ujne pensee philosoplzique repose sur des experiences 
prephilosophiques', 76 of which Fran9ois Poirie, in conversation with Levinas, identifies 
three. 
Firstly, literary influences: asked what it was that led him to philosophy, Levinas 
responds, 
'Je pense que ce sont d'abord mes lectures russes. C'est precisement 
Pouchkine, Lermontov et Dostoievski, surtout Dostoievski. Le roman 
russe, le roman de Dostoievski et de Tolstoi, me paraissait tres 
preoccupe des choses fondamentales. Livres traverses par l'inquietitude, 
par /'essential, l'inquietitude religieuse, mais lisible comme quete du 
sens de la vie. m 
Secondly, the Hebrew Bible, especially Talmudic texts and Rabbinical 
75 A Finkielkraut, La sagesse de /'amour, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), p.15 
76 Fran9ois Poirie, Emmanuel Levinas: Qui etes-vous? (Lyons: La 
Manufacture, 1987), p.10 
77 ibid., 69 
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commentary. Sean Hand78 notes that 'the fact of revelation (which has been contrasted 
with reason ever since the mediaeval writings of Saadya, often called the father of 
Jewish philosophy) leads Levinas to present the Bible as the model of ethical 
transcendental philosophy.' In his own introduction to Du Sacre au Saint79 when 
speaking of the relation of the oral Torah to the written Torah, Levinas writes; 'La Thora 
orale parle 'en esprit et en verite', meme quand elltsemble triturer des versets et des (/\ 
lettres de la Thora ecrite. Elle en degage le sens ethique comme l'ultime intelligibilite 
de l'humain et meme du cosmique.' The Jewish writings, especially the Talmud, though 
it is not itself a philosophy - since philosophy tends to be a Greek phenomenon - is 
nevertheless a rich source of experiences which can nourish philosophy. As Levinas 
says in Quatre Lectures Talmudiques8°: 'si le Talmud n'est pas la philosophie, ses traites 
sont une source eminente de ces experiences dont se nourissent !es philosophies.' 
Thirdly, the historical experience of emigration across Russia, and then to 
France, the rise of Hitler and National Socialism, and the experience of the holocaust. 
Of specifically philosophical influence is the thinking of Husserl, Heidegger, 
Bergson. Responding to a question from Richard Kearney on his philosophical 
itinerary,81 Levinas acknowledges his indebtedness to Bergson's theory of time as 
concrete duration (la duree concrete), the phenomenology of Husserl, with whom he 
studied at the University of Freiburg for two semesters in 1928-29, and Heidegger, who, 
after the publication of Being and Time in 1927, was then the leading light in German 
philosophy. 
78 Sean Hand, (ed.), Introduction to the chapter on 'Revelation in the Jewish 
Tradition,' a presentation of L'au-dela du Verset, in The Levinas Reader, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989). 
79 E Levinas, Du Sacre au Saint, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1977), p.10 
80 idem, Quatre Lectures Talmudiques, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 
1968), p.12 
81 R A Cohen: Face to" Face with Emmanuel Levinas, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1986), p.13 
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Maurice Blanchot 
Levinas acknowledges the influence of Blanchot, whom he met at Strasbourg 
where they were students together during almost the whole time that Levinas spent 
there. He writes of Blanchot, 
'II me mentionne parfois dans ses livres et m'eleve beaucoup dans tous 
/es sens du terme. le veux dire que je me trouve tres eleve quand dans 
ses interventions ii se rapproche de moi. Sur beaucoup des points nous 
pensons en accord. II a traverse une evolution toute interieure ou ii n y 
eut jamais la moindre concession, meme a l'egard de soi.... II choisissait 
toujours le chemin le plus inattendu et le plus noble, le plus dur. Cette 
elevation morale, cette aristocracie fonciere de la pensee est ce qui 
compte le plus et eleve .... II fut aussi pour moi comme /'expression meme 
de /'excellence fran9aise; pas tant a cause des idees qu'a cause d'une 
certaine possibilite de dire /es choses, tres difficile a imiter et 
apparaissant comme une force tres haute. Oui, c'est toujours en terms 
de hauteur que je vous parle de lui. t82 
Maurice Blanchot, author and critic, has been writing for the past fifty years, yet his 
work has been relatively unknown outside France until quite recently. However, 
although his texts are becoming more accessible to an English-speaking readership, they 
remain in themselves inaccessible, for Blanchot's main thrust is the infinite 
inaccessibility of the work (oeuvre). The inscription at the beginning of Blanchot's Le 
Tres-Haut states quite simply, 'Maurice Blanchot, romancier et critique. Sa vie est 
entierement vouee a la litterature et au silence qui lui est propre.' Michel Foucault 
writes that '[s]o far has he withdrawn into the manifestations of his work, so completely 
is he, not hidden by his texts, but absent from their existence, that for us he is that 
thought itself - its real, absolutely distant, shimmering, invisible presence, its inevitable 
law, its calm, infinite, measured strength.'83 To a world espoused to philosophies oflight 
and systems of integration, Blanchot's thought presents itself - if Blanchot can ever be 
said to be 'present' - as a thought from the outside of any philosophy and any system. 
His themes are those of 'night', 'darkness', 'absence', distance, 'impossibility' and 
'obscurity' rather than day, light, presence, proximity, possibility, and clarity; and work 
is an interrupting of standard philosophical discourse. His writing, rather than being a 
philosophical presentation, is the non-philosophy of the book whose theme cannot be 
presented or re-presented. This emphasis on the non-philosophy of the book is a 
82 E Levinas, in Fran~ois Poirie, op. cit., p. 71 
83 M Foucault, Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from the Outside, (New 
York: Zone Books, 1990), p.19 
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challenge to the privilege and primacy of thought. As Levinas notes, 'Blanchot does not 
see in philosophy the ultimate possibility, nor, moreover does he see human limitation 
in possibility itself, in the 'I can' (je peux).'84 Foucault remarks that it is now necessary 
to think through fiction for 'I speak' runs counter to 'I think'. 'I think' relates to the I's 
self-certainty as in the Cartesian project, but 'I speak' is distance, dispersion, effacing 
of existence. It is the outside and the disappearance of the speaking subject who is less 
the responsible agent of discourse, but a 'non-existence in whose emptiness the 
unending of language uninterruptedly continues.'85 Hence Mark Taylor can write that, 
for Blanchot, 'the book fails, always fails. A non-absent absence, which is not a 
presence, eternally returns to interrupt the author and tear to pieces the pages of his 
book.'86 A book moves towards the creation of a systematic totality, and yet fails in 
representing the thought of the author. With respect to the author, the book is strangely 
absent. It is strange and foreign (etrange), outside of the authors own space, and the 
author outside of the work's space. It is the neutral space.87 
84 E Levinas, Sur Maurice Blanchot, (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1975), 
p.9 
85 M Foucault, Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from the Outside, p.11 
86 M Taylor, Altarity, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p.226 
87 An extensive bibliography of, and essays on, Blanchot can be found in 
Sub-stance, 14, 1976. Further reading on Blanchot can be found in Emmanuel Levinas' 




1. 1 The Question of Method 
The question of method raises itself at the beginning of any enquiry. Otto Muck 
indicates that '[t]he question concerning methodology is an indication of a crisis [in 
which] the access to reality most familiar to us appears to have been called into question 
with regard to its fundamental validity.' 1 Methodology, however, although it 
'accompanies inquiry,' 'does not project a complete and adequate description of the way 
a priori.'2 Rather, method unfolds as inquiry progresses. The problem of charting and 
unravelling method was brought into focus by Kant's critical tum. Whereas formerly, 
metaphysics had concerned itself with the object of the investigation - Being - rather 
than with its own implied method, with Kant the method by which philosophy 
proceeded was to be exposed. Emerich Coreth, writing from within a transcendental 
perspective, reflects that previously '[t]he question was never raised about the basic 
method of metaphysics, that method by which metaphysics, if possible at all, should 
validate and build itself up in conformity with its own nature.'3 Marechal indicates the 
same, contrasting the approach inaugurated by Kant with that of previous thought, when 
he writes, '[i]f the epistemology of the ancients did not remain foreign to all critical 
preoccupation, their theory of knowledge proceeded from another viewpoint than the 
modem Critique.'4 
Kant had found inspiration in the new scientific method of the positive sciences 
which stood in marked contrast to the lack in the method of metaphysics, whose 
'prevailing mood [was] that of weariness and complete indifferentism - the mother, in 
all the sciences, of chaos and night' (A, x). Where the positive sciences had succeeded, 
metaphysics alone had 'not yet had the good fortune to enter upon the secure path of a 
science' (B, xiv), but remained a 'random groping' among 'mere concepts' (B, xv). If 
Otto Muck, The Transcendental Method, (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1968), p.11 (Original edition Die Transzendentale Methode in der Scholastischen 
Philosophie der Gegenwart, (Innsbruck: Verlag Felizian Rauch)) 
2 ibid. 
E Coreth, The Problem and Method of Metaphysics~ in International 
Philosophical Quarterly, 3, (1963), p.,403 (Hereafter, Problem and Method) 
4 J Marechal, Le point de depart de la metaphysique: lefOllS sur le 
developpement historique et theorique du probleme de la connaissance. cahier V. Le 
Thomisme devant la philosophie critique, 2me ed., (Brussels: L'Edition Univerrselle, 
1949), p.47 
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metaphysics was to secure itself, it needed to undergo a critique of itself. 'This attempt 
to alter the procedure which has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics, by completely 
revolutionising it in accord with the example set by the geometers and physicists, forms 
indeed the main purpose of this critique of speculative reason. It is a treatise on method, 
not a system of the science itself (B, xxii). As Heidegger notes, 'The aim of the Critique 
of Pure Reason is fundamentally mistaken if this work is interpreted as a "theory of 
experience" or as a theory of the positive sciences. The Critique of Pure Reason has 
nothing to do with a theory of knowledge.'5 Kant continues, that the Critique 'will, 
therefore, decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and 
determine its sources, its extent, and its limits - all in accordance with principles' (A, 
xii). The Critique is thus concerned with the possibility of Metaphysics, and a proper 
methodology is at the root of that possibility.6 
The question of method in an enquiry in which Levinas figures pre-eminently 
raises particular problems, for Levinas' methodology is continually challenged by his 
method and style. Those who have previously written of the method by which his work 
progresses populate their texts with questions. Steven Smith points out that Levinas' 
pursuit of the ethical with its 'uncompromising treatment of God and neighbour ... seems 
to negate the minimum conditions of sense and reason,'7 and raises questions for 
interpreters: 
'how can there be a rational argument concerning an infinite that 
avowedly exceeds any rational totality? How can there be a 
phenomenological description of something that is not evident, or an 
onto logical analysis of something that is beyond being? If Levinas' 
analysis is neither phenomenological nor ontological, what is it? Why 
call it philosophy?'8 
Charles Reed opens his discussion on Levinas' Question by asking, 'How does he do it?'9 
M Heidegger, Kant und das Problem, p.16 
6 See D P Dryer, Kant's Solution for Verification, (London, 1966), p.23, 
n.l 
7 Steven G Smith, Reason as One for Another: Moral and Theoretical 
Argument in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, in Richard Cohen (ed.) Face to Face 
with Emmanuel Levinas, (Alnaby: State University of New York Press,) 1986, p.53 
8 ibid. 
9 C W Reed, Levinas' Question, in Richard Cohen (ed.) Face to Face with 
Emmanuel Levinas, p.73 
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The question of method arises often in reading Levinas. He is 'aggravatingly profound' 
but where is the philosophical rigour? 
'Is he merely nai've and moralistic? Is there a deep structure contained 
within his thought? Or does he prod us into responding to his writings 
by asking an unheard of question?i1o 
In fact, Reed, having written his doctoral dissertation on the problem of method in 
Levinas' philosophy in 1983, 11 admits only three years later in 1986 that he is 'now 
firmly convinced that the question of method is simply the wrong entrance into Levinas' 
thought. Methodology is essentially a quest for transparency about the foundations of 
thinking; it not only assumes a structure but it assumes the strict and formal repeatability 
of certain procedures.i1 2 Levinas apparently fails with regard to the transparency and 
pre<lictablity of procedure. 
The reaction which Levinas' philosophy provokes derives in large measure from 
the clandestine manner in which his philosophy operates. Maurice Blanchot, who will 
prove an invaluable guide and interpreter in this work, likens the reaction provoked by 
Levinas to that provoked by scepticism. 
'Levinas wrote ... that scepticism was invincible. While easily refuted, the 
refutation leaves scepticism intact. Is it really contradicted when it 
openly uses reason that destroys it? Contradiction is also the essence of 
scepticism .... The invincible scepticism that Levinas admits shows that 
his own philosophy, his metaphysics... affirms nothing that is not 
overseen by an indefatigable adversary, one to whom he does not 
concede but who obliges him to go further, not beyond reason into the 
faculty of the irrational or towards a mystical effusion, but rather 
towards another reason, towards the other as reason or demand. All this 
appears in each of his books. Doubtless, he follows the same path; but 
in each case, the unexpected emerges to render the path so new or so 
ancient that, following it along, we are stuck as by a blow to the heart -
the heart of reason - that makes us say within ourselves, "But I've also 
thought that; I must think it. "' 13 
10 ibid. 
11 idem, The Problem of Method in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 
Ph.D Dissertation, 1983, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International). (Hereafter 
Problem of Method) 
12 idem, Levinas' Question, p.74 
13 M Blanchot, Our Clandestine Companion, in Richard Cohen (ed.) Face 
to Face with Emmanuel Levinas, p.42 
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In other words, Levinas' thought recognises an inherent rationality in reality, but the 
reality so indicated is not the reality which has become the victim of a philosophical 
entrapment by thought, and in which the ethical is simply an adjunct or derivative; the 
reality which Levinas recognises as rational is, first and foremost, an ethical reality, and 
this provides the wider framework within which philosophical thinking becomes 
operative; however, it is a framework which calls all other frameworks into question. 
For Levinas, reason's 'essential interest' lies beyond the speculative or the 
epistemological in the ethical, and to experience the ethical is to recognise that 'the Real 
is rational and that the Rational alone is real' and that there are reasons 'that "reason" 
does not know, and which have not begun in philosophy.' 14 As Reed indicates, the real 
provocation which Levinas effects is not simply his philosophy but the questions which 
touch us in our hwnanity. His claim about the 'nature of questions' is that 'they arise 
from our relation to what lies outside of ontology, beyond being.' 15 To this extent, then, 
any method which is operative in Levinas' thinking must be an anti-method, not in that 
it rejects method but insofar as the protoethical experience which animates thought 
constantly disturbs, disrupts, and finally undoes any methodology which would claim 
a sure foundation or yield a conclusive result. 
The question of method is equally important in Rabner, and raises questions of 
foundations, philosophy and methodology. In her study of Rahner's Theological 
Method, 16 Carr indicates the threefold problematic which confronts any attempt at 'an 
expository and interpretative analysis of the theology of Karl Rabner' and 'his 
characteristic way of doing theology,' 17 which, like Levinas' provocation, presents itself 
as a response to those questions which touch us in our hwnanity. 
'The problem is foundational in that it raises the question of the point of 
departure for theology, whether and in what way that grounding lies in 
concrete experience and thought. It is, implicitly at least, philosophical, 
calling for analysis of all that is presupposed about the hwnan situation 
in any theological affirmation. It is, finally, a methodological problem 
for it asks how theology is to be done in the light of what is thus known 
14 E Levinas, GP, p.143 
15 CW Reed, Levinas' Question, p.74 
16 Anne Carr, The Theological Method of Karl Rabner, (Missoula: Scholars 
Press, 1977) (Hereafter, Method) 
17 ibid., p. vii 
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about human persons and their world.' 18 
One might say that Carr identifies, firstly, a phenomenological perspective with regard 
to the problem of method: foundations relate to concrete experience and thought; 
secondly, a transcendental perspective: presuppositions require reflective analysis; and 
thirdly, a methodological perspective which enquires about the relationship between 
practice and knowledge. That Rahner's transcendental approach to philosophy and 
theology has been heavily criticised cannot be doubted. Yet, this criticism need not 
necessarily be definitive, for although Rahner takes as his starting point 'the principle 
that every philosophy, i.e. every genuine metaphysics worthy of the name must proceed 
along the lines of transcendental philosophy, or else it is not philosophy in this authentic 
sense at all,' 19 nonetheless such an approach need not necessarily take its point of 
departure the irreducible questioning of being from which he begins. A transcendental 
philosophy calls for a phenomenologically adequate articulation of 'concrete experience 
and thought,' and, as Levinas indicates, this concrete experience is not primarily 
speculative and theoretical but ethical. Finally, with regard to the methodological 
problem which Carr indicates, one can perhaps venture the suggestion that, like Levinas, 
whose own characteristic way of doing and undoing philosophy subverts any 
methodology, Rahner's own method and style of doing theology 'in the light of what is 
... known about human persons and their world'20 provides the beginnings of a resolution 
to the foundational (phenomenological) and philosophical (transcendental) problematic 
which Carr indicates, and enables Rahner's thought to be advanced beyond the captive 
fetters of the transcendental method as he makes use of it. 
In this particular enquiry, then, three particular methods are placed in question, 
and a fourth is sought as a way of going beyond them. There is first of all what might 
be called the metaphysical method which pervaded the tradition, whose validity Kant 
called into question in the Critique of Pure Reason, and which is often contrasted by 
18 ibid., p.2 
19 K Rahner, Reflections on Methodology in Theology, p.85 
20 The omission of the 'thus' from Carr's quotation is deliberate and 
important, for knowledge of human persons and their world is not the fruit of 
philosophical analysis but the seed. 
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transcendentalists with the transcendental method.21 The question, however, is not quite 
as simple as questioning the possibility of metaphysics, and effecting a transcendental 
transposition by which metaphysics might be rescued, but actually has to be taken 
deeper to enquire whether it is actually possible to overcome metaphysics itself. This 
is particularly important when dealing with Levinas' project of attempting an ex-
cendence from Being and the onto-theological tradition of Western Philosophy. Joseph 
O'Leary notes that '[m]etaphysics has been normative for Western thinking for two and 
a half millennia, the governing Logos of our culture, identical with the force of reason 
itself,'22 and that '[t]he struggle to articulate that [new critical] relationship [with the 
metaphysical tradition], in opposition to the tendency to fall back uncritically into the 
language of metaphysics, may be called the "overcoming of metaphysics."'23 The 
questioning of the metaphysical tradition as to its methodology may have been a major 
task among Catholic theologians in the transcendental tradition, Rahner included, but 
one can ask whether, in their adoption of a transcendental method as a way of 
vindicating the ontological claims of the metaphysical method and answering Kant's 
question of the possibility of metaphysics in the affirmative, and by arresting that 
transcendental reflection too soon, they fail to overcome metaphysics itself but are kept 
within its thrall. 
The second method, therefore, placed in question is the transcendental method 
itself. The transcendental edifice which Rahner has constructed is impressive, and has 
been seen 'as representing the ne plus ultra of theological enlightenment.'24 However, 
it is not unassailable. O'Leary remarks that 'the assurance with which Rabner passes 
from everyday reality to the infinite mystery of God, by means of this remarkable 
21 One can note here that, ultimately, both the Metaphysical method and the 
Transcendental Method as employed in Rahner's Marechaliam transcendentalism have (S\ 
the same concern for objectivity. In the metaphysical critique the ontological affirmation 
of being - the metaphysical object - is taken for granted, in the transcendental critique 
it is to be transcendentally deduced from the phenomenal object. Marechal writes, 'Car 
la Critique ancienne pose d'emb!ee l'Objet ontologique, qui inclut le Sujet 
transcendentale; et la Critique moderne s 'attache au Sujet transcendentale, qui postule 
l'Objet ontologique.' (Le Point. V, p.69) 
22 J S O'Leary, Questioning Back: the Overcoming of Metaphysics in the 
Tradition, (Minneapolis: Seabury, 1985), p.1 
23 
24 
ibid., p. l 
ibid., p.97 
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conjunction of the theological, the transcendental, and the phenomenological, must 
arouse doubts whether the sturdy and opaque texture of the world can be so easily 
transcended towards its infinite foundations,' and asks, '[h]ow reliable is the 
transcendental logic which engineers the transition?'25 The fundamental categories 
which Rahner employs to describe human reality, such as freedom, luminous self-
presence, and loving acceptance of finitude are, says O'Leary, mystifications, and, at an 
ideological level, the 'immense influence of Rahner's theology' may not be as innocent 
as it seems but 'goes hand in hand with the ahistorical mystification of his 
transcendentalism'26 which absolved the subject from practical engagement in the world 
and removes the human person's transcendental concerns somewhat from the flesh. A 
more radical and more adequate questioning has been avoided which might be more 
consistent with the experience of human reality and thus more phenomenologically 
adequate. Rahner tends to convince 'by the appeal of his metaphysical convictions' 
rather than 'by a concord between these convictions and the phenomenality of human 
existence.'27 His 'phenomenological fleshing out of the transcendental deduction ... 
always comes after the speculative fact, a varnish on its bareness .. .'28 O'Leary draws 
attention to the lack of 'phenomenological restraint'29 in Rahner who 'cannot defend his 
language on the ground of phenomenological fidelity to the experience of faith; faith, 
therefore, does 'not reflect a trusting openness to the mystery of God, but rather a flight 
from the poverty of inauthentic faith.' 30 The immediate self-presence of the subject in 
knowledge and freedom 'never becomes the focus of an autonomous phenomenological 
enquiry'31 nor are its thematic or unthematic poles addressed with 'phenomenological 
precision.' O'Leary concludes that Rahner's 'transcendental system steals the show from 
25 ibid., p.88 
26 ibid., p.97 
27 ibid., p.89 
28 ibid. 
29 O'Leary notes that 'Rahner's positing of transcendent and transcendental 






the data and robs them of their intrinsic meaning'32 on account of '[t]he chronic 
ineffectiveness of Rahner's gestures towards phenomenology [which] can only be 
explained by a reluctance to relinquish the mastery over experience which his categories 
promise.' 33 O'Leary writes, therefore, that 'a philosophical and poetic questioning about 
human being is surely conceivable which need not fit into the structures of Rahner's 
transcendental thinking,'34 and which would be more phenomenologically adequate. 
This brings us, thirdly, to the phenomenological method. If Rahner is to be 
criticised for a lack of phenomenological fidelity to experience, Levinas is one who has 
embraced phenomenology but who sees its own inadequacy in its classical expression. 
Although he claims that he is simply expanding on Husserl's phenomenological method, 
Levinas has little to say on method itself. Concerning method, he says, 
'I would also tell you that I know no more about it. I do not believe that 
a transparency in method is possible, nor that philosophy is possible as 
transparency. Those who have spent their lives on methodology have 
written many books in place of the more interesting books they could 
have written. What a pity for the walk beneath the noon-day sun that 
philosophy is said to be.'35 
Nonetheless, if not strictly a method, Levinas' philosophy nonetheless perhaps 
constitutes a fourth approach and style of doing philosophy which reminds us that 
'philosophy [is] life itself,' 'our companion day and night,' 'the clandestine friend we 
always respected, loved.'36 
1.2 The Phenomenological Method 
The disavowal of methodological transparency by Levinas presents problems in 
any approach to his work, however, as is perhaps seen in Reed's admission that, 
although in his own doctoral work he 'did uncover something like a method within 










E Levinas, Questions et reponses in Le Nouveau Commerce, 36-37 
M Blanchet, Our Clandestine Companion, pp.41-42 
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and that was built upon an observation about the structure of all questioning ... [and] ... 
named that method "diachronic transcendentalism",'37 such an approach does not attain 
Levinas' philosophy. While Levinas does acknowledge a debt to phenomenology, his 
use of the phenomenological method is 'exorbitant' and 'indirect,' and the progress of his 
work owes more to his 'characteristic way of doing,' to the gestures of the original 
philosophical style which methodological analysis fails to grasp. 'By considering 
structure to be primary and procedures to be repeatable, methodology misses the 
question to which structure is only a response,'38 namely, the question of the ethical 
encounter with the other person as the proto-philosophical experience. The distinction 
between methodology and method is important. If methodology, as a logos about 
methodos, attempts a system, method is the more pragmatic way of effecting a way 
beyond, in which a meta-hodos, is achieved. Levinas constantly seeks a way beyond, 
and his way of doing philosophy is perhaps better termed meta-hodological than 
methodological for his way, as a way beyond, is always also a way beyond 
methodology. His method subverts methodology. 
Reed, his subsequent doubt about the value of a methodological approach 
notwithstanding, identifies in his doctoral thesis three main characteristics of Levinas' 
method which work against methodological coherence and transparency. Firstly, there 
is the 'rejection of the phenomenological conception of evidence as the presence of 
consciousness to its object' and so an excessus with regard to the phenomenological 
enquiry as presented by Husserl; secondly, Levinas proceeds by way of a reduction 
whereby the ontological signification of language is reduced; thirdly, Levinas operates 
with a 'diachronic transcendental method,' which is 'necessarily addressed to an 
interlocutor' and which, therefore, 'prevents the formulation of a transparently foWlded 
transcendental system of signification.' Levinas rejects 'method as a transparent 
procedure which is imposed on events and phenomena for the purpose of ordering them 
37 CW Reed, Levinas' Question, p.73-74 
It is this 'structure of all questioning' which needs further consideration when one 
approaches Rahner. Rahner views the question as the only 'must' of human existence, 
the one fact which refuses to be dispersed by thought. Rahner, beginning from the fact 
of the question in human existence, Wldertakes a transcendental reflection to Wlcover 
its conditions of possibility. Levinas, however, provides a deeper reflection which 
recognises that the question is not the first datum of human existence but enjoys a 
position of secondarity which respect to a prior inter-personal context. 
38 ibid., p.74 
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rationally.'39 
Is Levinas, then, a Phenomenologist?40 The question of the link between Levinas 
thought and phenomenology is often raised. Levinas recognises that Husserl's great 
contribution to philosophy was a method. In Signature, he acknowledges that 
'Husserl will be remembered for having brought to philosophy a method. 
It amounts to an analysis of "intentions" which maintains the 
irreducibility of the various experiences of the real, delineates the 
unsuspected horizons in which this reality situates itself when one heeds 
the "intentions" which apprehend the real, and fixes the original standing 
of beings thus approached. But the method consists especially in 
recognising a dignity of experience and of apprehension in the attitudes 
of the mind (and of the body) which until now were not supposed to play 
a part in discovering being. These experiences of a new type, totally 
strange to the subject-object archetype, sometimes are foundations of the 
contemplative thought which fixes things and ideas and are prior to the 
technique which handles them and fashions them.' (Signature) 
Levinas himself suggests that, '[i]n spite of eve1ything, I think what I do is 
phenomenology, even if it not according to the rules laid down by Husserl, even if the 
39 idem, Problem of Method, p.28 
40 There is, of course, the deeper question raised by Derrida in Violence and 
Metaphysics. An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas (Writing and Difference, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978) of whether Levinas attempt to go beyond 
the philosophical tradition can be undertaken apart from 'philosophy'. The question of 
the death of philosophy, of philosophy's own possibility, is itself, says Derrida, a 
philosophical question. '[T]hose who look into the possibility of philosophy, 
philosophy's life and death, are already engaged in, already overtaken by the dialogue 
of the question about itself and with itself; they always act in remembrance of 
philosophy, as part of the correspondence of the question with itself (80). With his 
thought of the other, Levinas attempts to think the difference. But the Hebraic relation 
of transcendent alterity still demands its Greek articulation. Derrida acknowledges the 
Greek source of 'the entirety of philosophy' but this is simply to recognise that 'the 
founding concepts of philosophy are primarily Greek' and outside such a medium 
'it would not be possible to philosophise, or to speak philosophically' (81). Levinas, 
however, attempts the impossible in his 'departure from Greece.' His thought summons 
to 'a dislocation of the Greek logos, to a dislocation of our identity' (82) and a liberation 
'from the Greek domination of the Same and the One' (83). But such a thought 
'nevertheless seeks to define itself, in its primary possibility, as metaphysical' (83). 
One would want to say, however, that Levinas does not propose a wholesale 
discarding of tradition, but rather seeks to reduce the experience of doing philosophy 
to a more originary protoethical (Hebrew) experience with ·which the concepts and 
structures of (Greek) thought have to grapple interminably and always without 
resolution. 
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entire Husserlian methodology is not observed.'41 In the Preface to Totality and Infinity, 
he indicates that the notions he develops in the book 'owe everything to the 
phenomenological method.'42 It might seem therefore that one could adopt a strictly 
phenomenological approach to Levinas' thought, that is, 'it may be suggested that there 
is a (unique) "object" to which his extraordinary "descriptions" happen to be 
"adequate" ,'43 but whether it is useful to extend the notions of object and description to 
Levinas' enterprise and attempts is doubtful for Levinas thought tends to be sui 
generis.44 
In what sense, then, can Levinas be considered a phenomenologist? Smith points 
to Levinas' rejection of phenomenology's "principle of principles," its conception of 
evidence, and his denial of Heideggerian ontology.45 Strasser expresses his conviction 
that Levinas' philosophy 'differs essentiaIIy from aII that has been conceived as 
phenomenology up to now' when he writes that 'Husserl's and Heidegger's philosophies 
are the starting point of Levinas' path of thought' but that he 'moves away increasingly 
from Husserl's idealism'46 and maintains his relationship with the classical 
phenomenological movement 'at a distance.' Although 'his philosophy does indeed show 
traits which are characteristic of phenomenological thinking... it is... a novel 
phenomenology.'47 Craig Vasey considers Levinas an 11 anti-phenomenologist11 'without 
41 E Levinas, Questions et Reponses, p.72 
42 idem, TI, p.28 
43 S Smith, Reason as One for Another, p.53 Smith recognises this in Th. 
de Boer, Tussen filosofie en profetie, c.V 
44 Smith wishes 'to show the sui generis character of Levinas' 
nontheoretical yet genuinely philosophical argument, and - because I take "rationality" 
to be the conception of last resort governing the demands for justification that may be 
directed to a philosophy - to elucidate the implications for philosophy of the 
"rationality" that Levinas proposes, and that his achievement presupposes' (53). For 
Levinas, says Smith, reason is governed by the understanding of intersubjettivity laid 
out in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. 
45 ibid., p.62 
46 S Strasser, Emmanuel Levinas in H Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological 
Movement: A Historical Introduction, 3rd Ed., (The Hague: M Nijhoff, 1984), p.614 
47 ibid., p.648 
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connoting by this term that his philosophical position 1s non-phenomenological.'48 
Rather, Levinas is 'squarely within the phenomenological tradition, in such a way that 
his ideas cannot be understood apart from this tradition,'49 and, although he often comes 
to contrary conclusions, he 'consistently takes Husserl's work as the starting point for 
his own reflections.'50 The fundamental notion of phenomenology, says Vasey, is 
radically developed by Levinas and 'constitutes a revitalisation of Phenomenology,'51 
which is evident in Levinas' rethinking of intentionality and its relation to proximity. 
1.21 The Inadequacy of Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology 
Husserl, in the Cartesian Meditations ,52 had stressed the intentionality of 
consciousness; consciousness is always a consciousness of something; it has a noetico-
noematic transcendental structure, such that in each act of consciousness, a subjective 
noesis bestows meaning (the Sinngebung) on its noematic correlate, the intentional 
object. Levinas notes that 
'[i]n Husserl's philosophy (and this may be where we have to depart from 
it), knowledge and representation are not on the same level as other 
modes of life, and they are not secondary modes. Theory and 
representation play a dominant role in life, serving as a basis for the 
whole of conscious life; they are the forms of intentionality that give a 
foundation to all others.'53 
48 C R Vasey, Emmanuel Levinas: From Intentionality to Proximity, in 




Vasey notes that, in his most recent writings, Levinas goes beyond the notion of 
intentionality, and in Otherwise than Being abandons expressions such as 'incarnate 
intentionality', the 'intentionality of enjoyment' and affective intentionality', reserving 
the term only for the Husserlian notion of intentionality. The origin of the possibility 
of thematisation lies much deeper than incarnate intentionality; it derives from the 
experience of proximity which is 'a relation which pre-exists the relations that 
consciousness of... establishes, it pre-exists the noetico-noematic structure of 
intentionality' (ibid., p.186). 
52 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to 
Phenomenology, D Cairns (tr.), (The Hague: Ma1tinus Nijhoff, 1973) 
53 E Levinas, TIHP, p.53 
METHOD 14 
In Totality and Infinity, reflecting on the relationship between enjoyment and 
representation, he writes of Husserl's understanding of intentionality, 
'We know the rhythm with which the thesis is exposed: every perception 
is a perception of the perceived, every idea an idea of an ideate, every 
desire a desire of a desired, every emotion an emotion of something 
moving ... ; but every obscure thought of our being is also oriented toward 
something .... Yet already with the first expression of intentionality as a 
philosophical thesis there appeared the privilege of representation. The 
thesis that every intentionality is either a representation or founded on 
a representation dominates the Logische Untersuchungen and returns as 
an obsession in all of Husserl's subsequent work.'54 
It is this dominance of the representational model which is the focus of Levinas' main 
criticism of Husserl's understanding of intentionality, for it implies that human existence 
is accessible through theoretical and objectifying consciousness. For Husserl, it is only 
'inasmuch as we know an object theoretically that we have access to it as existing.'55 The 
consequence of this is that Being is thus made to be 'a correlative to theoretical intuitive 
life, to the evidence of an objectifying act.' 56 
However, the notion of evidence in Husserl in deficientas Reed points out. 
Husserl argued against the natural attitude with its spontaneous reason which presumed 
the adequacy of perception, the attitude that things are as they appear, and are known 
as such. Such a security of reason has never been assured, however, for reason can be 
fooled and deluded. The natural attitude has not yet woken up to reality, and calls for 
a critical reason other than spontaneous reason, and a need of a sober vigilance in the 
face of a naive realism or naturalism which accepts the adequacy of the evidence of an 
uncritical adequatio intellectus et rei. As Levinas says, '[i]t is not necessary to sleep, it 
is necessary to philosophise.'57 And to philosophise is to do phenomenology. 
Levinas recognises in Husserl a concern that rationality, the principle of 




idem, Tl, p.122 
idem, TIHP, p.134 
ibid., p.94 
57 See E Levinas, De La Conscience a la Veille: A partir de Husserl, in 
DQVI p.35. Levinas writes that 'In the present essay, one _contests precisely this 
ontological interpretation of reason in order to lead towards a reason understood as 
awakening (veillee) In which objectivity and objectivation only raise themselves to a 
certain depth, in which sleep is not yet dissipated.' 
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phenomenology will always be couched in the language of gnoseological expression, 
whether ontic or ontological, nevertheless, Husserl's transcendental reduction, says 
Levinas, draws attention to a sense of philosophy other than that of the adequate relation 
of thought to the world, and which will better explain lived experience. According to 
Levinas, the motivation of phenomenology is the instability and inadequacy of evidence 
and the na1ve adequation of thought to the world. 
'In the Ideas I, the passage to phenomenology is called the 
transcendental Reduction. It is accomplished in a Cartesian manner: 
from the inadequation of evidence relative to the world and to the things 
which belong there - through the suspension of belief in the existence of 
this world and these objects which are affirmed despite their uncertainty 
- to the search for certainty or adequate evidence of reflection on the 
cogitation to which this belief belongs - in order to measure there the 
degree of its certainty or uncertainty.'58 
But one also finds in Ideas the notion of an essential liberation of sensed thought from 
the norms of adequation as 
'gathering into a theme, as representation and as presence ... [whereby] 
the reduction would be not the discovery of uncertainties 
compromising certitude, but an awakening of the spirit beyond certainty 
or uncertainty ... an awakening in which there is profiled a rationality of 
thought - the signifyingness (signifiance) of sense - cutting across the 
norms which command the identity of the Same.'59 
Such an apodictic rationality finds its interpretation in the Cartesian Meditations where 
'the 11 adequation 11 of intuition and the signitive act which intuition fills' 60 is abandoned, 
since '[i]ntuition in its internal sense is ... incapable of filling the signitive intention.'61 
In the First Meditation (para 6), Husserl attempts to clarify the notions of 
absolute certainty and absolute indubitability. Na1ve consciousness presumes evidence 
to be more or less perfect. To the extent that it is less than perfect, it is incomplete and 
inadequate and calls for 'perfecting' through a synthesis of 'further harmonious 
experiences in which these attendant meanings become fulfilled in actual experience162 
so that 'adequate evidence' might be attained. Scientific or critical rationality, however, 
58 ibid., p.42 
59 ibid., p.43 
60 ibid., p.44 
61 ibid. 
62 E Husserl, op.cit., p.15 
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demands the more stringent criterion of apodicticity, or absolute indubitability of 
evidence. 
'Any evidence is a grasping of something itself that is, or is thus, a 
grasping in the mode "it itself', with full certainty of its being, a 
certainty that accordingly excludes every doubt. But it does not follow 
that full certainty excludes the conceivability that what is evident could 
subsequently become doubtful, or the conceivability that being could 
prove to be illusion - indeed, sensuous experience furnishes us with 
cases where that happens .... An apodictic evidence, however, is not 
merely certainty of the affairs or affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) 
evident in it; rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having 
the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute 
unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being, and thus 
excluding in advance every doubt as "objectless", empty .. .'63 
As a scientific or critical enterprise, the first and defining question for philosophy is the 
apodicticity of evidence. 
Now, as soon as one embarks on the quest for apodictic evidence, it becomes 
apparent that '[t}he evidence for the factual existence of the world is not apodicticM 
since sensuous experience is open to illusion. Further, insofar as the experienced world 
is the basis of science, it, too, is compromised as a discipline. What, then, asks Husserl, 
can be the basis for judgements, or for evidence, which could found apodictically a 
comprehensive philosophy, a question which leads to the ego cogito as transcendental 
subjectivity (para.8), 'the ultimate apodictically certain basis on which any radical 
philosophy must be grounded.'65 Since the world - and the sociality and culture 
associated with it - only claim being, it can only be regarded as a phenomenon of being 
and not something that is, and so must be bracketed in a phenomenological epoche with 
regard to its absolute existence. But, having so done, this 'does not leave us confronting 
nothing.'66 Rather, it yields the pure living of the subject and, accompanying it as its 
own, all 'phenomena' in the phenomenological sense. Thus, 
'[t]he epoche can also be said to be the radical and universal method by 
which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, with my own pure conscious 
life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and is 
precisely as it is for me. Anything belonging to the world, and spatio-
63 ibid., pp.15-16 
64 ibid., p.17 
65 ibid., p.18 
66 ibid., p.20 
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temporal being, exists for me - that is to say, is accepted by me - in that 
I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge 
about it, value it, desire it, or the like. Descartes, as we know, indicated 
all that by the name cogito.'67 
Levinas comments, 
'as we suspend the judgements made in the natural attitude, we still face 
the consciousness which makes these judgements and resists the epoche 
of the phenomenological reduction. We cannot "exclude" or 
"disconnect" the judgements that apply to consciousness. The absolute 
and specific existence of consciousness... guards it against such 
exclusion. By virtue of this existence, the act which posits consciousness 
has an absolute certainty, the certainty of the cogito. 
Thus, the phenomenological epoche leads us to considering 
conscious life. Conscious life is revealed as an intention directed at 
being and asserting the existence of its objects. These can be found in 
consciousness in the form of noemata, which are inseparable from 
consciousness. They are found "in brackets", to use Husserl's expression, 
or "reduced" to what they are for consciousness and ready to be studied 
by phenomenology.'68 
17 
Now, although 'the ego is accessible to itself originaliter' in transcendental experience, 
the 'strict adequacy' of this experience only extends to the ego's living present, 
grammatically expressed as ego cogito. Thus, in addition to the apodictic evidence of 
the cogito, Husserl also posits 'an indeterminately general presumptive evidence' to 
which belongs 'not only the ego's past, most of which is completely obscure, but also 
his transcendental abilities and his habitual peculiarities at that time'69 which, though 
strictly non-experienced, are nevertheless necessarily also meant. This evidence 
functions as 'an open, infinite, indeterminately general horizon, comprising what is itself 
not strictly perceived' or 'assured absolutely' but which opens on to what presumptively 
determines more particularly the being of the ego cogito. As Husserl writes, 'Each 
perception is an ex-ception (jedes Erfassen ist ein Herausfassen ).'70 'Cogitation makes 
the cogitatum its own by extracting it from a background which constantly accompanies 







E Levinas, TIHP p.147 
E Husserl, op.cit., p.23 
E Levinas, TIHP, p.19 quoting ldeen, 35 
ibid. 
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Husserl returns to the notion of presumptive evidence in his Third Meditation 
(para.28), and posits the world as 'an idea correlative to a pe1ject experiential 
evidence. 172 Evidence is essentially and necessarily one-sided, with each evidence 
referring beyond itself to infinities of other evidences or, more precisely, to 'a multiform 
horizon of unfilled anticipations,' which, as awaiting fulfilment, are mere meanings, 
referring, in their tum, to corresponding potential evidences.73 'The aspects which we 
see at any given moment always indicate further aspects,'74 virtually infinitely, and 
although these aspects are drawn into a process of 'perfecting' and 'actualising' through 
a synthetic transition from evidence to evidence, nevertheless, this synthesis is such that 
it necessarily remains incomplete and inadequate, given the infinite horizon of possible 
new meanings and evidences. Thus, '[t]hings are never known in their totality; an 
essential character of our perception of them is that of being inadequate;'75 and, 'any 
such synthesis must always involve unfulfilled, expectant and accompanying 
meanings.' 76 Now, it is precisely this wider horizon which constitutes the actual life of 
the subject, and which is always in excess of consciousness, which is to be 
transcendentally reduced. As Levinas notes, in an emphasis which recalls Rahner's 
insistence on historical humanity, "The phenomenological reduction is precisely the 
method by which we are going back to concrete man ... .'77 
72 E Husserl, op.cit.~ p.61 
73 ibid. 
74 E Levinas, TIHP, pp.21-22 
75 ibid., p.22 
76 E Husserl, op. cit., p.62 
77 E Levinas, TIHP, p.146 
Although Husserl's reduction seeks to render the horizon as an object for 
consciousness, a noetic correlate of a noema, Levinas own reduction will make the point 
that precisely because the horizon as other (autre) is autrui it is never given to 
consciousness as a counterpart of knowledge. 
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1.22 The Openness of Phenomenology. 
Husserl describes the level of the Ego - 'where subjectivity is most living its 
1 ife'78 - in terms of sleep and waking. The exposition of apodicticity was brought to a 
close in para. 9 of the Cartesian Meditations with the affirmation of the essential 
inadequacy of intuition: what is intended and what is perceived are not the same. 
Consciousness, as noematico-noetic correlation, is inadequate to homo vivans, and self-
consciousness, as an absolute knowledge, presents an inadequate model for the 'living 
present of the cogito-sum,' for presence to self is already disturbed by a rupture within 
immanence; and this is: awakening and life (reveil et vie.)79 For Levinas, to approach 
the question of subjectivity in terms of an immanent experience in which exteriority is 
reflected upon and represented within consciousness is to betray life as lived experience. 
Husserl may have seen the phenomenological reduction as a perfecting of knowledge, 
but its true import is its recognition that such knowledge, rather than being a perfecting, 
is a petrification and paralysation of life: the spirituality of thought has not been so 
much an adventure of knowledge, but the drowsiness which is part and parcel of 
wakefulness.80 Intentionality as representation makes Being 'a correlative to theoretical 
intuitive life, to the evidence of an objectifying act,' 81 and this 'constitutes an 
unnecessary restriction of Phenomenology's discovery, diminishing "the scope and 
interest of the assertions that all acts of consciousness are 'objectifying acts' and 
constitute being. "'82 Levinas, therefore, rejects the noema-noesis structure of 
consciousness as primordial,83 in favour of seeing the true significance of the 
phenomenological reduction as the reanimation or reactivation of the life 'forgotten or 
78 idem, DQVI, p.47 
79 See, idem, La Philosophie et l'Eveil, p. l 02 
For a fuller discussion of the relationship between life and awakening, with 
particular reference to the doctrine of grace in Rahner interpreted in the light of Levinas, 
see my forthcoming article, 'Gloria Dei, Homo Vigilans: Waking up to Grace in Rahner 




See, idem, DQVI, p.53 
idem, TIHP, p.94 
ibid., p.134 
83 See E Levinas, Tl, where he writes, '[o]ne of the principal theses of this 
work is that the noesis-noema structure is not the primordial structure of intentionality' 
(p.294). 
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weakened in knowledge,' 84 and the introduction of a rationality other than the rationality 
of a natural consciousness intending the world. Although the transcendental reduction 
'works back from the inadequate evidence of the experience of the world to the reflexion 
on the cogitations in which this experience is done, to measure the degree of certitude 
or incertitude of this experience,'85 and, in so doing, liberates sensed thought from the 
world with its norms of adequation, identification, thematisation, and re-presentation, 
nevertheless, the reduction does not simply halt at the certitude of the cogito, but 
awakens the cogito to a meaning despite the incompleteness of knowledge and 
identification, an incompleteness severing the norms which command the identity of the 
Same. And this is a meaning other than the subject. 
Now, by taking the reduction further, the ego cogito IS itself rendered 
vulnerable,86 for at the point where the noematico-noetic correlation breaks down, the 
transcendental reduction reveals the consciousness already wounded and compromised 
by what is other than consciousness. 
Levinas writes that '[p ]henomenology is method in an eminent way because it 
IS essentially open;'87 it can be applied to a number of domains, whether science, 
Kantism, or socialism, and provides 'an interpretative structure for a diverse array of 
possible "facts" .'88 Its eminence, however, derives from its own ability for 'critical self-
reflection,'89 whereby one can have not only a phenomenology of the diverse sciences 
and regions of being, but also a phenomenology of phenomenology. Now, openness 'can 
signify the openness of every object to every other object, in the unity of the universe', 
and it 'can designate the intentionality of consciousness.'90 Within these two senses, one 
can recognise also Rahner's understanding of the human subject as a transcendental 
openness to Being or as an oboediential potency for Revelation. There is a third sense, 
84 idem, La Philosophie et l'Eveil, p.99 
85 ibid., p.100 
86 For the relation between subjectivity and vulnerability, see Levinas' 
article, Sans identite: III Subjectivite et Vulnerabilite, in HAH, pp.91-95 
87 idem, 'Reflexions sur la "technique" phenomenologique,' in DEHH, p.111 
88 C W Reed, The Problem of Method, p.66 
89 ibid., p.67 
90 E Levinas, HAH, p.92 
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however, of openness which is no longer 'the essence of being which opens itself in 
order to show itself nor 'consciousness which opens itself to the presence of essence' 
but which is the openness 'of skin exposed to wounding and outrage,' beyond everything 
that can be shown, or exposed to comprehension.91 In recognising that 'access to the 
object makes up the being of the object,'92 the reduction is a method for the revelation 
of the being of those objects present within consciousness. But, insofar as the reduction 
can further be reflexively reduced, the phenomenological method is shown to be no 
longer simply a technique for the revelation of being but is 'a method of the revelation 
of their revelation.'93 But this means that an absolute transcendental ego is called into 
question. Since the way of access to a being constitutes 'the essential event of being,'94 
being 'lacks an absolute hegemony;'95 but also, since access itself - that is, the ego cogito 
- is exposed in phenomenological scrutiny as the very difference which is at its core, as 
a transcendence within its immanence, a situation is exposed in which the ego's 
positioning in being and the categories of being is inadequate to its life. There is an 
other than being which, as access, compromises being and the subject's position in 
being. In short, the apodicticity of the ego cogito, which the Husserlian Reduction 
affirms despite the inadequacy of evidence, is itself inadequate to the evidence. Its own 
apodicticity is seen to be dependent in that it is constituted by what is other than and 
outwith the play of being. Husserl may have awoken the subject beyond naive realism 
to a more phenomenological understanding of the world with its basis in the absolute 
ego, but he failed to pay sufficient regard to the dormant intentions, the forgotten 
horizons which disturb the noematico-noetic identity of the Same. At the core of the ego 
is not the peaceful possession of a self content within its ontological slumbers and 
assigning significance to objects on the basis of access constituting essence, but, rather, 
a wakefulness before a radical alterity which awakens the ego to its true significance. 
The presumed position of consciousness is shown already and always to be an 
ex-position, for the locus of subjectivity is always and already elsewhere than in 
91 ibid. 
92 idem, 'Reflexions sur la "technique" phenomenologique,' in DEHH, p.115 
93 ibid., p.117 
94 ibid. 
95 CW Reed, The Problem of Method, p. 70 
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consciousness. It is this third understanding of openness as reflexivity which is, 
according to Reed, Levinas' contribution to phenomenological method, and which Smith 
recognises as Levinas' 'transposition from the descriptive to the performative mode.'96 
1.23 The Eventful Dissimulation of Thought 
Levinas is not content with a descriptive phenomenology. The performative 
mode which Smith recognises in Levinas is evident in the way in which he notes how 
thought breaks up into events. Writing of the notions addressed in Totality and Infinity, 
he says that they 
'owe everything to the phenomenological method. Intentional analysis 
is the search for the concrete. Notions held under the direct gaze of the 
thought that defines them are nevertheless, unbeknown to this nai"ve 
thought, revealed to be implanted in horizons Wlsuspected to this 
thought; these horizons endow them with meaning - such is the essential 
teaching of Husserl. What does it matter if in Husserlian phenomenology 
taken literally these unsuspected horizons are in their tum interpreted as 
thoughts aiming at objects! What counts is the idea of the overflowing 
of objectifying thought by a forgotten experience from which it lives. 
The break up of the fonnal structure of thought (the noema of a noesis) 
into events which this structure dissimulates, but which sustain it and 
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This eventful dissimulation of thought, whereby its conceptual and descriptive apparatus 
falls before its performance, is applied by Reed to Totality and Infinity, especially the 
Preface, in which Levinas speaks of the eschatological break up of the totality. The 'real 
import' of eschatology is that 'it does not introduce a teleological system into the totality' 
nor does it lie 'in teaching the orientation of history' but rather it 'institutes a relation 
with being beyond the totality or beyond history.'98 'It is a relationship with a surplus 
always exterior to the totality .'99 But Levinas wishes to articulate this break up of the 
totality in terms of philosophy rather than eschatology, and in particular from the 
starting point of the philosophical notion of evidence. For Levinas, the philosophical 
significance of evidence is that its natural locus is not a representational relationship 
with Being. The 'irrefutable evidence of totality' is contested, for 'war and totality' do 
not coincide with 'experience and evidence;' rather, 'philosophical evidence refers from 
itself to a situation that can no longer be stated in terms of "totality" ,' 100 and this 
situation cannot be reached by ontology or phenomenology. It is possible to 'proceed 
from the experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation 
that conditions the totality itself.' 101 And this situation is infinity, 'the gleam (eclat) of 
exteriority or the transcendence of the face of the Other.' 102 Reed indicates that 
98 ibid., p_.22 
99 ibid. 
100 ibid., p.24 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid. 
A Dondeyne, in his article, Inleiding tot het denken van E. Levinas, (Tijdschrift 
voor Filosofie, 25, 3 - 4, 1963), draws attention to the significance of the 'and' in the title 
of Totality and Infinity and views this as best introduction, or point of entry into the 
thought of Emmanuel Levinas. Dondeyne writes, 'Merk op: er wordt gezegd: "Totalite 
et lnjini", niet: "Totalite ou Injini". Stond er "Totalite ou Infini", dan zou dit twee dingen 
kunnen betekenen: ofwel dat de begrippen "totaliteit" en "oneindigheid" synoniem zijn, 
ofwel dat we hier met een dilemma te doen hebben zodat we v66r een keuze worden 
geplaatst. Voor Levinas zijn "totaliteit" en "oneindigheid" niet synoniem; niettemin zijn 
beide begrippen onmisbaar voor een authentisch filosofisch denken, d. w.z. een denken 
dat aan de menselijke bestaanservaring voile recht laat werdervaren, zonder een of 
andere dimensie ervan te verdonkermanen' (p.555). A phenomenology which is 
adequate to our human experience and can fully explain it must embrace both concepts. 
In bringing them together Levinas distinguishes each from the other, but confirms the 
philosophical primacy of infinity (See E Levinas, Preface to Totality and Infinity). 
Perhaps one can recognise here the difference between and as a logical operator, and 
and as a philosophical operator. Whereas and as a logical operator is purely a 
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translating eclat by gleam is to impoverish the term and to maintain it within a the 
notion of light. Eclat is outburst, fragment, scandal; it is clatter, verbal, auditory. 
Maurice Blanchet makes a similar point when he attacks the notion of the ensemble with 
his thought of the 'shattering' (eclatement) effect of a fragment's violence. What is a 
fragment? he asks. The tendency is to regard a fragment as part of a whole. These few 
pages of this text have a con-text which would give them significance; the detail of that 
painting is organised within the frame of the total scene; this phrase of music plays its 
part in the sym-phony or the con-certo. Parts relate to wholes, and presuppose the whole 
to be available to our understanding. The whole gives the part its significance. But, says 
Blanchet, a fragment really does violence to the whole and cries out for its own 
particular integrity. There are parts which are charged with a significance in excess of 
the systematic whole, and which though seemingly surplus to the requirement of the 
balance of the whole, nonetheless serve the whole precisely because of the violence they 
do to the whole, and forever create fissures within it which open on to continued 
significations. 
'Whoever says fragment ought not say simply the fragmenting of an 
already existent reality or the moment of a whole still to come. This is 
hard to envisage due to the necessity of comprehension according to 
(reversible) connective distinguished from the disjunctive or, philosophically speaking, 
and functions both conjunctively and disjunctively, bringing together or associating 
realities which, nonetheless, remain separate. 
One can perhaps see this in the 'laughter which shattered... all the familiar 
landmarks' of Foucault's thought as he read the classification of animals in 'a certain 
Chinese encyclopaedia' which divided animals into those 'belonging to the Emperor', 
'embalmed', 'tame', ... 'drawn with a very fine camelhair brush' etc. (See M Foucault, 
The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Tavistock, London, 
1970, p.xv; originally, Les Mots et !es choses, Gallimard, Paris, 1966)). By means of 
and, the ratio of continuity, with its own particular classificatory episteme, has 
'insinuated itself into the empty space, the interstitial blanks separating all these entities 
from one another' (p.xvi). In other words, and is a tool in the hand of totality. However, 
the fact that the and is insinuated between realities points also the their discontinuity and 
disjunction, or, as Levinas might say, their absolution one from the other in the very 
relation which associates them. Writing later of history in The Archeaology of 
Knowledge, Foucault says, 'The cry goes up that one is murdering history whenever, in 
a historical analysis - and especially if it is concerned with thought, ideas or knowledge 
- one is seen to be using in too obvious a way the categories of discontinuity and 
difference, the notions of threshold, rupture and transformation, the description of series 
and limits.... But one must not be deceived: what is being bewailed with such 
vehemence is not the disappearance of history, but the eclipse of that form of history 
that was secretly, but entirely related to the synthetic activity of the subject... that 
ideological use of history by which one· tries to restore to man everything that has 
unceasingly eluded him for over a hundred years' (p. 14). 
METHOD 
which the only knowledge is knowledge of the whole, just as sight is 
always a view of the whole. For such comprehension, the fragment 
supposes an implied designation of something that has previously been 
or will subsequently be a whole - the severed finger refers back to the 
hand .. ,' 103 
25 
just as a Heideggerian tool derives its significance in its relation within a referential 
totality centred on Dasein. But, the significance of a fragment's 'shattering' (eclatement) 
or 'dislocation' (dislocation) is not simply a negation of a prior positivity of being, or a 
privation, but is a pointing to the value of discontinuity as a prior philosophical theme 
with its own meaning and value. Dislocation is not a lesser situation calling for the 
mending and healing of the whole, but, like the depaysement of exile, is the 
establishment of a new relation with the Outside. The fragment has a significance 
beyond the whole and has the capacity to fracture the whole. It is '[a] piece of meteor 
detached from an unknown sky and impossible to connect with anything that can be 
known.' 104 The eclat of exteriority in the face of the Other, like a fragment, is that 
situation which effects the eclatement of the totality. Insofar, then as phenomenology, 
as a method of philosophy, aims at a comprehension effected through a bringing to light, 
it 'does not constitute the ultimate event of being itself,' 105 for, outwith being, there is 
already a situation in which the hegemony of being has been shattered. 
Now, this 'break up of the formal structure of thought' into events which 'restore 
its concrete significance' is a deduction which is not guided by the ideal of objectivity 
which animates theoretical thought. Rather, it pursues a transcendent intention, outwith 
the noesis-noema structure within which Husserl was confined, and thus is goes beyond 
Husserl. 'Husserlian phenomenology has made possible this passage from ethics to 
metaphysical exteriority.1106 It is this 'nonevident moral relation which, when given a 
philosophical witness via the perturbation of theoretical truths, "restores the concrete 
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1. 3 Rahner's Transcendental Reduction 
Now, the transcendent intention, which can be explicitated through a 
transcendental reflection on the human spirit's dynamic intentionality is evident in 
Rahner's first work, Spirit in the World, in which he undertakes a transcendental 
reflection on the human spirit's dynamic intentionality. Rahner, however, maintains 
himself within a metaphysical framework within which there is a precise correlation 
between being and knowing, and he is guided by the notion of the intelligibility of the 
whole, that is, being; like Husserl, his thought is noematico-noetically structured. The 
noematic question intends being as its noetic correlate. This epistemological thrust is 
developed in Hearers of the Word, which attempts to show 'that human consciousness 
enjoys an intrinsic openness to divine being1108 which is founded on the inherent 
knowability of God. Hoye notes that what Rahner is asserting with 'speculative 
consistency' is 'that God himself falls within the horizon of man's cognitive 
potentiality
1109 
and that this assertion is based upon 'his transcendental analysis of the 
content of human consciousness.1110 But, says Hoye, to affirm that God is knowable in 
himself is not thereby to affirm that he is knowable for man. Rahner's understanding of 
God in Hearers of the Word 'lacks certain fundamental indispensable notes,' 111 for 
though it understands God in his transcendentality, that transcendentality 'pertains not 
to the totality of reality but solely to cognitive reality.1112 In other words, Rahner's 
reduction of the contents of consciousness remains within the noematic-noetic structure 
of thought. As such, one would want to say that it halts too soon. 
Hoye goes further, however, and recognises a 'fundamental dualism' in Rahner 
which can only conceive of reality in terms of the admixture of Being and non-Being, 
and which, therefore, confines God within an ongoing onto-theologism. 113 This, says 
108 W J Hoye, A Critical Remark on Karl Rahner's Hearers of the Word, in 
Anonianum, 48 ( 1973), p.517 
109 ibid., p.518 
110 ibid. 
111 ibid., p.523 
112 ibid. 
113 Hoye argues that God is reduced to the status of creaturehood, a 
composite which comprises, as o~e aspect~ absolu~~ Sein. God 'has' rather t~an 'is' 
b l t S · as Metz renders it m the second ed1t10n of Hearers, and thus 1s also a so u e em, . · h' h l · · 
characterised by the 'ontological difference,' albeit a difference w 1c cu mmates m 
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Hoye, leads to the situation which gives 'a notion of God that is unable to conceive of 
di vine transcendence in respect to the totality and, for the same reason, is devoid of 
authentic divine immanence in creatures.i1 14 In other words, Rahner pays insufficient 
regard to divine difference. However and ironically, the possibility of a philosophy of 
religion is achieved in Hearers of the Word by this very dualism for the association of 
the principles of Sein and Nicht-Sein both brings God, as Being, within the horizon of 
consciousness but maintains him, as Not-Being, beyond knowledge. It is the language 
of Being which hampers Rahners thought, for '[w]hile justly asserting the necessity of 
something other than Sein ... he finds himself in the dilemma of unavoidably treating this 
non-Being in terminology belonging to Being.1115 The question, then, is a question about 
this other than Being. As Hoye concludes, 'Nevertheless, for want of a name, the region 
of reality to which Nicht-Sein testifies proves to be insusceptible to integral subsumption 
into Rahner's attempt at transcending creation." 16 Further, '[t]he attempt to grasp reality 
within the (albeit infinite) perimeter of human consciousness (Erkenntnismetaphysik) 
excludes the supremely important datum that consciousness enjoys a type of reflection 
that is more than the a priori "structure of the known," and more than self-presence: It 
is also aware of the existence of the unknown as such, i.e. of the other than 
consciousness.' 117 Rahner's transcendental reflection needs to be deepened by taking it 
further along the way of a deeper phenomenological reflection which exposes it to an 
ethical other-than-Being which finds its limitation, not in Nicht-Sein but in the positive 
experience of ethical responsibility evoked by the Other whom Being and its categories 
can neither contain nor render justice to. 
Now, Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word do, however, contain 
elements which point to the possibility of an egress from the cognitive framework by 
a further inter-subjective reduction which situates cognitive drive within the context of 
the proto-ethical experience of alterity. Anne Carr, who had to reach Rahner's method 
absolute 'ontological identity, a vo'T]atc; vo11aowc; 
114 ibid., p.529 
115 ibid., p.530 
116 ibid., p.531 
117 ibid., pp.531-532 
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'by inference from his writings on more particular topicsi118 argues that Spirit in the 
World and Hearers of the Word are often taken to be philosophical works which lay the 
foundation for metaphysics and theology, - and here is the difficulty of those who read 
both these 'philosophical' works as a prerequisite for understanding Rahner's theology! -
but they are, rather, 'a theology which looks like philosophy.1119 Spirit in the World and 
Hearers of the Word may be taken as Rahner's initial word on his project, but they are 
certainly not the final word. In fact, seen in the context of his later thinking which 
emphasises a person's transcendental experience, one can ask whether in fact they are 
even an initial word and not a particular response conditioned by a particular Kantian 
philosophical problematic. If his thought is pursued beyond his transcendental 
framework as outlined in Spirit in the World towards those events in which 'the formal 
structure of thought' breaks up, that is, the dialogic and loving encounter with the Other, 
then this event enables, not so much the passage from the dynamism of the intellect to 
the ontological affirmation of being, but more the 'passage from ethics to metaphysical 
exteriority.' Rahner's concern, enabling a fruitful confrontation with Levinas, is not 
primarily the development of a transcendental system, but the failure of theology to 
concern itself with the hearer of revelation. 120 His attempt to address that concern for the 
hearer of Revelation in terms of transcendental subjectivity, however, has perhaps 
proved less than totally successful and has not been as widely accepted as it might, not 
necessarily because of any methodological failure but because, as we say, his reduction 
halts too soon. 
Is it possible, then, to deepen Rahner's reduction in a methodologically coherent 
manner? As soon as one moves beyond the terms of Spirit in the World and begins to 
speak in terms of the 'hearer of revelation' rather than the 'transcendental subject', the 
framework begins to be less one centred on an ego cogito, and more one which is 
embraced by the dialogic capacity of the human person. The very notion of "hearer" 
presupposes one who is addressed by another who speaks first. In fact, by approaching 
the philosophy of religion as 'the Ontology of the "Potentia Oboedientialis" for 
118 B Lonergan, A Response to Father Dych's "Method in Theology 
According to Karl Rabner", in Theology and Discovery, (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1980), p.54. 
119 Anne Carr, Method, p.4, quoting K Rahner, Transcendental Theology, 
in Sacramentum Mundi, Vol. VI, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p.287 




Rahner has already introduced at the beginning of his enquiry the 
possibility of a way beyond ontology through the notion of revelation. What Hearers of 
the Word does to Spirit in the World is actually to change its declension. The 
nominative of speaking in the question with its immediacy and intransitivity becomes 
the accusative of hearing which is always mediate and transitive. The solitary subject 
seeking within itself the transcendental source of its question becomes the one who 
discovers himself always and already the subject of an address. Carr indicates three 
inter-related stages of development in Rahner's 'characteristic method of thought.r1 22 
Firstly, Spirit in the World attempts, by a retrieval of the Thomistic metaphysics of 
knowledge, to demonstrate 'the dialectic unity and interdependence of knowledge of the 
world and metaphysical knowledge in human performaEce.' 123 Its accomplishment, says 
Carr, is the fact that Rahner 'has moved from an analysis of the performance of knowing 
into a metaphysics which encompasses more than knowledge.' 124 Although the person 
is considered as a knowing subject, the Vorgri([is presented as 'a movement of the total 
human spirit in its dimensions of cognition and striving' indicating the 'intrinsic 
emergence of will in human self-realisation.' The resolution of the Kantian problematic 
depends then on 'a reflection on the reciprocity between knowledge and will or 
theoretical and practical reason.' Further, because human performance and its 
unthematic horizons in human consciousness are his concern, 'he has moved beyond the 
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This movement by Rahner beyond the concept to experience is viewed 
negatively as 'an inherent weakness within his thought' by P Burke (Conceptual Thought 
in Karl Rahner, Gregorianum, 75, I (1994) pp.65-93). Burke writes that, in Rabner, '[a]s 
the essential, or formal order is relativised by the existential order in which the essential 
order is grounded and to which it is referred, so the universal concept, which refers to 
the form, is relativised by the sensible singular form from which it cannot be separated, 
and the horizon of all-being to which it is referred. Thus the form or concept, to 
whatever extent it exists distinctly within the Rahnerian analysis of knowledge, is 
always and inevitably relativised' (p.86). Again, Burke maintains that 'because the 
concept is always referred to both "esse" and the concrete,. "this-ther~", such _re~ec~on 
or conceptualisation can never grasp t~e ~-damental unity of subject and obJ.ec?ve 
reality and bring it to conceptual objectw1ty. A concept can only be a hm1ted · 
objectification of this original consciousness' (p.89). It 'is always and only an 
METHOD 
says Carr, 
'basical~y a Kantian transcendental reflection, but embodies an equal 
emph~s1s on "reduction" and "deduction". That is, it begins with an 
analysis of human knowing, an attempt to discover all that is 
simultaneously implied in that performance; then the conditions for the 
possibility of each dimension of knowledge are uncovered, in order that 
the structure of the experience itself may be more exactly described. 
Rahner moves from the a posteriori or ontic level to the a priori or 
ontological level, and then back again to the starting point. The 
empirical reality is analysed to show what is involved a priori; the a 
priori is explicated in order to state more precisely the structure of the 
empirical experience.1126 
30 
The second stage is developed in Hearers of the Word which explores the implications 
of the unitary phenomenon of Spirit-in-the-World, that is, of the conversio as always 
and already the human situation, and 'develops an ontology of human historicity as the 
locus of the metaphysical question', 'the place where a possible revelation might 
occur,
1127 
for 'the question of the human knower reveals not only the openness and 
hiddenness of being but also the historicity and freedom of human existence.1128 Hearers 
of the Word also attempts to clarify the difference between philosophy of religion and 
theology, but this, in turn, demands an answer to the question of whether and how it is 
possible for metaphysics to attain God. For Rahner, theology is not primarily the science 
of God in the objective genitive sense of theou logos, but rather, subjectively-genitivally 
understood as 'so completely dependent on the act of God that it cannot be given its 
foundation by the human mind ... is the original hearing of God's revelation, integrated 
in rudimentary fashion within human understanding.1129 It is this "original theology" 
which is subsequently reflected upon and systematised. Rahner's effort, then, is to 
provide a foundation for 'a "demonstration of the possibility in man for hearing the 
approximation of the original unified self-presence of the subject... existing only as a 
shadow of the reality which it seeks to capture' (p.92). Now, although Burke laments the 
danger which this conceptual relativisation poses for the development of doctrine 
opening the door to neo-Modemism, it is the very inadequacy of the concept to express 
adequately lived-experience which enables thought to be pursued as an endless 
adventure towards infinity. Human existence is not a poor expression of the perfect life 











message of God" if such a message were given and if humanity were granted the 
capacity to hear.
1130 
In other words, Rahner seeks to preserve the integrity of a properly 
theological enterprise in the face of a philosophy of religion which would deprive 
theology of its fundamental autonomy by metaphysically dictating and limiting its 
possible scope. 131 
The presupposition of Hearers of the Word is that it is possible to show that 
'listening for a possible command of God somehow belongs to human nature and really 
is human knowledge .... , and at the same time, is really a supernatural revelation, 
"mysterium stricte dicta.'" 132 In other words, man, as spirit, is metaphysically constituted 
as 'attentive to a possible revelation' that is, as a transcendental openness to God. 
Hearers of the Word thus becomes 'an analytic of the being of man (menschlichen Seins) 
as that which has the capacity to hear a revelation' 133 in which Rahner attempts to show 
'how the natural human constitution is a positive openness for a possible revelation from 
God (and therefore the possibility of theology)' 134 by a 'transcendental reflection on the 
conditions for the possibility of revelation.' 135 Now, until one enjoys the direct vision of 
God, God must reveal himself by a "word" which the person can understand. Rahner 
must, therefore, 'define the characteristics of human transcendence in order to determine 
the place of possible revelation.' 136 'Metaphysical anthropology thus becomes an 
ontology of the obediential potency for a possible free revelation, and the philosophy 
of religion an analysis of the human capacity for such a revelation.' 137 
Now, the fact that Rahner's "philosophical" description of the human person is 
determined by his theological conviction that revelation is a given and that only a 
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Rahner's understanding of the human subject as naturally and posztzvely 
open to divine revelation develops in the context of the Nature-Grace debate in Catholic 
theology, and in dialogue with de Lubac and la nouvelle theologie. See later. . 
136 
137 
ibid., p. 102 
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'Hea~ers of the Word is ultimately too limited because its starting point 
a~d its statement of the problem of philosophy of religion is construed 
simply as the problem of knowledge. Hence it remains fundamentally 
intellectualist, despite its inclusion of the intimate relationship of will 
and love to knowledge. At the same time, it is too much to be genuine 
philosophy because it is in fact fundamental theology. It presupposes the 
existence of God and the possibility of revelation, a position which can 
be justified theologically but which is not philosophically grounded in 
Hearers of the Word. Significant as the work is, its value is diminished 
because of methodological confusions.' 138 
32 
However, the methodological confusion, says Carr, which is seemingly apparent 
m Rahner can be clarified if one allows oneself 'to follow the development of his 
theological work to determine his understanding of the foundation for theology, for only 
in this way will his theological method be understood, not as something totally worked 
out beforehand and then applied to various aspects of theology, but as a method which 
emerges in the course of concrete theological refection.r1 39 Such a clarification emerges 
'in his notion of the supernatural existential and its concomitant factor of revelation as 
primarily transcendental and only secondarily as reflexive articulation in categorical-
verbal revelation.r1 4o And this, says Carr, 'implies important differentiations in his 
understanding of philosophy, human nature, and revelation, and signifies implicit self-
criticism on Rabner's part with regard to his early writings.' 141 
The third stage in the development of Rahner's theological method is found in 
his reflection on the Supernatural Existential. In his article on The Theological Concept 
of Concupiscence, 142 Rabner argues that 'a supernatural ordination to grace is already 
present in the concrete, historical order' and that '[t]his ordination is not simply an 
external, juridical decree of God,' but is 'a real ontological existential of man which 
qualifies him really and intrinsically.' 143 Indeed, so all-embracing of human existence 
138 ibid., p. l 05, quoting Heinrich Fries, Die katholische Religion philosophie 
der Gegenwart, (Heidelberg: F H Kerle Verlag, 1949), pp.258-260 
139 ibid., p.l 07 
140 ibid., p. l 06. See Rabner and Ratzinger, Revelation and Tradition, (New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1966), pp.9-25 
141 ibid.,p.107 
142 K Rahner, TI, I, pp.372-382 
143 A Carr, op. cit., p.110, quoting K Rahner; "Theological Concept of 
Concupiscentia, TI, I, p.376 
METHOD 33 
is the supernatural, that philosophy itself 'only exists within the wider context of the 
supernatural existential, an existential created in the human person and the world from 
the beginning by the fact of grace (and its concomitant revelation) which always 
concretely affects the data with which philosophy deals,' 144 and it is thus a 
transcendental presupposition for philosophical thinking. 
Carr concludes that a perspectival shift has occurred in the development of 
Rahner's foundational from his metaphysics of knowledge to some of the more overtly 
theological themes treated in his investigations. Whereas Spirit in the World provided 
the epistemological and metaphysical foundations for theology, and Hearers of the 
144 ibid., p.115 
Rahner indicates that the human person can only be properly understood in terms of 
reason and revelation, and that, in fact, reason only attains its true nature when it is 
understood in its relation and response to an already given address by God to the human 
person. In The Dignity and Freedom of Man, TI, Vol II, pp.235-263, a paper originally 
given in 1952 at the Austrian Katholiekentag, he writes that this implies that the person 
is already beyond himself in grace, that is, operates within a supernatural existential. 
'This means: the person ... is called to direct personal communion with God in Christ, 
perennially and inescapable, whether he accepts the call in redemption and grace or 
whether he closes himself to it in guilt... The person is addressed by the personal 
revelation of the Word of God in saving history which finds its climax in Jesus 
Christ.. .. ; the person is unquestionably situated within the offer of his interior, saving 
and di vinising grace ... .The supernatural existential is related to what we have called the 
personal nature of man, as a gratuitous free gift of God, as grace. In this way man exists 
in nature and 11 supernature 111 (p.240). '[H]is being possesses an ontic and spiritual-
personal capacity for communicating with Jesus Christ in whom God has forever made 
the countenance of man his own and has opened the reality of man, with an 
unsurpassable finality, in the direction of God' (pp.240-241). 
Elsewhere, in Experience of the Spirit and Existential Commitment, Tl, XVI, 
pp.24-34, Rahner makes the point that this supernatural ordering of the human person 
is constitutive to an understanding of the person, but is something which is given to the 
person. 'The gift of grace through the Spirit of God is in the first instance a genuine self-
communication of God to the transcendent human self and not an internal or external 
categorial reality of human consciousness, material, as it were for free decisions of the 
human person' (p.24). The point, for our study, is that already the confines of the ego 
cogito have been breached, for Rahner's 'basic assumption' in developing the notion of 
the supernatural existential is that 'the essential nature of genuine experience of the 
Spirit does not consist in particular objects of experience found in human awareness but 
occurs rather when a man experiences the radical re-ordering of his transcendent nature 
in knowledge and freedom towards the immediate reality of God through God's self-
communication in grace' (pp.27-28). That is, '[i]t comes about rather through God's self-
communication to the human spirit ('uncreated grace' by which God becomes a 
constitutive element in human transcendence' (p.26). 'Experience of the Spirit is, 
therefore, experience of the radical and permanent nature of human transcendence, 
which goes beyond itself towards God because it is constantly impelled by his self-
communication' (p.28). 
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Word indicated the structure of the human spirit as pointing to the structure of revelation 
in its essentially historical dimension, the essays relating to the supernatural existential 
make it clear that, for Rahner, the primary fact is the reality of revelation and divinising 
grace.14s 
145 See A Carr, op.cit., pp.120-121 
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1. 4. Another Reason, or the Other as Reason 
Now, the criticism which H Fries 146 addresses to Rahner, namely that theological 
conviction informs rationality in Rahner, raises the problem of the relationship between 
method and rationality, a problem which is apparent also in Levinas. It is the problem 
of whether method as transparency can be imposed as a system to order experience and 
whether rationality operates independently of the particular discourse whether it be the 
moral discourse of Levinas or the theological discourse of Rahner, or whether reason 
operates other than by coercion and force. 147 
146 See A Carr, ibid., p. l 05 
147 With regard to Levinas' concept of reason, Smith argues that it is 
'recreated in Levinas' argument as a function of the moral relation rather than of the 
theoretical relation' (S Smith, art.cit., p.64). The question of rationality cannot be 
separated from the question of method, but the significance and the concomitant 
challenge of Levinas thought for a philosophy used to directness and methodological 
clarity is 'the basic gratuitousness of his appeal' for 'he does not expect to demonstrate 
or coerce assent in the necessitarian fashion in which intuitions and arguments are 
typically wielded in our tradition' (p.65). Smith uses the example of Cain who murders 
his brother Abel, no doubt implying Blanchot's question in L'Entretien Infini when he 
asks why Cain killed Abel. Cain, as the epitome of the moral sceptic, is 'insensitive to 
his neighbour's claim' and his action cannot be contradicted as can the assertions of the 
theoretical sceptic. 'Cain seems rather to have logic and evidence all on his side, for the 
evidence is of a universal war from which no one can keep a distance, and logic 
supports this war by defining everything in terms of everything else ... so that the 
pluralism demanded by Totality and Infinity is lacking' (p.65). Now, it is only if Cain 
is wrong, and that it is the case that I am my brother's keeper, that Levinas' argument is 
justified, and I am 'warranted or constrained to follow the conceptual development of 
Levinas' philosophy' (p.65). Smith expands on this: 'Only if I acknowledge the surplus 
of my being toward my neighbour can I grant the appropriateness of the conceptual 
surplus of the Levinasian emphasis. In other words, only if I acknowledge substitution 
as the normative structure of intersubjectivity, according to which I am hostage 
to the need of others, responsible even for their responsibility, need I acknowledge the 
appropriateness of Levinas' interpretation of signification and the corollary 
interpretation of reason' (p.65). Levinas asserts that Cain is wrong, but cannot 
demonstrate it from first principles, for, in Levinas' thinking, ethics as the meaning of 
'reason as the one-for-the-other' (OB, p.167) is the first principle, and becomes the 
'principle of principles' subverting phenomenology's 'principle of principles', namely 
subjectively centred intentionality. Like grace, 'it belongs essentially to the goodness of 
this responsibility that it be gratuitous and independent of coercive demonstration. The 
personal order is different from the ontological because it rests on appeal and obedience 
rather than on causation and comprehension' (Smith, p.66). In other words the method 
of truth, emphasising the hodological aspect of method, cannot be by any way other than 
justice, which is responsibility. Going further, there can be no privileged external, 
rational viewpoint which one might adopt and which would provide the ontological 
foundation and methodological structure against which the claims of ethics could be 
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1. 41 Reason as 'Reductio in Mysterium' 
Method and foundation are inextricably linked. The transcendental reflection 
which Rahner employs 'provides not only a method of approach to the foundations of 
human existence in the world but also mirrors that foundation.' 148 Being solicits the 
question, and the question intends Being. But this remains problematical: the foundation 
which motivates the method and which the method seeks to clarify is transcendent with 
respect to the method. Carr indicates that Rahner 'repeatedly denies that the absolute of 
being is known as an object or that the mind can fonn an adequate concept of God.' 149 
How is this problem to be resolved adequately? Carr concludes, 
'The method will ineluctably move from the manifold truths or mysteries 
of Christianity to an ultimate reductio in mysteriwn: their fundamental 
unity will be approached in the single mystery of hwnan existence as the 
single mystery of the nearness of God. Such a method results in a 
theology which is essentially the science of mystery as such, i.e., the 
concept and the experience of the incomprehensible, nameless, and final 
mystery which is called God.' 150 
judged. Justice is always prior to truth, and although there remains the 'scandalous 
freedom to deny or disregard the moral context by participating in being on purely 
ontological terms ... [t]he goodness and superiority of the ethical argument, otherwise 
than being, is its very powerless to squelch Cain, the moral sceptic' (p.68). Cain is 
always possible, '[b]ut because of the divine inspiration of our already-given moral 
responsibility - an already-givenness more radical than the theoretical nongivenness 
of the other - ... Cain is not the arbiter of sense and reason' (p.69). 
Similarly, though anticipating the difference in understanding between Levinas 
and Rahner of the theological relationship, Rahners theological reason provides the 
context in which what he argues has meaning, and what he says likewise is 'gratuitous 
and independent of coercive demonstration' (p.66). 
148 A Carr, op. cit., p.121 
149 ibid., p.17 
Carr draws attention to Spirit in the World, pp.179-183. Rahner acknowledges 
the non-objective status of the whither (Voratif) of the Vorgrijf, that is, Esse Absolutum, 
which Rahner here equates with God. But this Esse Absolutum is not apprehended as a 
represented (Vorgestellter) object. The fulness of its being is never given objectively, 
but only made available through reflection, and then only as esse commune. But, argues 
Rahner, although reflection only attains esse commune, there must necessarily be an 
esse absolutum as an always and already condition of knowledge. Now, the move from 
esse commune to esse absolutum which Rahner identifies as God cannot be as a result 
of an a priori proof of God's existence, but are derived, and derived theologically, 'in 
the a posteriori apprehension of a real existent and as a necessary condition of the latter' 
(Spirit in The World, p.181). · 
150 ibid., p.268 
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Rahner himself says that the reductio in mysterium 'expresses a methodological pointer 
for the theologian' 
151 
and is in fact the condition which makes all the perceptions 
available to the human reason possible,' 152 such that theology 'is to be understood as the 
"science" of mystery as such.' 153 Although the methods employed by theology 'apply 
first and foremost in the particular concrete situation of the individual' and do 'not lay 
any claim to any permanent or universal validity,' 154 that particular concrete situation 
can be exposed to a transcendental reduction which reveals the subject as an orientation 
towards mystery as such, and this mystery, 'radically beyond all comprehension' is the 
horizon which 'makes knowledge possible within its ambience, this ultimate point of 
reference towards which all knowledge tends.' 155 The relation to mystery, then, is the 
possibility condition of knowledge. '[T]his fundamental state of being exposed to 
incomprehensibility is understood precisely as the condition of the possibility of 
conceptually elaborating, delimiting, and discriminating knowledge.r1 56 Egan comments 
on this when he notes that '[m]uch of [Rahner's] theology is ... architectonic, a reduction 
into Mystery, not really unscientific, for the "unscientific nature of this different kind 
of discipline which we are striving for lies in the object, not in the subject and his 
method."r1 57 The difficulty of the methodological attempt to reduce the mystery within 
a cognitive confine lies in the object. The cognitive exposition of mystery fails because, 
with regard to a cognitive framework, mystery is ex-position; as Husserl already 
indicated, 'Jedes Eifassen ist ein Herausfassen.' 'Comprehensive knowledge is a 
deficient mode of knowing when measured by that knowledge which is beyond all doubt 
the highest, the most intensive, and that which bestows the deepest blessing upon us, 
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Human reason is able to transcend the concrete because it has always and already 
transcended itself towards mystery. 'Natural' reason is by its nature already 'supernatural' 
for the existential of human existence always and already operates within a supernatural 
horizon. 'Thus,' says Rahner, 
'the mysterium reveals itself as the condition which makes it possible for 
us to know that which is not mysterious. The relationship in which man 
stands to the mysterium is a primary and ultimate datum of his own 
nature and his mode of existence, one of which, in his transcendence, he 
is constantly aware, though not as the object of his conscious thought, 
and one which cannot be deduced from any other datum as a secondary 
phenomenon.' 159 
Elsewhere, Rahner writes, 'reason must be understood more fundamentally as precisely 
the capacity of the incomprehensible, as the capacity of being sejzed by what is always 
insurmountable, not essentially as the power of comprehending, of gaining the mastery 
and subjugating. Reason must be understood ... as the capacity of excessus, as going out 
into the inaccessible ... i1 6o 
1. 42 Levinas' Reason 
The place and role of reason is recognised as problematical in Levinas thinking 
also. David Boothroyd comments that Levinas' thought 'exhibits a commitment to 
intelligibility; it is philosophical and yet seeks to express what in principle remains 
beyond the grasp of philosophy.' 161 Yet, although Levinas expressly commits himself 
to reason, 162 nonetheless, Derrida calls attention, in 'Violence and Metaphysics', 163 to the 
'theoretical incoherence of the notions of pure infinity and absolute otherness, or 
exteriority'. Like a 'square circle', the concept of an 'absolutely other' or an 'otherwise 
159 ibid., p.105 
160 idem, The Human Question of Meaning, p.97 
161 David Boothroyd, Responding to Levinas, in The Provocation of 
Levinas: Rethinking the Other, R Bernasconi & D Wood (eds.), (London: Routledge, 
1988), p.17 
162 E Levinas, TI, p.204 
163 J Derrida, Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas, in Writing and Difference, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978) 
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than being' are empty intuitions and are meaningless. 164 Derrida, highlighting the 
problem of alterity as it presents itself in Levinas' thought of Totality and Infinity, 
argues that Levinas proposes an absolute alterity, but that alterity, otherness, can only 
be understood in terms of being other than, that is, in its relation with the Same, a 
relation which Levinas is keen to exclude, for to be related to the Same, and to be 
judged other in terms of a relation to the Same is to be contaminated and compromised 
by the Same, and hence, not to be truly other. The transcendence for which Levinas 
argues, says Derrida, demands 'as one of its essential meaningsr1 65 that the self knows 
itself to be the other of the other, that the self is already implicated in the notion of 
alterity, otherwise the violence which the Same inflicts upon the other would not only 
be without a victim; it would be a violence without a perpetrator · 'the violence without 
victim would also be a violence without author.r1 66 Same and other, for Derrida, are in 
relation, and the only way in which absolution would be achieved from the relation 
between them is if the other were the other not of the Same, but of the other, other than 
other; according to Derrida, for Levinas, 'the other is what it is only as the absolute 
infinitely other absolved of its relation to the Same.r1 67 Derrida argues that the 
theoretical incoherence of an absolute alterity is not some Parmenidean muse which 
amounts to 'verbiage' or a 'dialectical virtuosity in the play of the Same', but raises 
problems for the rational coherence of thought itself. He writes, 
'(I) The infinitely other ... can be what it is only if it is other, that is, other 
than. Other than must be other than myself. Henceforth, it is no longer 
infinitely, absolutely other. It is no longer what it is. If it was absolved, 
it would not be the other either, but the Same. (2) The infinitely other 
cannot be what it is - infinitely other - except by being absolutely not the 
same. That is, in particular, by being other than itself (non ego). Being 
164 The 'theoretical incoherence of the notions of pure infinity and absolute 
otherness, or exteriority' indicated by Derrida derive from an understanding of meaning 
as a signification having the structure of ceci en tant que ce/a. In this structure which, 
foIIowing Husserl, equates meaningful language with intuitive fulfilment, the notion of 
an 'absolutely other' or an 'otherwise than being', like that of 'a square circle,' remain 
empty significations, and senseless. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty may have recognised 
that intuitions also depend for their meaning on the context of significations formed by 
language and culture, but since language remains in the house of being, to speak of the 
transcendence of being made no sense (See Levinas, HAH, pp.28ff). 




other than itself, it is not what it is. Therefore, it is not infinitely other, 
etc.i1 68 
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What this means, says Derrida, is that 'the expression "infinitely other" or "absolutely 
other" cannot be stated and thought simultaneously; the other cannot be absolutely 
exterior to the same without ceasing to be other.r1 69 The corollary of this, of course, is 
that 'the same is not a totality closed in upon jtself 170 but includes, as part of it meaning, 
alterity. 
Levinas, however, persists in affirming an absolutely other and a pure infinity, 
and the possibility of such a thought. Seemingly incoherent though the concepts be, he 
opens Totality and Infinity by affirming that Everyone will readily agree (on conviendra 
aisement .. .). Although what he writes may invite scepticism, nonetheless, like 
philosophy's failure to refute scepticism which makes its perennial return, Levinas' 
assertions, too, escape ultimate refutation for, although seemingly self-contradictory and 
refutable, they have their origin in an agreement which precedes them and which 
persists in the face of the logic of contradiction. Questioning begins in agreement, and 
so is already a response. 'The sceptical attitude, as an essential aspect of all 
philosophical questioning, must itself be questioned as to its sources.' 171 
Now, there is not only agreement, but agreement that it is of the highest 
importance. The emphasis on the superlative is 'deeply involved in his "answer 
concerning method" ,' 172 but it is not originary. The question of the highest, redefined in 
the idea of infinity, has no logical or ontological priority, but rather comes an-archically 
before thought and existence, and rather than founding the world, disrupts it. As such, 
it 'is entirely opaque to methodology, since no system can be founded upon it. A process 
of questioning leads back to this pre-originary anarchy, but no response is fully 
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For the significance of proto-agreement, see my forthcoming article, Agreement 
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'disrupts the way in which knowledge is conceived,' 174 what does it mean to know? 
Totality and Infinity offers a critique of comprehensive knowledge and the 
phenomenological conception of consciousness as consciousness of something; 
'[i]ntentionality ... cannot account for the absolute transcendence that the idea of infinity 
requires .... ' However, insofar as 'everyone agrees that it is important to know, ... 
knowledge is under the sway of opinion, and, 'says Reed, 'we suspect that Levinas has 
no intention of replacing our ready agreement with a certain knowledge. The agreement 
remains prior to knowledge; it is never superceded.r175 In other words, the ego cogito is 
not the final indubitable foundation of knowledge, but finds itself already and always 
within a relation which transcends the ego; for Rahner, this is articulated in terms of the 
supernatural existential - the supernatural is already and always an existential of Dasein; 
for Levinas, it is the relation with the infinity or extreme otherness of the Other. Now, 
what is placed in question is precisely the relation between knowledge and morality, that 
is, whether we are duped by .... morality. Descartes had placed morality 'at the furthest 
extremity from the founding moment; morality was the fruit of the tree ofknowledge.' 176 
But Descartes also valued the superlative as the foundation of knowledge, seeing in the 
certitude of the infinite the support of the cogito. To his own question of whether the 
idea of the infinite is 'discovered by a reasoning or an intuition that can posit only in 
themes', Levinas answers that '[t]he infinite cannot be thematised, and the distinction 
between reasoning and intuition does not apply to the access to infinity.' 177 Access to 
infinity is by way of a superlation which emphasises the superlative to the point of 
hyperbole such that 'they are enabled to describe something that absolutely exceeds their 
grasp.'178 
174 ibid., p.77 
175 ibid. 
176 ibid., p.78 
177 E Levinas, TI, p.211 
178 C W Reed, Levinas' Question p. 78 
This problematic finds a parallel in the question of the meaningfulness 
•A of religious statemnts and the Thomistic doctrine of analogy. See, for example, James 
F Ross, "Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language," in Aquinas: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1976). Ross 
maintains that a response to the question '[ c ]an you show that religious statements are 
meaningful?' (p.93) can be articulated in terms of analogy, and by so doing, one is 
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Reed's conclusion is that 'we have been duped by morality to the extent that we 
expect some new knowledge to alter the agreements under which we live'; further, 
'[s]tructurally the dupery is even more explicit, for ... we place the ego at the centre of 
the moral universe, thus excluding the others whom morality supposedly involves.1179 
In other words, '[w]e have been duped by morality to the extent that we place the ego 
above and before the other person.r18o But, 'Levinas does not believe that any knowledge 
will alter our agreement as to what is of the highest importance. And so ... we have not 
been duped by morality .... ; morality, by preserving the position of the other person 
above the ego, preserves the absolute transcendence that invests experience with 
meaning.r1 81 Elsewhere, speaking of the dupery of uttered truth, Levinas writes, 
'If no truth uttered could, without dupery, obtain as a primary truth, the 
interlocutor as a being and the relationship with the interlocutor's being, 
that is, language, situates one above the totality, and makes one able to 
seek it is out, if not discover, the dupery involved in the truths put 
forth.'182 
enabled to '(1) preserve the transcendence of God; (2) preserve the intelligibility of 
theological language; (3) make sense of the claim that human experience can furnish 
some evidence for the truth of the theological beliefs' (p.133) 
See also, and especially, David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, (London, 
SCM Press, 1981 ), pp.408-438, where he speaks of analogy as 'articulating similarity-
in-difference' (p.408). Significantly for this present work, Tracy draws attention to 
Rahner's linking of Mystery and Analogy. He writes, '[t]he obscure, for Rahner, is 
understood as obscure only on the other side of the clarity provided by those analogies 
and that order. The incomprehensible is theologically retrieved as incomprehensible 
only on the other side of a theological comprehensibility of those analogies and that 
order. Radical mystery is theologically understood not as a puzzle or problem but as 
mystery only on the other side of a critical, reflective retrieval of the intelligibility of ./t 
the concepts in the doctrines and the ordered relationships among the major doctrines. 
The unity achieved is never the deadened uniformity beloved by a univocal mind but 
a unity-in-difference disclosed by similarities-in-difference to an analogical mind. For 
Rabner, reality not merely has analogies but is analogy through and through. As the 
analogous journeys of the mystical theologies remind us, even the religious silence 
evoked by an intensified (i.e. mystical) religious experience of the orginating event is 
theologically understood as silence only on the other side of that speech, that reflective, 
second-order, kataphatic speech proper to the mystical theological as speaker' (p.412). 
179 ibid. 
180 ibid., p.79 
181 ibid. 
182 E Levinas, The Ego and the Totality, pp.42-43 
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Now, this pro to-agreement between interlocutors which sustains expressed agreement, 
and in relation to which alone the possibility of 'agreeing to disagree' or 'agreeing to 
differ' have any sense is articulated by Levinas, in Otherwise than Being, in terms of the 
distinction between what is uttered - le Dit - which is capable of duping us, and the 
actuality of uttering itself - le Dire - which is the prior relationship with an interlocutor 
which is able to support and vouch for what is uttered. 'The essential condition for 
propositional truth is not in the disclosure of a being, or of the being of beings, but the 
expression of an interlocutor to whom I tell both the being he is and the being of his 
being.' 183 This implies a faith or trnst in the other person. 'An interlocutor is not affirmed 
183 ibid., p.43 
Levinas seems to distance himself from Heidegger here. Graham Ward points 
out, however, that 'the distinction between the Saying and the Said is Heidegger's before 
being Levinas' (Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p.112). Charting the development of Heidegger's thought, 
particularly regarding poetic language, Ward says that 'Heidegger listens in the poetry 
to what is unsayable' and 'is moving beyond hermeneutics towards that which is the 
condition for hermeneutics,' to the 'transcendental condition for language' (pp.114-15). 
'The Word is a hint, and not a sign in the sense of mere signification' (On the Way to 
Language, p.27). Further, that 'hint' points towards the inadequacy of a 
phenomenological approach, or, we might say, the failure of the transcendental 
reduction in Husserlian phenomenology to address adequately the human situation of 
inter-subjectivity and the need to take the reduction further. 
David Boothroyd also questions whether Levinas's phenomenological analyses 
and subsequent claims are 'as radically opposed to Heidegger as he clearly thinks' 
(Responding to Levinas, p.17), because, despite any difference, 'there remains the fact 
that they are both attempting to deconstuct/surpass/delimit/go beyond ... the logocentric 
tradition' (p.19). Heidegger's project in Being and Time is an 'existential hermeneutic,' 
founded on Dasein's precomprehension of Being, in which 'Being is both disclosed and 
dissimulated in and by the question of Being - in language' (p.21 ). Being hides within 
the on tic metaphor of language, appearing in but transcending 'metaphysical (antic) 
determination,' as 'a trace which marks the withdrawal of Being within the antic 
metaphor' (ibid., p.21 ). Levinas, says Boothroyd, fails to give due weight to the 
'ontological difference' in Heiddeger, and asks whether Derrida is not correct in saying 
that 'Levinas confirms Heidegger in his disclosure: for does not the latter see in 
metaphysics (in metaphysical ontology) the forgetting of Being and the dissimulation 
of the ontological difference?' (Derrida, Violence and Metaphysics, p.142). By 
confirming Heidegger as the extreme example of the violence towards alterity to which 
the ontological tradition, as a history of Being, is susceptible, Levinas advances his own 
thought of absolute separation, not within the framework of Being, but in terms 
of the separation which the fact of speech outlines. 'Speaking (conversation) is 
understood to do the work of restoring the antecedence of the ethical relation' by 
interrupting a previously uninterrupted (comprehensive) relation between the same and 
the other' (ibid., p.25). But this, as Ward, indicates above, is not at odds with Heidegger. 
The difference between the two is ultimately theological. 'Levinas's work,' says 
Ward, 'can be viewed as a Jewish midrash on Heidegger's' (Ward, p.123). Both 
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like a truth, but believed,' 184 not as 'a second source of cognition' but 'presupposed by 
every theoretical statement.1185 Where phenomenology fails is in its analysis of uttered 
truth, and in its halting before the interlocutor. It is 'the face-to-face position 
characteristic of language [which] admits of a more radical phenomenological 
analysis.1186 
Now, it is this emphasis on agreement, says Smith, that revises the notion of 
rationality with which Levinas operates. Whereas the tradition privileges theoretical 
truth, in the 'root complicity' between its epistemological ontological emphases, Levinas 
claims that prior to truth there is justice187 which is irreducible to any teleological unity. 
The perichoresis of being and knowing is contested by the social relation which is an 
essential 11 nonadequation11 • The other does not present himself as a truth to be known, 
but 'is the one in the face of whom truths are offered and criticised in discourse; he is the 
judge of the proceedings never the accused.1188 Although philosophy tends to reduce the 
order of justice to the order of knowledge and truth, the human context is non-
theoretical, primarily moral, and the presupposition of truth. 
This elevation of the truth of justice over epistemological and ontological truth 
to the status of a philosophical thesis is immediately problematical, for 'how can 
operate 'at the limits of phenomenology,' both are 'metaphysicians of metaphysical 
desire,' both are 'concerned with origins,' both 'treat concealment' and wish to locate, 
beyond this conc~ment, 'the place of the unthought, the wholly other' (Ward, p.123). D' 
Heidegger, however, commits himself to the historicity of thought, outside of which 
there is no alterity, save a hint, and the neutrality of Being, and remains within 
philosophy; Levinas, in his concern for the transcendent, finds his significant difference 
from Heidegger in locating the post-metaphysical in an ethical a priori, which, 
ultimately, for Ward, is a theological a priori. 'It is the theological perspective that 
al lows Levinas to describe the Saying in profoundly personalist and ethical language' 
(Ward, p.125). Again, 'Levinas's project, unlike Heidegger's, appeals to monotheism's 
God. It is this theological appeal that determines the ethical emphasis in his work upon 
social responsibility and intersubjectivity' (Ward, p.140). 
184 E Levinas, The Ego and The Totality, p.41 
185 ibid. 
Levinas writes, 'Faith is not the knowledge of a truth open to doubt or capable 
of being certain.... it is the face-to-face encounter with a hard and substantial 
interlocutor...' (ibid.). 
186 ibid., p.43 
187 See idem, TI, pp.42-48 
188 S Smith, art. cit., p.55 
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[Levinas'] case be made except as a statement of the case? How can a rational account 
be given of something that is not a truth? 1189 'Or is the idea of the other a merely verbal 
proposition of meaning, unfulfillable and untestable, which thus ought to be excluded 
from philosophical discussion?r1 9o Such questions, however, are grounded in the 
presupposition of theoretical truth rather than the truth of justice which 1s 
'fundamentally different.r1 91 For, while the idea of the absolutely other may be 
incoherent, as Derrida claims, it is must still be asked 'what this incoherence might 
betoken, or what purpose it serves.1192 The other may be 'a phenomenological nonobject, 
absolutely nonevident and independent of any intentional correlation,' 193 yet nonetheless 
there is still the social relation within which questions of truth and coherence are asked 
and answered. Smith argues that, '[b]y calling the social relation "the logical plot of 
being," 194 and asserting that being is plural, or that 'exteriority "is" the essence of 
being,' 195 Levinas uses the language of ontology to express anti-ontology; he answers 
the question of being by displacing it is.' 196 Thus, 'the paradoxical antiphenomenology 
and anti-ontology of Totality and Infinity are to be taken, not as phenomenological and 
ontological theses, but as pointers from phenomenology and ontology to that which they 
fail to express, the transcendence of the moral life.' 197 It is an approach which 
189 ibid. 
190 ibid., p.56 
191 ibid. 
192 ibid. 
193 ibid., p.55 
194 E Levinas, TI, p.289 
195 ibid., p.292 
Rahner also explicitly acknowledges the pl~urality of Being, when, in "The 
Theology of the Symbol," he notes that Being cannot be reduced to 'a hollow, lifeless 
identity' (p.227), but rather that 'a being is, of itself, independently of any comparison 
with anything else, plural in its unity' (p.227) 
196 S Smith, art. cit., p.55 
197 ibid., p.56 
Ward comments that 'Levinas moves through a phenomenological 
analysis of subjectivity qua consciousness towards the other (l'autre) beyond and behind 
the Other person (l'autnti). The movement towards the other-in-th-self is a movement O'-
towards the collapse of phenomenology' (op. cit., pp.142-143). 
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approaches the significance of the social relation - which 'does not belong to 
phenomenology, to the comprehension of "appearance" and "dissimulation"" 98 - 'from 
the standpoint of the phenomenology that it interrupts.' 199 
One must approach Levinas philosophy, then, not by asking whether or not it).( 
might be rational 'according to the theoretical-descriptive idea of rationality' but by 
asking 'how his argument revises the meaning of rationality itself, by challenging the 
assumption that the pursuit of theory simply justifies itself and controls all meaning.1200 
Rationality, theoretically considered, operates within an inter-relational context in which 
0 \ the other~ always calls for prior consideration. For Levinas, this demands the assertion 
of the priority of justice over truth, or of justice as the context within which any uttered 
truth has meaning; for Rabner, it is the realisation that love is the fulfilment of ratio and 
that justice is the doing of love to the neighbour, before whose mystery there is always 
more to be done. As Levinas aptly puts it, 'Philosophy is the wisdom of love at the 
service of love.'201 The focus of Totality and Infinity, then, is the deformation of 
phenomenology and ontology which results from the interlocutor's transcendence with 
respect to the question of his theoretical truth. 'The face to face remains an ultimate 
situation,'202 and the meaning of reason is now apology and appeal to the other as 'the 
primordial phenomenon of reason,'203 'the first rational teaching, the condition for all 
teaching.'204 'The essence of reason consists, not in securing man's foundation and 
powers, but in calling him in question and inviting him to justice.'205 The two "reasons" 
which are evident in Totality and Infinity present two philosophical roads: the one, a 
cul-de-sac leading to the incoherent idea of the absolute otherness of the neighbour 
which discredits every theoretical attempt to deal with intersubjectivity (and this 'is, on 
198 E Levinas, DEHH, p.199 
199 ibid. 
200 S Smith, art.cit., p.56 
201 E Levinas, OB, pp.161-162 
202 E Levinas, TI, p.88 
203 ibid., p.252 
204 ibid., p.203 
205 ibid., p.88 
'. 
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the whole, the main achievement of Totality and Infinity');206 the other, indicated as a 
via eminentiae, leading 'to a positive claim for the rationality of morality and a positive 
linkage between justice and being,'207 which derives from 'an ethical surplus of saying 
similar to the theoretical minus of scepticism' and which, although 'essentially refutable' 
and 'incapable of a coherent appearance in the text of discourse,' is nonetheless 
'unquenchable in inspiration' and outwith the 'synchronic teleology of knowing and 
being.'208 'The moral, unlike the merely sceptical, is a surplus instead of a denial or 
privation; but it is equally refutable.'209 Yet, like the sceptical, it perdures. In other 
words, Levinas operates within a framework of diachronic signification which refuses 
the disposal of the truly transcendent originary agreement by intuition or the play of 
being. This means, however, that Ceci is not offered for cela in a representative or 
significative manner as in Derrida's structure of meaning as ceci en tant que cela, but 
as a personal, ethical signification which coincides with the moral event of substitution 
in which one is for the other (moi en tant que celui). It is the self that "'stands for" the 
neighbour as does the sign for the signified, one for another.'210 Derrida's implicit 
standard of rationality and meaningfulness, therefore, finds its critic in Levinas who 
argues that language as representation is only 'a mode of its primordial work of opening 
interlocutors to each other for mutual service,'211 and that the root structure of reason is 
the "one-for-another" of substitution and signification,'212 which is to restate the thesis 
of Totality and Infinity that philosophy is morality before it is theory. 'Not by emphasis 
and not by logic does this philosophy appeal, but by an emphasis of evidence and logic 
based on the elementary solicitation of every person by every other.'213 However, the 
'glory of purely "rhetorical" argwnent is that it is inconclusive' and abstains from the 
206 ibid., p.59 
207 S Smith, art. cit., p.59 
208 ibid., p.62 
209 ibid., p.65 
210 See E Levinas, OB, pp.11-14 
211 S Smith, art. cit., p.61 
212 ibid.; cf. E Levinas, OB, p.167 
213 S Smith, art. cit., p.68 
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coerc1 ve demonstration, the winning, which would end all argument, 'in order to 
preserve what argwnent is primordially expressive of, namely, moral fellowship.' 214 
214 ibid., p.69 
Smith points out that this radical introduction of the interlocutor into a methodology has 
implications for the manner or the style in which the methodology will be pursued and 
can be compared to the relationship between the methodological assertions of the 
preface and the main text, Reed comments that 'the methodological assertions of the 
preface are not necessarily more trustworthy or more insightful than the method as it is 
performed in the text itself. The method may indeed be opposed to the methodology' 
(p.72) 'The word by way of preface ..... belongs to the very essence oflanguage, 
which consists in continually undoing its phrase by the foreword or 
exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to restate without 
ceremonies what has already been ill understood in the inevitable 
ceremonial in which the said delights' (Levinas, Tl, p.30). Hence 
the intrinsic importance of style for method. The ceremony of language 
must happen, and no transcendental methodological discourse can 
replace or overcome it ~because 'the dupery of every spoken truth 
/'- always retumsA(Smith, p.72). 'The ceremonial of the said must always 
be unsaid; it is must always be brought back to language as a relation to 
an interlocutor.'(p.73) One can reflect here on the Preface to Humanisme 
de l'autre homme, where the same "undoing" is spoken of. 'L'avant-
propos, toujours ecrit apres le !ivre, n'est pas toujours une redite 
en termes approximatifs, de l'enonce rigoureux qui justifie un livre. 
II peut exprimer le premier - et !'urgent - commentaire, le premier 
"c 'est-a-dire" - qui est aussi le premier dedit - des propositions ou, 
actuelle et assemble, s'absorbe et s'expose, dans le Dit., l'inassemblable 
proximite de l'un-pour-l'autre, signtfiant comme Dire (HAH, p.11 ). 
The methodology employed is always usurped by the recurrent arrival 
of a Saying at the heart of the Said which overturns the certainties 
expressed in the Said. 
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1.5 Levinas' Reduction: 
The significance of the interlocutor remains to be reduced. But, why 1s a 
reduction necessary? 
The possibility of being duped is maintained by the equivocity with which 
language represents the world, such that any sens unique must therefore be sought 
elsewhere than in language's representational function.215 This sens unique is not a 
'foundation to the sciences, a transcendental source from which all knowledge could be 
systematically reconstituted' but is rather 'an invisible point within the system of 
meanings around which that system revolves. The significance of the reduction is its 
capacity to inquire back to that point.'216 Levinas writes, 
'L 'experience a toujours ete comprise comme essentiellement incertaine 
de ses pretensions et, dans ce sens, comme egarant la pensee. La 
nouveaute de la phenomenologie consiste a reduire "l'experience-
pretendant-a-une-verite" a une conjoncture ayant une signification par 
elle-meme, c'est-a-dire source d'une reuvre transcendentale a partir de 
laquelle la notion meme de la verite prendra seulement un sens. Ces 
significations sont la clarte originelle. Dans le langage husserlien ce 
retournement s'appelle Reduction transcendentale. Les contemporains 
qui ne l'accomplissent pas selon !es reg/es de !'art definies par Husserl 
se placent neanmoins sur son terrain. L'experience pour etc( est source 
de significations. Elle est eclairante avant d'etre probante.'211 
Levinas, then, begins from experience while contesting its claim to be the source of 
meamng. The movement from experience to an absolute experience involves 'a 
reduction from the egological to the intersubjective in which the egological level 
receives its significance and its justification.'218 As Vasey writes, Levinas abandons an 
active and sovereign subjectivity 'for he finds that what is essential in subjectivity 
resides in significations, or more exactly in the signification which renders signification 
significant (dans la signification qui rend signifiantes !es significations). 1219 Reed 
indicates the two aspects of this reduction: firstly, an existential aspect, preeminent in 
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its world adequately, that is, that reason is insufficient to itself.220 Husserl may have 
redeemed the ego from its naive, natural attitude, but he awoke it to the universality of 
the doxic thesis. 'The ego is awakened from its natural attitude, but it is not awakened 
from its preswned position at the centre of the world as known;'221 and secondly, the 
theme of Otherwise than Being, which expresses a further level of awakening, indicated 
but not pursued by Husserl, which takes its origin in 'the exposition of the other (Autre) 
in the Same ... in which the subject loses the atomic consistency of transcendental 
apperception.'222 '[D]espite its gnoseological expression - ontical and ontological -
phenomenology calls attention to a sense of philosophy which does not lead to a 
reflexion on the relationship of thought to the world, a relationship which sustains the 
notions of being and of the World.'223 Husserlian philosophy enabled a value to be given 
to thought other than as an explanation of experience, understood as an experience of 
being or of presence in the world, and which, though it begins in wonder, always 
remains a relationship of adequation between what is given and what is signified in the 
subjective unity of transcendental apperception. But 'this is not the sole, nor even the 
initial modality of the subjective in the Husserlian analyses.'224 Husserl's analyses are 
always more surprising than his 'system' and programmatic discourse, for while 
appealing to intuition 'as the principle of principles,' and while referring evidence to a 
horizon of the Same, nonetheless, Husserlian phenomenology places in question the 
formal and thematic logic which would ensure the rationality of reason. The permanent 
revolution of the phenomenological reduction undertaken by Husserl is that it brings to 
life again what has been forgotten in knowledge, and places in question the subject 
understood as intuitive reason and agreement. 'Doesn't the style of Husserlian 
phenomenology,' asks Levinas, 'multiplying the gestures of reduction and effacing in 
consciousness every trace of subordination to the world .. , call attention to that which is 
discovered behind consciousness submitted to its antic destiny in the thought of the 
Same?'225 'The reduction signifies the passage from the natural attitude to the 
220 See E Levinas, De La Conscience a la veille, pp.34-37 
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transcendental attitude,'226 and although this passage seems to be a search for certainty, 
as in Descartes, it shows once again the inadequacy of the experience of the world to 
thought. With Husserl, we may still be confined within a philosophy of knowing, a 
theory of knowledge, but, nonetheless, Husserl's reduction liberates sensed thought from 
the world, from adequation, from identification, from being as the accomplishment of 
a theme, and from the re-presentation of presence. Levinas continues by saying that 
' [ w ]e think that the reduction reveals its true meaning and the meaning of the subjective 
which it signifies in its final phase, which is the intersubjective reduction. The 
subjectivity of the subject shows itself in the traumatism of awakening, despite the 
gnoseological interpretation which, for Husserl, finally characterises the element of the 
spirit.'227 It is not the ego of the alter-ego, rooted in knowledge and freedom, which is 
significant, but the alter of the alter-ego which, in its alterity, contests the ego. But this 
is no longer Husserl, for whom the reduction remained a passage from a less perfect to 
a more perfect knowledge. The 'astonishing or traumatising' aspect of the Husserlian 
theory of the intersubjective reduction is the possibility it gives for a 'sobering up,' 
'beyond the sobriety of simple lucidity,' in which the self, opposed to the other of the 
self rather than the other self, is liberated from itself, and roused 'from dogmatic 
slumber.'228 'The Reduction... describes the awakening, beyond knowledge, from 
insomnia or from wakefulness of which knowledge is only one modality.'229 It is the 
explosion of the Other in the Same, leading to an absolute insomnia, in which the 
priority and atomic consistency of transcendental apperception is placed in question. If 
self-consciousness was posited as an insomnia, vigilant before the anonymity of being, 
and the first wakening was a waking to a natural, pagan existing devoid of 
transcendence, absolute insomnia is vigilance before the alterity of the other, who in his 
very approach contests my natural existence and draws me beyond the confines of my 
solitary existing with its concerns. To be sure, I may still wish to take recourse to sleep 
and remain deaf to any appeal from alterity; I can still seek significance by attempting 
to construct my place in the sun. The tragedy for such a way of living, however, is that 
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it is a vain and notional pursuit. Pagan life, a life without alterity, is already betrayed its 
own existence; the natural, non-transcending, self is not self-assured in its relations, as 
Husserl demonstrates by showing the inadequacy of consciousness and its evidence. The 
transcendental Reduction pursued by Levinas reveals a second level awakening, which 
is not a coming to self-consciousness, but an awakening of the other in me. 
'In granting the sense of "ego" to the other, and also in my alterity to 
myself by which I can confer upon the other the sense of the ego, the 
here and the there are inverted. It is not a homogenization of space 
which is thus constituted; it is me - however obviously primordial and 
hegemonic, however identical to myself and in my "own", however snug 
in my skin and in my hie et nunc I may be - who passes to the second 
level. I see my own self starting from the other, I am exposed to the 
other, I have accounts to render.'230 
1. 51 Saying (le Dire) and Said (le Dit) 
Now, Reed argues that it is the second aspect of the reduction - the waking to 
alterity - rather than the existential realisation of the insufficiency of comprehensive 
reason, which is more properly methodological, 'for it concerns the ability of philosophy 
to describe the inversion which occurs in the movement from egological to 
intersubjective.'231 The sens unique, around which systems of meaning revolve is the 
Saying (le Dire). But '[t]he Saying occurs only as an overflow of the Said, in an 
emphasis which always implies more than is actually said.'232 However, if Saying only 
ever shows itself in the Said, which is already within the framework of Being, '[c]an an 
otherwise than Being ever be liberated from Being long enough to talk about it?233 How 
. ,"-, can the Saying catfDe led to betray itself, and thereafter reduced? Levinas poses this 
v 
methodological problem when he asks, 
' ... whether the pre-original element of saying (the anarchical, the non-
original, as we designate it) can be led to betray itself by showing itself 
in a theme (if an an-archaeology is possible), and whether this betrayal 
can be reduced; whether one can at the same time know and free the 
known of the marks which thematization leaves on it by subordinating 
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the unsayable. In this betrayal the indiscretion with regard to the 
unsayable, which is probably the very task of philosophy, becomes 
possible.'234 
53 
Reed expresses it thus: '[t]he reduction would not be possible if the trace of the Saying 
were not in some way already visible in the Said; but the reduction would not be 
necessary if this Saying were simply the transcendental correlate of the Said.'235 If we 
grant, with Feron, that there is a reductive movement from the Said to a Saying, and an 
inverse deductive, constitutive movement from the Saying back again to the Said, how 
is the Saying to be released from thematic contamination?236 Feron writes, 
'La reduction commence dans !es structures du savoir et de 
l'intentionalite. L 'analyse de fa configuration intentionnelle et 
linguistique de la connaissance n 'est done pas une etude preliminaire 
exterieure a la pensee propre de Levinas, elle est deja prise dans le 
mouvement de la reduction. La reduction serait-elle d'ailleurs possible 
si le Dire de proximite n 'etait pas deja present d'une certain maniere des 
le point de depart, precisement dans le langage, dans le correlation du 
Dire noetique et du Dit, c'est-a-dire dans sa correlation avec le Dit? 237 
Of course, one can identify the same double movement in transcendental Thomism. 
Coreth recognises both a reductive and a deductive moment, writing that the 
'[t]ranscendental reduction uncovers thematically in the immediate data 
of consciousness the conditions and presuppositions implied in them. It 
is a return from what is thematically known to that which is 
unthematically co-known in the act of consciousness, to that which is 
pre-known as a condition of the act. Transcendental deduction, on the 
other hand, is the movement of the mind which, from this previous 
datum, uncovered reductively, deduces a priori the empirical act of 
consciousness, its nature, it possibility, and its necessity. Whereas 
reduction proceeds from a particular experience to the conditions of its 
possibility, deduction goes from these conditions to the essential 
structures of the same experience.'238 
Coreth, however, compromises the unthematic element within the reduction, exposing 
it to thematisation in the deduction, when he adds that '[t]he two movements are in 
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constant interaction, they influence each other.'239 In other words, the conceptual 
mediation of what is immediate in experience compromises the absolute value of the 
horizon, a compromise which, in terms of the relationship between the Saying and the 
Said, Levinas would refuse.240 
Reed identifies the problem which appears in Feron as one of the synchronic 
operation of the reductive and deductive movements. Hence, the mutuality of interaction 
and influence. If the Said always offers the Saying as its synchronic correlative, then the 
Saying as significant beyond the Said, is contested and the reduction rendered 
redundant. The relationship between Saying and Said, however, is not synchronic, but 
diachronic, and, therefore the Saying is outwith the possibility of thematic exposition 
in the Said. Literally, the Saying is ex-position. The reductive moment is not on the 
same plane as the deductive moment. As Rahner notes in reference to his own reduction, 
there exists 'an irreversible difference... between an original experience of 
transcendence ... on the one hand and the objectifying and verbalising reflection on this 
experience of transcendence on the other...'241 The reductive movement and the 
deductive movement are irreversibly different. Reed indicates that Feron overlooks the 
diachronic element, although he implicitly acknowledges it when he writes in the above 
quotation, that the reduction has already begun ( elle est deja prise dans le mouvement 
de la reduction) in the analysis of intentionality. The Said, prior to any exposure to 
intentional analysis, is already being reduced by the very fact of the Saying of the Said 
which gives the Said a significance in excess of the expressed content. The fact that the 
Said is always on the lips of one who is saying means that the Said can never be 
scrutinised as a theme isolated from its interlocutor. The text of the Said is always 
otherwise because it is Said in the con-text of a Saying.242 It is not so much the case that 
239 ibid. 
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"le Dire est Dit"243 as "le Dit est Dire." The Said is not a pure Said, but, because it 
involves a Saying, is also always otherwise than Said, and as such is already subject to 
a reduction. Levinas writes that '[t]he otherwise than being is stated in a saying that 
must also be unsaid in order thus to extract the otherwise than being from the said in 
which it already comes to signify but a being otherwise.'244 This saying and being unsaid 
cannot be assembled, nor can they be 'at the same time,'245 for, were that a requirement, 
it would be already to reduce being's other to being and not being'246 and already once 
again to affirm the Saying as no more than the correlative of the Said, and once again 
to engineer its ontological confinement. Saying, rather, is a pure smplus over evidence, 
theme and logic; it is the positive production of the other as other (autrni), and it is this 
which gives all signification its significance (la signification qui rend signijiantes !es 
significations), as Vasey has already noted. The contradiction which logic recognises 
in scepticism's illegitimacy, and which applies in a similar way to the relationship 
between the Saying and the Said, derives from the tendency to simultaneity, whereas the 
persistence of scepticism and the insistence of Saying in excess of the Said derives from 
'a secret diachrony [which] commands this ambiguous or enigmatic way of speaking, 
and because in general signification signifies beyond synchrony, beyond essence.1247 
Ultimately, what is said has significance not on account of itself, but on account of its 
issuing in a Saying always excessive with regard to what is said, and, irrespective of 
whether what is Said is sense or non-sense from whatever perspective, always 
significant. Simply put, it is only because there is an other who speaks that what is said, 
whatever is said, has any ultimate significance. 'The face opens the primordial 
discourse... that obliges entering into discourse.'248 It 'is the evidence that makes 
always a hermeneutic and an exegesis. But, having said that, the Other in his Saying, 
though culturally signified in his textuality, nonetheless signifies as a context. The Other 
does not visit us solely clothed in culture, but remains outwith such a cultural 
manifestation, signifying by himself (See, ibid., pp.193-194) 
243 E Feron, De l'idee de transcendance a la question du langage, Jerome 
Millon, Grenoble, 1992, p.183 




248 E Levinas, TI, p.201 
METHOD 56 
evidence possible.'249 
Now, the two movements of reduction and deduction which Feron recognises 
in Levinas' method are also identified by Reed who notes that Levinas' method has two 
specific procedures - the reductive and the retracing. In the first place, the statement in 
which the otherwise than Being is thematised must be unsaid, and this is accomplished 
in two ways: firstly, by a simple negation and restatement, and secondly, by an iteration, 
the characteristic of which is diachronic expression, - like being out of step with oneself 
and putting one's foot down out of time, or a hardly distinguishable echo which 
nonetheless returns to disrupt the simultaneity of the Saying and the Said, or like the 
almost imperceptible delay in long distance calls which interrupts the conversation by 
disconnecting the Said from its Saying, - a repetitive phrasing in which the place of the 
concept within the ontological system is called into question. 'Both ways of unsaying 
the Said function critically, by calling into question the ability of consciousness to 
comprehend the concepts involved.'250 
Now this unsaying of the Said anses within an ethical context, for the 
relationship with the interlocutor is, before anything else, an ethical relationship. It is 
this ethical context which resolves the methodic quandary of the incoherence of the 
absolutely other which Derrida recognised in Totality and Infinity. In Otherwise than 
Being Levinas attempts to show performatively what language can do, other than 
represent, in terms of le Dit and le Dire. Commenting on the passage previously 
indicated, Smith indicates that Saying belongs to 'a horizon of sociality'251 
incommensurable with the Said, but its origin and presupposition. Levinas aims to 
'perform a "reduction" of the said to saying, to "surprise" saying before it becomes said 
and thus to resolve the problem of the unsayableness of the good by saying it anyway, 
in a kind of indiscretion.'252 It is a reduction because like Husserl's phenomenological 
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Saying is a pure surplus over evidence, theme and logic, and the saying of Saying is the 
'positive production of the infinite distinct from the negative witness of the gaps created 
in totality (the phenomenologico-ontological realm) by the theoretical incoherence of 
the idea of the other.'254 Now, the ethical significance of the Saying has both a material 
and a methodological implication: materially, 'the problem of the apparent impossibility 
of saying the unsayable is not dissolved but made relative to the inner, properly moral 
necessity of saying the unsayable by saying saying itself;'255 Derrida's criticisms are 
justified, 'but by a justification that is inferior to the justification of the ethical,'256 for 
just as life is not confined to the theoretical, so neither is language; methodologically, 
'the only way to reflect the right relation between morality and theory consistently is to 
derive the theoretical from the ethical. Only thus can theory be shown to be a mode of 
that which exceeds it: that is, only thus can the claim that justice is prior to truth be 
philosophically justified.'257 This is the value of superlation - 'it does not point to a 
privation of knowing and being but rather to that of which knowing and being per se 
would constitute a privation were they abstracted from it.'258 As Levinas writes, '[t]he 
ethical relation ... accomplishes the very intention that animates the movement unto 
truth.'259 Again, '[t]he face opens the primordial discourse ... that obliges entering into 
discourse, the commencement of discourse rationalism prays for, a "force" that 
convmces even "the people who do not wish to listen" and thus founds the true 
universality of reason.'260 And again, '[t]he face is the evidence that makes evidence 
possible - like the divine veracity that sustains Cartesian rationalism.'261 
says that ethics is a movement as radical as the transcendental reduction' (S Smith, 


















1.6 A Transcendental Method? 
By requiring metaphysics to undertake a critique of itself, Kant effected a 
transcendental tum in philosophy. Rahner's own transcendental schema follows on from 
Marechal's response to the Kantian problematic. To what extent and in what way can 
Levinas' thinking be termed 'transcendental'? Levinas notes that philosophy, in tracing 
its freedom back to what precedes it, is critique. 'Critique or philosophy is the essence 
of knowing. But what is proper to knowing is not its possibility of going unto an object, 
a movement by which it is akin to other acts; its prerogative consists in being able to put 
itself in question, in penetrating beneath its own condition.'262 Insofar as it seeks its own 
condition, then, it can be termed transcendental. Rabner outlines the characteristics of 
the transcendental method when he writes, 
'Basing ourselves on Kant's definition of concept we can say: A question 
is posed on the transcendental plane when it asks for the a priori 
conditions that make knowledge of an object possible. The subject who 
assumed this attitude therefore does not approach the object head on; he 
does not try to get out of himself, so to speak, so as thereby to encounter 
the object, but turns back to reflect upon himself and examines in 
himself, as subject, which conditions permit him to make this object his 
own. It goes without saying that in the course of this search for the 
subject's a priori conditions for the possibility of knowledge, a certain 
provisional knowledge of the object is always presupposed. It is also 
clear that when one tries to identify what conditions the grasp of an 
object of specifically human knowledge, it is not a matter of any 
pragmatic, experiential conditions, such as those arrived at by 
experimental psychology, but of those revealed by an a priori deduction, 
thus conditions necessary for the apprehension of every object that can 
come under a finite human knowledge.'263 
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Now, while a transcendental method attempts to 'penetrate beneath its own condition,' 
one must ask whether a transcendental approach, while necessarily concerning itself 
with a priori conditions, should uncover those conditions in the knowing subject to the 
exclusion of 'any pragmatic experiential conditions,' or whether experience, as 
experience of what is other than the subject, also contributes, in some way, to the 
framework within which transcendental thinking is operative. 
1. 61 Kant's Transcendentalism: 
Kant, as Marechal notes, undertakes his transcendental critique to 'deliver "the 
principles of possibility" of objective knowledge, that is, the principles which are 
logically prior to a particular knowledge, which they intrinsically determine.'264 He 
writes, 'I call transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects 
as with the mode of our knowing objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be 
possible a priori.'(Al 1/B25) At the end of his section on the transcendental deduction, 
2nd edition, Kant gives the following brief outline: 
'The deduction is the exposition of the pure concepts of the 
understanding, and therewith of all theoretical a priori lmowledge, as 
principles of the possibility of experience - the principles being here 
taken as the determination of the appearance in space and time in 
general, and this determination, in turn, as ultimately following from the 
original synthetic unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding 
in its relation to space and time, the original forms of sensibility'(B 168-
69). 
Benton describes the general features of Transcendental Arguments in the Kant's 
First Critique as 'a concern with justifying a priori synthetic judgements and an appeal 
to the conditions of possibility of experience to ground the argument,'265 whose 'aim is 
precisely to establish a framework so that the argument cannot depend upon data that 
could be given only within that framework.' 266 He argues, however, that focusing on the 
deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason as 'a model for transcendental arguments as 
such has made it more difficult to see either, in general, what a transcendental argument 
264 J Marechal, Le point de depart de la metaphysique, III, p.112 
265 R Benton, Kant's Second Critique and the Problem of Transcendental 
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is, why it is needed and how it is possible, or more specifically, precisely what structure 
an argument must have.'267 Benton therefore proposes his own model of a Kantian 
argument, indicating that the fundamental problem of the synthesis behind the 
Deduction is not the linking of concepts, but rather the problem of how a synthetic 
relation between intuition and concept can be achieved a priori, such that the categories 
are "applicable" a priori to all intuition.268 Using the transcendental argument structure 
of the Second Critique, Benton retrospectively illumines the First Critique with regard 
to 'the question of the a priori relation of the faculties for practical reason as well as for 
theoretical reason.'269 The theoretical or speculative knowledge gained in the First 
Critique is rooted in intellect and sensible intuition; practical knowledge, however, as 
sought in the Second Critique, flows from the intellect and the will, faculty of desire. 
The transcendental problem of the Second Critique, therefore, is the a priori relation of 
reason to desire - a relation which is addressed by Levinas - and which is brought to a 
synthesis in the moral law, 'not because it asserts a connection between concepts, but 
because it asserts an a priori connection between a rule of reason and the faculty of 
desire (it asserts a determination of the will by pure reason).'270 But this makes clearer 
the two features exhibited by transcendental arguments; '[t]he a priori relation between 
the two roots of (for example) theoretical knowledge is a presupposition not only of a 
priori synthetic judgements but also of experience,'271 and the common basis of both 
features is the finitude of the human mind; in other words, 'the fact that for us 
(according to Kant) knowledge always involves more than one root (A50/B74; 
B 135).'272 Benton, therefore, proposes the following preliminary model: 
'A Transcendental argument will be concerned with establishing the 
conditions of the possibility of a cognitive framework (but a framework 
267 ibid., p.5 
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determined not arbitrarily but by necessary laws). And since the ultimate 
principle that must be referred to in establishing the "conditions of the 
possibility of..." is the principle of the unity of apperception (which 
guarantees the unity of the viewpoint), the argument will be concerned 
not with just any conditions whatsoever, but rather precisely with the 
conditions of the possibility of a priori relationships between faculties 
(that is, relationships between faculties as such that allow them to 
function together to establish a unitary framework) - namely, between 
those faculties whose functioning is constitutive of the framework in 
question.'273 
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Now, Benton argues that, while it is the case that philosophical arguments can involve 
only concept manipulation, and that these concepts must be a priori since they cannot 
be empirical, it is not the case that a priori concepts can ever be defined in the strict 
sense; in other words, 'we can never be sure they are given in their entirety,'274 for 'to 
define ... only means to present the complete, original concept of the thing within the 
limits of its concept' (A,727/8,755). Again, '[p]hilosophical arguments can proceed only 
by concept-manipulation, and yet the concepts with which they deal can never be 
assumed to be completely given.'275 The adequacy of the concept to its object is in the 
realm of probability rather than apodictic certainty (A 728/B756), a point which, as we 
have seen, resurfaces in Husserl, is expressed by Rahner in terms of the relationship 
between performance (Vollzug) and concept, and is developed by Levinas in terms of 
the phenomenological inadequacy of evidence. Benton attempts to resolve the difficulty 
of the two roots of knowledge and the link between judgement and experience by 
examining the must/can structure of knowledge which Kant develops in the B edition 
of the First Critique, and which demonstrates the necessity of reason's categorial 
determination but not necessarily the possibility of such. He writes, 
'It might at first seem strange to propose an argument-structure in which 
necessity is proved first and possibility second (the traditional line of 
reason being that necessity implies possibility); but it must be kept in 
mind that the necessity in question is the necessity of consequences 
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faculties, whereas any further detennination of the concept (insofar as 
it lays claim to being knowledge) involves at least an implicit reference 
to our sensible faculties, and the conditions of the latter cannot be 
analytically derived from those of the fonner.' 276 
62 
The point being made is that in the B edition of Critique of Pure Reason, the deduction 
proves the 'application' of the categories to sensed objects in two separate arguments, 
which can be explained by employing the distinction between must and can. The 
argument is then seen to proceed by proving firstly 'that sensible intuitions in general... 
must be subject to the categories a priori' although 'it does not show that they can be 
subject to the categories.'277 In a second step, the argument moves from the general 
application of the categories to the particular fonns of intuition to demonstrate 'that the 
conditions they impose on cognition are a priori compatible with the conditions of finite 
consciousness in general.'278 The effect is to highlight the limitation of the concept and 
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Rahner when he considers the relationship between nature and grace. The metaphysical 
concept of 'historical' human nature is 'a synthesis, already achieved beforehand and 
never wholly resolvable, of a priori conditioned "concept" and "intuition" (experience);' 
but, 'in this history he continually experiences new modes of the single process of the 
realisation of his essence, which he would never have been able to infer from his 
essence a priori' (K Rahner, Concerning the relationship between Nature and Grace, 
p.300, n.1). Now, grace is a necessary transcendental condition for that history of self-
experience, but, in order that grace might be communicated in human experience 
(nature), a corresponding necessity in nature is called for. Because God wishes his self-
communication to be unexacted, 'he must create man just 'so' ('Darum mujl er eben den 
Menschen "so" schaffen ') that he can receive this self-communication only as grace' 
(ibid.). God, in view of the unexactedness of grace, cannot do other than, that is, must 
necessarily, create man in the way he has created him ('just "so"') as capable, in his very 
nature, of receiving that unexacted self-communication. In other words, it is not the case 
the God must necessarily create, but that, in creating, creation must necessarily be the 
creation that it is, just 'so.' Steven Duffy, borrowing terminology from C. Peter, explains 
this can-must structure of grace and nature in terms of the is-contingency of grace and 
the must-be, or hypothetically necessity of nature (Stephen J Duffy, The Graced 
Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modem Catholic Thought, Liturgical Press, Collegeville, 
Minnesota, 1992, p.92, referring to C. Peter, The Position of K Rahner regarding the 
Supernatural: a comparative study of Nature and Grace, in Proceedings of the Catholic 
Theological Association of America, 20, (1965), p.85). Grace is the transcendental 
condition of nature but this is contingently verified in nature, some elements of which 
become hypothetically necessary, for example, nature as the hypothetically necessary 
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argument can be proposed: 
'A Transcendental argument is one that is concerned with establishing 
the conditions of the possibility of a cognitive framework .... The 
problems of possibility that it will deal with will be problems of the 
possibility of a priori relations between different human faculties (how 
they unite, in the sense of functioning together, a priori to produce a 
given cognitive framework). In addition, we can expect to find in the 
argument a must/can structure that first establishes a point with respect 
to a deliberately restricted concept and then, on different grounds, show 
the compatibility of further determinations with the conclusion of the 
first step.'280 
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The point which we wish to stress is, as Benton indicates, that the concept is deliberately 
restricted, and can be subjected to modification in the light of human experience, as is 
called for in Kant's Second Critique. This points, however, to the possibility of a change 
in framework. 
In the First Critique, the object appears within the formal a priori structure of 
consciousness. The manifold of sense in sensibility is subjected to the categories and is 
brought to a synthetic unity by the 'Transcendental Ego,' the original synthetic unity of 
apperception, which, as the formal unity of consciousness, forms 'the supreme principle 
for the possibility of understanding.'281 Understanding, therefore, arises within the 
heuristic structure of space and time, which 'regulates antic manifestations of 
experience.' It is structurally conditioned. Crawford also interprets as a structure or 
framework question the transcendental question of the possibility of experience.282 
Having indicated Carnap's distinction between internal framework questions and 
external framework questions regarding the reality of the framework itself, she suggests 
a third type of question which she terms a 'transcendental question.' 
factor for historical humanity, being-in-the-world, corporeality, sociality, self-
transcendence. In other words, the transcendental a priority of grace is further 
determined by human experience which is necessarily just 'so' in order that it be 
congenial for grace. Nature cannot be deduced from an a priori understanding of grace, 
though this a priori is to be affirmed; the understanding of grace, however, is modified 
in the light of human experience. 
280 R Benton, op.cit., p.18 
281 C E W inquist, The Transcendental Imagination: an Essay m 
Philosophical Theology, (The Hague: M Nijhoff. 1972), p.17 
282 Patricia Crawford, Kant's Theory of Philosophical Proof, m Kant-
Studien, 53 (1961-62), pp.275-268 
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1 A transcendental question is a question about a framework but not a 
question about the existence of a framework. It is a question we ask 
about a certain area of knowledge or discourse. The question is: What is 
the framework of this particular area of knowledge or discourse?'283 
64 
A transcendental argument, then, establishes a cognitive framework,284 within which 
'phenomena are brought into systematic unity' and among which 'lawful relations' 
obtain.285 However, Crawford suggests that no particular framework can be erected as 
the only one, 'for a transcendental deduction always justifies a principle relative to some 
field of knowledge or discourse ... that it is part of the framework of that particular area 
of discourse. '286 There may well be other heuristic structures, particularly the practical 
or moral, which provide 'a wholly different framework for knowledge.'287 If we take the 
transcendental framework outlined by Kant in the First Critique to be a response to the 
first of the question he asks in A805/B833, namely, 'what can I know?' then, what we 
hope to argue is that the response to the questions 'what must I do' and 'what have I the 
right to hope for?' place that particular framework in question, especially when 
confronted with the ethical encounter with the other person. Benton alludes to the 
possibility of other frameworks when, in his own model of a transcendental argument, 
he refers to 'the framework in question;'288 Winquist similarly implies the same when 
referring to Kant's own framework as a classical heuristic structure since it 'anticipate(s) 
that the intelligibility of the world will be presented as a systematic horizon of an 
inclusive formal conditions which is invariant through transformations of reference 
frames.'289 
283 ibid., p.266 
284 See Benton, op.cit., p.8 
285 ibid. 
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1. 62 A Dynamic Transcendental Framework: 
When one attempts a Thomistic transposition of Kantian transcendentalism, the 
name of Joseph Marechal comes to the fore. In fact, Otto Muck comments that '[i]t is 
impossible to think of the Transcendental Method in neo-scholasticism without 
mentioning Joseph Marechal (1878-1944), and rightly so.'290 Rahner, too, indicates that 
'we must refer to that work by Marechal which probably constitutes the best example 
of a philosopher in the spirit of Aquinas coming to terms with the central problem of 
Kant.'291 
In Le Point de depart. III, Marechal indicates that his project will attempt the 
translation of the 'metaphysico-epistemological argument of the metaphysical 
affirmation of being into a transcendental proof,'292 by means of a transcendental 
reflection, which will go beyond the limits set by Kant's question, 'What can I know?' 
The transcendental method, as employed by Marechal is essentially reflective, since it 
seeks 'the value of the truth of knowledge in the immanent essential characteristics of 
direct knowledge.'293 Its starting point, thus, is the analysis of what is directly and 
necessarily given in consciousness. Now, for Marechal, what is truly given directly in 
consciousness, prior to any sort of analysis, is the object as intellectually known, and 
these objects are, unquestionably, given to us as "objects in themselves" with an 
ontological value. However, since the transcendental critique intends to examine the 
rational foundation of the claim to objective truth, absolute assent to the intrinsic reality 
of the objects thus represented is withheld, and the object is thus to be understood, at 
this stage, in its precisive sense, that is, as the phenomenal object (rea/itas-
phaenomenon), which 'as phenomenal, or phenomenological, is only an object insofar 
as it affects consciousness, and therefore, with respect to the subject, is also called the 
immanent object.'294 Muck writes, 
'We can conceive of the starting point of the transcendental method as 
the object in the precisive phenomenological sense, viz., as a bracketing 
of all conceptions with regard to the intended object which goes beyond 
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is an act that must be distinguished from other intentional acts. The 
object is considered only insofar as it is a component of the intentional 
act through which the act is distinguished from other intentional acts.'295 
66 
The transcendental method thus operates phenomenologically. It 'grasps the 
phenomenological analysis and function as a phenomenological method by representing 
the content of what is given in the act.'296 Thereafter, the transcendental procedure will 
involve a reflective analysis of the elements and relations within the object as present 
in consciousness, while suspending any assertions regarding its ontological status. Only 
subsequently will the logical implications of this position need to be questioned. Such 
an analysis yields as its first result the absolute value of the necessary object of 
affirmation as a practical postulate. The subject must act as if the object were a real 
object with an objective value. Thus, the value of the affirmed object, though treated as 
absolute, remains still indirect and subjective, grounded in the a priori necessity of a 
volitional act by an active subject. This is the position beyond which Kantianism fails 
to venture. In order to free ourselves from Kant at this point, the absolute objective 
value of the affirmed object, from which the ontological ("nownenal") affirmation as 
a theoretical or speculative necessity is derived needs to be affirmed; in other words, the 
practical and external necessity of a "transcendental order," admitted by Kant, is itself 
grounded in an absolute necessity which extends intrinsically to every immanent object 
in its very constitution in consciousness, and this condition logically contains the 
affirmation of a transcendent object, not merely as a practical "postulate", but as the 
theoretical necessity of what is speculatively evident. In other words, 'the 
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Rahner writes, 'For Aquinas a judgement does not consist merely in a synthesis 
between two concepts so as to form a single concrete idea. In Thomas' eyes a 
concretising synthesis of this kind - Heidegger would call it a predicative synthesis -
would still be an incompletum of the type, for instance, to which definition belongs. In 
order for judgement and truth in the true sense to be present, the concretising synthesis 
must be further related to the reality itself, there must be a comparatio vel applicatio ad 
rem per ajfirmationem vet negationem. An affirmative or objectifying synthesis of this 
kind (and it is only through this kind of synthesis that a complexio or judgement is 
arrived at) is therefore a constitutive element of judgement and so too of truth (with 
Heidegger we might also call it a veritative synthesis), though admittedly only provided 
that this affirmative synthesis is also in fact a valid one'(K Rahner, Thomas Aquinas on 
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Now, in this transcendental deduction, it is the operative moment of the act of 
knowledge - 'the principle of operative analysis'298 - which is key, for the transcendental 
method tries to determine the meaning of the object of noetic activity through an 
analysis of this activity, fixing a tight correlation between the conditions of this act 
(subjective conditions of possibility) and the structural elements of the object (objective 
conditions of possibility). The analysis of the conditions of noetic activity undertaken 
by Marechal shows that this activity must be such that its object, in order to be 
knowable, must be related to the absolute order of being. 
For Marechal, the logical truth required to affirm the ontological value of an 
object present to consciousness is a quality of judgement. The objectivity of the object, 
in an absolute sense, results formally from an affirmation and not merely from sensible 
or conceptual representation. To affirm the absolute value of the object, affirmation goes 
beyond the object as represented. 
'The power to think objects, therefore, surpasses the power of directly 
representing an object through its proper form. The realm of knowable 
objects thus does not necessarily coincide with the realm of directly 
representable objects. In knowledge, more can be meant than can be 
represented through the structure of a concept directly related to an 
object.'299 
That knowledge does not coincide entirely with representation can be appreciated from 
the fact that, although initially empirically grounded, conceptual differentiation 
continues beyond the quantitative. The synthesis produced within consciousness, 
however, demands a further concretive synthesis, whereby the intellect relates what is 
receptively given and conceptualised to a suppositum, transcendent with respect to 
consciousness. This is an objective synthesis which, in judgement, relates the order of 
representation to the order of reality, and posits its absolute existence with respect to the 
subject, and thereby situates it within the teleology of the subjective drive towards the 
Absolute, 'the orientation of knowing.'300 Subjective interiority, in other words, refers 
itself in judgement to the exteriority of being. 
Truth. TI, XIII, p.17) 
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One can note this operative element in Levinas' movement from a descriptive 






1. 63 Levinas' Diachronic Transcendentalism 
Now, like Marechal, Levinas is responding to the questions raised by Kant's 
transcendental approach to the possibility of knowledge and the principles regulating 
moral action. Is his own approach 'transcendental'? Throughout his own writings he 
makes frequent and critical reference to the transcendental subject which underpins 
Kant's own philosophical framework. In Otherwise than Being, he criticises critical 
philosophy's tendency towards a cognitional intentionality emanating from a centralised 
and centralising transcendental subject which projects meaning onto its own world. The 
proper signification of subjectivity is not the nominative 'I' of the transcendental ego, 
but the accusative (and accused) 'me' of proximity. The subject finds itself already and 
always incarnate in the world, and with others, but neither is this incarnation 'a 
transcendental operation of a subject'301 nor is the world a world which arises as a result 
of a representational act of a subject. While there is an apprehensive movement on the 
part of the subject, there is, says Levinas, also an obsession. 'Intentionality, the noesis 
which the philosophy of consciousness distinguished in sensing, and which it wanted, 
in a regressive movement, to take hold of again as the origin of the sense ascribed, the 
sensible intuition, is already in the mode of apprehension and obsession, assailed by the 
sensed which undoes its noematic appearing in order to command, with a non-
thematisable alterity, the very noesis which at the origin should have given it a sense.'302 
Later, pointing out that the incarnation of the subject is 'hardly intelligible' if the 
transcendental ego is viewed in so much 'indeclinable straightforwardness,' he writes 
that 'subjectivity is not called, in its primary vocation, to take the role and place of the 
indeclinable transcendental consciousness, which effects syntheses straightaway before 
itself, but is itself excluded from these syntheses.'303 Like Rahner's transcendental 
deduction of the necessary conversion of the finite spirit to the world, Levinas notes that 
the transcendental subject is 'implicated in [these syntheses] only through the detour of 
incarnation' .304 However, in God and Philosophy, Levinas will criticise transcendental 
301 E Levinas, OB,76 
302 ibid., pp.76-77 
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subjectivity as a model of the universal doctrine of presence in which '[p]hilosophy is 
not merely the knowledge of immanence [but] is immanence itself,'305 saying that in 
such a model '[n]othing can happen and nothing could have happened without 
presenting itself, nothing could be smuggled by without being declared, without being 
shown, without letting its truth be inspected. Transcendental subjectivity is the figure 
of this presence; no signification precedes that which I give to myself.'306 In such a 
criticism, Rahner would be implicated insofar as the incarnation of the finite subject is 
understood as being demanded in order to achieve a degree of self-presence. However, 
we would want to argue that, insofar as the Rahner's finite spirit's turning to the world 
is driven by its implicit relation with transcendent exteriority - which for him is the 
horizon of being - incarnation is not simply part of the accident of a return to self, but 
a response and a possibility of commitment to alterity. 
Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, acknowledges that, insofar as there is the 
experience of exteriority or of transcendence, which he terms infinity, and insofar as this 
experience is the point of departure for his philosophy, then his method is similar to the 
transcendental method. He writes, 'the way we are describing to work back and remain 
this side of objective certitude resembles what has come to be called the transcendental 
method (in which the technical procedures of transcendental idealism need not 
necessarily be comprised.)'307 However, unlike the premature halting of the reduction 
in Husserl and in Rahner, Levinas argues that subjectivity 'is not, in the last analysis, the 
"I think" (which it is at first) or the unity of "transcendental apperception" [but] is, as 
a responsibility for the other, a subjection to the other.'308 Philosophy's failure is that '[i]n 
the description which has been pursued up to now there has been no question of the 
transcendental condition for some sort of ethical experience.'309 Yet this is essential to 
philosophy's task, for '[e]thics ... breaks up the unity of transcendental apperception, 
condition for all Being and all experience.'310 Like Kant, who, as Yovel claims, sought 
to safeguard reason's 'essential interest' by opening the possibility of it being realised in 
305 idem, GP, p.131 
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the field of moral praxis, Levinas locates the true origin of philosophy, not in the 
immanence of a transcendental subjectivity, but 'in a cry of ethical revolt, a testimony 
of responsibility .... in prophecy.'311 But this is to recognise that reason's essential interest 
is satisfied beyond the purely speculative or epistemological. It is '[t]o recognise with 
philosophy - or to recognise philosophically - that the Real is rational and that the 
Rational is alone real, and not to be able to smother or cover the cry of those who, the 
morrow after this recognition, mean to transform the world, is already to move in a 
domain of meaning which inclusion cannot comprehend and among reasons that 
"reason" does not know, and which have not begun in philosophy.'312 It is, in other 
words, to recognise that ethics is first philosophy. 
How then is Levinas transcendentalism to be understood? Levinas 
operates from a phenomenological starting point and employs a transcendental method, 
yet these need to be clarified. In the preface to the German edition of Totality and 
Infinity, he writes that the 'phenomenological inspiration' of the work 'proceeds from a 
long acquaintance with Husserlian texts, and an incessant attention to Sein und Zeit.'313 
Yet, the point of departure which the Husserlian phenomenology of consciousness 
provides, namely that 'all consciousness is consciousness of something', needs to be 
surmounted. In an essay on Hermeneutics and Beyond, he writes of Husserlian 
phenomenology that '[i]ts essential principle ... announces that being commands its ways 
of being given, that being ordains the forms of knowledge which apprehend it, that an 
essential necessity links being to its ways of appearing to consciousness.'314 This a priori 
state of affairs which Husserl formulates has to be thought 'beyond their formulations' 
for the event of being (essg_nce)315 subverts or positions itself (ex-position) 
diachronically outwith the synchronic ontology of presence and identity which 
phenomenology requires. The event of being is always in excess of, or beyond, the 
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this 'rejection of the phenomenological conception of evidence as the presence of 
consciousness to its object' as one of the key elements which founds Levinas' method 
of philosophy, for the 'time of the subject' is always diachronic with respect to that to 
which he relates. Husserl may well have suspended the 'natural attitude,' 'withholding 
his assent to the apparently conclusive results of everyday experience,'316 but, Levinas 
would argue, the so-called natural attitude is not really natural at all, for 'experience is 
questionable and strange before it settles into everydayness.'317 The 'time of the subject' 
may be thought to be originally an ecstasis, yet one looks to it to regulate one's 
relationship with the other - for working, for meeting, for catching the train - and these 
facts of everyday life are far from frivolous but are the stuff of human salvation. 
Secularity has a salvific significance. Everyday living contains within itself an inherent 
meaning. Levinas points out that '[e]veryday life is a preoccupation with salvation,'318 
and, as such, its natural concerns are far from frivolous. 'However much the entirety of 
pre-occupations that fill our days and tear us away from solitude to throw us into contact 
with our peers are called "fall," "everyday life," "animality," "degradation," or "base 
materialism," these pre-occupations are in any case no way frivolous. One can think that 
authentic time is originally an ecstasis, yet one still buys a watch .... '319 That everyday 
time is significant would seem to be common sense, for no matter how much one may 
reflect philosophically on the nature of time, its reality, relativity and unreality, 
nonetheless, one still buys a watch to regulate one's days and relations. Now, these, as 
Levinas says, 'may seem like facile objections to the seriousness of philosophical 
thought, 'recalling the ones certain realists address to idealists when they reproach them 
for eating and breathing in an illusory world.'320 On the contrary however, it is simply 
to recognise that, prior to the interpretation of human experience, prior to reason 
understood as discursus mentalis, '[t]here is something other than naivety in the flat 
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about existence.'321 This 'natural' base of everyday living and human encounter provides 
the ground and evidence for philosophical discourse, or rather for philosophy as 
dialogue and discourse. 
One might say that Levinas is sceptical with regard to the phenomenological 
inadequacy of that serious philosophical thought which overlooks the natural base for 
everyday living and human encounter, and in this regard he parallels the Common Sense 
Philosophy espoused by Thomas Reid. For Reid, the cure for the scepticism of sceptical 
and idealist philosophies is the scepticism which Common Sense brings to bear on 
philosophical systems; in other words, the adoption of a 'general posture of skepticism 
toward skepticism.'322 Philosophy, constructing itself on the basis of a narrow 
rationality, invites scepticism, and does so precisely on account of its forgetfulness of 
the rationality inherent in the virtue of Common Sense. With regard to the methodic 
doubt of Descartes and the placing in question of the propositions, 'I think; I am 
conscious; Everything that thinks, exists; I exist,' Reid ventures to ask, 'would not every 
sober man form the same opinion of the man who seriously doubted any one of them? 
And if he was his friend, would he not hope for his cure from physic and good regimen, 
rather than from metaphysic and logic?'323 He continues, 'Poor untaught mortals believe 
undoubtedly that there is a sun, moon and stars; an earth which we inhabit; country, 
friends, and relations, which we enjoy, land houses and moveables, which we possess. 
But philosophers, pitying the credulity of the vulgar, resolve to have no faith but what 
321 ibid. 
By stressing the salvific significance of secularity, Levinas opposes both 
Heidegger's understanding of in-der-Welt-Sein, and Husserl's refusal of the natural 
attitude. Heidegger had interpreted the subject's being-in-the-world as 'proximally and 
for the most part - in its average everydayness (in seiner durchschnittlichen 
Alltiiglichkeit (Being and Time, p.37-38). "Everydayness" is that way of existing in 
which Dasein maintains itself "every day" (BT, 422), a 'definite "'how" of existence' 
(BT, 422) which permeates Dasein 'as a rule' for life, even though, existentially, it may 
have been "surmounted". Levinas' objection is that the antic familiarity of "average 
everydayness" is not a way of Being which Dasein must surmount in order to possess 
as its own (eigen) its existence as authentic (eigentilich); rather, the seemingly facile 
moments of everyday living 'in and out of time' - the very buying of a watch - .are the 
salvific moments of being-in-the-world. 
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is founded upon reason.'324 D C Holy comments that Reid 'must assume that a 
philosophy of sorts is contained in the ordinary transactions of life, in the things we 
ordinarily, unreflectively, do and say. This philosophy is expressed in propositions of 
which we should not be aware except for philosophical pronouncements to the contrary 
and which is implied, because assumed in our everyday behaviour.'325 Levinas expresses 
this in terms of the sincerity of intentions and the salvific (and philosophical) 
significance of secularity. 'Life is a sincerity,'326 he writes, and it is this sincerity which 
characterises our relationship with the world and our ethical interaction with people, 
'with whom,' as Reid might put it, 'we can transact business, or call to account for their 
conduct. '327 'The world,' writes Levinas, ' ... is what we inhabit, where we take walks, 
lunch and dine, visit, go to school, argue, carry out experiments and investigations, write 
and read books ... .'328 The structure of sincerity accords with the directness of its 
intentions, whether it be the sincerity of a desire sincerely intending its object, with no 
further intentions behind it 'which would be like thoughts,' and finding complete 
correspondence between desire and satisfaction, or the sincerity and immediacy of 
enjoyment in which 'the act nourishes itself with its own activity' and where 'the 
contents of life are its direct objects.'329 'To be in the world is ... to go sincerely to the 
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desirable and take it for what it is. It is the very possibility of desire and sincerity .1330 
With regard to the ethical encounter with the other person, the primordial sincerity of 
the relation reveals itself, before anything is uttered or thematised, in the standing before 
the other in order to speak or to say (le Dire). 
'It is by saying that sincerity - exposedness without reserve - is first 
possible. Saying makes signs to the other, but in this sign signifies the 
giving of the sign itself. Saying opens me to the Other before saying 
what is said, before the said uttered in this sincerity forms a screen 
between me and the other. This saying without a said is thus like 
silence.'331 
The proto-experience of the other is an experience of sincerity, 'the one-for-the-other' 
which, as 'the formal structure of signification, signifyingness or the rationality of 
signification ... does not begin by being exposed in a theme, but is my openness to the 
other, my sincerity or my veracity.'332 In standing before the other person in order to 
speak, to say, I expose myself to the other person, I am rendered vulnerable. Such a 
coming together in a face-to-face encounter is pre-reflexive, sincere.333 Before I have 
time to think, I am there. Before the subject-object, signifier-signified, saying-said 
correlation has emerged, I am first there before the other person in the sincerity and 
veracity of a saying, which, only afterwards, becomes defaced and distorted.334 
Now, the presence of an interlocutor points to the discursive nature - other than 
discursus mentalis - of Levinas transcendental approach to philosophy and instates 
diachrony at the core of any philosophical method. His method, therefore, says Reed, 
can best be termed a 'diachronic transcendental method', but, as previously indicated, 
this lacks transparency and, as essentially discursive, has 'no ultimate transcendental 
perspective from which it may be viewed.'335 The major transcendental systems of 
philosophy find their basis in the principle of evidence which 'provides both a ground 
for the structures of consciousness and a ground for its own performance; evidence is 
self-evidence, its application to itself is self-validating.'336 The systematic function of 
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evidence is twofold; firstly, by providing a material basis for thought, it renders an 
object present to consciousness; secondly, since it is self-validating, it halts the infinite 
regress to which transcendental thought is prone, Kant's dialectical illusion. According 
to Reed, 
'[t]ranscendental philosophy, as an exploration of the conditions of 
possibility of experience in general, is necessarily anchored to the 
experience from which it begins and it ends in the unity of self-presence. 
Methodology as it is traditionally understood is concerned with the 
clarification of evidence by means of a reflection on the conditions of 
experience, the statement of the structural principles of experience, and 
the explanation of future experiences in terms of those principles.'337 
More generally, it implies the temporal synchronicity of the system, by which the 
originary unity of experience and the continuity of framework can be established. 
'Evidence conceived as a unifying presence produces a methodological synchrony.'338 
How, then, is Levinas' approach to be termed 'transcendental? Reed's answer is that it 
is 'diachronically transcendental since it 'is produced on the basis of exposure rather than 
evidence ... [and] ... operates within a new notion of temporality'339 understood as time 
opened up by and for the 'ethical adventure' of the relationship to the unassimilable, 
incomprehensible other person.340 Time is 'accomplished in the face-to-face with the 
Other.' Its condition 'lies in the relationship between humans.'341 The Other who gives 
this time to me cannot be comprehended in a synchronic system; any relation to him is 
'absolutely outside of every experience .... There is no present in which the Other or the 
relation to him appears; the relation to the Other is based on an absolute difference.'342 
The transcendental ego's vain attempts at representation always fail for there remains 
something 'irrecuperable, refractory to the simultaneity of the present, something 
unrepresentable, immemorial, prehistorical.'343 
Rejecting both the Kantian and Husserlian understandings of transcendental 
philosophy as too narrow and exclusive of many aspects of human existence, Levinas 
337 ibid. 
338 ibid., p.255 
339 ibid., pp.255-256 
340 cf. E Levinas, TO, Preface, p.32 
341 ibid., p.79 
342 CW Reed, op.cit., p.263 
343 E Levinas, OB, p.38 
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tries phenomenologically to deepen human experience of subjectivity and signification 
through a re-appraisal of the other of transcendence and the meaning which inheres in 
it, and by showing how the transcendental structures erected by both Kant and Husserl, 
when exposed to the complex of human experience, "the overloading (surtendre) of 
traditional concepts" and the 11 overdetermination of ontological categories" break down, 
open onto a new transcendence, and are "transformed into ethical terms" .344 Reed writes, 
'At the very point where Kant and Husserl believe transcendental 
philosophy culminates - the subject as transcendental ego or 
transcendental apperception, and presence as the temporal unity of 
experience - Levinas turns to "conjunctions of elements" in which these 
transcendental structures break up, or perhaps break down might be a 
more appropriate image. There is a source of signification for Levinas 
which transcends the transcendental, even understood in Husserl's 
"broadest sense" .1345 
Levinas philosophy, then, 'is transcendental insofar as he inquires back into the 
conditions of experience and the sources of its signification. However, insofar as he 
considers transcendence to be an event which no transcendental structure can 
comprehend with perfect clarity, his thought must be distinguished from every previous 
transcendental philosophy by its character as diachronic.'346 
344 See ibid., p.115 
In a footnote to God and Philosophy, Levinas cnttc1ses the accepted 
philosophical understanding of experience and signification as too restricted, linked as 
it is to the notion of 'presence'. He writes, '[t]he notion of experience is inseparable from 
the unity of presence or simultaneity, and consequently refers to the unity of 
apperception which does not come from the outside to "become conscious" of 
simultaneity .... But all signification does not derive from experience, does not resolve 
into a manifestation .... Suffering-for-another, for example, has a meaning in which 
knowing is adventitious. The adventure of knowledge which is characteristic of Being, 
ontological from the first, is not the only mode, nor the preliminary mode, of 
intelligibility or meaning. Experience as the source of meaning has to be put into 
question. It is possible to show that meaning qua knowing has its motivation in a 
meaning that at the start is not a knowing at all. This is not to deny that philosophy is 
itself knowledge. But the possibility for knowing to take in all meaning does not require 
a reduction of all meaning to the structures that its exhibition impose. This then 
suggests the idea of a dia-chrony of truth in which the said has to be unsaid, and the 
unsaid unsaid in its turn. In this sense the sceptical essence of philosophy can be taken 
seriously: scepticism is not an arbitrary contestation; it is a doctrine of inspection and 
testing, of a kind irreducible to the scientific kind of testing' (GP, p.144). 
345 C W Reed, op.cit., p.257 
346 ibid., p.258 
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1.7 Summary 
Methodology stands under the aegis of alterity. If, as Levinas says, 'philosophy 
is the work of love in the service of love,' then it will always be summoned to go beyond 
its current confinement and extend its endeavours to render an account of the 
relationship with the Other to the Other. That the text of philosophy arises, not primarily 
in solitary wonder, but in the dialogic context of the relationship with the Other, of and 
about whom questions are asked, and to whom answers are offered renders 
methodological transparency difficult. The Other is a question, the answer to which is 
always inadequate. Methodology is thus subverted in two ways: it can only proceed 
dialogically, as Rahner might term it, and diachronically, as Levinas indicates. Because 
the subject matter of philosophy is a relationship between the self and the Other who is 
excessive with regard to the self, but whose very excess will sustain the relationship, the 
Same and the Other can neither be said in the same time or the same place. Thus, 
methodology finds itself robbed of a stable ground which would provide a sure footing 
for its quest for transparency. Jacques Pohier was certainly correct when he indicated 
that 'transparency is only a quality for window panes' not of human beings.347 
Now, the excess of the Other means that the articulation of the relationship 
proceeds, not simply by a via negativa which would demand a constant unsaying of 
what is said with regard to the Other, but by a via eminentiae in which the Other is 
spoken of in an eminent and superlative way, descriptive language pushed to the limit 
by the glory of the other to whom such language is inadequate. 
This failure of thought to grasp or comprehend the Other needs to be stressed. 
It is a failure which arises because, aiming at being critically grounded, it maintains a 
forgetfulness of difference and is blind to its own situatedness. The text of philosophy 
is always and already contextualised, and is none other than an attempt at understanding 
which is always and already grounded beforehand in a relationship with alterity. For 
Levinas, this context is the proximity of the Other in the ethical encounter; for Rahner, 
it is the theological reality of the supernatural existential, and both in their own ways 
will link the theological and the ethical. Thought, then, is challenged by the Other who 
calls all our concepts into question and so insinuates himself into the apparatus of 
understanding as to undo the categories in which that understanding is expressed and 
in which the world is framed. Like Banquo's ghost who returns to undo Macbeth's well-
347 See J Pohier, God in Fragments, (London: SCM Press, 1985), p.267 
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laid plans and projects, the ethical encounter with the Other constitutes an ultimate 
situation of ultimate ab-solution with respect to thought and returns to haunt and disturb 
the best-laid schemes of subjectivity. 
Now, while this is clearly the thought which animates Levinas' own thinking, it 
is also to be found in Rahner, though in a less developed way. Rahner's philosophy 
advances itself in response to an alterity, initially affirmed as Being in its 
comprehensibility, but ultimately understood as the proximity of incomprehensible 
mystery. Both Rahner and Levinas proceed phenomenologically: the contents of 
consciousness - the phantasmata of Aquinas - provide a point of departure for their 
reduction. Both employ a transcendental method, seeking to expose the transcendental 
conditions of possibility of thought, and find the ultimate transcendental condition in 
an alterity which is excessive to the subject. Rahner, responding to the Kantian 
problematic regarding the question of the possibility of metaphysics, discovers this 
alterity as the source and goal of the dynamic tendency of the finite intellect, yet 
acknowledges the weakness of a purely intellectual approach which fails to do justice 
to the personal and inter-subjective' character of subjectivity. Levinas straightaway 
acknowledges that metaphysics can only be undertaken as ethics. Rahner is 
anthropocentric in his approach without being egocentric. At the core of his subject, and 
constitutive of the subject, is a revelation of and a receptivity to alterity. The 
anthropological reflection, transcendentally pursued, opens onto and ontologically 
affirms alterity. Thus, as Levinas expresses it, subjectivity finds its defence and its 
inviolability in terms of its relationship to an incomprehensibility excessive to the 
subject, and which is ultimately to be reduced as mystery. If one, at this stage, might 
point out a difference. Rahner understands alterity within the ontological framewor~ 
and has difficulty, within the strict confines of critical philosophy, in attributing 
philosophical significance to the material or the interpersonal world. Ultimately, alterity, 
otherness, is absolute being, which is identified with God. Levinas, on the other hand, 
disavowing the ontological, finds true alterity in the other person, and only in terms of 
the relationship with the other person is God to be discovered. 
In the following chapter, the transcendental reflection upon which both embark 
will be examined. Rahner, following Marechal, goes beyond the static formalism of the 
Kantian Critique and demonstrates the dynamic activity of the intellect. Levinas, too, 
will pursue a transcendental reduction but, recognising the inadequacy of intellection, 
will pursue it beyond the subjective to the inter-subjective, begun but not completed by 
METHOD 
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Towards the end of the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant indicates that 
all the interests of reason, speculative and practical, combine in the questions: 
I . What can I know? 
2. What ought I to do? 
3 What may I hope? 
The first question, which 'is merely speculative' (A805/B833 ), has already been 
answered in the Critique. Another line of inquiry can be pursued, however: 'whether 
pure reason may not also be met with in the practical sphere' (A804/B832), and 
'whether, therefore, reason may not be able to supply to us from the standpoint of its 
practical interest what it altogether refuses to supply us in respect of its speculative 
interest' (A804/B832). The responses to the second and third questions, opening as they 
do onto the practical domain, take us beyond the limits imposed on reason by its 
speculative interest, and to answer them constitutes a response to the Kantian 
problematic other than that offered by the transcendental dynamism of the intellect 
advanced by Rabner and Transcendental Thomism. Levinas provides such a response. 
Towards the beginning of Totality and Infinity, Levinas echoes the Kantian problematic: 
"'The true life is absent." But we are in the world.ti Such an affirmation is, says Levinas, 
the alibi which has, in the history of thought, maintained and sustained metaphysics, 
which has always been presented 'as a movement going forth from a world that is 
familiar to us, whatever be the yet unknown lands that bound it or that hide it from 
view. '2 Since Kant's limitation of the power of pure reason to the categories, this 
uncharted beyond cannot be known - or cannot be known categorially. Yet, like Kant 
who maintains the regulative function of a beyond, Levinas recognises the need for 
metaphysics and human transcendence to be grounded, and this can only be elsewhere 
than in the power of speculative reason. In Dieu. la Mon et le Temps ,3 he recognises that 
the transcendental approach of the First Critique is a radical exposition of the finitude 
of being, a point also maintained by Benton who recognises in transcendental 
philosophy 'the finitude of the human intellect - which is itself one of the most 




E Levinas, TI, p.33 
ibid. 
E Levinas, Dieu. la Mort et le Temps, Paris, 1993, (Hereafter DMT) 
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according to Kant, are asked in philosophy, and which he raises in A805/B833, namely, 
What can I know? What must I do? What may I hope? it is the second, says Levinas, 
which exceeds the first, for the first reduces itself to the question of the possibility of 
the comprehension of being, while the others address the obligations (devoir) and 
salvation (salut) of the hwnan person. 'The question what can I know? leads to finitude, 
but what must I do? and what am I in terms of hope? go further, and in any case 
somewhere other than towards finitude?' 5 
The purpose of this chapter will be to demonstrate two responses to the Kantian 
Critique, namely, that of the dynamism of the intellect in the transcendental Thomism 
which Rahner inherits from Rousellot and Marechal, and that of the ethical response 
developed by Levinas. 
2.1 The Dynamism of the Intellect, or, What can I know?: 
The fixed and static view, or the invariant form, presented by Kant in the 
Critique of Pure Reason is contested in Transcendental Thomism. Marechal, who 
profoundly influenced Rahner's thinking,6 asked whether 'the agnosticism of Kant can 
be overcome by means of the Kantian transcendental method.'7 In Le point de depart. V, 
E Levinas, DMT, p.71 
6 Responding to a question by Patrick Granfield in an interview of October 
1965 (Karl Rahner in Dialogue) regarding his philosophical influences, Rahner 
mentions Marechal 'who exercised a great influence on my philosophy' (p.13). '[T]he 
initial, truly philosophical insight was given by Marechal. His book, Le point de depart 
de la metaphysique, especially Cahier V, influenced me greatly when I was younger' 
(p.14). Were it not for his study of Heidegger and Marechal, he acknowledges, in an 
interview with Albert Raffelt in 1974, that he 'would not have done philosophy in a 
transcendental manner' (p.132). As to whether it was Heidegger or Marechal who 
provided the decisive direction for his thinking, in an interview with Leo O'Donovan in 
1979, Rahner, at 75 years old, reflected, 'if I ask myself whether Heidegger exercised 
a great influence on me, then I would say I am not exactly sure. Naturally I am grateful 
that I was able to sit in his seminar with a few others for two years. Certainly, I learned 
a variety of things from him, even if I have to say that I owe my most basic, decisive, 
philosophical direction, insofar as it comes from someone else, more, in fact, to the 
Belgian philosopher and Jesuit, Joseph Marechal. His philosophy already moved beyond 
the traditional neoscholasticism. I brought that direction from Marechal to my studies 
with Heidegger and it was not superceded by him' (p.190). 
7 J Marechal, L'aspect dynamique de la methode transcendentale chez 
Kant, in La revue neoscolastique de philosophie, 42 (1939), p.343. (Hereafter, L'aspect 
dynamique) 
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he responds by saying that 'Kantian agnosticism demands being overcome,'8 but that this 
is only possible if there is a 'recognition of the speculative role of dynamic finality' .9 
Marechal will, therefore, seek to show the dynamic character of human knowledge 
which is the logical development and the fulfilment of the critique initiated by Kant and 
further elaborated by Fichte. To fail to recognise the dynamism inherent in the act of 
knowledge is to fail to attain the object in itself, and to remain locked within the subject. 
He writes, 'nous demeurons, de droit confines a l'interieur du sujet comme tel, nous 
sommes emmures dans le "relatif', et aucun artifice de demonstration ne nous permettra 
de ''Jeter un pont" vers l'exterieur et l'absolu, 110 a point which Coreth puts when he 
writes that, '[t]ranscendental reflection, precisely because it goes together with oblivion 
of being, has not reached its ultimate basis, the last unconditioned condition of the 
human act of thinking: being. It has stopped at the penultimate condition: the subject.111 
Levinas, too, will point to the penultimacy of the subject when he writes that 'Totality 
and Infinity' will 'present itself as a defence of subjectivity,' 12 by recognising subjectivity 
'as founded in the idea of infinity.' 13 
Marechal seeks, then, to go beyond Kant so as to attain 'the possibility of the 
metaphysical affirmation,' uncritically accepted in the pre-Kantian metaphysical 
critique, by considering the dynamism inherent in Kant's own schema. The metaphysical 
critique had recognised the objective reality of the object as the necessary term of the 
intellect's dynamic tendency. However, the epoche effected by the transcendental 
8 idem, Le point, V, p.39 
9 ibid. 
More recently, the dynamism inherent in Kant's own schema is recognised by 
Gerd Buchdahl in Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, Essays on the Structure of Kant1s 
Philosophy, (London, 1992). Buchdahl notes that 'Kant's transcendental ontology aims 
at giving us only the passivity of cognition of an object's existence' (p.5), but goes on 
to show 'the dynamical version of Kant's transcendental method.' In his Preface, he 
writes that his work attempts 'a fresh over-all view of the general strategy of Kant's 
transcendental approach... [employing]... as a hermeneutical tool, the notion of 
"dynamical" process of "reduction and realisation" in order thereby to yield an entirely 
fresh explication of Kant's transcendental structure' (p.ix). For a detailed elaboration of 
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critique had removed the term of the intellect's dynamism from consideration. 
Marechal's task, then, is the re-establishment, through reflective analysis, of the relation 
of logical truth between the ontological object and the knowing subject such that the 
implicit dynamism within the act of knowledge had its goal restored As Aquinas says, 
'Truth is not known by the intellect except inasmuch as the intellect 
reflects upon its act; inasmuch, namely, as the intellect knows the 
relationship of its act to the thing, which relationship cannot be known 
unless the nature of the act be known, and hence the very nature of the 
intellect itself, insofar as it is in the very nature of the intellect that it be 
conformed to things. Hence, the intellect knows truth inasmuch as it 
reflects upon itself.' 14 
The affirmation of the ontological reality of the object, a true relationship with 
exteriority,15 is essential for Marechalian realism, for it is the a priori which conditions 
all acts of affirmation, preceding thought and action, although known only a posteriori 
through reflective analysis. Marechal himself, in Le Sentiment de Presence, writes, 
'The human mind is not simply a mirror passively reflecting objects 
which come within its reach, but an activity, oriented in its most intimate 
depths towards an end term, in which alone it could completely absorb 
itself, towards absolute Being, absolute Truth and Good. The Absolute 
has placed its mark on the basic tendency of our mind; further, this 
tendency constantly goes beyond particular intellections, which are 
always relative in as much as they are particular.r1 6 
To account for this dynamism inherent in the intellect, Marechal maintains the need for 
an affirmation of being as absolute, 'the objective necessity of Being, in genera1' 17 yet 
it must be deduced transcendentally for Kant's criticism of the metaphysical method 
holds. 
For Marechal, Kant's transcendental reflection had uncovered the a pnon 
conditions formally determining the appearance of the intentional object within 
14 Aquinas, De Veritate, q.1, a.9, quoted by G Isaye, Scheuer: an interior 
and rigorous metaphysic, in Continuum, 2, No.1, (Spring, 1964), p.32 
15 Levinas writes, 'The ethical relation, opposed to first philosophy which 
identifies freedom and power, is not contrary to truth; it goes unto being in its absolute 
exteriority, and accomplishes the very intention that animates the movement unto truth' 
(TI, p.47, italics added). 
16 J Marechal, A propos du sentiment de presence chez les profanes et chez 
les mystiques, in Etudes sur la psychologie des mystiques. Tome !er, Paris and Bruges, 
1924, p.120 
17 idem, Le Point, V, p.84 
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consciousness. However, Kant had restricted the synthesis achieved in apperception by 
the transcendental subject to the purely categorial, 18 whereas, says Marechal, any 
categorial synthesis demands a horizon of absolute unity to which a judgment can be 
referred, and which is constitutive of the contents of consciousness rather than merely 
regulative. 19 He writes, 'Since an absolute reality ... was known objectively by theoretical 
reason, it is necessary that this reality intervenes, as internal condition of possibility, 
in the same constitution of the object necessary to our knowledge.'2° Kant's categorial 
synthesis presupposed the unifying synthesis effected in the transcendental of unity of 
apperception, taken as a priori, but this results in the object being the result of a static 
analysis which is merely a 'more attentive noting of the opposition of unity and diversity 
present to our consciousness in every apprehension of an object.'21 From this stasis, the 
dilemma arises, namely, '[h]ow, in effect, with purely formal and static representations -
the phenomena - and with the aid only of the analytical principle understood in a purely 
normative sense, can one, without recourse to any other source of information, discover 
a necessary beyond, and more, an absolute beyond opposed to the subject as a reality 
in itself?'22 To begin with the phenomenal is to remain within the phenomenal, a 
confinement which arises from the Kantian view of judgement as synthesis to the 
neglect of judgment as affirmation and relation to an absolute. Kant's failure lay in 
disregarding, 'by a strange lack of logic,'23 the active finality of the subject in the 
constitution of objects, a failure which Marechal will exploit and develop. 
Kant's agnosticism with regard to the absolute reality needs to be countered, but 
from within the Kantian critique itself. Using the same point of departure and a 
18 For a fuller discussion, see J Marechal, Jugement 'scolastique' 
concernant la racine de l'agnosticisme kantien in Melanges Joseph Marechal Tome !er: 
Oeuvres, Brussels, 1950 
19 E Mascall regards this as the central point of disagreement between Kant 
and Marechal. Whereas Kant views the absolute as having a regulative role, Marechal 




J Marechal, Le Point, III, p.306; Cf. Le jugement, p.281 
idem, Le Point, V, p.56 
ibid., p.476 
23 G Van Riet, Thomistic Epistemology: Studies concerning the Problem 
of Cognition in the Contemporary Thomistic School, Vo. I, G Franks (tr.), London, 
1963, p.247 
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transcendental reflection, Marechal intends to 'go beyond the negative conclusions of 
Kantian Idealism and restore beneath the phenomenological object the metaphysical 
object.'24 'The agnostic conclusions rest, in the final analysis, on a strictly static and 
formal conception of objective knowledge,' 25 and, by neglecting the act of knowledge, 
remain definitively within that formal conception. In fact, says Marechal, '[t]he history 
of the problem of the object, in Kantian criticism, is one of a latent conflict between the 
formal viewpoint and the actual viewpoint ( entre le point de vue de la forme et le point 
de vue de l'acte. )'26 Yet, Kant's formalism is already overcome by Kant himself, for he 
goes beyond himself in his use of a dynamic language to describe the structural inter-
relations between condition and conditioned.27 B Jansens writes, 'Kant himself, from 
the first edition of the Critique (1781) ... then, anew, and much more clearly, in the 
transcendental Deduction of the second edition, goes beyond the exclusively formal 
point of view to be exposed.'28 In the B edition of the Critique, Kant indicates the 
dependence of the analytic unity of apperception on the synthetic unity of apperception 
(B,133; Cf. A,77-78), writing, '[t]he synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that 
highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the 
whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this 
faculty of apperception is the understanding itself (B,134, note a.). Thus Marechal can 
say that, '[i]n effect, from the first to the second edition of the Critique the dominant 
point of view in the theory of transcendental apperception passed from the idea of a 
subsuming of phenomena under formal a priori conditions, the highest of which was 
apperceptive unity, to the idea of a synthesis of phenomena by the original apperceptive 
activity, namely the categories. Judgement, forby formal representation of the effected 1~'\_ 
subsumption, becomes the very act of categorial synthesis and its spontaneous reference 
to the supreme unity of consciousness.'29 
24 J Marechal, Le Point, V, p.570 
25 idem, L'aspect dynamique, p.343 
26 idem, Le Point, IV, p.112 
27 See ibid., V, p.75 
28 B Jansen, La philosophie reli~ieuse de Kant, p.355 
29 J Marechal, L'aspect dynamique, p.357 
Marechal notes, however; the danger of an absolute idealism implicit in a 
subjective act of synthesis in which the subject is the sole source of being and knowing, 
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The implicit dynamism of the intellect which the transcendental reduction 
uncovers enables Marechal to move towards a transcendental deduction of the 
ontological affirmation formerly achieved in the metaphysical critique. He does so in 
a threefold movement: firstly, he performs a phenomenological epoche, setting aside 
any ontological consideration of the object, and seeks to clarify the inherent elements 
and relations within the phenomenological object through reflective analysis; secondly, 
he concludes the affirmation of the absolute value of the object as a practical postulate, 
which finds its basis in the volitional activity of the subject - the stage at which Kant 
halts; thirdly, he proposes the absolute value of the affirmed object as a theoretical and 
speculative necessity, by showing that the practical and extrinsic necessity of a 
'transcendent order,' Kant's transcendental ideal, is founded on an absolute order. Hence, 
the transcendental deduction of the ontological affirmation. Marechal presents this 
deduction polysyllogistically as a transcendental proof, which can be summarised thus: 
Human intelligence, being non-intuitive, reveals itself as a movement in which 
what is potentially knowable becomes actually known. However, all movement points 
towards an end, yet to be attained though implicitly grasped. Now, since this dynamism 
does not cease with any particular end, an absolute end, coextensive with absolute 
being, must be posited for this alone will satisfy the dynamism of the intellect. Although 
this end is absolute being, however, the discursive nature of the human intellect can only 
attain it through discourse with the particular ends known in sensibility, which must 
display receptivity to sense objects and which is to be understood as a moment in the 
intellect's drive towards the absolute. As simply received in sensibility, the sensible 
object is not an object for consciousness, but requires a concretive synthesis, whereby 
a danger which becomes reality in the post-Kantian developments in Fichte, whereby, 
in the dynamic act, the subject becomes absolute in the constitution of the object. For 
Fichte, the Ego is creative of its reality; yet, stresses Marechal, the passivity of the 
subject needs also to be recognised. 'A theory of knowledge can neither neglect the 
passive aspect or the active aspect of the intellectual act: to exaggerate the passive 
aspect is to slide towards empiricism; to exaggerate the active aspect is to be on the 
verge of ontologism or idealism' (Le Point, V, p.19). He notes that '[t]he reservations 
which we should perhaps oppose to Fichte bear less on the intuition of an activity of the 
Ego than on the nature of this activity and of this Ego .... From the fundamental principle 
of the pure activity of the Ego, Fichte, conforming to the idealist postulate, had to 
1 deduce,' not only the particularities of the theoretical Ego, but the boundaries of the 
practical Ego; and in the theoretical Ego, not only the synthetic form of concepts, but 
the forms of sensibility and even including the sensible 'given', the first material of 
knowledge' (Le Point, IV, p.352). Rather than being creative of its object, the dynamism 
of the intellect discovers the object, absolute and other than itself. 
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it becomes concept for the intellect. However, as this concretive synthesis is unable to 
yield an object distinct from the knowing subject, a further objective Jynthesis which 
relates the object to an absolute, ontological horizon in required. This is none other than 
the ontological affirmation. Now, if the ultimate end to which the intellect is striving, 
namely, absolute being, is actually constitutive of the objectivity of the object, then 
some knowledge of this absolute must enter implicitly and absolutely into our 
immediate consciousness of every object as such; and since such a necessity has been 
derived solely from a reflective analysis upon the phenomenal object in response to the 
demands of critical philosophy, it can be concluded that the affirmation of absolute 
being is not simply a practical necessity but, above all, a theoretical necessity of 
reason.30 
30 cf. J Marechal, Le Point, V, p.554 
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2.2 Rahner's Metaphysics of Knowledge: 
2.21 Presentation of the problematic in Thomas: 
Rahner intends a metaphysics of knowledge.31 In his doctoral thesis, presented 
and rejected in 1936, yet published in 1939, he addresses the question posed by Aquinas 
in ST, I, q. 84, a 7: 
31 Whether or not Rahner's project is best described as 'a metaphysics of 
knowledge' or, as V Brannick refers to it, as 'an ontology of understanding' (An 
Ontology of Understanding: Karl Rahner's Metaphysics of Knowledge in the context of 
Modem German Hermeneutics, St. Louis, 1974) will need to be made clear in the light 
of Emmanuel Levinas' criticism of the Western Tradition as an ontological confinement 
which, in reality, is a reduction of the meaning of metaphysics. The unwitting ease with 
which such a confinement arises is witnessed in the way that the philosophical 
foundation of Rahner's thought is commonly referred to as an 'ontological 
epistemology.' (See, P Burke, Conceptual Thought in Karl Rahner, in Gregorianum, 75, 
1 (1994), p.79). Levinas, however, would distinguish ontology and metaphysics. 
Ontology is 'a reduction of the other to the same by the interposition of a middle and 
neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being,' whereas metaphysics is 
'transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same ... the ethics that accomplishes 
the critical essence of knowledge' (TI, p.42). Metaphysics fails as comprehension and 
systematic incorporation through what Derrida terms the 'logic of parergonality' (See 
J Derrida, The Truth in Painting, G Bennington & I McLeod (trs.), Chicago, 1987) for 
the other is maintained in its alterity and absoluteness. Derrida terms this the differance, 
which prevents any system from encompassing what is its other or what is in excess of 
it, for any system includes what is other to it as part of its definition. We would want to 
say, with Levinas, that the object which is metaphysics' lure is always and remains 
always in excess of and resistant to the force of ontology. '[A]s critique precedes 
dogmatism, metaphysics precedes ontology (Levinas, TI, p.43)'; further, 'ontology 
presupposes metaphysics' (TI, p.48). 
Druscilla Cornell perhaps shows the import of this in a practical way when she 
describes the deconstructive endeavour as a philosophy of the limit (The Philosophy of 
Limit, New York & London, 1992) which has juridical and legal significations; justice 
is 'an aporia that inevitably serves as the limit to any attempt to collapse justice into 
positive law' (p.2). 
With regard to Rahner, insofar as his epistemology is framed within the 
comprehension of being, he attempts an ontology; insofar as he interprets the human 
spirit as a dynamism for an absolutely other, he can be said to be undertaking 
metaphysics, as Levinas understands it. However, Rahner risks collapsing metaphysics 
into ontology; the language and the categories of being are not entirely adequate or 
appropriate to his theological and anthropological endeavour. By demanding that the 
meaning of Being be thought once again so as to go beyond the limitation which its 
fram,<ework imposes and by introducing the notion of metaphysics as ethics, a C"\_ 
metaphysics which respects absolute alterity, Levinas helps us to understand afresh 
Rahner's project. Further, re-thinking Rahner in the light of Levinas will also challenge 
Levinas to clarify the meaning of Being which he rejects, since, as Rahner's Thomism 
reminds us, Being is not a univocal but analogical concept. 
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Utrum intellectus possit actu intelligere per species intelligibiles quas 
penes se habet, non convertendo se ad phantasmata. 
Aquinas, answering the various objections, says: 
Respondeo dicendum quad impossibile est intellectum nostrum, 
secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori conjungitur, 
aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. 
90 
For Thomas, the human person is both intellect and sense, or as Rahner terms it, Spirit 
and World. More precisely, the human person is Spirit in World; intellect and sense are 
so inextricably linked, 'united in the one human knowledge,'32 that the Thomistic 
epistemological problem is not the modem philosophical problem of how the intellect 
escapes from the interiority of subjectivity to encounter the otherness of the world, but 
rather how the subject, as already and always immersed in the world, manages to 
extricate itself from the world of sensibility so as to possess himself in knowledge. This 
problem, which Thomas had already addressed, is taken up by Rahner: as always and 
already in the world as sensibility, the medium wherein the sensing subject encounters 
the sensible other, a confusion arises between subject and object; this necessitates a 
subsequent differentiating act whereby, through an abstractive return to self (reditio in 
seipsum ), the subject distinguishes itself from the object and so possesses both itself and 
the object in knowledge. If the unitary phenomenon of Spirit-in-World (Geist in Welt) 
is the initial epistemological moment, how is the subsequent distinction between Spirit 
and World effected? If the subject is already confused exteriority, how does a clarified 
interiority distanced from a clarified exteriority arise? In short, with regard to the World, 
the question is not, to borrow an image from Levinas, one of the Abrahamic egress into 
the strange land of sensibility - 'how do we get there' - but the Ullyssean problem of 
returning to a homeland - 'how do we get back'? Rahner addresses the problem in Geist 
in Welt thus: 
'[F]or the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge the problem does not lie 
32 K Rahner, SW p.238 
Thomas Sheehan in Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations, (Ohio 
University Press, Athens, 1987), opts to speak of the "unified bivalence" of human 
nature to avoid any dualist interpretation in Rahnerian epistemology. Spirit and World 
are not two poles or two moments in knowing 'but a substantially unified human being 
exercising one act of knowledge' (p.160). The 'hermeneutics of human bivalence' 
adopted by Rahner 'stands in the tradition that would save and protect man's dynamic 
unity against all Platonic forms of dualism' ... [for] ... 'there are not two knowledges, one 
of the universal predicate, the other of its possible instantiation, which then 
collaborate .... There is only the experience of having something present by holding it 
at arm's length' (pp.189-190). 
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in bridging the gap between knowing and object by a "bridge" of some 
gap: such a "gap" is merely a pseudo-problem. Rather the problem is 
how the known, which is identical with the knower, can stand over 
against the knower as other, and how there can be a knowledge which 
receives another as such. It is not a question of "bridging" a gap, but of 
understanding how the gap is possible at all.'33 
2.2 The Convertibility of Being and Knowing 
91 
Now, the context for the Thomistic problematic 1s the doctrine of the 
convertibility of being and knowing. The proper object of the intellect is being as 
knowable, since 'whatever can be, can be known.'34 As power to know, the intellect, or 
Spirit, transcends itself towards being as the horizon of its activity in order knowingly 
to possess being, since '[t]he concept of a being unknowable in principle is rejected as 
a contradiction.'35 As Rahner says, 'the first metaphysical question, the most universal 
question about being, is already the affirmation of the fundamental intelligibility of all 
beings.' 36 'Being itself is the original, unifying unity of being and knowing in their 
unification in being-known.'37 It is 'the one ground which lets known and being-known 
spring out of itself as its own characteristics, and thus grounds the intrinsic possibility 
of an antecedent, essential, intrinsic relation of both of them to each other.'38 Rahner, 
discussing truth in Aquinas, writes, 
'Pure being and pure knowing are the same reality, and we call it God. 
A finite being is endowed with knowledge, and in fact with knowledge 
of itself, in that it is, in a certain measure and according to a certain 
"analogy", being .... If being and knowledge (pure being in the absolute 
and a being in the measure that it is being) constitute an original unity, 
then knowledge cannot at its ultimate basis consist in a state of having 
something intentionally "over against" one as an object; the only way 
still open to us to conceive of it is as a state in which the being 
concerned is "with" or "beside" itself, in which being is inwardly 







K Rahner, SW, p.75. 
Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, II, 98 
K Rahner, SW, p.68 
idem, Experience of the Spirit, pp.28-29 
idem, Religious Enthusiasm and the Experience of Grace, p.37 
ibid. p.39 
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known are identical, in which the knower in the true sense and the 
known in the true sense are one and identical in being. At its 
metaphysical roots, then, true knowledge consists in the unquestioning 
"being with itself' of being.'39 
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If, then, being and knowing are convertible such that to be is to know and to be able to 
be known in an original unity, and to know is to know being, then, what prevents the 
knowing subject, always and already in the presence of being, from possessing that 
being as always and already known? If knowing is the 'being-present-to-itself of Being'40 
in an original relation, why is being not completely possessed in knowledge? Why the 
question? Rahner writes, '[i]f being signifies the original unity of knowing and being 
known, if it is fundamental to the conception of being that it be present-to-self, then it 
would appear that there can be no existent thing which is not an a priori identity of 
knowing and being known.'41 So, '[t]he question becomes in fact how there could be a 
not-knowing at all?'42 The felicitous reason for this lack of transparency between being 
and knowing in human being and human knowing is the finitude of the human intellect. 
The coincidence of being and knowing only occurs in an original unity in a being which 
is without limitation. 'Only the pure act of being is the absolute identity of being and 
knowing, and perfectly realises what is meant by the concept of being.'43 For a finite 
being there is not only the experience of self-presence, but also of self-absence, - a 
bivalence which Sheehan somewhat cumbersomely prefers to term 'pres-ab-sence'44 -
and it is from this position of being-away-from-self, or not at one with oneself, that the 
39 K Rahner, Thomas Aquinas on Truth. in Theological Investigations, XIII, 
(1975), p.29 
Blanchet, interestingly, makes the point that God is an unquestioning being 
when he writes of the questioning of time. 'Every question,' he writes, 'refers back to 
someone who questions, that is to say, to the being we are and for whom alone exists 
the possibility of questioning, or of coming into question. A being like God (for 
example) could not put himself in question - he would not question; the word of God 
needs man to become the question of man. When after the Fall Jahweh asks Adam 
"Where are you?" this question signifies that henceforth man can no longer be found or 
situated except in the place of the question. Man is from now on a question for God 
himself, who does not question' (M Blanchet, IC, p.14). 
40 K Rahner, SW, p.75 
41 idem, HW, p.45 
42 idem, SW, p.75 
43 idem, HW, p.13 
44 T Sheehan, op. cit., p.167 
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finite subject relates to being, which impinges upon the subject not as known but as yet-
to-be-known, and as yet-to-be-known, as questionable. An infinite intellect would grasp 
being in an intellectual intuition and thereby achieve total self-luminosity in a complete 
coincidence of knowing, being known, and being; finite being, however, lacking total 
self-presence and incapable of intellectual intuition can only achieve presence-to-self 
from its position of being-away-from-self and being-with-the-other in sensible 
intuition.45 In other words, human knowing implies a commitment to the world, and 
positively so, since, for Rahner the human subject is not to be considered as finite on 
account of sensibility or world, but as sensibility or world on account of its finitude. As 
Aquinas puts it, knowledge of the world is always per sensum et imaginationem, and 
for the intellect to understand its proper object it is necessary quod convertat se ad 
phantasmata, that is, to the 'content of the one human consciousness to which thought 
also belongs.'46 For the finite intellect to know, it is necessary that it turn towards the 
phantasm, for its knowledge is mediated. In other words, finite spirit, as a power to 
know, cannot remain spirit, but must become world47 and in fact already and always 
finds itself, not in a Heideggerian fallenness in the world, but in a felicitous state of 
being declined as world, a declension which opens the subject, or renders it vulnerable 
to the advent of the Other, a declension which, for Levinas translates the nominative of 
the ego subject both grammatically and ontologically into the accusative. Intellectual 
intuition being excluded, finite knowing cannot be the result of an immediate relation 
between a subject in itself and an object in itself, but requires a power of receptivity, 
open to exteriority, and a reciprocity between received exteriority and the intellect as 
receptive interiority.48 Thus, in terms of the subject's acquisition of its own subjectivity, 
45 It is interesting to note that the model of knowledge, however, remains 
the same: knowledge involves a coincidence of subject and object; in intellectual 
intuition, an identity is forged between the knower and the known in that the external 
object is assimilated in an immediate act of knowing; in sensation, knower and known, 
epistemologically undifferentiated, coincide first of all in the exteriority of sensibility 
since the act of the sense object takes place in the matter of the sensing subject, thereby 
becoming simultaneously the act of the knower and the known, and thereafter and 
differentiated, in the interiority of the intellect itself. 
46 K Rahner, SW, p.238 
47 In a logical sense, for the finite subject is not otherwise than always and 
already in the world. 
48 Kant makes this point when he distinguishes between an 'original' and 
a 'derivative' intuition. Primordial being knows through an original intuition for it 
originates what it intuits. Human intuition, however, 'is dependent upon the existence 
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the world assumes what one might tenn a 'salvific significance'. It is the felix culpa, the 
necessary sin of Adam. 
2.3 The Subject as the Point of Departure for the Metaphysical Question: 
Now, 'the unquestioning "being with itself' of being' is a mark of that being in 
which there is utter coincidence of being and knowing. For finite being it is otherwise, 
and so Rahner places the performance of raising questions at the beginning of the 
metaphysical enquiry, and, as Sheehan points out, 'move[ s] from a consideration of 
man's nature as an implicit metaphysics to a discussion of explicit metaphysics as 
transcendental questioning.'49 
'Man questions. This is something final and irreducible. For in human 
existence the question is that fact which absolutely refuses to be replaced 
by another fact and thus to be unmasked once again as being itself 
derivative and provisional. For every placing-in-question of the question 
is itself again asking a question, and thereby a new instance of the 
question itself. So the question is the only "must", the only necessity, the 
only thing beyond question to which questioning is bound.'50 
The human spirit, as finite, is an inquisitive tendency towards being, and, within 
Rahner's transcendental framework, that inquisition of being - (and do not the very 
terms inquisition and interrogation conjure up a violence towards what is being 
questioned rather than the gentle pursuit of knowledge) - shows itself primarily in the 
quest for knowledge, whereby inquisition becomes acquisition, for '[t]he original 
meaning of knowing is self-possession, and being possesses itself to the extent that it 
is knowing.'51 In fact, it is the capacity for knowledge which marks the subject as a 
of the object, and is therefore possible only if the subject's faculty of representation is 
affected by the object' (Critique of Pure Reason, B,72). Again, 'intuition takes place only 
insofar as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, insofar 
as the mind is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving 
representations through the mode in which they are affected by objects is entitled 




T Sheehan, op. cit., p.157 
K Rahner, SW, p.57 
idem, Religious Enthusiasm, p.41 
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subject, for knowing is essentially subjectivity,52 and subjectivity is the original self-
possession of being.53 However, although questioning directs itself to some particular 
being or entity, no particular being or entity seems able to satisfy the inquisitive 
impulse. In theory, it might be possible to interrogate the sum total of beings and so 
seemingly exhaust the scope of questioning. Yet there would still remain the question 
about the question itself - why the why - and about its proper object, for ultimately the 
question is not about being in its particularity, but about being as such. 
'The movement of the mind or spirit towards the individual object with 
which he is concerned always aims at the particular object by passing 
beyond it. The individually and specifically and objectively known thing 
is always grasped in a broader, unnamed, implicitly present horizon of 
possible freedom, even if the reflective mind only with difficulty and 
only subsequently succeeds in making this implicitly present fragment 
or aspect of consciousness a really specific object of consciousness, and 
objectively verbalises it.'54 
Now this kind of question is the metaphysical question, and it is, for Rahner, this 
question which holds the key to an understanding of the human subject, for this is the 
question which no one may refuse for, 'even when he pauses or even deliberately 
declines to carry on enquiring, he still produces an answer to the question.'55 The 
question may be thought irrelevant or meaningless, or be confined to a mere region of 
being, yet, in so thinking, the subject implicitly affirms his own understanding of being 
as irrelevant or meaningless, or limited. However the question is framed or confined, 
it still remains a question about being and its meaning, and the subject's relation to being 
as such, for, ultimately, the subject himself is the question which must be asked. '[A]ll 
metaphysical enquiry into Being in general is an enquiry into the Being of that existent 
thing which must necessarily ask this question, that is, it is an enquiry about man. 
Human metaphysics is thus always an analytic of man.'56 






K Rahner, Experience of Transcendence, p.177 
ibid., p.176 
idem, The Spirit in the Church, Burns & Oates, London, 1979, pp.12-13 
idem, HW, p.33 
ibid., p.36 
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and its meaning echoes Heidegger51 who, in Being and Time, takes as his point of 
departure for the formal structure of the question of being (Seinsfrage) and the meaning 
of being (Sinn van Sein) that being who, 'in its very Being has that Being [as] an issue 
for it,' 58 and who is 'ontically distinctive in that it is ontological,'59 incorporating into its 
own antic structure 'a pre-ontological understanding of Being... as a definite 
characteristic.'60 Dasein is 'the primary entity to be interrogated.'61 Heidegger writes that, 
57 The question of the relatedness and indebtedness of Rahner to Heidegger 
is difficult to assess. He attended lectures delivered by Heidegger from 1934 - 1936, and 
many of the themes which Heidegger addresses are implicit in his writings. He notes 
that it was 'a style of thinking and of investigating' which he adopted from Heidegger 
rather than specific doctrines (See P Granfield, An Interview: Karl Rahner. Theologian 
at Work, in Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews. 1965-1982, (New 
York: Crossroads, 1986). He acknowledges that, were it not for Marechal and 
Heidegger, he 'would not have done philosophy in a transcendental manner' 
(Approaches to Theological Thinking, 1974, in Karl Rahner in Dialogue, p.132). In the 
introduction to Spirit in the World, he admits that the work is limited in its scope and 
'does not permit an explicit, detailed, confrontation of modern philosophy from Kant to 
Heidegger with Thomas', but that there are points of contact which can be inferred by 
the reader. Perhaps the most direct admission by Rahner himself on the contribution of 
Heidegger to his own philosophical development is in an article written in Martin 
Heidegger im Gespriich (R Wisser (ed.), Freiburg & Munich, 1970, pp.48-49) and 
reprinted in translation as a Preface to Sheehan's work, Karl Rahner. The Philosophical 
Foundations. Rabner refers to Heidegger as his 'master' and his only 'teacher,' though 
the relationship with him has been quiet and inner. However, ten years later, in a radio 
interview with Peter Pawlowsky (11 July, 1980), although he acknowledges the 
contribution of the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit 'with whom [he] learned to think a little 
bit,' he is able to say that '[i]nsofar as it is philosophical, my theology does not really 
show the systematic and thematic influence of Heidegger. What he communicated was 
the desire to think, the ability to think ... I would say that Martin Heidegger was the only 
teacher for whom I developed the respect that a disciple has for a great master ... [but] ... 
I would say that Heidegger had little influence on my philosophy or even my theology, 
although I am really extremely grateful to him' (On Becoming a Theologian, in Karl 
Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews. 1965-1982, p.257). 
Perhaps specifically, and of note for this present work, Rahner says of 
Heidegger, 'surely he has taught us one thing: that everywhere and in everything we can 
and must seek out that unutterable mystery which disposes over us, even though we can 
hardly name it with words.' Although Heidegger himself refrains from speech about this 
mystery, it is a 'speech which the theologian must utter.' 
For a comprehensive exposition of a Rahnerian reading of Heidegger, see T 
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'If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried 
through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then 
any treatment of it... requires us to explain how Being is to be looked at, 
how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped; it 
requires us to prepare the way for choosing the right entity for example, 
and to work out the genuine way of access to it. Looking at something, 
understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it - all these ways 
of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of 
Being for those particular entities which we, as inquirers, are ourselves. 
Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an 
entity - the inquirer - transparent in its own Being. The very asking of 
this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential 
character from what is inquired about - namely, Being. This entity which 
each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the 
possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "dasein". If we are 
to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give 
a proper explicitation of an entity (Dasein), with regard to its Being.'62 
For Heidegger, Dasein can be adopted as the starting point for the metaphysical enquiry 
because, in its own being, it already has, at the pre-conceptual level, a relationship with 
its being. When it comports itself towards other antic entities 'within-the-world', being 
as such is always present as a presupposition and horizon in the light of which 
individual entities can be articulated and expressed. The task of Heidegger's 
phenomenological analytic of Dasein is to lay bare this implicit grasp of being, so as to 
enable being to disclose itself. 
Commenting upon Heidegger's existential approach to the problem of the 
meaning of being, Rabner points out that, with Heidegger, the study of being 'assumes 
a transcendental form,' 63 and seeks 'to establish the a priori conditions under which man 
can raise that question [of being].'64 In his own approach, Rahner, too, stresses the 
transcendental nature of his enquiry. The question about being is a transcendental 
question, turning upon itself so as to make clear its own presuppositions. It is the 
'transcendental question, which does not merely place something asked about in 
question, but the one questioning and the question itself, and thereby absolutely 





K Rahner, The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Heidegger, p.129 
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65 idem, SW, p.14. In other words, the subject is 'quodammodo omnia' 
(Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, III, 112) 
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metaphysics; and since the question is the question of the human subject - subjectively 
and objectively genitivally understood - as that being who must ask questions, and who, 
in asking questions, interrogates not simply beings in their particularity ad infinitum but 
being at its most fundamental, namely, being as and insofar as it is being, then the 
human subject is the privileged access to being; since the question about being includes, 
as part of its own questioning, the being of the one who questions, then the question 
about being also becomes the question about the question of being, that is, the question 
of the question. Rahner, speaking of the transcendental method at the heart of his own 
enquiries, writes that'[ e ]verything which already reaffirms itself with implicit necessity 
in the very question about the nature of man and in the very way many put this 
question .... belongs to the metaphysically necessary nature of man ... ,'66 and that '[t]he 
point of departure for the answer to the general question about being can be nothing 
other than the question itself,'67 which is the subject. Thus, the question about being has 
become the question about the question itself, and metaphysics can be said to take 'the 
"whence and whither" of its asking about being in its totality precisely from this very 
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2.4 Transcendental Subjectivity as Self-Presence69 in Knowledge and 
Freedom: 
For Rahner, the subject realises itself not only in knowledge but as freedom. 
'Man is the being who possesses unlimited transcendence of knowledge and freedom. 
The inner dynamism of his spirit is directed to absolute being . . . and then to God (or 
whatever one calls the goal of human transcendence) which goes beyond all that can be 
grasped in objective categories.'70 However, this transcendence, in which the process of 
self-realisation or self-actualisation is effected, occurs at the juncture of Spirit and 
World. 
2.41 Human Knowledge 
For Rahner, the subject is the unitary phenomenon, 'Spirit in World,' which are 
'moments of the one man, moments in which the primordially unitary essence of man 
necessarily displays and unfolds itself.'71 Spirit characterises the power of the subject 
to transcend itself towards an absolute horizon; World is the name of that 'reality which 
is accessible to the immediate experience of man.'72 As Spirit, the subject is dynamic 
orientation towards Being; as World, that dynamism is always by way of conversion to 
the world. 'Spirit grasps at the incomprehensible, in as much as it presses beyond the 
actual object of comprehension to an anticipatory grasp of the absolute . . . the 
primordial and fundamental which is the ultimate transcendental condition of the 
69 In Spirit. Matter. Becoming: Karl Rahner's Spirit in the World (Geist in 
Welt) (Modem Schoolman. 48 (1971). p.152), Andrew Tallon notes, 'Beisichsein and 
Bei-dem-andern-Sein (or: Bei-einem-andern-Sein). Presence-to-self (self-presence) and 
presence-to-other (or: another) (self-absence) are less literal than being-with-oneself and 
being-with-the-other (or: with-another). As nouns the first set serves better; as verbs the 
second has advantages. Self-absence also renders Weg-von-sich-selbst-beim-andern-
Sein, when sensation is meant. The basic concepts are of spirit as self-presence and 
matter as self-absence; the being composed of both principles achieves its presence to 
others (and ultimately to itself) by being away from itself through materiality.' Sheehan 
notes that knowledge as self-presence is 'the presupposition of Western metaphysics' 
(Karl Rahner, p.164), a presupposition to be challenged by Levinas. 
70 K Rahner, Anonymous and Explicit Faith, p.55 
71 idem, Christology within an Evolutionary View of the World, p.162 
72 idem, SW, p.liii 
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possibility of knowledge.'73 A reference to absolute being inheres in every act of the 
subject as knower, for '[this] intramundane spirituality already includes the 
transcendental and conscious relation to that ultimate ground which bears all being in 
its own which we call God.'74 Further, it is this relation to a transcendent ground which 
is the goal of transcendence and the transcendental condition of knowing which 
constitutes the subject in his subjectivity, for the subject only returns to himself in an 
'absolute having-been-given-to-self (ein Sichselbstgegebensein),'15 the counterpart of 
which is his being referred to an absolute reality. In other words, subjective knowledge 
is reflexive, arising in the concomitant return which accompanies being always away-
from-self towards the otherness of reality, absolutely considered. Co-experience of self 
accompanies experience of an object. In explicitly theistic terms, Rabner writes, 
'[ e ]xperience of God and experience of self. . . in a real and fundamental sense stand 
for the totality of human experience and human knowledge. '76 
Now, if human experience and human knowledge relate to the experience of 
God, as absolute, and the concomitant experience of self, then one must revise the 
understanding of knowledge as the subjective power of appropriation, which Levinas 
will criticise in the western philosophical tradition. Knowledge may be a reditio in 
seipsum, but whether that return to one's own native land of interiority is a return laden 
with the booty of exteriority, as Levinas would understand the return, needs to be 
questioned. Rabner seemingly embraces such a comprehensive understanding. The 
ultimate mutual perichoresis of Being and Knowing which constitutes the Thomistic 
framework would seem to support the comprehension of Being as the ultimate goal of 
73 idem, The Concept of Mystery, p.42 
74 idem, The Unity of Spirit and Matter in Christian Faith, in TI, VI, p.156 
P Burke (Conceptual Thought in Karl Rabner, Gregorianum 75. 1 (1994)) notes 
a change in the term of the excessus of the human spirit from Spirit in the World to 
Hearers of the Word (p.74, n.33). In Spirit the term of intellectual dynamism is esse 
commune not God who is esse absolutum, whereas in Hearers reference to esse 
commune is abandoned in favour of a dynamism towards the 'pure infinity of God'. The 
jump from Being as such ( esse commune) to God is a problem within the transcendental 
schema. See J M McDermott, The Christologies of Karl Rahner, in Gregorianum. 67 
(1987), pp.92ff. 
75 K Rabner, Christology within an Evolutionary View of the World, 
pp.162-63 
76 idem, Experience of Self, p.122 
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knowledge. But such a situation of total transparency, as already indicated, only pertains 
to absolute being. For finite being it is otherwise, and analogical, a point which Levinas 
in his refusal of analogy seems to neglect. Comprehension ultimately fails before the 
Mystery. If the relation to Being can only be understood analogically, so too the 
knowing relationship needs to be analogically considered. For Rahner, the possibility 
(Fragbarkeit) and the necessity (Fraglichkeit) of the metaphysical question indicate the 
enigmatic relationship of the finite spirit to absolute being. The human subject knows 
being, hence the possibility of the question, yet Being is not comprehensively grasped 
in knowledge, hence the necessity of the question.77 Questioning, then, is a paradoxical 
knowing not-knowing. It is a transcendence beyond the limit of our present knowledge 
towards a knowledge which is not yet present, but which is already anticipated, and 
which can be termed 'pre-knowledge' (Vorgriff). Such a pre-knowledge is implicit in any 
question as the horizon towards which the question tends. 'It is a knowledge which 
transcends itself into non-knowledge,'78 'the movement of pure surpassing and pure 
anticipation,' 'the constitutive condition of the possibility of any question whatsoever.'79 
Particular questions are not the stepping stone towards a more complete possession of 
Being; rather, the particular question, the question in its antic manifestation, is only 
possible in the light of an anticipation of an absolute, ontological horizon, which Rahner 
terms absolute Being, and ultimately God, and which constitutes the framework within 
which questions are raised, the horizon against which questioning takes place. 'Every 
question is evoked by an antecedent summons from what is questioned, which as 
conscious (although not reflexively known, or although not even knowable reflexively) 
and as known (although not explicitly known, or although not even knowable explicitly) 
is present in the question itself.'80 The virtually infinite pursuit of the particular is 
transcended in the question about everything that is, insofar as it is. It is a question 
about being, which brings together and unites every particular into a questionable 
whole, and the unthematic pre-knowledge of which forms the anticipated horizon of 
77 Rahner writes, 'Possible: that which we enquire about must, in principle, 
be knowable. Necessary: that about which we enquire is not so obvious that allows no 
further questions.' (HW, in A Rahner Reader, p.11) 
78 E Coreth, Metaphysics, p.54 
79 ibid., p.57 
80 K Rahner, Experience of the Spirit, p.28 
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questioning. 'The possibility of inquiring about being as such and in its totality is the 
condition of the possibility of every single question.' 81 The question, then, is 
'unrestricted desire for being', a pure anticipation of being as such. 
Rahner, then, indicating that what he means by 'knowledge' is transcendental 
knowledge, goes on to say that this 'should be enough to indicate from the outset that 
what we are treating of is that kind of knowledge which is present in every man as 
belonging essentially to the roots of cognition in him, and as constituting the starting 
point and prior condition for all reflexive knowledge.' 82 The experience of God and the 
experience of self constitute an ultimate and all-embracing unity, for in every act of 
knowledge, the subject co-experiences at the same time both himself as knower and God 
as absolute horizon to which this knowledge is ultimately directed; the experience, 
however, is never directly or explicitly given, but rather remains implicit within any 
objective experience as its transcendental or 'enabling' condition.83 This original unity 
of the subject with its transcendent and transcendental ground is far more original than 
the unity which exists between experience of an object within-the-world and subjective 
co-experience, for the implicit experience of God is the horizon within which any 
possible experience whatever occurs. However, such transcendental experience only 
arises in the knowing encounter with objects within-the-world. Even when the subject 
makes of itself its own object in an act of knowledge, its own transcendentality 
continues to be implicitly co-presented. Writ" later in life in Foundations, outlining his 
epistemology, Rahner writes, 
'Even if this knower in an act of reflection explicitly makes the co-
known self-presence of the subject and his knowing the object of a new 
act of knowledge, the same thing happens again. The new act itself, 
which makes the subjective co-consciousness the object of the 
subsequent act in a conceptual way, also includes once again such an 
original self-presence of the subject and his knowledge of this second, 
81 ibid. 
82 idem, Experience of Self, p.123 
83 See ibid., p.125 
Marechal had written in similar vein, speaking of the latent dynamism in 
Aquinas' own thought, ' ... perception of 'intelligible objects' does not happen without a 
certain reflexive perception of the action of the intellect upon them, or to express it 
better, in them: "Manifestum est quod [intellectus] ex eo quod cognoscit intelligibile, 
intelligit ipsum suum intelligere, et per actum cognoscit potentiam intellectivam" (ST, 
I, 14,2, ad 3)' (Le point. V, p.377). 
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reflexive act, as the condition of its possibility, as its subjective pole.'84 
Thus, knowledge is not the reflection of an object in consciousness nor is it primarily 
contact with an object, nor the intentional going beyond itself of the subject; knowledge 
is a 'being-with-self (Beisichsein). 'In its original concept knowledge is self-possession, 
and anything which is, possesses itself in the measure in which it is being.'85 Essentially, 
then, knowing is subjectivity, the 'being-present-to-self of being' which 'being-present-
to-self is the being of the existent. '86 
A further consideration presents itself. To what extent is that being-present-to 
self in Rahner to be equated with knowledge understood as comprehension, for it is 
precisely this understanding of knowledge that Levinas criticises. Rahner himself 
indicates that knowledge is self-presence, but this self-presence, as an original 
relationship to Being, precedes conceptual elaboration. Knowledge is originally 
proximity, and only thereafter and inadequately concept. 
For Levinas the knowing relation compromises the alterity of the Other, bringing 
it within the dominion of the Same. Much of Levinas' criticism of the ontological 
tradition is directed against Heidegger, yet, for Heidegger, the original relationship with 
the world is not a relationship in which Dasein knows or comprehends its world. Rather, 
knowledge is a reduced manner of being-in the world. Primally, Dasein has a care 
(Sorgen) for the world, and it is as care that the Being of Dasein is to be made visible. 87 
But this original care has to be realised in a categorial way as concern (Besorgen), as 
a 'having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and 
looking after it, making use of something, giving up something and letting it go, 
undertaking, accomplishing, evmcmg, interrogating, considering, discussing, 
determining .... All these ways of Being-in have concern (Besorgen) as their kind of 
Being.'88 The antonymic and deficient description of concern is 'leaving undone, 
neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest.' The difficulty of viewing the relationship with the 
world in terms of a comprehensive knowledge is that the founded character of 
84 K Rahner, Foundations, p.18 
85 idem, HW, p. 39 
86 idem, SW, p.69 
87 M Heidegger, BT, p.83 
88 ibid. 
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knowledge is neglected. Heidegger does acknowledge that 'in knowing, Dasein achieves 
a new status of Being [Seinsstand] towards a world'89 which can develop autonomously 
as a task to be accomplished or as a scientific knowledge with the role of a guide for 
Being-in-the-world, but such knowledge is always derived and is itself found on the 
primordial Being-in. He writes, 'a "commercium" of the subject with a world does not 
get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the 
world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-
world.'90 Being-in-the-world is experienced ontically as knowing the world, but this 
knowing relation to the world is often interpreted superficially 'as a "relation between 
subject and Object. 11191 'But subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the 
world.'92 
Levinas' criticism of 'knowing the world' seems to presume a polar relationship 
between the knowing subject and an object which is to be apprehended and 
comprehended such that the heteronomy of alterity is sacrificed for the autonomy of the 
subject. Alterity is reduced to presence-to hand (Vorhandenheit) and assumes 
significance as ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) in relation to Dasein. But such a schema 
presents Dasein as an interiorised cogito which forges links with an outside world and 
then comprehends it. Dasein, however, is not an interiorised cogito. 'When Dasein 
directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an 
inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being 
is such that it is always "outside" alongside entities which it encounters and which 
belong to a world already discovered.'93 Dasein is proximally and for the most part 
already and always the unitary phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. It is always and 
already alongside the objects which it knows. Knowing, then, is not the relationship 
which establishes a relationship with the world. 'Knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein 
as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically on this state of Being .... knowing is a 
89 ibid., p.90 
90 ibid. 
91 ibid., p.87 
92 ibid. 
93 ibid., p.89 
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kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world.'94 The relationship with the world 
is already and always part of what it means to be Dasein. Dasein is already alongside 
the objects which it knows; '[K]nowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-
alongside-the world,'95 and to be alongside the world is not be situated as one present-at-
hand to another present-at-hand; rather 'Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated 
by the world with which it is concemed.'96 But, is to be fascinated by the world not to 
be taken into the thrall of an alterity, which rather than being grasped by 
comprehension, has already 'grasped' our attention? As with Heidegger, so too with 
Rahner. Knowledge is not to be understood primarily as comprehension, for ultimately 
knowledge's comprehensive mastery of alterity fails before the mystery of the Other. 
Further, knowledge is not to be understood superficially as a relationship with an object 
to be introduced into interiorised consciousness. Proximally and for the most part, 
knowledge is a reduced manner of relating to that which pre-dates subjectivity and is 
experienced proximally as proximity. 
2.42 Human Freedom 
Now, the transcendence towards the Absolute which is manifest in the desire to 
know is also recognised in human freedom which perfects and completes the self-
transcendence of knowledge, for the subject is more than knowledge. Rahner develops 
his understanding of human freedom and its transcendental significance in his later 
writings, noting that the emphasis on the experience of and desire for human freedom 
rather than the quest for human knowledge better reflects the shift in the experience of 
Transcendence 'from the world to existence.'97 In Ober die Einheit von Niichsten- und 
Gottesliebe, in 1965, he writes that 
'it seems that, in some mysterious and profound sense, we are already 
questioning again the transcendental philosophy of the pure subject, with 
its openness to the absolute .... Sociology is making an attempt to replace 
metaphysics or to convert philosophy into an ontology of 
intercommunication ... ; knowledge is seen as the event of self-
94 ibid., p.88 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid. 
97 K Rahner, The Experience of God Today, TI, XI, p.162 
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consciousness which dwells only in action itself.'98 
The epistemic subject, ordered towards an intellectual cognition of being, is an 
inadequate model for understanding the human person, a point, as we noted earlier, 
Rahner himself makes when, as if writing against himself, he speaks of the dynamic 
reality which is the human person only being fully realised in a loving turn to another 
person. When he writes of love and freedom this point becomes more apparent. 
Knowledge may be prior to love and freedom but it has to be understood as only being 
'realised in its true sense when and insofar as the subject is more than knowledge, when 
in fact it is a freely given love.'99 It is in freedom that the question of existence is worked 
out, for, in freedom, one makes of oneself an issue for oneself. '[F]reedom is 
primordially not the ability to choose a particular way of relating oneself to this or that, 
but is the freedom of self-understanding, the possibility of saying yes or no to oneself, 
the possibility of decision for or against oneself.i1oo In freedom the subject returns again 
to self for the free act is 'not so much the positing of another, something that is alien, a 
work that stands over against the act itself in otherness, but is the fulfilling of [the 
subject's] own essence, a taking possession of itself, a taking possession of the reality 
of its own creative power over itself.' 101 Although knower, the subject, in the 
existentiality of his existence, is called, precisely on account of his concern for that 
Being which is in each case mine, to assume ultimate responsibility for who he is and 
what he does. He is 'the being which always has a relationship to itself, which is a 
subject and never merely a nature, which is always already a person, never simply there 
98 idem, Schriften Zur Theologie, VI, Zurich & Cologne, 1965; English 
Translation, Love of God and Love of Neighbour, in TI, VI, p.232 
99 idem, The Concept of Mystery, p.43 
100 idem, Theology of Freedom, p.185 
The resonance with Heidegger is apparent. Outlining the theme of the analytic of Dasein 
in terms of its existence (Existenz) as mineness (Jemeinigkeit), Heidegger writes, 
'Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case 
mine ... [B]ecause Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very 
Being, "choose" itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 
"seem" to do so' (BT, p.68). 
101 K Rahner, The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia, p.361 
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(vorfindlich), but always already personally existent (befindlich).' 102 Such a personal 
relationship is effected in the dialogic encounter which takes place with another person 
in love. 
This priority of love over knowledge which Rahner addresses in The Concept 
of Mystery will be significant when we consider Levinas' criticism of ontology's 
comprehensive grasp of Being and will open a way beyond his criticism of thought's 
entrapment within a philosophy of presence by affirming the 'excess' which is at the 
heart of human subjectivity. Mystery is not beyond the world in which the subject finds 
himself, but is the beyond of the world to which the subject already and always relates 
within the world. Having spoken of knowledge's true realisation in free love, Rahner 
indicates that this is made possible only 'if knowledge is ultimately a faculty ordained 
to an object attainable only because the object is greater than the faculty' .103 Insofar as 
reason is 'a potentiality to be actuated in love, then it must indeed be the faculty which 
welcomes the greater sight unseen, the faculty of simple rapture, of submissive 
dedication, or loving ecstasy'; its proper object is a reality which is 'sovereign and all-
embracing exigence which cannot be mastered, comprehended or challenged'. Rahner's 
unmastered mystery will become Levinas' incomprehensible infinity in the presence of 
whose demands the subject is called to response and responsibility. In the light of this, 
we will wish to revise Rahner's articulation of subjectivity as knowledge and freedom, 
and affirm it as proximity and responsibility. 
2.5 The Place of the World 
A consequence of stressing the transcendental dynamism of the intellect is that 
the significance and role of the world gets passed over and is undervalued. To begin 
with the intentional object within consciousness, and thereafter transcendentally reduce, 
without any recourse to external reality, the necessary conditions of possibility of 
knowledge is to to make of the intellect its own object. To take the act of knowing itself 
as a point of departure and therein discover an a priori grasp of Being as such as its 
absolute horizon, and only thereafter encounter the world, is to reduce the reality of 
102 idem, Guilt - Responsibility - Punishment within the View of Catholic 
Theology, p.202 
103 idem, Concept of Mystery, p.43 
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being-in-the-world to a secondary and accidental mark of human subjectivity rather part 
of the human existentiale. J Reichman describes such a p.sychogenesis of being, saying 
that 'for Rahner the unlimited horizon of being is realised before the particular form is 
grasped, for it is only, it seems, in and through the transcending, dynamic potentiality 
of the intellect that the particular form can be referred to and known as being; not indeed 
as being as such but as this limited participation in being.r1 04 This point is also made by 
K Baker: 'we can only surpass the boundaries of experience if they are already 
surpassed. Thought can only know particular being if it is already open to being as such, 
and metaphysics is only possible if we already have an openness to being as such in our 
daily experience.1105 The consequence of this is the material, sensible world is 
undervalued, for, although Rahner often speaks of the importance of the world for a 
metaphysics of knowledge, nowhere does he accord it its proper significance. Noel 
O'Donoghue recognises, in Rahner, an identity being forged between being and spirit, 
yet, although the material dimension is acknowledged in human existence, Rahner's 
transcendental approach, he says, 'nowhere provides an ontology of the material 
principle; he [Rahner] has much to say about its role or function as receptive, but 
nothing at all about its constitutive function as combining with form as an intrinsic 
cause of the concrete thing.' 106 It is not so much, then, that the world is neglected in the 
104 J Reichman, The Psychogenesis of Being, in The Thomist, (1968), p.467. 
Taking the intellect's own activity as the starting point is criticised by J 
Reichman, for, if the intellect is aware of its dynamism prior to engaging with the world 
in sensibility, 'there is no need for the intellect to wait upon an abstraction of 
intelligibility from the phantasm to thematise its full awareness of itself (ibid. p.503). 
Such a stress on the a priori grasp of being fails to recognise that 'the intellect can come 
to a thematic knowledge of the unlimited and unrestricted nature of Being only through 
a reflection simultaneously mediated by limited and restricted beings which we 
progressively experience sensible as well as intellectually' (op.cit., p.472). 
J Vande Wiele, too, comments, 'le rapport entre le sujet et l'Etre absolu possede 
une certaine priorite sur le rapport du sujet humain a son monde fini d'existence' 
(Metaphysique et pensee contemporaine: Etude critique in Revue philosophique de 
Louvain, 61 (1963), p.104). 
105 K Baker, Rabner: The Transcendental Method, in Continuum. 2. (1964), 
p.56 
106 N.D. O'Donoghue, Rabner: Early Philosophical Philosophy, in The Irish 
Theological Quarterly. 37 (1970), p.323. 
More recently, the undervaluing of the material base of history by 'classic' 
modern theologians, including Rabner, has been criticised by the liberation theologians. 
Clodovis Boff, in Theology and Praxis. Epistemological Foundations, Maryknoll, 1987 
(Originally, Teologia e pratica: teologia do politico e suas media96es, Petropolis, 1978) 
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cognitive process, for '[w]orld is the name of the reality which is accessible to the 
immediate experience of man,' 107 but that the world is not appreciated as being 
foundational for human knowledge and experience; in its secondarity, the relationship 
with the world lacks, as Levinas might say, sincerity. Rahner's world is a very much 
impoverished world, being a staging post on the way to spirit. It is not the world 
wherein one reads books, takes walks or meets friends. Since the foundation is that 
'[k]nowing is the being-present-to-self of being, and this being-present-to-self is the 
being of the existent,' 108 knowledge is from the outset a purely spiritual faculty which 
'put into colourful terms . . . amounts to saying that every entity (every material entity 
too) is a more or less deficient angel. 1109 
The undervaluing of embodiment finds its contemporary critics also in Sorri and 
Gill who use the Common Sense approach of Thomas Reid to criticise the Kantian 
epistemology based on 'the passive and static structures of the mind.1110 Since rationality 
functions formally as an organising structure, knowledge is spoken of in terms of the 
structuring of "'objects of thought" through "intellectual judgements" 'much the way one 
might speak of furniture being arranged and rearranged in a room.ti 11 Further, although 
the categories of space and time are acquired by way of the body, Kant abandoned 
reference to the cognitive role of the body, seeing it 'as essentially secondary, as a 
passive means to an intellectual end ... , as a conveyor of sensations to the mind, rather 
than as an active participant in the process of perception.' 112 Such a scepticism towards 
cnttc1ses theologies of history as 'examples of theoretical syntheses, or totalising 
discourses' whose 'general characteristic ... is surely their speculative or contemplative 
aspect' (p.48). An analysis of their theories shows that 'history pretty much hovers in the 
abstract' (p.256, n. 46). A proper theology of history which acknowledges the 
materiality of hwnan life in the world might recognise that within that history there is 
de facto 'a transcendence of pure facticity' (p.48), that 'history has meaning, and that this 
meaning pertains to Mystery' (p.49). 
107 K Rahner, SW, p.liii 
108 ibid., p.69 
109 C. Ernst, Introduction in K Rahner, TI, I, p.xiii, n.1 
110 Mari Sorri & Jerry H Gill, A Post-Modern Epistemology : Language. 
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the world displayed by modern (philosophically speaking) rationalism in general finds 
its critic in Thomas Reid, who criticises modern epistemology for reasons which can 
equally well be addressed to Rahner's epistemological approach, holding that thought 
cannot be confined to 'passive redemption of "sensations"' but is interactive with a world 
of things, people and values rather than "ideas". Further, this interaction with and 
knowledge of the world is by virtue of bodily participation and an immediate or direct 
experience of objects within the world. 113 
Reid laments the lack of Common Sense in philosophy when it addresses the 
reality and significance of the world, a lack which issues from the 'new method' of 
Cartesianism which is the source, he says, of all idealist and sceptical philosophies. In 
language reminiscent of the opening remarks in the Critique of Pure Reason (A, x) 
which Kant applied to metaphysics, Reid bemoans 'the very low state' of 'our philosophy 
concerning the mind and its faculties,' which, unlike the sciences, has not yet had the 
good fortune to find universally applicable principles which would apply to the mind, 
'the phaenomena of human thoughts, opinions and perceptions,' but, is surrounded by 
'darkness and perplexity,' and, were it not for the stubbornness of common sense, 'it is 
also odds but we end up in absolute scepticism.r1 14 The blame for this scepticism is laid 
squarely at the door of 'the ideal system' of Descartes which 'hath the same original 
defect; that this scepticism is inlaid in it, and reared along with it.r1 15 'I observe, That 
modem scepticism is the natural issue of the new system; and that, although it did not 
bring forth this monster until the year 1739, it may be said to have carried it in its womb 
from the beginning.r1 16 By embarking upon 'these profound disquisitions into the first 
principles of human nature' a person is 'naturally and necessarily' plunged into 'this 
abyss of scepticismr1 17 which, 'with regard to the mind and its operations, derives not 
113 For a summary of Reid's attack on modern epistemology, and the 
importance of the embodiment of knowledge, see ibid., pp.103-110 
114 Thomas Reid, Inquiry I, in Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays R E 
Beanblossom & K Lehrer (eds.), (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 
p.3 
115 ibid., pp.I 0-11 
116 ibid., p.112. 1739 - the year in which Hume's Treatise of Human Nature 
appeared. 
117 ibid., p.10 
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only its spirit from Des Cartes, but its fundamental principles ... " 18 Reid locates the 
general spirit and tendency of Descartes' new method in its attempt to build a new 
system upon new foundations 'with a resolution to admit nothing but what was 
absolutely certain and evident." 19 Consequently, Descartes was naturally led 'to attend 
more to the operations of the mind by accurate reflection ... than any philosopher had 
done before him.' 120 The operations of his own mind - thought, doubt, deliberation -
were the first of all truths, 'the first firm ground upon which he set foot, after being 
tossed in the ocean of scepticism.' 121 However, this attention to the operations of the 
mind led, says Reid, to a spiritualisation of the body and its qualities and a devaluation 
of sense objects which were to be deduced by strict argumentation from consciousness. 
'As the attributes of the thinking substance are things of which we are conscious, we 
may have a more certain and immediate knowledge of them by reflection, than we can 
have of external objects by our senses.' 122 The existence of the body is no longer to be 
taken as a first principle, and nothing is to be admitted in respect of it other than what 
can be deduced, 'by just reasoning,' from sensations which are no longer to be taken as 
secondary qualities corresponding to bodily qualities, but as pertaining to the mind. 
Sound, taste, smell, colour are sensations, not to be associated as 'the vulgar' do, with 
the body, but are to be taken as 'mere sensations of the mind.' 123 
Now, the problem with the 'new system' which issues from Descartes and ends 
up in scepticism is that, whereas '[t]he old system admitted all the principles of common 
sense as first principles, and without requiring any proof of them' and was therefore 
'built upon a broad foundation and had no tendency to scepticism,' the 'new system 
admits only one of the principles of common sense as a first principle; and pretends, by 
strict argumentation, to deduce all the rest from it. That our thoughts, our sensations, 
and every thing of which we are conscious, hath a real existence, is admitted in this 
system as a first principle; but everything else must be made evident by the light of 
118 ibid., p.l 08 
119 ibid., p.l 09 
120 ibid. 
121 ibid. 
122 ibid., p.110 
123 ibid., p.111 
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reason. Reason must rear the whole fabric of knowledge upon this single principle of 
consciousness,1124 namely, the 'one axiom, expressed in one word, cogito.1125 Thus, 
scepticism is the natural issue of this system, with regard to everything except the · ' 
existence of our ideas. 
This Cartesian element, inherent in Rahner's starting point, which leads to the 
disembodiment of thought has its consequences, for not only is the material world 
rendered inconsequential, but the personal world of intersubjectivity, too, is overlooked. 
From a Heideggerian perspective which affirms the world as Dasein's existential, Vande 
Wiele asks whether 'being-outside-of-oneself, being-in-the-world, in a word 
"transcendence", does not constitute the feature of the finite spirit as such.1126 Such an 
understanding of the human subject which would recognise the intersubjective, 
relational and finite nature of human existence would be more in-keeping with the thrust 
of a contemporary philosophy which stresses 'being-with-others,' where 'the other' is 
appreciated as a 'personal other', as the defining and 'totally original structure of man's 
essence.' 127 Vande Wiele continues, 'it is preferable to look for the Absolute through the 
mediation of a complete and meticulous description of the human spirit in its total 
density and in its relationships with the world and other people.1128 
Now, although Rahner does adopt knowing as a power of spirit towards absolute 
being as his point of departure, and stresses the original unity of being and knowing 
which directs this dynamic tendency, there is apparent within his thinking a tension 
which lends itself to a re-appraisal of his theological enterprise and facilitates a shift to 
another framework which takes account of the differance, in Cornell's sense of the 
'excess to the system', which resists Rahner's schema. Two particular areas are worth 
looking at: firstly, the force of being-in-the-world, whose interpretation as self-absence 
can be positively interpreted as a relationship with alterity which founds subjectivity, 
a relationship which is ethical as Levinas will argue; and secondly, a reading of alterity, 
especially the alterity of the personal other (l'autrni), in terms of mystery so as to 
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With regard to the world, although Rahner begins from the premiss of an original unity 
of Being and Knowing and then transcendentally deduces the need for the incarnation 
of the finite spirit in the materiality of sensibility, there is also an original unity of 
subject and object in sensibility. It is this problematic which initiates the project of 
Spirit, as previously indicated: the problem for a Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge 
is not the pseudo-problem of 'bridging the gap' between subject and object, but the 
problem of the return to self given the initial confusion of sensibility, the problem 'of 
understanding how a gap is possible at all. 1129 Rather than focussing on the 
transcendental deduction of the finite spirit's need for world, one should subject the 
initial phenomenological datum of sensibility to further reduction so as to demonstrate 
the 'salvific significance' of the world, as exteriority, for subjectivity; and more 
significantly, the salvific significance of a world which is primarily to be understood in 
terms of the relationship with the Other person. In other words, the framework of 
intelligibility founded on the doctrine of the convertibility of being and knowing is to 
be translated to the framework of sensibility. Sensibility, not intelligibility, is the key 
and the guide, and its significance, as Levinas indicates, needs to be subjected to 
phenomenological reflection. The human existentiale is in-the-world; in Heideggerian 
terms, being-in-the-world is part of the ontological constitution - an existentiale - of 
Dase in. Whether authentic ( eigentlich) or inauthentic ( uneigentlich ), human existence 
is 'in-the-world.' Rabner indicates this when he notes that, ordinarily, it is 'being-away-
from-self, or self-absence, rather than self-presence, which characterises human 
existence. The subject is usually 'with-the-other' and not 'with-self and this 'being-with-
the-other is not a contingency, but an ontological necessity for a finite spirit. Despite 
this, however, Rabner attempts to place the Heideggerian existential of 'in-der-Welt-
Sein' within the (Cartesian) framework - lacking in Heidegger - of the ego cogito, such 
that the subject 'is receptive knowledge in such a way that his self-knowledge, his 
cognitive self-subsistence derives always and necessarily from a stepping out into the 
world, from the grasping of something other distinct from him, that constitutes the first 
object of human knowledge.' 130 Subjectivity becomes an epistemological journey in 
which finite spirit moves in circular fashion through sensibility to selfhood. But, unlike 
Coreth, for whom materiality is 'the principle on account of which a being is non-
129 K Rahner, SW, p.75. 
130 idem, HW, in A Rahner Reader, pp.48-49. Italics added. 
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spiritual, unable to be really self-present ... that which causes a being to be outside of 
itself,' 131 Rahner, more positively, deduces materiality from the requirement of a finite 
spirit to know Being. Sensibility is not so much the limit and restriction of spirit, but 
is demanded by spirit's own finitude which requires engagement in world. In other 
words, spirit is not finite because it is worldly; it is worldly because it is finite. 'Man is 
spirit in such a way that, in order to become spirit, he enters and has ontically always 
and already entered into otherness, into matter, and so into world.' 132 The intentionality 
of the finite spirit is beyond the world towards the metaphysical, 133 yet that movement 
is frustrated through the limitations which finitude places upon it. 'By itself it cannot 
give itself immediately to itself; it comes to itself only insofar as it receptively allows 
another to encounter it, and without this receptive letting-self-be-encountered by another 
it is itself not present to itself.' 134 And this '[r]eceptive knowledge is essentially 
conceivable only as the being of something material, it is sensibility.r13s Receptivity 
demands materiality; it requires that the subject is such that it is 'essentially and 
ontologically being-away-from-itself-with-the-other (Weg-von-sich-beim-andern-
Sein).'136 
It would seem that, to begin the deduction of sensibility from the intentional 
131 E Coreth, Metaphysics, pp.102-3 
132 K Rahner, HW, in A Rahner Reader, p.51 
The priority accorded to the material world is acknowledged by Rahner in his 
essay, Christo logy within an evolutionary view of the world: 'As matter, man 
comprehends himself and the environment that belongs necessarily to him such that the 
act of returning to himself in the experience of being referred to the mystery that must 
be accepted in love, always and primarily occurs in the encounter with that which is 
individual, with that which manifests itself, with that which is concrete and cannot be 
disposed of, and with that which is finite, even though it is unfailingly given .... Matter 
is the condition of possibility of that which is objectively other; the condition of that 
which we experience immediately ... ; the condition of the otherness that alienates man 
from himself and in so doing brings him to himself; and the condition of the possibility 
of an immediate intercommunication with other spiritual subjects in space and time 
which constitutes history. Matter is the ground of the prior givenness of the other as the 





See idem, SW, p.liii 
idem, The Spirit in the Church, pp.12-13 
idem, SW, p.80 
ibid., p.81 
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cogito, and to overlook the a priori situation of the subject in the world, opens onto the 
undervaluing of the world itself and of the subject's commitment to the world which 
always seems per accidens. Yet, constantly, Rahner speaks of the ontological necessity 
of the conversio, the essential nature of receptivity, and a subject 'essentially and 
ontologically' absent from self with the other. 
The importance of this essential being-with-the-other had already been 
recognised by Rahner's philosophical mentor, Man~chal, when, following some mis-
representations of Cahier V of Le point de depart de la Metaphysique, he identified 
certain lacunae in his own work, which, had it been completed, would have been 
covered in Cahier VI, namely, the 'metaconceptual' and 'irrepresentable' aspects of 
human experience, and also the personal dimension of life. Cahier V, writes Marechal, 
underlined the 'metaconceptual' and 1irrepresentable1 character of God and pure matter 
in Thomas and Cajetan, and indicated that the dialectical explanation of this meta-
rational life (ce metarationnel vecu), which is the basis of metaphysical analogy, 
consitutes 'a first stage towards a metaphysics 11 of existence 11 •1137 Further, and on a 
fundamental (capital) point, 11 [t]he intellectual being is a 'person' and cannot be satisfied 
with a supreme End which would only be a 'Thing' to possess: if God is our ultimate 
End, it seems he must be such as 'personal.' But, between persons, the only relationship 
capable of fulfilling profound aspirations is the free and reciprocal gift of friendship.' 138 
Rahner acknowledges this when, throughout his theological writings, he speaks of the 
centrality of the personal other in human development. Human nature is 'a 
multidimensional, dynamic reality, realising itself only when turning lovingly to another 
137 J Marechal, Le point, V, p.608 
These pages (599 - 608) first appeared in the Revue neo-scolastique de 
Philosophie, XU, (1938), pp.253-261 as 'A propos du point de depart de la 
metaphysique' in order to address some inexact interpretations of Cahier V, and have 
been editorially added. 
One should note here the importance of analogy. Marechal, following Thomas, 
sees the doctine of analogy as the explanation of relationships which defy the logic of 
reason, that is, existential relations of one person to another. Levinas dismisses analogy 
as an appropriate vehicle for articulating the relationship between one person and other 
since, at root, the analogical understanding of being is founded on a . univocal 
substantialist understanding of being (as ousia). See below. 
138 J Marechal, Le Point, V, p.608 6\ 
Marechal recognises in 'this enlarged perspective open to the dynamism of the 
spirit, the problem of supernatural destiny' (p.608), only outlined in Cahier V, which 
theology was at that time beginning to address in a renewed way. See Rahner's debate 
with and criticism of la theologie nouvelle below. 
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person,1139 and again, speaking in a voice other than Cartesian, he writes, 'a priori 
openness to the other human being belongs essentially to man's transcendentality.1140 
The world and intersubjectivity within the world are not incidental and existentiell, but 
are constitutive of the existential which is the human person. 
Perhaps this lacuna opens on to the most general criticism of Rahner's 
transcendence, and acts as the scotoma which, when illumined, casts its shadow over 
the the luminosity of being, providing a hole within the whole, yielding the thither side 
of being and knowledge, and presence which is their conjunction. Within Rahner's 
transcendental framework, the subject has been understood to be spirit, dynamically 
oriented towards the Absolute, and this is taken to be the point of departure for 
metaphysics. It is a starting point which, as we have indicated, can be subjected to 
criticism, and one which Levinas himself with succinct comprehensivity criticises when 
he writes in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 
'Here the subject is origin, initiative, freedom, present. To move oneself 
or have self-consciousness is in effect to refer oneself to oneself, to be 
an origin. Then a subject-origin which is also a subject of flesh and 
blood becomes problematic. The effort is made to understand it on the 
basis of an incarnation as an avatar of the representation of oneself, as 
a deficiency of this representation, the occultation of a translucid and 
spontaneous consciousness into receptivity and finitude. Whence the 
necessity of going back to the beginning, or to consciousness, appears 
as the proper task of philosophy: return to an island to be shut up there 
in the simultaneity of the eternal instant, approaching the mens 
instantanea of God. 141 
For Levinas, the relationship with a personal other, which Marechal acknowledges as IJ\ 
the only relationship capable of fulfilling a person, situates itself in a time outwith 'the 
ontological horizon of the being of a being [l"'etre de l'etant'T, that is, in 'the beyond 
of being [/"'au-de/a de l'etre'li142 The relationship to the Absolute is 'a relation or 
139 K Rahner, The Commandment of Love m relation to the Other 
Commandments, p .441 
140 idem, Love of Neighbour and the Love of God, p.237 
Such a priori openness to human alterity would, for Levinas, consitute the proto-
ethical situation in which the subjects always and already finds itself. The 
transcendental framework is already pre-dated by the ethical givenness of human inter-
subjecti vity. Rahner, however, pays little regard in his theological enterprise for ethics 
as foundational. 
141 E Levinas, OB, p.78 
142 idem, Preface (1979), to TO, p.30 
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religion that is not structured like knowing - that is, an intentionality. Knowledge 
conceals re-presentation and reduces the other to presence and co-presence_r1 43 The 
absolute of the relationship frustrates com-prehension, and defies the illumination and 
vision of the intellect, where sight is understood as 'contact at a distance'. The absolute 
is in-visible with respect to the subject, 'where invisibility results not from some 
incapacity of human knowledge, but from the inaptitude of knowledge as such - from 
its in-adequation - to the Infinity of the absolutely other, and from the absurdity that an 
event such as coincidence [in time and consciousness] would have here.' 144 In other 
words, the 'in-' of in-finity is not a negative indicator indicating a lack, but a positive 
determination of the subject: in the relationship with infinity, the infinite is in some way 
in the subject, and it is this meta-conceptual and irrepresentable dimension of the 
relationship which constitutes the relationship. Rahner had identified the Thomistic 
epistemological concern of one of the coincidence of the subject with itself in the return 
to self in knowing self-possession. Positioned in the presence of Being, spirit directs 
itself towards Being as its horizon, and in this transcending moment, gains itself. 
Levinas' approach is not a positioning within Being, but an ex-positioning of the 
relationship with the other, which calls into question the subject's 'position in Being' .145 
Marking the initial outline of his own philosophy of existence in Existence and 
Existents, and recognising the renewed understanding of ontology offered by Heidegger, 
he nonetheless recognises the 'profound need to leave the climate of that philosophy.' 146 
In Totality and Infinity, he writes that, 
'Between a philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere the true 
life to which man, escaping from here, would gain access in the 
privileged moments of liturgical, mystical elevation, or in dying - and a 
philosophy of immanance in which we would truly come into possession 
of being when every "other" (cause for war), encompassed by the same, 
would vanish at the end of history - we propose to describe, within the 
unfolding of terrestrial existence, of economic existence (as we shall call 
it), a relationship with the other that does not result in a divine or human 
totality, that is not a totalisation of history but the idea of infinity. Such 
a relationship is metaphysics itself.t1 47 
143 ibid., p.31 
144 ibid., p.32 
145 idem, EE, p.15 
146 ibid., p.19 
147 idem, TI, p.52 
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In place of a subjectively-centred transcendence, Levinas proposes an 'ex-cendence', 'a 
departure from Being and the categories which describe it,1148 not to deny ontology, but 
to recognise that beyond the categorial is an ethics which, though having 'a foothold in 
Being', 149 is ultimately ordered beyond Being towards the absolutely other. 
2.51 Sensibility 
The difficulty with Rahner's transcendental deduction of sensibility from the 
finitude of the human spirit is that the receptive capacity of the subject flows from the 
prior activity of the subject in the Vorgriff. Sensibility as receptive openness to the 
material other derives from spiritual dynamism. Passivity is necessitated by activity. 
Rahner notes that 'for Thomas the receptive knowledge of an object is essentially 
sensibility.1150 The Agent Intellect (intellectus agens) - the intellect in act - is 'this 
transcending apprehension of further possibilities;' 151 it has its counterpart in the 
Possible Intellect which is the potentiality to actually know what is inherently knowable, 
that is, Being. Rahner explains that the intellect qua possible 'is being, that is to say, 
being-present-to-oneself, complete return, but it is not of itself always and already 
present to itself. By itself it cannot give itself immediately to itself; it comes to itself 
only insofar as it receptively allows another to encounter it, and without this receptive 
letting-self-be-encountered by another it is not present to self.1152 Again, '[t]he (possible) 
intellect is a spirit which of itself exists in potency to be actually present to itself. ... 
Insofar as this essentially does not happen by the fact that it is already of itself always 
present to itself, this coming to self (Zu-sich-selber-Kommen) is possible only by the 
fact that it comes to itself in the receptive letting-self-be-encountered (hinnehmenden 
Sichbegegnenlassen) by another as what is immediately and first apprehended.' 153 In 
short, passivity as vulnerability and openness to otherness is logically pre-dated in 
Rahner's transcendental schema by a more original active drive of the intellect towards 
148 idem, EE, p.15 
149 ibid. 
150 K Rahner, SW, p.344 
151 ibid., p.142 
152 ibid., pp.243-244 
153 ibid., p.24 7 
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presence-to-self. 
The distinction between the intellect as active (agens) and the intellect as passive 
allows another criticism which Levinas makes of the tradition. Writing in the 
introduction to Humanisme de l'autre homme, he notes that being-in-act is the primary 
attribute of consciousness which aims at the complete and actual presence of being to 
itself, devoid of any alterity. "'The original unity of apperception" expresses 
superlatively nothing other than being-in-act.' 154 The intellect, as agent, is being-in-act 
and aims at rendering being actually intelligible through an actualised presence. In place 
of this, Levinas proposes a consideration of the 'inactuality' of being, not as a present 
ignorance yet to be overcome, nor as a negation of what is actual, but as the other of the 
actual. If the actual is 'being-in-act', the inactual is the other of being in act, the other of 
being, of the esse of being, which has the power to interrupt the synthesis of the all-
inclusive present. The point of departure is not being in its actuality, but being in its 
passivity, a 'passivity more passive than the passivity conjoined to act', 155 and which is 
to be appreciated as a proximity to the inactuality of alterity which, through its 
irreducibility to any system, contests the intellect's project of effecting a total presence. 
This 'other of being' which resists and contests the active assimilative power of the 
intellect is the primary human experience and the first, original meaning and sense 
(sens). He writes, 
'II s'agit plutot de la mise en questison de /'EXPERIENCE comme source 
de sens. de la limite de l'apperception transcendentale, de la fin de la 
synchronie et des termes reversibles; ii s'agit de la non-priorite du 
Meme, et a travers toutes ces limitations, de la fin de l'actualite. comme 
si l'intempesti( venait deranger !es concordances de la re-presentation. 
Comme si une etrange faiblesse secouait de frissons et ebranlait la 
presence ou l'etre en acte. 156 
Although the passivity of the intellect is not lacking in Rahner, the active drive 
of the intellect towards th~ absolute overwhelms it. Rather than sensibility and its 
passivity being a moment in the quest for self-presence, Levinas stresses that passivity 
and receptivity are the key to undertsanding subjectivity. In sensibility and the 
immediacy of its associated sensations, subject and object become proximate to the 




E Levinas, HAH, p.8 
ibid., p.135 
ibid., p.11 
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phenomenological reflection following this should not so much be a concern with the 
problem of the return, but a recognition of the inherent meaning contained in sensibility. 
Levinas writes, '[t]he signification proper to the sensible has to be described in terms of 
enjoyment and wounding, which are, we will see, the terms of proximity,' 157 which is 
accessibility to other beings, and more particularly, a non-indifference towards one's 
neighbour. The passivity of sensibility and the 'musicality' or immediacy associated with 
it reveals the subject as radically and originally open to what is other. Levinas 
recognises that 'sensibility can become "sensible intuition" and enter into the adventure 
into the adventure of cognition,' 158 but this role is secondary; 'the dominant signification 
of sensibility is already caught sight of in vulnerability, and it will be shown in the 
responsibility characteristic of proximity.' 159 The gnoseological understanding of 
sensibility and its ontological structure is one of the hallmarks of Western philosophy, 
and permeates Rahner's own ontology of understanding. This, however, marks a break 
with the immediate which is already the experience of enjoyment and wounding, an 
immediacy 'which is not reducible to the gnoseological role assumed by sensation.' 160 
This stress on the immediacy of sensibility is part of Levinas' project of contesting the 
dominance of philosophy as thematised presence. Phenomenology aimed at disclosing 
a 'pre-original signification,' prior to manifestation, but constrained this to the present 
moment and to representation. For Husserl, he maintains, sensation is meaningful 'only 
inasmuch as it is animated by intentionality,' 161 but such an intentionality remains bound 
to the structure of thought or comprehension. Heidegger, too, maintains, 'the founding 
primacy of cognition1162 and assigns significance to each object insofar as it is enabled 
to be disclosed by Dasein, 'freed' to be. The intentionality of affectivity and desire 
remains neglected, being 'packed into the logos of being.' 163 But, Levinas asks, '[d]oes 
the fact of showing oneself exhaust the sense of what does indeed show itself, but, being 
157 idem, OB, pp.62-63 
158 ibid., p.63 
159 ibid. 
160 ibid., p.64 
161 ibid., p.65 
162 ibid., p.66 
163 ibid. 
PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS 121 
non-theoretical, does not function, does not signify as a monstration?1164 'Is it certain that 
manifestation founds all that manifests itself?1165 Meaning is not exhausted by 
representation, an any attempt at thematising is already founded on the immediacy of 
experience which is always in excess of thought; 'signification is sensibility .' 166 
Using the language of language rather than the logos of Being, he agrees that the 
possibility of philosophising cannot take place before monstration, or before something 
becomes a theme in 'a said' (dit), as opposed to 'a saying' (dire), but one cannot then say 
that 'being' is the source of such a manifestation and signification, 'or that monstration 
would be the foundation of everything that manifests itself.' 167 The ontological 
framework makes of manifestsation 'the privileged and ultimate sense of the subjective 
. . . [but] ... '[t]he notion of access to being, representation, and thematisation of a said 
presupposes sensibility, and thus proximity, vulnerability and signifyingness.' 168 
In other words, to affirm the immediacy of sensibility as prior, yet nonetheless 
as signifying, and to say that in sensibility the gnoseological structure is secondary, is 
'to reach the subjectivity of the subject complacent in itself and positing itself for itself 
and to 'recognise a sense somewhere else than in ontology. It is even to subordinate 
ontology to this signification beyond essence.1169 
164 ibid., p.67 
165 ibid. 
166 ibid. 
167 ibid., p.68 
168 ibid. 
169 ibid., p. 64 
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2.6 What must I do? What have I the right to hope for? 
The true life may be absent while we are in the world; 170 nonetheless, Levinas 
recognises the need to satisfy reason's essential metaphysical interest by grounding 
metaphysics and human transcendency in the exteriority of a beyond. In two courses 
taught by him at the Sorbonne, between 1975-76, and published as Dieu, la Mort et le 
Temps, he addresses the Kantian question of the possibility of metaphysics, not by way 
of a response to the first of Kant's questions towards the end of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, What can I know?, which only leads to the 'humiliation of reason' in 'that it 
achieves nothing in its pure employment' (Cf.A 795/8832) but remains bound within the 
limits of experience; rather, Levinas takes as his own point of departure for metaphysics 
Kant's subsequent questions, What must I do? and What may I hope for? to show that 
if the role of reason can be clarified in its practical, ultra-speculative employment, then 
perhaps the Ideas might be properly established. 
2. 61 Kant's Ethical Project 
At the end of the First Critique, Kant brings all rational enquiry back to these 
three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? The first, as 
previously noted, is purely theoretical and is addressed in the First Critique. The 
enquiries raised by the other two subsequent questions, however, are yet to begin. As 
a purely practical and first-order question, What ought I to do? falls outwith the scope 
of a transcendental enquiry and so does not belong to the Critique. What may I hope 
for?, however, is not only practical but also second-order and theoretical 'in such 
fashion that the practical serves only as a clue that leads us to the answer to the 
theoretical question, and when this is followed out, to the speculative 
question' (A805/B833). Both questions are essentially linked though, for, although the 
first addresses duty and the second, happiness, one needs to consider whether and by 
what I am compelled to do what I ought, and whether, having done this, I attain 
happiness. Is duty linked to happiness a real or a futile hope? 
Our hope, says Kant, is for happiness, and happiness lies in the fulfilment of 
desire. Prudence may advise us what we ought to do so as to be happy but moral laws 
advise us how to deserve happiness. The answer to the second question may be 'Do that 
170 cf. idem, TI, p.33 
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through which thou becomest worthy to be happy' (A809/B837), but, having done or 
failed to do what I ought to do, am I therefore entitled to hope to have merited happiness 
or not? Such a question must find its basis in a necessary and not simply fortuitous link 
between practical action in the world of experience and the principles governing the 
moral world. Benton made this point when, as quoted earlier, he spoke of the 'a priori 
connection between the rule of reason and the faculty of desire1171 which makes 
theoretical knowledge 'a presupposition not only of a priori synthetic judgements but 
also of experience.' 172 Kant links the hope for happiness and dutiful action in the world 
when he notes that, although moral laws can have absolute application without any 
reference to empirical motives, they nonetheless act as possibility conditions of 
experience where experience is taken in the sense of actions conforming to the moral 
law and actually happening in history. To put it otherwise, just as the formal unity of 
consciousness, the original synthetic unity of apperception, is the supreme principle for 
the possibility of understanding, so the moral law also constitutes a transcendental 
heuristic structure which also regulates experience.173 Further, moral law, as a structure 
for experience, is itself only realised in its application within experience. As Kant 
writes, 
Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative employment, 
but in that practical employment which is also moral, principles of the 
possibility of experience, namely, of such actions as, in accordance with 
moral precepts might be met with in the history of mankind 
(A807 /B835). 
But as such actions are commanded by reason, they must be possible, and, further, a 
context within which they take place must also be possible. Such a context, which 
provides 'a special kind of systematic unity' is the moral world. '[I]t is in their practical, 
meaning thereby their moral, employment, that the principles of pure reason have 
objective reality' (A808/B836). The Kantian insight contained towards the end of the 
Critique is that the hithertofore accepted way of understanding the relation between 
morality and intelligibility in which the world is perceived as being moral on account 
of it being intelligible is to be reversed. The world is not moral because intelligible; it 
is intelligible because moral. He writes, 
171 See Benton, op.cit., p.11 
172 ibid. 
173 See Crawford, art. cit, p.266 
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I entitle the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance 
with all moral laws; and this is what by means of the freedom of the 
rational being it can be, and what according to the necessary laws of 
morality it ought to be. Owing to our here leaving out of account all 
conditions (ends) and even all the special difficulties to which morality 
is exposed (weakness or depravity of human nature), this world is so far 
thought of as intelligible only. To this extent, therefore, it is a mere idea 
though at the same time a practical idea, which really can have, as it also 
ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, 
so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea. The idea of a 
moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object 
of intelligible intuition (we are quite unable to think any such object), 
but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an 
object of pure reason in its practical employment, that is, as a corpus 
mysticum of the rational beings in it... (A808/B836). 
124 
In other words, the objective reality of the world arises in the domain of 
intersubjectivity, the mystic body of all rational beings encountered in sensibility. Here 
again, we encounter the idea of the salvific significance of the world stressed by 
Levinas, the incompleteness of the relation to the world understood solely in terms of 
intelligibility, and the submission of intelligibility to the ethico-moral context within 
which it gains its significance, and which Levinas expresses in terms of the antecedence 
of responsibility to freedom. 'Responsibility is what first enables one to catch sight of 
and conceive of value.i174 
The question arises, then, of the possibility of satisfying both the metaphysical 
and critical interests of reason by going beyond the limits imposed on reason in the First 
Critique through a transcendental reflection on moral activity, or ethics, and thereby 
assigning to ethics its place, as Levinas would say, as first philosophy and the basis for 
the possibility of metaphysics. This is the project upon which Levinas sets out, but it is 
a project which is in-keeping with the programme outlined by Kant in his own work. 
What then is the essential interest of reason? In a reconsideration of Kant's 
practical philosophy Yirmiyahu Y ovel queries the 'interests of reason' which underlie 
both the theoretical and practical aspects of Kant's philosophy. 175 Yovel identifies Kant's 
project as an 'architectonic of reason' which presents a meta-philosophical theory in 
which reason is to be conceived as a system of ends or objective rational interests, and 
174 E Levinas, OB, p.123 
175 See Yirmiyahu YOVEL: 'The Interests of Reason: From Metaphysics to 
Moral History' (pp.135-148) in Yirmiyahu YOVEL (ed): Kant's Practical Philosophy 
Reconsidered, Papers presented at the seventh Jerusalem Philosophical encounter, 
December 1986, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London., 1989 
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which Kant refers to as the "essential ends" of reason (Kant's term, A839/B867). 176 
Reason seeks an architectonic and rational-teleological unifying goal. For Kant, 
however, that unity is provided by reason itself sinceZmrsues rationality as an end in /. 
itself in the speculative and practical domains. Thus, not only is the freedom and 
autonomy of reason (Vernunft) safeguarded from any reduction to understanding 
( Verstand), but becomes the foundation for moral action and decision. Significantly, 
however, for Kant, 'interested reason' actually also contains the inactual, in that it is a 
goal yet-to-be-realised. 'Human rationality, as inherently limited, is thus the pursuit of 
its own realization.' 177 In the context of Kant's critical renewal of metaphysics, the 
Critique can be understood as a response to the antinomy arising between reason's 
metaphysical interest and a critical interest which the Enlightenment made acute. 
Now, Kant reconciles the critical and metaphysical interests principally by 
limiting the speculative interest within the cognitive domain, and diverts the extra-
scientific surplus which remains to the realm of morality and praxis. The way is thus 
opened for the development of a metaphysics of practice, which takes as its point of 
departure the subject's moral experience of the corpus mysticum of other rational beings. 
Such an approach realises a number of goals. First of all, the transcendent focus of 
traditional, dogmatic metaphysics is replaced by a critical, scientific, transcendental 
metaphysics, freed from a concern with the existence of what is supernatural, and 
interested rather with the existence conditions of natural entities. 178 Such a critical 
approach, however, confines metaphysics to the phenomenal world, and fails to attain 
the absolute. It would seem, then, that the essential, metaphysical interest of reason is 
thwarted by its critical interest and reason's dynamism towards a transcendent object is 
re-directed so as to produce nothing other than 'a heuristic methodology of the natural 
176 ibid., p.136 
177 ibid. 
178 This continuing interest in the possibility conditions of existence 
demonstrates, says Y ovel, the fact that in the Transcendental Analytic, Kant displays an 
ontological as well as an epistemological concern 'which states that the epistemological 
conditions for knowing real entities in nature are the same as the ontological conditions 
for these entities to actually be what they are' (ibid., p 141 ). By exposing the necessary 
structure of knowing the world, the fundamental structure of the world itself is 
transcendentally brought to light. In fact, the epistemological force of the 
Transcendental Analytic flows from its ontological significance. Knowledge conforms 
to the essential structure of the world. But, as indicated, this world achieves its objective 
reality as a moral world. 
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sciences' 119 to replace dogmatic metaphysics. Yet reason's essential interest, its drive 
towards the absolute, remains. But, secondly, it realises itself not purely cognitively but 
as 'a metaphysics of ethical practice (Metaphysik der Sitten).' 180 'If reason, in its 
cognitive interest, cannot know the absolute and the total, then in its practical use it can 
engender and shape them.' 181 
It is this transformation of the metaphysical interest into a metaphysics of ethical 
practice which is the Critique's 'major enterprise'; reason's former and abortive 
epistemological confinement gives birth to metaphysics as ethics. 182 
Now, this, says Yovel, is not without religious significance for, in its pursuit of 
morality, reason opens up an access to the beyond or what, as such, may be termed the 
'divine'. The religiosity of reason critically transforms religion because '[i]t transfers to 
the ethics of human reason all the divine attributes and exalted emotions that were 
traditionally associated with the historical religions and with the will of God expressed 







182 This involves a transformation of the totality and unconditionality which 
were sought by traditional, pre-critical metaphysics in God or the universe. Now 
practically transformed, the interest of unconditionality becomes the categorical 
imperative, and the interest of totality beomes the moral ideal of the Highest Good, co-
operatively realised by humanity. With regard to unconditionality, Kant assigns an 
absolute value, produced by reason itself, to every moral act, and since moral acts derive 
exclusively from reason's categorical imperative, they provide a means whereby reason 
can continue its quest for the absolute. By seeking a practical realisation of its essential 
interest, rather than speculatively pursuing 'the spurious attempt to know the absolute' 
(ibid., p.144), reason is able to realise its fundamental structure. In other words, reason 
creates itself as moral value. 'Hence, in transforming the ultimate metaphysical concerns 
of the human mind with their halo of sublimity and infinity, the critique does not merely 
put forward an abstract philosophical principle but, thereby, performs an act of profound 
cultural and existential implications' (ibid.). With regard to the interest of 
comprehensivity or totalisation, the ethical idea and empirical reality are brought 
together in the doctrine of the Highest Good. By working to achieve the Highest Good, 
humankind orientates its actions towards the creation of a new human and moral all-
embracing reality and meaning. Thus, moral acts directed towards the Highest Good not 
only have absolute value, but are ordered towards the ultimate and comprehensive 
fulfilment of human history. 
183 ibid., p.145 
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the Highest Good, which is to be won through human action and effort, the morality of 
which is rooted in the authority of the rational human will. Such a religion provides no 
metaphysical, historical, or para-scientific truth, but recasts the metaphysical interest 
into a moral-historical ideal of the "kingdom of God on earth" (the Highest Good). 
By reflecting on reason in its practical application, Kant's redeploys reasons 
critical interest and returns to it the universal and absolute nature frustrated in the First 
Critique. No longer is reason's essential interest 'the futile effort to know the world as 
one totality', 184 but is, because moral actions now have significance beyond their 
individuality, 'the task of reshaping it as a moral totality.1185 The ontological question, 
which Heidegger would later cast as the question of the 'meaning of being', has already 
been answered in ethics: 'the world exists for the sake of the moral world it can and 
should eventually become through human action in history.' 186 'In consequence, the 
ultimate objective of metaphysics is no longer Truth or Being as such but the Good, 
more precisely, the Highest Good, taken as a historical ideal.' 187 'Critical metaphysics 
thus begins as theory and ends as praxis; it starts by explicating the a priori structure of 
nature and ends by projecting a semi-messianic ideal, for which it also provides the 
drive to act and the grounds for hoping it can be achieved.' 188 
However, Yovel has reservations about~success of Kant's programme. Kant c/\. 
pursues the 'interests of reason.' The metaphysical interest of reason may be a sui 
generis interest which is 'unassailable to those of action and morality,' but equally may 
also be irrational, 'a form of self-deception in which a genuine interest of reason is 
repressed, masked under the guise of another interest and silenced by the humdrum of 
daily social action and endeavour.' Yovel, however, identifies a 'deeper significance of 
the primacy of the practical interest in Kant.. [which] ... infringe[s] upon the autonomy 
of a genuine rational interest and subordinates it to another. The cognitive metaphysical 
interest cannot be obliterated without distorting human rationality.' 189 The metaphysical 
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interest may have no critical answer, yet may be affirmed as having a salutary 
philosophical value in itself. It should not be dismissed as meaningless, but neither 
should it be claimed that it is answered, for 'both alternatives are equally irrational.' 
Yovel concludes that Kant's own position and 'meaning of his critical move' is that 
'[t]here must necessarily remain a gap, a tension, between the queries and their 
impossible answer and this/ gap is the genuine and authentic feature of the human Ct 
situation.' But, if this is the case, 'the alleged "sublimation" of the ultimate cognitive 
queries by transporting them into another domain,' should have been refused for this 
only serves to distort 'a genuine metaphysical interest and must end up in its repression 
and illusory satisfaction.i19o 
Y ovel's criticism raises a number of points. First of all there arises the question 
of the transparency of reason to itself and the claim that reason must be entirely and 
solely reasonable. That reason can ever be wholly transparent to itself such that its 
genuine interest is accessible to itself is not only called into question by its own 
transcendental nature which maintains the rational subject inaccessible to its own 
probings, but has perhaps been contested by more recent writings of Foucault and others 
who ascribe to knowledge and the rationality which drives it its own archaeology and 
genealogy. One can think also of the work of Habermas when he outlines the various 
forms of rationality which need to be laid bare in the complex of modern society. 
This leads on to a further question regarding the autonomy of reason, which, 
Y ovel fears, is compromised in its submission to another moral, practical interest. If the 
assignation of primacy to practical reason impinges on the autonomy of a genuine 
rational interest, which it seems to do by wresting the domain of praxis from the sole 
control of the subject, then perhaps this does not so much point to a crisis of moral 
freedom and autonomy, as to the call for a more phenomenologically appropriate and 
adequate description of reason's essential interest which takes account of its incarnate, 
inter-subjective or social form. It is not a case of obliterating the cognitive metaphysical 
interest with a resulting distortion of human rationality, but rather a question of 
deepening the concept of human rationality such .that it is not simply rational but also 
human and pays heed to a practical and moral interest. This is really to seek an answer 
to the question of the critical grounding of morality and ethics. While there may always 
be a gap between human questioning and its adequate answer and while this gap may 
190 ibid. 
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be may be 'a genuine and authentic feature of the human situation,' reason, nevertheless, 
in its drive to understand, cannot simply accept the gap and be silent about that which 
it cannot speak. Kant may have affirmed the gap, and Yovel may be correct in 
recognising this. But Kant himself, in recognising the gap opened between reason's 
metaphysical and critical interests, did try to go beyond the strictures of the First 
Critique, seeking in ethics the essential interest of reason. Whether this is sublimation, 
distortion and an ultimate repression and illusory satisfaction of reason's genuine 
interest needs to be addressed. Perhaps Levinas provides a way and a method to 
reconcile the critical and essential interests of reason through an understanding of 
metaphysics as primarily ethics. 
2. 62 Kant's Ethical Project in Levinas 
The strategy of knowledge for Kant in the First Critique consisted in the known 
object being present to the knowing subject according to the heuristic structure of 
consciousness. But this meant a limitation of experience to the phenomenal world. What 
Levinas will seek to do, in order to go beyond the limitations imposed on consciousness 
by the First Critique, is to contest an understanding of knowledge as a content possessed 
in consciousness, and to go beyond experience as purely phenomenal. Key to his 
approach will be a re-appraisal of the philosophical doctrine of being as presence. 
In his class of Friday, February 6th, 1976, Levinas confronts Heidegger with 
Kant's radical question. Heidegger attributes a priority to Being, yet that priority is 
contested by death and time, for their meaning (sens) lies elsewhere than in Being. 
Levinas asks, 'Is meaning always an event of Being?1191 Heidegger may have 
accustomed us to view philosophy in the W estem tradition as a history of Being, 
whether recollected or forgotten, but that same history shows that ontology does not 
exhaust meaning (signification). Levinas asks, 'whatever may be the situation of being's 
move (la geste d'etre), doesn't the history of philosophy designate an other disquiet 
(inquietude)? Does the beyond of being (/'au-de/a de l'etre) inscribe itself in being's 
move (la geste d'etre)? 192 The fact of transcendence invites a deeper reflection. For 
example, the philosophical disquiet before the God-question finds its significance 
191 E Levinas, DMT, p.69 
192 ibid., p.70 
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somewhere other than in the forgetfulness of being and the ontotheological wanderings 
(errance) of philosophy. The God of ontotheology may be dead, but this is not the only 
God. Levinas writes in a note at the beginning of Otherwise than Being and Beyond 
Essence, 193 that 'to hear a God not contaminated by Being is a human possibility no less 
important and no less precarious than to bring Being out of the oblivion in which it is 
said to have fallen in metaphysics and in onto-theology.' Heidegger may have reduced 
Kant's philosophy to a first radical exposition of the finitude of being, as Benton has 
noted, 194 but, as previously indicated, of the questions which Kant identifies as 
philosophy's agenda at the end of the First Critique, it is not What can I know? which 
is principal, but What must I do? and What have I the right to hope for?, for whereas the 
first leads to an understanding of the subject in terms of knowledge and finitude, the 
other two answer the question of the human in terms of obligation (devoir) and salvation 
(salut), beyond being and comprehension. 
193 E Levinas, OB, p. xlii 
194 Benton stresses that finitude of the human intellect is at the core of Kant's 
transcendental argument, and is the reason for his concern with the a priori synthesis. 
See op.cit, p.24 
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2. 63 The Thanatological Undoing of Being195 
131 
For Levinas, death indicates an egress from being. The radical significance of 
death lies outwith ontology. For Heidegger, death and time are always thought of as 
modalities of being in so far as being. Thanatology speaks the language of ontology. 
Subjectivity, formerly snuffed out in death, now appropriates, as integral to its own life, 
death, and reasserts its mastery, authentically and resolutely appropriating what 
otherwise we would rather forget. But to answer the question of the meaning of being 
thus is to forget the meaning of death. As Blanchot says, we have lost death. 196 
For Heidegger, Dasein's Being is a Being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode). Death 
marks the end of Dasein.197 In death, Dasein becomes 'no-longer Dasein.' 198 However, 
just as Dasein realises itself either authentically or inauthentically, so the death which 
Dasein undergoes can be either authentic or inauthentic. Inauthentic death is the death 
which others undergo, the death other than my own death. Death might certainly come, 
but it always afflicts others first; Dasein's own death is something so much in the 
distance that it is an affair with which Dasein should not be concerned. This lack of 
concern with one's own death is, however, an evasion. 'In accordance with the tendency 
to falling, which is essential to everydayness, Being-towards-death has turned out to be 
195 For a fuller exposition of the relationship between being and death 
proposed here, see my article The Mystery of Death: Alterity and Affectivity in Levinas, 
in New Blackfriars, 76, December, 1995, pp.524-34. 
196 Maurice Blanchot writes in his essay, The Great Refusal, (The Infinite 
Conversation), 'We have lost death' (p.34). Referring to the 'already decomposing 
remains of Lazarus,' Blanchot notes that the confrontation of Lazarus in death by 'he 
who ... is able to name it, "comprehend" it, and by this understanding, pronounce the 
Lazare veni foras' (p.35) is a confrontation in which death is deprived of its true 
significance. In an implicit criticism of Heidegger, Blanchot writes that the restoration 
of Lazarus is 'death comprehended, deprived of itself, become pure privative essence, 
pure negation' (p.36); it is a 'death that... affirms itself as a power of being, and as that 
through which everything is determined, everything unfolds as a possibility' (p.36). But, 
then, he goes on to ask, 'But how can one not sense that in this veritable death, the death 
without truth has entirely slipped away: what in death is irreducible to the true, to all 
disclosure, what never reveals itself, hides, or appears?' (p.36). 
197 Heidegger writes, 'If "death" is defined as the 'end' of Dasein - that is to 
say, of Being-in-the-world - this does not imply any ontical decision whether 'after 
death' still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein 'lives on' 
or even 'outlasts' itself and is 'immortal' (BT, p.292). 
198 ibid., p.286 
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an evasion in the face of death - an evasion which conceals.t1 99 Further, insofar as death 
is something undergone by others, Dasein's '[e]veryday Being-towards-death' is 
associated with the idle talk of the They which, though it concedes the certainty of 
death, conceals this certainty by covering up dying in order to 'alleviate [Dasein's} own 
thrownness into death.'200 They say, "One dies too, sometime, but not right away. 11201 
They say, "It is certain that 'Death' is coming."202 The death of others with which Dasein 
concerns itself in its everyday dealings is, however, an empirical death, without an 
ontological significance for Dasein's ownmost possibilities. 'For the most part, everyday 
Dasein covers up the ownmost possibility of its Being - that possibility which is non-
relational and not to be outstripped.'203 'Thus they "they" covers up what is peculiar in 
death's certainty - that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death 
goes the indefiniteness of its when. Everyday Being-towards-death evades this 
indefiniteness by conferring definiteness upon it.'204 
Such a consideration of inauthentic death enables Heidegger to arrive at the full 
existential-ontological conception of death: 'death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's 
ownmost possibility - non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be 
outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.'205 As 
Richard Cohen notes, for Heidegger, 'deathboundedness constitutes the existing totality 
of that being which is Dasein, and it constitutes Dasein as a totality.'206 Robert Manning 
summarises four characteristics of an authentic interpretation of death: firstly, death is 















206 R Cohen, Time in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, State University of New York, 1979, p.128 
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its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it "is" at all;'207 secondly, death 
is a possibility towards which Dasein is oriented. Dasein is 'being-towards-death,' who 
becomes authentic when it faces up to the possibility of its own demise, when it 
resolutely accepts its own being as being-towards-death; thirdly, in accepting death as 
its own, Dasein takes distance from the inauthenticity of the 'they' and affirms itself as 
a separate and unique individual. 'Death individualises Dasein by calling it back from 
its lostness in the they to realise itself as a solitary being;1208 'all its relations to any other 
Dasein have been undone;'209 fourthly, death is appropriated as that about which one can 
be certain. Death is Dase in 's ownmost certainty. 
Now, what this means is that death confers a future upon authentic Dasein, 
revealing its temporality. 'It is only when authentic Dasein receives death as its 
ownmost, non-relational, not to be outstripped, and most certain possibility that it 
becomes aware that it has a future of its own to anticipate and to which it may project 
itself to actualise its own authentic possibilities.'210 Manning quotes Lingis, 'The sense 
of my imminent impotence is a Power. It brings me forth into all the potentiality for 
Being that I am [and] is the very basis of all power in me.'211 Death, the impossibility 
of possibility, delimits Dasein as finite, but, as such, defines the arena wherein authentic 
Dasein can realise itself. Authentic acceptance of one's own death enables Dasein to 
authentically comport itself towards the actual possibilities of its own Being. Blanchot 
recognises the same: all our relationships within the world are relationships of that 
puissance which possibility contains. Man is possibility. 'Dasein always understands 
itself in terms of its existence - in terms of a possibility of itself.'212 Death would thus 
offer the final impossibility to my possibility; however, 'even death,' says Blanchot, 
'is a power, a capacity. It is not a simple event that will happen to me, an 
objective and observable fact; here my power to be will cease, here I will 
207 M Heidegger, op. cit., p.284 
208 R J Sheffler Manning, Intemreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel 
Levinas's Ethics as First Philosophy,(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1993), 
p.69 
209 M Heidegger, op.cit., p.294 
210 R J S Manning, op.cit., pp.68-69 
211 ibid., p.70, quoting A Lingis, Introduction to Collected Papers, , p.x, n.7 
212 See M Heidegger, op.cit., p.33 
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no longer be able to be here. But death, insofar as it belongs to me alone, 
since no one else can die my death in my stead or in my place, makes of 
this non-possibility, this impending future of mine, this relation to 
myself always open until my end, yet another power (pouvoir).' 213 
134 
In other words, I am able to die; I can appropriate to myself my death as my power 
(pouvoir), a solitary resolution.214 
Thus, death is drawn into the realm of the ontological and is appropriated by the 
subject as its final possibility. To quote Heidegger, 'Being-towards-death, as anticipation 
of possibility, is what first makes this possibility possible, and sets it free as 
possibility .... Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility.'215 
Now, Levinas, wants to disassociate ontology and thanatology in order to 
recover the meaning of death outwith ontology. The priority which Heidegger assigns 
to Being is contested by death, for its meaning (sens) lies elsewhere than in Being. 
213 M Blanchot, IC, p.42, Entretien, pp.59-60 
214 Cf. M Heidegger, op.cit., p.311. Heidegger, speaking of the existential 
constitution of Dasein which is yet to be addressed in the face of being-unto-death, asks 
'whether the anticipation of [zum] death, which we have hitherto projected only in its 
ontologi,cal possibility, has an essential connection with that authentic potentiality-for-
Being which has been attested (p.311 ). For Heidegger's understanding and definition 
of 'resolution' (Entschluss), see SZ, 270, 296, 298, 301, 305, 329, 382, 39lf. 
This Heideggerian thanatology is theologically appropriated. Ladislaus Boros, 
in 'The Moment of Truth: Mysterium Mortis,' (London: Search Press, 1973) proposes 
the thesis that '[d}eath gives man the opportunity of posing his first completely personal 
act; death is, therefore, by reason of its very being, the moment above all others for the 
awakening of consciousness, for freedom, for the encounter with God, for the final 
decision about his eternal destiny' (ibid., p, ix; see also, pp. 84, 165). Death is 'a 
fundamental modality of living, concrete existence' (ibid., p.8), the picture of which 
must be sought 'in the inner structure of living human existence' (ibid., p.25). The 
human person is constitutively ordered towards death from the beginning of existence 
(ibid., p.9). Further, since 'death is the unreflexive, uncoordinated factor in our 
existence, one of those primitive metaphysical data that precede immediate experience,' 
its reality can be disclosed by a transcendental reflection on human existence. '[D]eath 
is essentially present in the structure of every living existence, and can, therefore, be 
grasped in the existent being itself at the point of intersection of the various pointers to 
death' (ibid., p.23). Rahner, too, would seemingly assume the same existential 
thanatology, when he speaks of the knowledge of the inescapabi}ity of the experience 
of death as being the distinguishing factor between a huma~being and an animal. 
'[O]nly man exists always and inescapably confronted with his end, with the totality of 
his existence, with its temporal end. Only man possesses his existence unto this end' 
(Foundations, p.270). 
215 M Heidegger, op.cit., p.307 
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Meaning is not always an event of Being. With respect to Being, death presents itself 
as an excess. For example, the death of Socrates recorded by Plato in the Phaedo offers 
an approach to the meaning of death as an experience of incomprehensible alterity 
which reveals itself in the affectivity demonstrated by Appolodorus' tears. Socrates is 
the one who authentically and resolutely faces death, 'a man who has really devoted his 
life to philosophy [and is] confident in the face of death.'216 His friends, however, are 
perplexed at the prospect of his untimely death. Hence, Socrates' admonition to Crito 
not to confuse Socrates and the mortal body which remains, nor to lament at the funeral 
'that it is Socrates whom he is laying out or carrying to the grave or bmying.'217 Such is 
the idle talk which surrounds inauthentic dying, and which, says Levinas, associates life 
and movement. Death, in its 'empirical facticity,' brings this to an end, affecting 'the 
autonomy or the expressivity of movement.'218 'Death is the sans-reponse.'219 From the 
point of view of language and the observation of the death of the other man, death is an 
immobilisation, and the beginning of decomposition. It is not a transformation, but an 
annihilation, 'the passage from being to no-longer-being understood as the result of a 
logical operation: negation.'220 Hence the description of the death of Socrates who, after 
drinking the hemlock, experiences a gradual and spreading numbness creeping into his 
limbs, depriving him of the power to move.221 But death is not simply, inauthentically, 
an empirical fact. But nor does its authenticity lie in the individualisation of Dasein in 
its solitary being, all relations with others having been undone. 'Is death separable from 
the relation with others (autrni)?'222 Levinas argues that the negativity of death is not 
simply the negation of being but the sense of 'departure towards the unknown,' a 
departure without return, a departure 'without leaving an address'223 and this gives rise 
216 Phaedo, 63e, H Tredennick & H Tarrant (trs.), (London: Penguin 
Classics, 1993) 
217 Phaedo, l l 5e 
218 E Levinas, DMT, p.17 
219 ibid. 
220 ibid., p.18 
221 Phaedo, ll 7e-118a 
222 E Levinas, DMT, p.17 
223 ibid. 
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to great emotion. Death is emotion par excellence; it is affectivity. Upon the death of 
Socrates, 'Appolodorus, who had never stopped crying even before, now broke into such 
a storm of passionate weeping that he made everyone in the room break down.'224 
Levinas notes that, for some, the death of Socrates may be a reason for hope insofar as 
the good life, or theory, triumphs over the negativity of death; but there are also those 
who, like Appolodorus, 'weep more than necessary, weep without measure: as if 
humanity were not exhausted by the measure, as if there were an excess in death. '225 And 
so, Levinas asks, 'What is the sense of this affectivity and of these tears?1226 
Whereas for Heidegger, death's significance lies in its certainty and the resolute 
manner in which Dasein comports itself to its own demise and the future opened by its 
own being-towards-death, for Levinas, the significance of death is otherwise: not so 
much the fact of its certainty, but rather the fact of its unknowability. But this aspect of 
death has been overlooked. Levinas asks, 
'I even ask myself how the principal trait of our relation with death has 
been able to escape the attention of philosophers. It is not from the 
nothingness of death of which we know nothing precisely that the 
analysis must proceed, but from a situation in which something 
absolutely unknowable appears; absolutely unknowable, that is to say, 
foreign to all light, making impossible all assumption of possibility, but 
in which we are seized.'227 
Death, for Levinas, is supremely uncertain and mysterious. It evades our attempts to 
grasp and understand it. 
'The fact that we can only conceive of death via the deaths of others does 
not say something about our inauthentic stance towards a death from 
which we would take flight; rather, it says something about death itself: 
"The fact that it deserts every present is not due to our evasion of death 
and to an unpardonable dispersion at the supreme hour, but to the fact 
that death is ungraspable ... "'h8 
It is 'absolutely unknowable,' 'foreign to all light.' Against Heidegger who viewed the 
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of one's being as being-towards-death, Levinas stresses that death cannot be possessed. 
This means that mineness (Jemeinigkeit) cannot express the reality of death; death is not 
something that will be mine, but only some day; it is that which can never be mine 
because it has its own reality. It is other than myself. It comes to me, not as a reality 
which I encounter in a welcoming embrace or in Stoical acceptance, but as an opposing 
force in relation to which there is combat and struggle. Mars et vita due/lo. To be 
conscious of death brings with it not power but vulnerability. 'The will to oppose death 
is mine, but the power that seizes me in my death is supremely other than mine, is 
quintessentially a power external to me. '229 
Now, if death approaches with the alterity of an opposing force which marks the 
end of my power, then there is a source of meaning other than myself. Death's meaning 
is found in the fact that the subject, 'locked in itself and in its present,' is encountered 
by what is other than the subject, and what the subject can never be nor understand. 'In 
death, the subject meets the other, absolute alterity. By being always already in relation 
to death, the subject is in relation to something other than itself and its present.'230 This 
other contests the power of the subject and marks, not the possibility of impossibility, 
as in Heidegger's Being-towards-death, but rather the impossibility of possibility. In 
death, I am brought to an end, and not simply in the empirical facticity of existence, but, 
radically, in my very subjectivity. 'Death announces an event in which the subject is not 
the master, an event in relation to which the subject is no longer subject.1231 This means, 
says Levinas, commenting upon Blanchot, that 'Death ... is not the pathos (l.e pathetique) 
of the ultimate hwnan possibility, possibility of impossibility, but the incessant re-
possessing of that which cannot be grasped, before which the ''je" loses its ipseity. 
Impossibility of possibility .'232 
229 ibid., p.71 
230 ibid. 
231 E Levinas, Le Temps et L'Autre, p.57 
232 E Levinas, Sur Maurice Blanchot,(Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1975), 
p.16 
Cohen argues this point in Time in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. When 
death is the possibility of impossibility, as in Heidegger, then it is 'intrinsic and essential 
to Dasein' since it enables Dasein to project itself towards the future and the possibilities 
for Dasein available therein. However, if death is the 'impossibility of possibility,' then · 
it is 'extrinsic or external to subjectivity' (See pp.138-139). 
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Now, since death does not provide the backdrop against which possibilities 
temporally unfold, but extinguishes possibility, the future it reveals is a future excessive 
to my present, a future other than the future filled with expectation and projection which 
Heidegger proposes for authentic Dasein. Since death is absolutely other, I can have no 
projections or expectations with regard to it, for I can only project from myself and my 
present. Projected and expected future is not a pure future, but the 'future of the present' 
or the 'present in the future'. Death, as absolute alterity, refractory to all anticipation and 
projection, opens on to a 'strange' or 'foreign' future, an 'absolute future' which I cannot 
overcome or make my own. 'There is an abyss between the present and death, between 
the ego and the alterity of mystery .'233 Or again, 'The distance between life and death is 
infinite.'234 
What, then, is the significance of Appolodorus' tears? Levinas notes that, 
although Heidegger presented authentic existence as an existence in which one 
resolutely embraces one's own death, the reality is that the knowledge one has of death 
is overwhelmed by the sense of loss and departure, the affection and the weeping, and 
this raises the question of the nature of our relationship with death. The disquiet which 
one feels in the proximity of death - 'emotion as deference to death'235 - is the very 
question which needs to be asked, but emotion is a question which does not hold within 
itself the elements of a response. In other words, affectivity is a response to alterity. 
The affectivity which one experiences in the face of death lies beyond 
intentionality and thematisation, refractory to all phenomenal appearance, 'as if emotion, 
in the question, without encountering any quiddity, were going towards the acuteness 
of death and were instituting the unknown, not as purely negative, but in a proximity 
without knowledge.'236 Heidegger attempted to understand the emotion experienced in 
the face of death by reducing it to the anguish felt at the prospect of nothingness. The 
233 E Levinas, Le Temps et L'Autre, p.73 
See also, J Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counteifeit Money, (Peggy Kamuf 
(tr.), (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p.28 where he criticises 
temporality founded on the notion of presence, and indicates that time involves a 
relationship with is 'without being [sans etre ], that is not what it is and that is what it is 
not, which is to be it without being (it) [qui est de l'etre sans l'etre].' 
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P haedo sought to affirm that theory - the good or authentic death - is stronger than the 
anguish of death. Nevertheless, Appolodorus still cries more than the others, 
excessively, and beyond measure. Emotion is excessive, and points to death's excess. 
What Levinas wishes to argue is that Heidegger's cognitive stance with regard to death -
the ontological reduction of death - fails to recognise death as an opposing force which 
is not known but undergone. Death happens to us; hence the truism of the impossibility 
of experiencing death, of a non-contact between life and death, which signifies the 
passivity of affectivity. One does not experience death. Death affects us without there 
being any intentionality on our part; it is neither a seeing nor an intending, but an 
'affectivity without intentionality',237 an emotion which does not have representation as 
its basis, a movement of anxiety into the unknown. 
Now, it is this break with the ontological which Levinas recognises as the great 
contribution of Kant's First Critique. Formally, the question, What must I do? has no 
reference to being, which means that, apart from Being and its comprehension, meaning 
and signification persist. Kant's practical philosophy, answering his second and third 
questions contests the reductive power of Being. The Heideggerian reduction is not 
obligatory; finitude is not final. 
'If one had the right to retain one trait from a philosophical system and 
neglect all the details of its architecture .. , we would think here of 
Kantism, which finds a meaning to the human without measuring it by 
ontology and outside of the question "What is there here ... ? 11 that one 
would like to take to be a preliminary, outside of the immortality and 
death which ontologies run up against. The fact that immortality and 
theology could not determine the categorical imperative signifies the 
novelty of the Copernican revolution: a sense that is not measured by 
being or not being; but being on the contrary is determined on the basis 
of sense.'238 
While the transcendental conditions for the appearance of the phenomenal object 
operate within the domain of Being, the synthetic activity of the understanding 
according to the categories makes appeal to the whole of reality, which is given in the 
transcendental ideal, which, significantly, never receives the predicates of being. Yet 
it is by relation to this that given objects of experience are thought as entirely 
determined. While the transcendental ideal is a sensed notion, it is postulated outwith 
Being, and as such, can be termed aberrant, wandering from the path of the tradition. 
237 ibid., p.26 
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Levinas notes that the transcendental ideal is thought in concreto, but Kant refuses being 
to it, for being's prototype is the phenomenon. In other words, reason has ideas which 
go beyond being. This understanding of the transcendental ideal as otherwise than being 
is first mentioned in Existence and Existents, where, in the context of the intentional 
comprehension of the world by a knowing subject, Levinas notes that the idea of a 
synthetic and exterior whole 'is already adjusted to and refers to what is interior,'239 and 
that '[t]he very idea of totality or of a whole is only intelligible where there is a being 
that can embrace it.'240 While this synthetic whole falls within the realm of being, 
knowing itself 'is essentially a way of being on the hither side of being ... , a way of 
relating to events while still being able not to be caught up in them.'241 It is this 
transcendentality of the knowing subject with respect to the known object, the 'power 
of unending withdrawal,'242 'the power to withdraw infinitely ,'243 which, for Levinas, is 
the insight of Kantian philosophy. 'Kant's thesis that inner sense gives us only a subject 
transformed by the conditions for all objectivity enables us to grasp just what is essential 
in a subject':244 it is an epoche. The subject remains transcendental, always 
diachronically out of step with and inadequate to the idea it can have of itself. It is this 
epoche which defines the 'I'. But, more significantly, the suspension from involvement 
with objects is a positioning outwith being. 'The I is a being that is always outside of 
being and even outside of itself.'245 
239 E Levinas, EE, p.47 
240 ibid., pp.48-49 
241 ibid., p.49 
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2.64 Hoping Beyond Being 
The speculative question about the limits of knowledge addressed in the First 
Critique finds its 'essential interest' pursued by practical reason, which deals with life 
in the natural world before it has settled into 'average everydayness,' 'the humdrum of 
daily social action and endeavour,'246 of which Yovel speaks. Meaning is found in the 
practical sphere, in areas where access is denied to speculation. Heidegger's attempt to 
situate meaning within Being is foiled by death, which lies outwith the cognitive domain 
in the realm of the affective and the practical. In the 'epic of being' in which existence 
is determined by temporality and death, there are things which cannot be incorporated 
into this epic. Although the human adventure is reduced by Heidegger 'to the epic of 
being insofar as being which is being-unto-death,'247 there are nonetheless significations 
irreducible to being. The regulative force of the reality of God and the immortality of 
the soul, which reason demands in order to maintain a reasoned accord between virtue 
and goodness, is applied independently of the ontological adventure and against all that 
ontology teaches us; it constitutes an after (apres) which actually derails the claims of 
a comprehensive ontology, and finds its significance in the phenomenon of hope, which 
is a power of signifying beyond the theoretical. Hope may be a temporal reality, but its 
significance goes beyond time.248 The finitude which is at the heart of both Kant's First 
Critique and Heidegger's Sein und Zeit must still be recognised, but one must also show 
that, at the core of finite being, there is a rational hope, an a priori hope, which is not 
simply a will to survive, but another conjunction of meaning. To affirm hope as an a 
priori is to recognise it within finite reason, and, as such, to affirm it as rational. This 
is not to deny being-unto-death as finitude's very presupposition, but, as in Kant's 
practical philosophy, to gain 'the possibility of thinking a beyond of time (un au-de/a 
du temps) by hope,'249 a beyond which has a meaning other than that of finite or infinite 
time. Rational hope is a manner of relating otherwise; it is situated in 'a temporality 
246 
247 
Y Yovel, op.cit., p.147 
E Levinas, DMT ,p.74 
• 
248 See J Derrida, Given Time, cc. I & 2, where he deals with the question 
of how to give time. 
249 E Levinas, DMT, p.75 
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other than that of being-unto-death,'250 and is 'refractory to all knowledge, to all 
gnosis.'251 Because hope is rational yet outwith the ontological orb within which 
Heidegger locates meaning, it inaugurates 'a relation by relation to which time and death 
have an other sense,'252 not dictated by a relation to being, but with reference to 
morality; 'it is not by accident that this way of thinking a meaning beyond being is the 
corollary of ethics.'253 
Knowledge, as the convertible counterpart of being, projects itself to the limits 
of the phenomenal and is there bounded. Thus, Heidegger can speak of the finite subject 
ultimately confronting the annihilation of all possibility in death. Hope, however, 
projects itself beyond the confines of being into the domain of the good, 'for the 
supreme Good can only be hoped.'254 For Kant, the categories of space and time allow 
and yet limit theoretical access to the phenomenon, yet the noumenal can be accessed 
in the rationality of human moral action, guided by its universal maxim, for the subject 
is interiorly bound by the moral obligation of duty. To act morally, one must necessarily 
comport oneself as if the soul were immortal and as if God existed. Such hope-
motivated action is a hope against all knowledge, and yet is a hope which is rational. 
The important point here is that hope is outwith the temporal ecstases which 
provide the interpretative key to Being for Heidegger; it is neither a backward and 
nostalgic glance a la recherche du temps perdu, nor a present positioning, waiting for 
a future knowledge to be comprehended in time, unless that waiting is understood as a 
relation 'with what cannot come, not because the waiting would be in vain but because 
the awaited is too great for the waiting and the length of time is a relation which holds 
more than it holds. Hope become waiting and temporal length is already a relation (in 
a non-negative sense) and welcome of a surplus.'255 It is often recognised as more than 
a human comportment yet less than being. But here, says Levinas, the question arises: 
'is hope - as more than a human comportment and less than being - not more than 
250 ibid., p.76 
251 ibid. 
252 ibid. 
253 ibid., p.78 
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255 ibid., p.80 
PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS 143 
being?'256 It is as if hwnan rationality were not exhausted in maintaining its own being, 
not even in serving being.257 One says that knowledge is in the measure of what it 
knows, but what is hoped for is always in excess of what knowledge can conceive. 
Whereas in cognitive intentionality, there is a correlation between noema and noesis, 
hope seems to be outwith intentionality; it has no identifiable object. It is a relation with 
something unmeasured (demesure) by knowledge. It is a relation with more than being, 
with that which can never be affirmed as an existent or signified as a correlative of 
knowledge. And this opens on to a subjectivity related to the unrealisable, not in its 
romantic sense, though, but as an order above or beyond being ( un ordre au-dessus ou 
au-de/a de l'etre). 
The possibility of such a rational hope which lies beyond being is addressed by 
Levinas in a lecture entitled, 'How to think nothingness' (Comment penser le neant) (20 
Feb, 1976). If hope (esperance) is an emptiness awaiting fulfilment, rational hope 
(espoir) does not anticipate a future. For Husserl, says Levinas, intuition fills the 
emptiness with its own significations in view of future knowledge,258 but for Kant this 
256 ibid., p.77 
Maurice Blanchot's reflection on the poetic character of hope is illustrative here. 
Quoting Rene Char, 'Le poeme est !'amour realise du desir demeure desir' (L 'Entretien 
Infini, p.56), he recognises the association of hope and desire, neither of which are 
manufactured by the subject, but find their drive in the obscurity of an objective and 
excessive exteriority. This obscurity can be discovered in hope. Blanchot identifies the 
function of poetic hope, like poetry itself, as providing the means whereby a future 
promise is rendered present. Yet that presence is not grasped in an already and 
immediate manner, but is the presence of what is always yet to come, and may in fact 
never come. 'Plus lointain ou plus difficile est l'objet de l'espoir, plus l'espoir qui 
l'affirme est profond et proche de sa destine d'espoir: j'ai peu a esperer, quand ce que 
j'espere est presque sous la main' (p.58). Hope speaks of the possibility of that which 
escapes the possible; it holds onto a relationship at the very point or limit where the 
relationship is lost, and makes of itself a hopeless hope which no longer awaits 
possibility but affirms the improbable advent of what will never happen. 'L 'espoir est 
le plus profond, lorsque lui-meme se retire et se destitue de tout espoir manifeste' (ibid.). 
To attend the possible is to anticipate a welcome into ontology, for what is possible can 
be; to hope for the improbable is to wait for what can never be, not on account of an 
absolute nothingness, but because the categories and language of being are inadequate. 
257 cf. E Levinas, DMT, pp.79-80 
258 Husserl distinguishes between mere intentions, which refer blindly to 
intentional objects and are intuitively empty, and the intuitive fulfilment of such acts 
with intuitive content. Speigelberg writes, 'There are thus two types of intentions, both 
having equal rights as far as their intentional structure goes: promising intentions, which 
are still intuitively empty, and fulfilling intentions, which also carry intuitive content. 
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is impossible: hope in the beyond of time cannot be constrained by the categories of 
time and space for then what is other than being in its temporality would be an 
accomplishment of that temporality, and contact with the absolute would be 
accomplished in the realm of the phenomenal, a possibility excluded in the First 
Critique. To postulate the immortality of the soul and the existence of God define a hope 
which cannot be deduced from sense or intellect and which does not belong to 'the 
ontological adventure - as if, in the spirit, in reason, there were something other than the 
fact, for being, of being.'259 Rational hope is like an extra-ordinary, non-temporal, 
projection of meaning into a domain of pure nothingness, a relationship in which it is 
impossible to conceive or equal or contain what is hoped for, a relation of inadequation. 
Yet, the presence and power of nothingness has remained largely unaddressed 
by philosophy. Levinas writes, 'Nothingness has defied Western thought.'260 
'We understand corruption, transformation, dissolution. We understand 
that the forms pass while something subsists. Death severs all that, 
inconceivable, refractory to thought, and, however, incontestable and 
undeniable. Neither phenomenon, hardly thematisable, nor thinkable -
the irrational begins there. Even in anguish, even by anguish, death 
remains unthought. To have lived anguish does not permit one to think 
it.'261 
Yet it is impossible not to know this negativity, though its inaccessibility has been a 
characteristic of western thought from Aristotle to Bergson. With Bergson, according 
to Levinas, the idea of absolute nothingness is dismissed as a self-destructive, and its 
suppression as simply its replacement or substitution by another term.262 Heidegger, too, 
found the possibility of a non-theoretical access to nothingness in angst fascinating; 
being objectless, angst has for its object the non-object, and is thus the very experience 
of nothingness. Phenomenology, too, also seems to give access to a thought of 
nothingness through the idea of intentionality as access, whether theoretical or non-
theoretical, to something other than self. 
But the two are intimately related. The first even requires the second as its complement' 
(H Spiegelberg, op. cit., p.99; for a brief outline of the intentionality of consciousness 
in Husserlian phenomenology, see pp.97-100). 
259 E Levinas, DMT, p.79 
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2.7 Summary 
Rahner, following Marechal, sought to answer Kant's question regarding the 
possibility and the scope of metaphysics - 'what can I know?' - by undertaking a 
transcendental analysis of the inherent dynamism of the human spirit. As 'power to 
know,' the finite spirit intends being, since, following Aquinas' dictum, 'whatever is can 
be known.' This essential convertibility between being and knowing is articulated by 
Rahner in terms of self-possession. Being knows itself insofar as it possesses itself. The 
corollary of this is that not-knowing is a lack of self-presence. Knowledge is thus 
essentially comprehension, a unified and unifying grasp of Being. Although human 
being is finite, and so not fully present-to-self or self-possessed, nonetheless the 
framework within which Rahner's thought unfolds is an 'ontology of understanding,' and 
the proper object which the intellect intends is Being. Questioning and acquisition go 
hand in hand. The fulfilment of Rahner's question is the acquisition of Being. To inquire 
is to acquire. Acquisition is by way of inquisition. 
It is this latent violence within Being's quest for comprehensivity and 
comprehension which is at the heart of Levinas' criticism of the western ontological 
tradition, the violence of comprehension which fails to give due regard to difference 
and otherness, but seeks instead to reduce the other to the same, enclosing it within an 
egological totality of understanding. Levinas will thus seek to pursue the totalising 
apparatus of thought to its limits, to the very point at which the event of thinking breaks 
down before the unassailable excess of the Other. 
Now, although contained within and constrained by an ontological framework 
of understanding which would forge an essential link between Being and knowing, 
Rahner, attentive to a more metaphysical (in Levinas' sense of the term) strand in his 
thought, nonetheless recognises the limits of the ontological structure. As noted, he 
moves from an emphasis on human knowledge in the limiting philosophical 
propaedeutic of Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word to the acknowledgement 
of wider human experience, writing later that 'experience of God and experience of 
self ... in a real and fundamental sense stand for the totality of human experience and 
human knowledge.'263 Again, even later in Foundations, he refers to knowledge in the 
wider sense of human experience pointing out that 'every transcendental experience is 
mediated by the categorical encounter with concrete reality in our world, both the world 
263 K Rahner, Experience of Self, p.122 
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of things and the world of persons.'264 Knowledge is inadequately understood when it 
is understood as concept. Rather, knowledge, as transcendental experience, finds its 
perfection and realisation as freedom and love, and ultimately is to be situated within 
the orientation towards Mystery, categorically realised in the love of the other person. 
In other words, the text of knowledge has always to be read within the context of 
Mystery. lntellectus falters because ratio, as orientation towards mystery, is capax, 
infiniti. This mystery draws close in the proximity of grace, a supernatural existential. 
Levinas, too, will emphasise the manner in which knowledge is disturbed by the 
proximity of the other. As Blanchot puts it, 'cet Autrui est etrangement mysterieux.' The 
dominant and dominating position of knowledge as comprehension is always and 
already called into question because, with regard to it, the Other is ex-position. 
A further related issue arises. Rahner's finite spirit demands the receptivity of 
materiality. The 'pure openness for absolutely everything,'265 which the subject 'by its 
very nature' fundamentally is, demands the receptivity of materiality. The spirit can only 
realise itself by a conversion to the world. But this material world in Rahner is not 
necessarily anything other than the impersonal, material world. As Thomas Reid has 
pointed out in his criticism of Cartesianism and the philosophies which issue from it, 
the resulting spiritualisation of the body means that there is no place for embodiment. 
Rahner himself recognises the limitation of his early works in this regard and will seek 
to redress it in his later articles by stressing the subject's essential openness to the 
personal other and will link the loving experience of God with the loving experience of 
neighbour, and do so essentially. Ultimately, the redemptive role of the world for the 
finite spirit is achieved in the personal world of intersubjectivity. 
Levinas, too, stresses the salvific role of secularity. Sensibility is not so much 
a staging post along the way of the ontological adventure, as in Rahner's propaedeutic, 
but is the locus of passivity and essential receptivity where the self is exposed to and 
rendered vulnerable to the incursion of the Other. These themes are yet to be more fully 
developed. First of all, it will be worthwhile to show how Levinas enlarges the 
framework of knowledge - answered by Kant's first question, 'What can I know?' - by 
situating it within the context of the ethical. Death and hope have already demonstrated 
the possibility of an egress from the ontological because they constitute a relation with 
264 idem, Foundations, p.52 
265 ibid., p.20 
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true exteriority. That egress, however, has also already and always taken place in the 
relationship with the Other. 
3. 
Beyond Presence 
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Rabner privileges the question as the proper starting point of metaphysics. The 
human subject is that being who must ask questions, and who, in asking questions, 
interrogates not simply beings in their particularity ad infinitum but being at its most 
fundamental, namely, being as and insofar as it is. In questioning the being of beings, 
the human subject, as Heidegger argues, is the privileged access, for the question about 
being includes, as part of its own questioning, the being of the one who questions; and 
thus, the question about being becomes also the question about the question of being. 
Dasein 'is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that being is an issue 
for it.... Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein 's Being. 
Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.it Thus, it is 'the primary entity to 
be interrogated.12 In short, the transcendental question, which refuses to be ignored and 
must be asked, is that question 'which does not merely place something asked about in 
question, but the one questioning and the question itself, and thereby absolutely 
everything.13 One can try to evade the question about being by immersing oneself 
wholeheartedly in the world either by attempting to manipulate or control the concrete 
world such that by limiting reflection to the concrete entities of the world, self-reflection 
can be refused; or, by simply accepting the fact of finite, categorical existence and 
leaving the question of the ultimacy of existence to the side; or, by giving way to a 
despair which sees everything devoid as sense such that any question would prove 
meaningless.4 But, 
'even when he pauses or even deliberately declines to carry on enquiring, 
he still produces an answer to the question. He declares the question to 
be unresolvable or meaningless, thus answering it, saying that the being 
of that which exists is unimportant, empty of meaning, something 
looking out to him from every thing which exists, and making him 
appear to be enquiring about nothing. Alternatively, man implicitly turns 
some particular existent thing into being itself - matter or business, the 
life-force or death and resignation. Whenever man surrenders his own 
existence utterly to some existent thing, by making this absolute of one 
existent thing he declares it to be the centre of all that surrounds him and 
of all that he is, and everything else to be but support and expressions of 
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to understand by being, and how he interprets himself as an 
understanding of being. He is practising metaphysics. Thus we are 
compelled to indulge in metaphysics because we are always doing it. We 
are compelled to ask: What is the "being" of that which is?"5 
150 
Now, the possibility of raising a question in the schema embraced by Heidegger and 
Rahner presupposes as a condition of that possibility some prior awareness or 
understanding of that which is to be questioned; it presupposes the presence to the 
subject in some manner of the object being questioned. Ultimately, since the question 
is an ontological and not simply an antic pursuit, that schema is essentially ontological. 
Human existence has a relationship with Being as an ontological presupposition. As 
Heidegger writes, since Dasein 'is also that entity which already comports itself, in its 
Being, towards what we are asking about when we ask this question ... the question of 
Being is nothing other than the radicalisation of an essential tendency-of-Being which 
belongs to Dasein itself - the pre-ontological understanding of Being.'6 The 
Heideggerian goal, taken up by Rahner then, is an attempt to make the relationship 
between being (das Seiende) and Being (Sein) transparent. '[T]o work out the question 
of Being adequately, we must make an entity - the inquirer - transparent in its own 
Being.17 For Rahner, the transcendental conditions of the question are to be reduced so 
as to disclose the absolute horizon of Being as the ultimate possibility-condition for any 
act of questioning. As Rahner says, 'Every transcendental reflection on the performance 
of the question about being shows that it has as condition of its possibility an unthematic 
knowledge of being.'8 
Now, Levinas notes that this schema is at work in the tradition from Aristotle to 
Heidegger: Being is not to be considered principally as a being (Seiende) but as a 
necessary condition for the manifestation of a being. Being is the open area in which a 
being manifests itself, and to comprehend a being properly one must journey into this 
open space. 'To comprehend the particular being is to apprehend it out of an illuminated 
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a horizon is expressed in terms of the schematism of vision and light which has 
occupied a privileged place in the tradition, and, indeed, such a schematisim is also 
adopted by Rahner. Presence is equated with light, and the language of presence is the 
language of the 'luminosity' or 'self-luminosity' of being, 'the luminousness of the 
intellect..io Levinas writes, '[t]he Critique of Pure Reason, in discovering the 
transcendental activity of the mind, has made familiar the idea of a spiritual activity that 
does not issue in an object, even though this revolutionary idea was in Kantian 
philosophy attenuated in that the activity in question constituted the condition for the 
object..i 1 But such transcendental activity has always operated according to the model 
of sight, essentially 'contact at a distance,' by which the object is attained and 
illuminated within a transcendental framework. 
'Illuminated space all collects about a mind which possesses it. In this 
sense it is already like the product of a synthesis. Kant's space is 
essentially a lit up space; it is in all its dimensions, accessible, 
explorable. It lends itself to the movement which will absorb it.. .. Sight 
apprehends and situates. The relationship of the object with the subject 
is given at the same time as the object itself. Already a horizon is open.' 12 
The very language of horizon implies a sight model. 'To see is hence always to see on 
the horizon.' 13 'The connection between vision and touch, between representation and 
labour, remains essential. Vision moves into grasp. Vision opens up on perspective, and 
describes a traversable distance, invites the hand to movement and to contact, and 
ensures them.' 14 And vision, also, is subjective. 
'The world, whose existence is characterised by light, is not, then, the 
sum of existing objects. The very idea of totality or of a whole is only 
intelligible where there is a being that can embrace it. There is a totality 
because it relates to an inwardness in the light. Here we come to 
10 idem, OB , p.63 
Blanchot also notes the privilege accorded to sight and its association with the 
notion of being as luminous. This privilege 'is originally and implicitly supposed not 
only by every metaphysics but also by every ontology (and, although useless to add, 
every phenomenology), and according to which everything which is thought, everything 
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recognise the profundity of Kant's view about the role of the synthesis 
of apperception and of its unity in the constitution of the world - on 
condition that we understand it as a synthesis of intuition, sight or 
light. 115 
3.1 The Dialectic of Performance and Concept. '6 
152 
Levinas criticises philosophies of presence. For Rahner, knowledge is the self-
presence of Being. Such knowledge is not, however, to be equated with comprehension. 
Rahner recognises a dialectic in human experience. There is the experience of the object 
which is given in consiousness, but there is also, reflexively, the self-consciousness 
which accompanies this. 
1 
[ J]ust as in the case of the relationship between immediately 
experienced joy, anxiety, love, or suffering, and the content of a 
reflexive concept of joy, anxiety, love or suffering, so too exactly, but 
in a much more original way, is the relationship between the necessary 
self-presence of the subject, and his knowledge of what is objectively 
known, a self-presence at the subjective pole of the knowledge 
relationship, and the reflexive objectification of this self-presence.117 
Such experiences of joy, anxiety and love are, says Rahner, pre-reflective, and cannot 
be adequately articulated, for although 'experience as such and subsequent reflection 
upon this experience in which its content is conceptually objectified are never absolutely 
15 idem, EE, p.49 
The question arises once again as to the extent to which knowledge, as the being-
present-to-self, coincides with knowledge understood as comprehension, and to what 
extent the human subject is to be ontologically defined in terms of its relationship with 
Being. Rahner himself indicates that knowledge is self-presence, and that this self-presence 
is an original relationship to Being. However, Rahner also indicates that this self-presence 
precedes conceptual elaboration. In the language of Levinas, what we need to show now 
is that knowledge is originally a relationship of proximity, and only thereafter and 
inadequately comprehension in concept. 
16 'Performance' or 'act' is the term used to translate 'Vollzug', which is used 
by both Rahner and Coreth. The basic meaning is that of enacting or placing into act, 
of going from a potentiality for act (or existence) to the actual being and doing of the 
act. Despite the prefix 'Voll', it does not necessarily imply a full realisation, actualisation 
or perfecting of an action or a being. Rather, it refers to the process of moving from 
potency to act, essentially ongoing and incomplete for the finite subject. For a fuller 
explanation, see, A Tallon, Spirit. Matter and Becoming: Karl Rahner's Spirit in the 
World (Geist in Welt), in Modem Schoolman. 48 (1971), pp.151-165. 
17 K Rahner, Foundations pp.18-19 
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separate one from the other ... reflection never totally includes the original experience.i1 8 
The human subject 'knows more of self at a non-thematic, non-reflective level in the 
ultimate and fundamental living of his life than he knows about himself by reflecting 
upon himself.' 19 Now, while joy, anxiety, love, and suffering are experiences in which 
the subject is for itself - happy, egoist, deaf to the other person - experiences in which 
the subject sincerely 'lives from ... ' or 'lives on ... (vivre de)' the other (autre),2° 
nonetheless they also betray an openess to the other person (autrui). Transcendental 
experience is thus also an experience of transcendence, and not only a transcendence of 
the self with respect to the self, a non-coincidental relationship of the same, but a 
transcendence of the other with respect to the same. Transcendental experience is not 
a simple undifferentiated experience before its differentiation into act and concept. The 
very act of subjectivity finds itself already differentiated as a non coincidental 
relationship with the other, with difference. Now, Rahner's transcendentalism takes as 
its starting-point the non-coincidence of the same. The eventual goal of knowledge 
however remains a coincidence of the same in which transparency, or self-luminosity 
is achieved. What Levinas helps us to realise is that this 'more' implicates an other and 
that the eye - model of sight, model of the I - will never be adequate to its disclosure, 
for being's lack of self-coincidence is not accidental and temporary, but essential and 
perduring. The core of subjectivity is difference. The original relationship is not within 
the realm of the same, but, beyond the same, with alterity, which is why Levinas is able 
to present Totality and Infinity as 'a defence of subjectivity' in terms of 'the relationship 
of the same with the other (autre).'21 This remains to be shown, however. For the 
moment, we return to the dialectic of performance and concept in Rahn er. 
'The limits of sense experience,' says Coreth, 'can be transcended, because we 
always have already transcended them.'22 It is this transcendence of the self, 
immediately co-presented in experience, which provides the proper starting point for a 






·idem, The Experience of God Today, pp.151-152 
idem, Experience of Self, p.123 
cf. E Levinas, TI, pp.110-114 
ibid., p.26 
E Coreth, Metaphysics, p.35 
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possibility, the content of the act of knowledge cannot be the proper point of departure, 
for each content has its own presuppositions, and these would need their own validation. 
However, even before the question of the validity of the content of knowledge, there is 
the prior question of validity itself. The critical starting point, says Coreth, needs to be 
presuppositionless, being self-validating and self-evident, without recourse to any 
evidence beyond itself by which it would be justified. In the transcendental enquiry 
pursued by Rahner, the act of questioning, that is, the question as such, is prior and 
allows a proper access to metaphysical enquiry since, in its act, it transcends its explicit 
content towards what is implicit in it. There is no content opening onto a virtually 
unlimited horizon of other presupposed contents, but only its own act which takes for 
granted nothing other than its own actuality as 'a continuous dynamic orientation 
towards unrestricted being.'23 But, ultimately, the act of questioning is sustained by what 
is other than the question, for the question is not creative of its object, but is a 
questioning response to that antecedent object. In short, the Transcendental Ego is not 
its own evidence, nor is it entirely presuppositionless, as the transcendental reduction 
will show. 
One can note here, in passing, a similar problematic in Descartes Third 
Meditation which Levinas addresses in Totality and Infinity. The Cartesian process of 
methodic doubt, according to Levinas, contains within itself an 'arbitrary halt' which has 
a transcendental justification elsewhere than the cogito. Descartes exercises doubt in 
respect of objects whose presuppositions yield further doubts, but doubting itself 
presupposes some evidence for its own exercise, demands some validation of itself as 
a process, which the cogito itself cannot provide for, as Levinas says, 'it ends up at an 
evidence that is not a final or initial affirmation, for it can be cast into doubt in its turn.'24 
What is presupposed as a transcendental necessity by Descartes in order that his 'work 
of infinite negation' might reach certitude is the existence and veracity of a God whose 
actuality is able to ground that act whereby Descartes can place the existence of all 
things in question, but can nonetheless affirm the exercise of doubt. 
This attention to act rather than content is evident in Kant's question regarding 
the a priori transcendental conditions involved in our way of knowing objects. With 
Kant, however, the transcendental method was imprisoned within subjectivity, and the 
23 
24 
K Rahner, SW, p.68 
E Levinas, TI, p.93 
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resulting knowledge was relativised since it was subjectively, not absolutely, grounded. 
In considering the formal conditioning and determining relation of knowing to its 
object, Kant had failed, according to Coreth, to appreciate knowledge 'in its real and 
actual performance,'25 thereby failing to appreciate absolute being as the a priori of an 
object's objectivity. The subject's actuation of itself in its knowing precedes all objective 
content of knowing, so this actual performance or act is prior, but it 'must be questioned 
about the conditions of its possibility, insofar as these are constitutive of performance 
and thereby present in it, even though only included implicitly, not thematised.'26 If 
these conditions are vindicated as constitutive of performance, then they can be 
transcendentally derived from it. In other words, 
'If it can be shown in a transcendental reflection of this kind (a) that, 
whatever the content of our knowing may be, there is, as antecedent 
condition of possibility, a fundamental knowing occurring in 
concomitance, not a thematic or objective knowing, but still a knowing 
that is simultaneous with the occurrence of the thematic, objective 
knowing; (b) that this fundamental knowing can be made thematic and 
conceptual by reflective penetration of the conditions of possibility of 
performance; and as a result, ( c) that this fundamental knowing is a 
knowing about Being as a condition of all particular knowing about 
beings, thus opening the horizon of being in general in which knowing 
as knowing is performed, then - I would venture to make it more precise 
still: only then - is metaphysics as a science possible.27 
The unthematic aspect of the act of knowledge needs to be uncovered. In the Kantian 
analysis, the a priori is never attainable in itself, for finite knowledge is restricted to 
experience. Further, although the a priori is formal and determinative in respect of 
objects, it is contentless in itself, and only given with the empirical object. It 'can 
never... be shown directly, but only through the mediation of an analytically reductive 
25 idem, Dialectic, p.448 
Fichte may have moved beyond Kantian formalism towards a performative 
understanding of knowledge by taking as his starting point the self-actuating and self-
mediating spirit's· self-experience (Jch-an-sich), but Fichte, positing the Ego as absolute 
being accessible within the operation of the intellect, failed to pursue the Ego's 
transcendental conditions. For a critique of Fichte's transcendental idealism in the 
context of this present study, see J Marechal, Le point de depart, IV, (Brussels: Edition 
Universelle, 1947), pp.335-440, summarised from pp.437-439. 
26 E Coreth, Dialectic, p.450 
27 ibid., p.451 
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thought process.'28 In other words, it is only accessible in act. 'The object of such a 
transcendental experience does not appear in its own reality when man is dealing with 
something individual and definable in an objective way, but when in such a process he 
is being subject and not dealing with a 'subject' in an objective way.' 29 
To return to the issue of immediacy: the Kantian subject cannot be reached for 
it is transcendental with respect to experience, and, as there can be no intellectual 
intuition, immediate knowledge is denied. Fichte admits an intellectual intuition which 
yields knowledge of the subject, but, in so doing, removes the need for mediation 
through experience which can now be deductively derived from the absolute prius of 
the self-presence of the subject. Neither of these approaches, however, are acceptable 
within Rahner's framework. The first refuses supra-sensible knowledge, whereas the 
second denies the necessity of the conversio.3° For Rahner, as for Coreth, the truth of 
incarnate knowledge, that is, a knowledge dependent upon sense and intellect, must lie 
between mediacy and immediacy in a mediated immediacy. This is the necessary 
tension at the root of all human thought and enquiry; the task of metaphysics is 'through 
transcendental retrieval to thematise and make explicit the mediation of immediacy,'31 
while recognising at the same time that the act of knowledge exceeds its 
conceptualisation. 'The conceptualised and thematised self-presence of the subject and 
its knowing are never identical with the original self-presence and never recaptures its 
content completely .'32 
28 ibid., p.452 
29 K Rahner, Foundations, p.31 
30 Thomas, in the corpus of ST I, q.84, a.7, which is the starting point for 
Rahner's Geist in Welt, writes, 'Si autem proprium obiectum intellectus nostri esset 
forma separata; vel si naturae rent.m sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, 
secundum Platonicos, non oportet quad intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret 
se ad phantasmata. 
31 E Coreth, Immediacy and the Mediation of Being, in Language Truth and 
Meaning, P. McShane (tr.), (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, 1972), p.34 
32 K Rahner, Foundations, p.18 
Coreth expresses the same idea: 'When we reduce the activity of thinking to this 
condition of its possibility, the original knowledge of being can be made explicit and 
put into concepts. But it can never be grasped adequately in concepts; it is never 
exhaustively contained by concepts .... Since being is always more than what can be held 
in concepts, since the being that is known implicitly in the very act of thinking is always 
more than what is expressed on the conceptual level, we must always keep returning to 
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Now, the immediate that co-presents itself in every thematic act of knowledge 
is not simply the transcendental subject, but also, since that subject is situated within the 
horizon of being in its totality and as such, being in its totality and as such. 'The basic O'\._ 
structure of being is already, i.e. immediately, set forth in every complete intellective 
act as a preliminary condition of the very possibility of our questioning and judging 
whether or not something is.'33 This immediate apprehension of being, though, 'must be 
mediated [for] there is no mediation without immediacy; however, there is also no 
immediacy without mediation.'34 This mediation is effected through a transcendental 
reduction of the act of knowledge in the knowing subject to its conditions of possibility, 
whereby there is taken 'possession reflexively of the knowledge of being which every 
mind possesses and exercises even in the simplest act of inquiring and knowing.' 35 
However, just as for Marechal the concretive synthesis is exceeded in the affirmation 
which attains objects 'in the exact measure of their actuality'36 and relates objects in 
consciousness to the order of being, so, in Rahner and Coreth, what is mediated and 
our transcendental reflection ... ' (Problem and Method, pp.415-416). 
33 J Reichman, Transcendental Method and the Psycho genesis of Being, in The 
Thomist. 32, p.455 
The reason why Being as such is a necessary condition for any questioning or 
judging is outlined by Rabner when writing on truth in Aquinas. 'For Aquinas a judgement 
does not consist merely in a synthesis between two concepts so as to form a single concrete 
idea. In Thomas' eyes a concretising synthesis of this kind - Heidegger would call it a 
predicative synthesis - would still be an incompletum of the type, for instance, to which 
definition belongs. In order for judgement and truth in the true sense to be present, the 
concretising synthesis must be further related to the reality itself, there must be a 
comparatio vel app/icatio ad rem per affirmationem vel negationem. An affirmative or 
objectifying synthesis of this kind (and it is only through this kind of synthesis that a 
complexio or judgement is arrive at) is therefore a constitutive element of judgement and 
so too of truth (with Heidegger we might also call it a veritative synthesis), though 
admittedly only provided that this affirmative synthesis is also in fact a valid one' (K 
Rahner, Thomas Aquinas on Truth, p.17). 
34 E Coreth, Immediacy and Mediation, pp.37-38 
35 idem, Problem and Method, p.416 
36 J Marechal, Le point de depart, V, p.321 
Marechal makes the point that the representational contents before our mind, that 
is, the concretive synthesis, does not co-incide with the object as affirmed in its real 
existence. The affirmed object displays a certain transcendence, affirmed in judgement, 
with respect to the knowing subject; it is always more than can be conceptualised in the 
concretive synthesis. 
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conceptualised is inadequate to the actual reality. 
Rahner expresses time and again this incommensurability of concept and reality. 
For example, when sepaking of the experience of grace, he reiterates the fact that the 
existentiell (Existenziell) of human living 'is an original unity of reality and its own self-
presence' but it 'is not totally mediated by the concept which objectifies it in scientific 
knowledge.'37 The existential experience of the Spirit is not fully measured by its 
concrete expression in commitment. There is a distinction between grace as God's 
'genuine self-communication ... to the transcendent human self and not an internal or 
external categorial reality of human consciousness'38 and the human response 'through 
an existential decision which always involves historically limited, categorial material.'39 
Genuine experience of the Spirit of God in its essential nature 'does not consist in 
particular objects of experience found in human awareness but occurs rather when a 
man experiences the radical re-ordering of his transcendent nature in knowledge and 
freedom towards the immediate reality of God through God's self-communication in 
grace'40 whereby God becomes 'a constitutive element in human transcendence.'41 Yet 
there remains 'an irreversible difference... between an original experience of 
transcendence ... on the one hand and the objectifying and verbalising reflection on this 
experience of transcendence on the other.. . .'42 God's actual communication of himself 
in human experience, though, 'is mediated through categorial objects, for the finite, 
spiritual essence of man only comes to self-expression in relationship to what is other, 
and in the ultimate analysis this other must be personal. 113 The experience of grace as 
such 'is not the same as the objective form in which it is conceived'44 nor should it be 
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when an objective concept is also produced in the form of a categorial content of 
knowledge .. .'45 
Post-Reformation Catholic theology is to be criticised for viewing grace as 'a 
purely ontological reality'46 which lies beyond conscious awareness. Instead, he argues 
that grace 'operates within human consciousness.'47 
'I mean by the essence of grace the self-communication of God to the 
transcendent spirit of man. In virtue of this self-communication the 
transcendence of man is permanently and necessarily ordered to the 
direct presence of God, whether this be the object of conscious or 
thematic reflection or not. Furthermore God's self-communication is a 
dynamic force which transforms the inner, transcendent reference of the 
human spirit to God so that this transcendent, spiritual movement finds 
its fulfilment in the beatific vision, the direct knowledge of God face to 
face in love, in which God is possessed without the mediation of any 
created reality. Grace is thus understood as the radical transformation of 
human transcendence so that God is not merely the final goal of human 
striving which one may come nearer to but never reach. He is not only 
the ultimate objective which, asymptotically approached, opened up the 
whole spiritual movement and intellectual history of mankind and kept 
it in motion. Grace is that which makes it possible for this movement to 
reach God in himself. Naturally, therefore, grace divinises man and 
bestows upon him a share in the holiness of God.'48 
Further, 
'Uncreated grace is thus God himself, the goal and ground of those acts 
which are related to God himself. According to our thesis no particular, 
categorial object of consciousness is assigned to this grace, which is 
present rather in transcendent experience. The latter can, however, 
subsequently be the object of historical and categorial reflection and in 
fact must be reflected upon, since no transcendent experience is to be 
found without some complementary historical expression.'49 
And while the reality of the experience of God is affirmed, and thereby excluding 
atheism, sceptical positivism and the theology of the absolute remoteness of God, 
nonetheless 'the experience of God' is 'more fundamental than that knowledge of God 
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outcome of an a posteriori process of reasoning as the conceptual objectification of 
what we ca11 the experience of God;'50 '[t]he original basic realisation of man's 
transcendence as mind and freedom toward the mystery that we Christians call God on 
the one hand and the categorial and verbal, reflective objectification on this basic 
realisation on the other are never identical.. .. '51 
We have, then, a hermeneutic of understanding which can be termed a 'dialectic 
between performance and concept,' 'a dialectic between the pre-conceptual non-explicit 
knowing included unthematica11y in performance, and the conceptua11y explicit, 
thematica11y formulated knowing.' 52 More precisely, '[a] dialectic between the act and 
concept means therefore more exactly a dialectic between the knowledge of being which 
is imp licitly co-affirmed in the act of thinking and the knowledge which is each time 
expressed in concepts. Since concepts never exhaust being, the awareness of it always 
points beyond itself.'53 This dialectic has its own circularity. On the one hand, the 
original self-presence of being, that is, the performance, seeks always to translate itself 
into concepts so that it can be communicated inter-subjectively. 'Everyone strives to te11 
another, especially someone he loves, what he is suffering.'54 On the other hand, a 
movement also occurs from concept to experience. 'Reflection, conceptualisation and 
language have a necessary orientation to that original knowledge, to that original 
50 idem, The Experience of God today, p.149 
51 idem, Experience of Transcendence, p.177 
52 E Coreth, Dialectic, p.453 
53 E Coreth, Problem and Method, p.416 
This dialectic is unlike Hegel's dialectic which is a dialectic between concept and 
concept. Rather, it is a dialectic in the Fichtean sense 'between the spiritual drive to the 
Absolute which is the spring of every question and the limited conceptual expression 
which the answer to each question must receive on the level of explicit, objective 
knowledge' (G McCool, Philosophical Pluralism and an Evolving Thomism, in Continuum, 
II. No.1 (Spring), p.14), a dialectic between concept and act, between that which is thought 
and that which is thinking it. 
A comparison may be made with Blondel who views the concept as deriving 
from a reflection upon living action. However, the concept is insufficient in its 
comprehension of the fulness of the action. There is the need for a second concept 
which is opposed to the first but which, nevertheless, is united with the first in the action 
itself. Yet, even these two concepts, expressing the same action, fail to grasp the full act, 
and so the need for yet more concepts. Thus there is a constant interaction or dialectic 
between the concept and the act which always transcends the concept. 
54 K Rahner, Foundations, p.16 
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experience in which what is meant and the experience of what is meant are still one.'55 
A person tries to experience in his life what he already knows conceptually; he tries to 
translate his knowledge into lived experience so as to authenticate it. Rahner writes of 
this transcendental experience, 
'We shall call transcendental experience, the subjective, W1thematic, 
necessary and W1failing consciousness of the knowing subject that is co-
present in every spiritual act of knowledge, and the subject's openness 
to the unlimited expanse of all possible reality. It is an experience 
because this knowledge, W1thematic but ever-present, is a moment 
within and a condition of possibility for every concrete experience of 
any and every object. This experience is called transcendental 
experience because it belongs to the necessary and inalienable structure 
of the knowing subject itself, and because it consists precisely in the 
transcendence beyond any possible group of possible objects or of 
categories. Transcendental expenence 1s the expenence of 
transcendence.' 56 
This experience of transcendence is not only the active transcendence of the subject, co-
present in every act of knowledge, but is also the actual transcendence of being as such, 
to which the subject is open, and which is disclosed through a transcendental reflection. 
'Man is the subject of a transcendentality that is limitless. As such he apprehends each 
of the objects of his knowledge and freedom in a prior awareness, itself not contained 
within any finite limits, of the original and infinite unity of all possible objects.'57 But 
further, and significantly, the transcendence of being to which the subject is open, and 
which is to be disclosed through a transcendental reflection, is the transcendence of 
personal being. As previously noted with regard to the experience of grace, 'in the 
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3.2 The Interrogative Relation 
Like Rahner, Blanchot and Levinas recognise the importance of raising the 
question, but question its privilege and its commerce with Being. Whereas for Rahner 
the question is ordered towards the unity of the whole within a framework of continuity, 
Blanchot recognises the disruptive force of the question, which responds to the 
philosophical demand for discontinuity (!'exigence de discontinuite), rather than 
continuity, and Levinas rejects the ontological nature of the question which always 
reduces the who to a what, quis-nity to quiddity.59 
For B lanchot, interrogation has been institutionalised in teaching and 
philosophy, and its fulfilment is found in the unified synthesis which research intends, 
the university dissertation being its prized model. Yet this institutionalisation of 
interrogation, whereby it submits to the whole of a course (cursus), already charted, was 
not always the case. Blanchot cites the example of Aquinas whose Summa was 
presented not so much as being built on underlying principles ordered towards a unified 
whole, but was based rather on the principle of interrogation; so too with Descartes who 
undertook his research in the Discourse on Method by a questioning advance upon the 
object questioned. One would want to include also in this scenario Rahner himself, 
whose work does not achieve itself by way of a unified and systematic corpus, but 
whose Schriften zur Theologie are pursued by way of various Theological 
Investigations, and which, as inachieved (inachevees), seeks to answer the various, 
disparate questions of the time, 60 albeit within a transcendental framework which strains 
under the effort - but this is our own question being pursued here. 
The institutionalisation of philosophy as interrogation began, according to 
Blanchot, with Socrates, Aristotle and Plato when philosophy as the intelligent 
(}' conversation_,..rfa conversation intelligente) prized by Heraclitus, in which the Logos 
was communicated in the form of lesson (le9on), gave way to teaching, in which 'la 
59 See E Levinas, OB, p.27 
60 When asked whether there might be 'a short formula for what you [i.e. 
Rahner] propose to accomplish with your theology,' Rahner responded, 'My life work, 
if we can call it that, has had no plan, proposed in advance, but was strongly influenced 
by the needs of the day, by the tasks I had as a professor, and so on. If you look at the 
twenty volumes of my Theological Investigations, you will see that they are made up 
of individual articles, which were mostly lectures originally' (Karl Rahner in Dialogue, 
p.334). 
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philosophie s'institutionalisee.'61 This institutionalisation continued in Church and State, 
with the notable exceptions of Pascal, Descartes, Spinoza proving the rule and marking 
the rupture with the philosophical courses which were current in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Pascal's Apology may have offered a structured and coherent 
discourse for teaching Christian truths, but this discourse, with its double dissonance of 
thought and death, says Blanchet, unfolded as dis-cursus, a 'cours desuni et interrompu, • 
and for the first time advanced the idea of the fragment as coherence. From this point 
onwards, says Blanchet, it was writing, not teaching, which became the mode of 
philosophy, finding its accomplishment in Rousseau in the eighteenth century. 
Nietszche went further and, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, thought accomplishes itself by 
way of separate and separated fragments. The traditional philosophical task of bringing 
what is disparate together to form an ensemble is abandoned. 'Cette noble maniere d'etre 
ensemble ... est ici refusee. '62 When Heidegger, who was essentially a writer,63 opened 
his inaugural lecture (une le~on inaugurale) at the University of Frie burg in 1929, it was 
with the question, 'what is metaphysics?' 
Now, the fact that Heidegger initiated his course with the question 'what is 
metaphysics' invites the deeper reflection on the question which Levinas offers. In the 
opening chapters of Otherwise than Being, Levinas presents the Heideggerian schema, 
also evident in Rahner. Questioning, as a quest for the truth, intends the 'exhibition of 
being.'64 This is possible because '[t]he question, "what shows itself?" ... is already 
wholly enveloped with being.'65 It is being's correlative. The question 'is ontology, and 
at the same time has a part in effectuation of the very being it seeks to understand.'66 
Because it is in the presence of Being, the question is possible; because it does not yet 
61 
62 
M Blanchet, Entretien, p.2 
ibid., p.3 
63 Blanchet writes in a footnote, 'Mais ii faut tout de suite l'ajouter, l'un des 
traits de la philosophie telle qu'elle se man{feste avec Heidegger peut exprimer ainsi: 
Heidegger est essentiellement un ecrivain' (Entretien, p.4). 
The point being made, similar to Derrida's criticism of the tradition for view 
writing in its position of secondarity with repect to the voice (phone), is that, whereas 
speaking is characterised by the proximity of voice and word, writing is marked by 
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fully possess Being, it is necessary. Thus, Levinas points out, 'Being would be not only 
what is most problematical; it would be what is most intelligible.'67 
But 'this intelligibility is questionable.'68 So, too, is the question about the 
question of Being, namely, Dasein as the who of the question. '[E]ach question about 
the question is more radical still.'69 So, too, is the question as the exhibition of Being. 
For, although the manifestation of being is the primary event - 'the very primacy of the 
primary is in the presence of the present - this manifestation 'is discontinuous, and lasts 
from a question to the response,' 70 and what is forgotten - radically - in the question, in 
the movement from question to response, is the who, who is taken to be 'the identical 
subject, allegedly placed in the openness of Being,' yet who is 'the crux of a diachronic 
plot... between the same and the other.'71 It is this who which must be surprised in the 
question. The problem with an the ontological analytic of the who is that the who 
amounts to a "what?", and the logical supremacy of the "what" which the logos 
articulates 'lets the "who?" get lost in the "what?'" In asking "'who is this who?" it asks 
"what about this who? "'72 'Thus,' says Levinas, 'on all sides the privilege of the question 
"what?", or the ontological nature of the problem is affirmed.'73 
Now, Being and cognition do go together, and the question does align them, but 
'[t]he subject opening to the thought and truth of being ... opens upon a way quite 
different from that which lets the subject be seen as an ontology or an understanding of 
being. Being would not derive from cognition .... Being and cognition together signify 
in the proximity of the other and in a certain modality of my responsibility for the other, 
this response preceding any question, this saying before the said.'74 It is this element of 
a saying before the said which will need to be reduced, as we hope to show later. The 
question become the question of the question of Being - subjectivity itself - cannot avoid 





71 ibid., p.25 
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73 ibid. 
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of the other to the same.'75 The significance of subjectivity is not its relation to Being, 
but its relation to the Other (autrni) who eludes ontological confinement. '[S]ubjectivity 
is the other in the same,'76 and this is experienced as responsibility. 'The knot tied in 
subjectivity ... signifies an allegiance of the same to the other, imposed before any 
exhibition of the other, preliminary to all consciousness .... This allegiance will be 
described as a responsibility of the same for the other, as a response to his proximity 
before any question.'77 
'Both being and the vision of being refer to a subject that has arisen 
earlier than being and cognition, earlier than and on this side of them, in 
an immemorial time .... The "birth" of being in the questioning where the 
cognitive subject stands would thus refer to a before the questioning, to 
the anarchy of responsibility, as it were on this side of birth. We will try, 
with the notion of the saying without the said, to expose such a modality 
of the subjective, an otherwise than being. '78 
While questioning seeks a response from being, letting entities be heard,' as it were, 
what Levinas draws attention to is the need to 'surprise the echo of the saying, whose 
signification cannot be assembled'79 ontologically. 'Behind being and its monstration, 
there is now already heard the resonance of other significations forgotten in ontology, 
which now solicit our inquiry.'80 'It is not ontology that raises up the speaking subject; 
it is the signifyingness of saying going beyond essence that can justify the exposedness 
of being, ontology.'81 Again, '[i]t will be possible to show that there is question of the 
said and being only because saying or responsibility requires justice.'82 This is yet to be 
reduced, but nonetheless, Levinas avers 'we suspect that there is in the position in which 
the folding back of being upon itself, or subjectivity, is produced something else than 
this reflection ... .' 83 
Now, the significance of speaking, of saying, can be seen, according to Blanchet, 
75 ibid., p.25 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid. 
78 ibid., p.26 
79 ibid., p.27 
80 ibid., p.38 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid., p.45 
83 ibid., p.28 
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m teaching. Blanchet wishes to demonstrate, however, that the traditional model of 
teaching, in which the professor occupied his chair to hand down his cursus to his 
pupils, was essentially dis-cursus, and that the synthesis he sought to present was 
actually subverted in the very act of teaching, which has its own original structure, and 
which rather than being a 'tranquil discursive continuity' 84 is fundamentally rupture. To 
teach is to speak, but at the heart of speaking is not simply what is said by the master, 
but the inter-relational space (l'espace interrelationnel) which opens up between him 
and the disciple, a space which refuses any symmetry of presence, any reversibility of 
relation, and any unified discourse. As Rahner might put it, they relate asymptotically. 
There is and can be no equivalence between master and pupil; between the point 
occupied by each there is an uncommon distance, an 'infinite distance,' a 'relation of 
infinity' which separates them like an abyss. The field of relations between them is 
upturned (bouleverser) and what is spoken by the master is offered to the disciple from 
the point of the 'unknown,' such that to know is to know by measure of the unknown, 
which is 'to approach things in their familiarity, while preserving their strangeness.' 85 In 
other words, the abyss at the core of master-pupil relation is the model of the abyss at 
the core of interrogation, which is always a knowing-not-knowing. Two consequences 
follow: firstly, the unknown which research questions is neither subject nor object, for 
the speech in which the unlmown speaks belongs to a relationship of infinitude. 'Le 
rapport de parole ou s'articule l'inconnu est un rapport d'infinite;' 86 secondly, the 
relationship is always tangential - which, with Levinas, Blanchet terms 'curvature' 
( courbure) - always by way of approach but, asymptotically, never of making contact, 
never direct, nor symmetrical nor reversible, never the formation of an ensemble, nor 
the achievement of any contemporaneity whether in time or in place. Asymptotic. 
Blanchet, in conversation with himself, notes three different kinds or genre of 
relation. In the first, 'a mediate relation of dialectical or objective identification,'87 the 
human subject craves unity and contests any separation. What presents itself as other 





M Blanchet, Entretien, p.8 
ibid., p.5 
ibid., p.6 
M Blanchet, IC, p.68; Entretien, p.97 
BEYOND PRESENCE 167 
history. The second relation, 'a relation demanding immediate unity ,'88 also demands 
unity, but obtains it immediately in a relation of coincidence and participation between 
the self and the absolutely other. The Self and the Other lose themselves in one another: 
there is ecstasy, fusion, fruition.' 89 The sovereignty of the self (je) is surrendered in the 
face of the sovereignty of the Other who becomes the sole absolute. Yet, in such a 
participatory relationship, the other is a substitute for the one. It is a third relation, which 
Blanchot terms the relation of the 'troisieme genre', which is significant. 
3. 21 A relation of a third genre 
The third genre of relation does not tend towards unity; the One does not 
constitute the ultimate and continuous horizon. In fact, Blanchot subtitles the section of 
his essay dealing with with the third genre of relation, 'Man without horizon (Homme 
sans horizon).' Further, this third genre of relationship, which is a pure interval between 
one person and an other, relates the self to another person, but not to that other as 
another myself. The relationship with another is radically outwith my control; he is truly 
exterior and absolutely outwith my own perspective and horizon; he is not at the centre 
of another horizon similar to my own which I might map in relation to my own and 
which I might glimpse. Rather, he turns towards me from a horizon which is wholly his, 
and, in this sense, with respect to me, the Other can be said to be a-horizontal, that is, 
beyond any perspectival description, and thus beyond the possibility of any horizontal 
relation. In this sense, says Blanchot, he is 'a being without being, a presence without 
a present, thus foreign to everything visible and to everything invisible.'90 The approach 
he makes to me, neither seeing nor being seen, is as speech (parole), which is at the 
heart of the third relationship, the relation of the third genre, for speech is the 
relationship with that which remains radically separate, without unity and without 
equality. As such, any communication with the Other (Autrui) is neither a trans-
subjective nor intersubjective relation, but inaugurates a relation which is neither from 
88 ibid. 
89 ibid., p.66; (Entretien, p.95) 
90 ibid., p.69, (Entretien, p.98) 
Levinas will express this lack of on ontological horizon in terms of the 
ethical verticality of the relationship with the other who always dwells in the 
transascendent dimension of height. 
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subject to subject, nor from subject to object. 'The relation of this Autrui to myself is not 
a relation of subject to subject.'91 Instead, it is characterised by an interruption of being. 
'[B]etween man and man there is an interval that would be neither of being nor of non-
being, an interval borne by the Difference of speech - a difference preceding everything 
that is different and everything unique. '92 What founds this relationship is no longer 
proximity but strangeness or foreignness. 'Now what "founds" this third relation, leaving 
it still unfounded, is no longer proximity - proximity of struggle, of services, of essence, 
of knowledge, or of recognition, not even of solitude - but rather the strangeness 
between us: a strangeness it will not suffice to characterise as a separation or even as a 
distance.'93 To reach this point, says Blanchot, is to reach a threshold, which verges on 
the question of alterity. Who is the Other (Autrui)? He is the subjectless other (autre), 
beyond substantiality (for language makes of everything a substance). 'Autrui, c'est done 
l'Autre, lorsqu'il n'est pas sujet. i94 
Such an understanding of the other beyond subjectivity is at the heart of Levinas' 
understanding of alterity, and will be developed by him in tenns of illeity,95 as we shall 
see later. To regard the other person as another subjectivity with whom I can share the 
mutual comm-union of familiarity, as do Buber and Marcel in their characterisation of 
the inter-personal relationship in tenns of a tutoiement, is to relativise his alterity by 
situating it 'within the community of a genus - excluding one another by their definition, 
but calling for one another by this exclusion, across the community of their genus. '96 A 
relation of inter-subjectivity or trans-subjectivity is a relationship within a genus, and 
already a nullification of alterity. The relation of the third genre is a relationship in 
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95 Levinas regards the origin of alterity as illeity. For Levinas, the other is 
not to be dressed or addressed in the familiarity of a tu (tutoiement), but in the im-
personality of the ii. He writes, 'L"'illeite de cet II", n'est pas le "cela" de la chose qui 
est d notre disposition ... L'illeite est l'origine de l'alterite de /'etre a /aquelle !"'en soi" 
de l'objectivite participe en le trahissant'(HAH, p.69). 
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relationship in which difference is not produced by the differentiation of species with 
a genus, a relation in which '[t]he difference thus encountered remains bound up with 
a logical hierarchy it contrasts with, and appears against the ground of the common 
genus.'98 For Levinas, such a specific difference is not truly difference, and certainly not 
the difference from which speech flows. What is in play here is absolute difference, and 
the possibility of a relationship, despite Derrida's criticism of the logical incoherence 
of Levinas' thought of absolute alterity, with what is and remains absolutely other, 
beyond the commonality of subjectivity and so also outwith any dialectic which would 
conceive of the other as a negation of the self or the same yet still within the 
constructive whole of subjectivity. Formal logic balks at the thought of this, yet it is 
possible in speech for speech 'accomplishes a relation between terms that break up the 
unity of a genus,'99 a relation in which 'the terms, as interlocutors, absolve themselves 
from the relation, or remain absolute within the relationship.1100 'Language is perhaps to 
be defined as the very power to break the continuity of being or of history.' 101 It is 
eschatological. What Levinas is opposing here is the notion of 'the one great 
comprehensive event' of history and the notion of 'the irresistable working of historical 
forces' which is connoted by the term Geschichte, and in which the individual is caught 
up as part of the process. 102 The significance of the interlocutor is that - like the 
extraordinariness of the eschatological prophet who 'institutes a relation with being 
beyond the totality or beyond history,' 103 and submits it to judgement - by the 
'incomprehensible nature' of his presence, by the very fact of speaking (le Dire), he 







Levinas writes that the whole of Totality and Infinity 'aims to show a relation 
with the other not only cutting across the logic of contradiction, where the other of A 
is the non-A, the negation of A, but also across dialectical logic, where the same 






102 See the article History in Encyclopaedia of Theology: A Concise 
Sacramentum Mundi, K Rahner (ed.), (London: Bµrns and Oates, 1975), pp.618-635 
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significance by instituting 'a relation with the infinity of being which exceeds the 
totality.1104 Within a Christian theological perspective, the power to intenupt history and 
invest it with a significance beyond itself through a relationship with the 
incomprehensible Other is surely at the heart of the Incarnation. As W Kaspar puts it, 
speaking of the theology of history: 
'The starting-point is the primary mystery of the grace of the self-
communication of God to man and hence to history. This has taken place 
once and for all in Jesus Christ, and will be fully manifested in a real 
future yet to come. This affirmation about the end of history is 
necessarily veiled, because it sees the fulfilment as the sovereign act of 
God, whose mystery cannot be anticipated by human knowledge.' 105 
It seems, then, that in our relation with the Other, we deal with what is ungraspable, 
save for the fact that the Other speaks. Blanchot writes, 
'Autrni speaks to me. The revelation of autrni that does not come about 
in the lighted space of forms belongs wholly to the domain of speech. 
Autrni expresses himself, and in this speaking proposes himself as other. 
If there is a relation wherein the other and the same, even while holding 
themselves in relation, absolve themselves of it (being terms that thus 
remain absolute within the relation itself, as Levinas firmly states), this 
relation is language.' 106 
Now, as we said earlier, 'Autrni, c'est done l'Autre, lorsqu'il n'est pas sujet. '107 For 
Levinas, the cipher of this Other devoid of a common subjectivity is the 'face' (visage), 
which is the epiphany of the other in its very refusal to be grasped or contained within 
the same, and this 'occurs only by the opening of a new dimension' 108 which, with 
Blanchot, we term a third genre of relation. The face, of course, is an ambiguous 
metaphor for the Other, for faces present themselves to us, are distinguishable, but 
identify what is other than us within a common humanity. Faces indicate a specific 
difference between the self and the other. Hence the confusion and hesitation when the 
difference in the face is not specific enough to identify one specific other but results in 
mistaken identity. But to view the face of the other in such a way, that is, as indicating 
a specific difference, is for Levinas, to overlook the real significance of the face. For 
104 ibid., p.23 
105 W Kaspar, The Theology of History, in Encyclopaedia of Theology: A 
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although a face may present another to us, it presents another without giving the other 
to us. The face is a presence, but it is present as a 'refusal to be contained.' 109 The other 
whose face I see remains other than his face, is beyond any phenomenology. Levinas, 
responding to a question on the phenomenology of the face, speaks: 
'I do not know if one can speak of a "phenomenology" of the face, since 
phenomenology describes what appears. So, too, I wonder if one can 
speak of a look turned toward the face, for the look is knowledge, 
perception. I think rather that access to the face is straightaway ethical. 
You turn yourself toward the Other as towards an object when you see 
a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best 
way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the colour of his 
eyes! When one observes the colour of the eyes one is not in social 
relationship with the Other. The relation with the face can surely be 
dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is what cannot 
be reduced to that.' 110 
When it manifests itself, the face breaks through its own plastic image. 
'Sa presence consiste d se devetir de la forme qui cependant deja le 
manifestait. Sa manifestation est un surplus sur la paralysie inevitable 
de la manifestation .... le visage parle. La manifestation du visage est le 
premier discours. Parler, c'est, avant toutes choses, cette fafon de venir 
de derriere son apparence, de derriere sa forme, une ouverture dans 
/'ouverture.' 111 
The visitation of the face is not the unmasking of a world. In the concreteness of the 
world, the face is abstract or naked. It is denuded of its own image, detached from its 
form. The face enters into our world from a sphere absolutely foreign, from an ab-
solute. Its significance is literally extra-ordinary, outwith all order, and every world. In 
short, the face is that aspect of the Other wherein the Other offers himself as absolute 
and wholly other mystery. 
The face is the transcendent other proximate to me in his difference and 
distance: '[i]n the visage (visage) whereby it offers itself to me openly, in the frankness 
109 ibid., p.194 
110 idem, Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo, R Cohen 
(tr.) Pittsburgh (Duquense University Press), 1985, pp.85-86. 
One can trace this thought in Rahner also. Speaking of the theology of the 
Incarnation, Rahner notes the mystery which is the other person, and that '[t]hat which 
is absolutely unseen and wholly other is not appropriated by the free act, when it aims 
at definite and limited objects' (K Rahner, On the Theology of the Incarnation, in TI, IV, 
p.119). The definite description of the Other is not the object of our love, but the 
mystery which, beyond the plastic image, offers itself to our gaze. 
111 E Levinas,HAH, p.51 
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of a gaze, in the nakedness of an approach that nothing prevents, it is presence itself.1112 
B lanchot comments that, for Levinas, the face - and the very word, he says, is difficult -
is not simply an aspect of the body. Rather, by his face the other, already beyond a 
common world, becomes visible. Yet in his visibility, and this is the essential thing, he 
remains outwith the possibility of subjective domination, absolutely other than the I and 
other to the I, and always in excess of any subjective representation, or form, image or 
view or idea which I can affirm. The face is the other radically freed from my power. 
'In front of the visage, Levinas emphasises, I am no longer able ('}e ne puis plus 
pouvoir''). 1113 Even to the point of killing. The relationship with the face, at first ethical 
rather than ontological or epistemological, is from the outset an obligation, which is 
summed up in the biblical injunction, 'Thou shalt not kill.' Blanchet reflects upon Cain's 
murder of Abel in the book of Genesis which can be considered as the archetypal 
affirmation of the self and refusal of the other. Cain could not accommodate Abel within 
his own framework. Although brothers, Cain could not accept Abel in his alterity as 
neighbour, who called him to ethical responsibility, and so the only remaining option 
is to kill, thus removing Abel's intrusive presence which disturbs his own 'order of 
things.' Reflecting on this passage from Genesis, Blanchet notes that 
'Cain killing Abel is the self that, coming up against the transcendence 
of autrui (what in the other exceeds me absoutely ... ), attempts to 
confront it by resorting to the transcendence of murder. 
- But are these two transcendences of the same order? And what 
can their conflict mean? Cain says to Abel: your dimension as infinite 
and absolutely exterior, that by which you claim to surpass me, that 
which puts you beyond my reach - I will show you that I am its master; 
for as a man of power, I am master also of the absolute and I have made 
death into my possibility. 
- This is because Abel's infinite presence stands in Cain's way 
like a thing that is thus truly a thing belonging to Abel and of which Cain 
must deprive him. And in a sense, this is not false: this presence is also 
Abel's good fortune, the blessing, the flock that multiplies. As soon as 
the presence of the other in autrni is not received by me as the 
movement through which the infinite comes to me, as soon as this 
presence closes around autrui as a property of autrni established in the 
world, as soon as it ceases to give rise to speech, the earth ceases to be 
vast enough to contain at the same time autrni and myself, and it is 




M Blanchet, IC, p.54; Entretien. p.77 
ibid.; (Entretien, p.78) 
ibid., p.61; Entretien, pp.86-87 
BEYOND PRESENCE 173 
In other words, 'we have to say that man, when facing another, has no choice but to 
speak or to kill.1115 For, if'[p]eace is produced as [the] aptitude for speech,' war and 
killing flow from the fact that, although people can speak, they 'lend their lips to the 
anonymous utterance of history.' 116 
To sum up, Blanchot recognises a relationship of a third genre whose genre is 
language and writing. This is not an abstract relation; rather, in it, the one is never 
comprehended by the other, nor forms with him an ensemble, nor a duality, nor a 
possible unity; instead, the one is foreign to the other, without this distance privileging 
either the one or the other. Such a relationship can be called neutral (neutre), indicating 
that it cannot be grasped either in affirmation or in denial, and demanding of language 
the possibility of a saying which says without either saying 'being' or denying it. Such 
a neutral relation of one to the other, a 'rapport sans rapport', is doubly dissymetrical.' 117 
It arises within a non-isomorphic field whereby the distance between point A and point 
B is not the same as the distance between point B and point A - a distance which 
excludes reciprocity, but presents a curvature. As Levinas expresses it '[t]he curvature 
of space expresses the relation between human beings.' 118 While it is easy to focus on 
115 ibid. 
116 E Levinas, TI, p.23 
117 cf. M Blanchot, Entretien, p.104 
118 Blanchot recalls that it was Levinas 'who gave this turn of speech its 
determinant signification'. Cf. IC, p.441, VII, n. l; Entretien, p.104, n.1 
Elsewhere, comparing the geometries of Euclid and Riemann, he notes that the 
dialogical relationship between two people has often been conceived in terms of 
straight-line geometry and on the same plane such that relations are direct and remain 
symmetrical. He continues, however, 'But let us suppose that the field of relations rests 
upon some anomaly analogous to what physicists would call a curvature of the universe; 
that is, a distortion preventing any possibility of symmetry and introducing between 
things, and particularly between man and man, a relation of infinity. 
Let us suppose with regard to this spatial knot, this point of abrupt density, this 
polarisation, this fundamental irregularity that hollows out and swells extension and 
duration in such a way that there would be nothing equal in them, and nothing simply (j~ 
unequal either - let us suppose that it falls to speech not to reduce it, not to turn away 
from it by declaring it unsayable, but rather to present it, that is Gust the same), give it 
form. Yes, let us suppose this, and let us agree to acknowledge the full reach of the 
exigency that is given to us by this supposition. First of all, that to speak is certainly to 
bring the other back to the same in a search for a mediating speech; but it is also, first 
of all, to seek to receive the other as other and the foreign as foreign; to seek autrui, 
therefore, in their irreducibile difference, in their infinite strangeness, an empty 
strangeness, and such that an essential discontinuity can retain the affirmation proper 
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the two terms of the relation, it is the relation itself - which Levinas will express in 
terms of responsibility for-the-Other - which is important for the Other who participates 
in this genre of relation is no longer one of the terms; but, while he is proximate in 
nothing other than the relation itself, he is other than the relation. Here, a double 
contradiction needs to be thought: to think of the Other as the infinite of a relation 
without terms, and as the infinite terminal point of a term without relation. 
Now, it is precisely on this point of the irreversibility of the relation across the 
interval that Levinas disagrees with Buber. Buber acknowledges that the self is not a 
substance but a relation. There is no event of pure subjectivity because the self (je), in 
the totality of its situation, is 'already transcendence' and finds itself in an encounter 
with a personal other (tu), which leads, not back to the subject, but to the event of being. 
This interval between the two ('/'entre-les-deux', Zwischen) is not a geometric or 
intersidereal space but is the je-tu encounter in its particularity. Buber's ontology is 
founded on this interval - 'la notion de /'entre-les-deux fonctionne comme la categorie 
fondamental de /'etre1119 - and, since the interval arises in the inter-personal encounter, 
presents itself as an anthropology. Levinas quotes Buber's affirmation of the ontological 
necessity of the other for subjectivity: 'Ce n'est pas par un rapport avec soi-meme mais 
par un rapport avec un autre soi-meme, que l'homme peut etre comp/et. '120 The relation 
between the self and the other is not simply a psychology, but an ontology. Further, the 
relation can also be considered a relation of true knowledge because it acknowledges 
the alterity of the Tu. 'La tentative de Buber consiste a maintenir dans la relation Je-Tu 
l'alterite radicale du Tu dans la liaison precisement: le Je n'y absorbe pas le Tu comme 
un objet, ni ne s'absorbe en lui extatiquement. '121 And, 'La relation Je-Tu est une 
relation avec ce qui demeure absolu malgre la re/ation. 1122 
However, Levinas has some objections. He asks, on the one hand, how it can be 
possible to maintain the specificity of the I-Thou relation without valuing the strictly 
to it.. .. It is to this Difference that we are initially turned ... ' (Blanchet, IC, p.81-82; 
Entretien, p.115). 
119 E Levinas, Nommes Propres, p.31 
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ethical sense of responsibility which, for Levinas, is disinterested with respect to the 
Other, and, on the other hand, how it can be possible to value this ethical sense without 
placing in question the reciprocity which Buber always insists upon, for ethics always 
begins when the I relates to another which is above itself, a-horizontal. 
It is to the reciprocity of the I-Thou in Buber and his failure to recognise an 
essential dissymmetry, 123 that Levinas addresses his principal criticism. Buber uses 
ethical themes often, but he describes the I-Thou encounter in the more abstract 
structure of distance and relation. Levinas wonders whether the dialogical relation with 
the alterity of the Other (Autrui) can be described without taking note of the paradoxical 
difference of level between the I and the Thou. The originality of the relation between 
the I and the Thou in Buber is that it takes its point of departure from the I who 
accomplishes it, and whose place therefore is interchangeable with that of the Thou. If 
I become I in saying 'Thou,' then I hold the place of what is co-related to me, and the I-
Thou relationship then resembles any other relationships, which raises the question of 
ipseity. The formality of the encounter in Buber makes both terms of the relationship 
indifferently interchangeable. But, in a truly ethical encounter, the relationship between 
the I and the Thou, what distinguishes the I from the Thou, is the dimension of height 
which breaks with the formalism of Buber. What Buber has done is attempt to qualify 
the relationship with alterity in a wholly formal way rather than qualify alterity itself. 
In reflecting on the interval and the Relation, Buber has failed to take separation 
seriously. 'L'homme n'est pas seulement la categorie de la distance et de la rencontre, 
ii est aussi un etre a part.'124 
123 Levinas writes in a letter to Buber of 11 March 1963 that his objection 
is guided by the idea that the Relation is 'essentially dissymmetrical' (Nommes Propres, 
p.46). 
124 ibid., p.42 
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3.22 Discontinuity 
Returning to Blanchot, it would seem that dissyrnmetry and irreversibility give 
rise to two demands for a resolution of the problem, the first being 'the demand for 
absolute continuity and a language that might be called spherical,' first evidenced in 
Parmenides; 125 the second, which is opposed to this, is 'the exigency of a discontinuity 
that is more or less radical, the discontinuity of a literature of fragments,t1 26 which 
persists in Heraclitus, the Platonic dialogues, Pascal, Nietzsche, Georges Bataille, and 
Rene Char. The first, the language of continuity, the official language of philosophy, 
took its origin in Aristotle, the father of the Western onto-theological tradition, and 
exalts logical coherence, reducing it to the three principles of identity, non-contradiction 
and the excluded middle. Yet, though Aristotle's thought might seem to present a unified 
and unifying unity, his writing, Blanchot notes, was neither continuous or coherent, but 
is a badly unified ensemble, put together by his editors.127 Continuity proper was only 
achieved in Hegel's system, which managed to bring together being and nothingness in 
a dialectical relation, thereby including discontinuity as part of the process towards 
continuity. Yet, says Blanchot, this systematic dominance of synthesis and 
reconciliation pays insufficient regard to the part played by the strand of discontinuity. 
Because being and its contradiction are simply opposed, they are already too close to 
one another, like 'two enemies already bound in a relation of unity,' 128 whereas between 
the 'unknown' and the familiar the difference is infinite. Rather than the harmony of the 
whole, the language of discontinuity speaks of interruption and rupture, difference and 
tension. There is a demand for discontinuity, for discontinuity is at the core of language. 
Building on the notion of teaching as communication, the sense of interruption 
and discontinuity can be appreciated if the dynamics of dialogue are considered. When 
two people are in conversation, they do not speak together, but each in his own turn. 
One says something then stops, then the other speaks and stops. Discourse is sequential 
and interrupted, not continuous. The fact that speech must necessarily pass from one to 
125 
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127 W.D.Ross points out that '[t]he Metaphysics as a whole expresses not a 
dogmatic system but the adventures of a mind in its search for truth' (Aristotle's 
Metaphysics, Vol 1, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924, p.lxxvii). 
128 M Blanchot, IC, p.8; Entretien, p.8 
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another shows the necessity of interval. The power to speak interrupts itself, and 
although this interruption may seem to play a subservient role, in reality it bears with 
itself the very enigma of language: the attentive pause is significant for it enables 
language. The one who speaks incessantly closes in on himself, and engages in terrible 
self-enclosed monologue. Interruption permits exchange. 'S'interrompre pour 
s'entendre, s'entendre pour par/er. '129 In other words, discontinuity assures the 
continuity of understanding. 
The significance of this interruption can be pursued in two directions: firstly, 
says Blanchot, there is the 'arret-intervalle', comparable to the ordinary pause which 
allows the one-after-another of conversation. This discontinuity is essential, since it 
promotes exchange, but relative - quite simply, one must breathe. 'Elle est la respiration 
du discours.' 130 'S'interrompre pour s'entendre. '131 But, there is another, second kind of 
interruption, more enigmatic and weightier, which introduces an expectation which is 
the measure of the irreducible distance between two interlocutors. In interrelational 
space, communication with another person can take various forms. The other can be 
considered as an objective possibility within the world and related to objectively; or, he 
can be considered as another myself, who, though possibly different, is first identical, 
and thus equally capable of speaking in the first person; or, thirdly, he can be related to 
immediately rather than through the mediacy of impersonal comprehension, each thus 
claiming to lose themselves in each other or to draw close to each other in the proximity 
of an intimacy ('tutoiement') which wipes out any distance. These three modes of 
relation have a common support, namely, 'the fact that all three tend toward unity: the 
"I" wants to annex the other (identify the other with itself) by making of it its own thing, 
or by studying it as a thing, or, yet again, in wanting to find in it another myself, 
whether this be through free recognition or through the instantaneous union of two 
souls.' 132 But there is another mode of relation which does not have unity as its goal, and 
where common ground with the other is not sought. What is at issue here is the essential 
and absolute distance (etrangete) between the self and the other, the idea of an infinite 
129 M Blanchot, Entretien, p. l 07 
130 ibid., p.108 
131 ibid. 
132 M Blanchot, IC, p.77; Entretien, p.108 
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separation, fissure, and interval which leaves him infinitely outwith me, but which, 
nonetheless, in this very interruption of being, founds my relation with him. It is a 
relationship with an alterity which is not 'for me,' an alterity which is not another me, 
nor another existence, nor a modality or a moment of universal existence, nor a 
'surexistence' (God or non-god), but is the unknown in his infinite distance. Such an 
alterity can be named the 'neutral.' 
3.3 The Neutral Turn, or Illeity 
The 'neutral' is articulated by Levinas in tenns of 'illeity.' When the personal 
other approaches us as 1tu, 1 it is to 'if that we relate. The proximity of tutoiement remains 
with horizon of the I, but the face of the other does not speak to us from a simple canvas 
nor from another world behind our own world. 'L"'au-deld" est precisement au-deld du 
"monde". '133 He is beyond any unveiling and transcends all knowledge, whether 
symbolic or signified - 'Ni semblable, ni dissemblable, ni identique, ni non-identique.' 
Wyschogrod notes that what the face opens is 'a personal order irreducible to rational 
discourse or to the world of need,' 'a third person' who has 'withdrawn into an 
irreversible past' which is designated as "illeity",' 134 '[a] neologism fanned with ii (he) 
or ille. '135 It is this perduring trace of illeity which is 'the origin of alterityt1 36 in the other, 
the foWldation of all other 'seeming alterity' which 'assures the condition of possibility 
of ethics as the very possibility of the beyond.t1 37 In other words, illeity ensures the 
irreducibility of the other to a theme of discourse or the satisfaction of a need by 
ensuring that the relationship with him is a relationship of transcendence. The face, 
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and thereby betrays the objectivity and alterity of the plastic image which I can form. 138 
The face breaks the mould for the radical exteriority - the illeity - of the other which is 
'refractory to disclosure and manifestation' 139 confronts comprehension with its own 
insufficiency. For Levinas, the face in its illeity, beyond disclosure and manifestation, 
is 'by itself visitation and transcendence1140 and 'visits like the dawn from on high.' 
The face is abstract, but not a logical abstraction. The face is naked; it has no 
form in which to present itself. It does not indicate. 'Autrui est un pur trou dans le 
monde. II procede de l'absolument Absent. '141 The relationship with the face signifies 
a relationship with absolutely absent which does not reveal the absent. Revelation and 
dissimulation have no place here. But there is a third path, that of the significance of 
the trace. 'L'au-dela dont vient le visage signifie comme trace. Le visage est dans la 
trace de !'Absent absolument revolu, absolument passe, retire ... dans ... ''profond Jadis, 
Jadis Jamais assez" (Paul Valery) .... '142 The face signifies the trace of the other with 
whom we enter into relation outwith any representable time, a relationship of diachrony. 
The face signifies the 'au-de/a de l'etre'. The personal order to which the face obliges 
us lies beyond being; it is otherwise than being, and this otherwise than being is a third 
person whose profile is 'ii,' and who is not defined by ipseity. The possibility of this 
third direction of irrectitude escapes the polarity of immanence and transcendence. What 
is au-de/a is the illeity of the third person, which expresses inexpressible irreversibility. 
Illeity is not less than being; it escapes ontology. 
While we relate to illeity in the significance of the trace, as a signifying without 
appearing, we have to approach it through a third way, for the trace is not like any other 
sign, although it plays the same role as a sign. Signs refer to people who are absent, and 
we follow them like the detective who seeks the evidence of presence. The trace, 
though, unlike other signs, relates to irrepresentable presence, beyond all intention and 
project. The trace breaks up the ontological order of the world. Its original significance 
is that is seeks to erase the signs of its having been present, like the thief who leaves a 
138 E Levinas, DEHH, p.202 
139 ibid. 
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BEYOND PRESENCE 180 
sign of his presence in the very act of removing signs. In this sense, all signs are traces. 
They point to a past. 'Dans la trace a passe un passe absolument revolu. '143 'La trace est 
/'insertion de l'e.\pace dans le temps, le point ou le monde s'incline vers un passe et un 
temps. '144 And this time is essentially diachronic, a time characterised by the withdrawal 
of the other from being and from the ontological distinction between Being and beings, 
for the ii is absolute. Properly speaking the illeity of the other, as trace, has never been 
there but is always past. 'La trace comme trace ne mene pas seulement vers le passe, 
mais est la passe meme vers un passe plus eloigne que tout passe et que tout avenir, 
lesquels se rangent encore dans mon temps - vers le passe de l'Autre ou se dessine 
l'eternite - passe absolu qui reunit taus /es temps. '145 
Now this talk of illeity, which would seem to be in the order of speculative 
philosophy, is not without significance in the practical and ethical order. For example, 
Richard McCormack, in his 1974 'Notes on Moral Theology', draws attention to 'an 
excellent article' by Albert Outler which, in the context of the abortion debate, 'rejects 
as arbitrary all "magic moment theories" as to when the defenseless deserve to be 
defended. 1146 Outler rejects as a prolongation of the body-soul dualism the attempt to 
ascertain the "moment" at which personhood can be claimed. Instead, notes 
McCormack, Outler 'sees terms such as "person," "personality," "personhood, 11 and 
"self' as code words for a transempirical or self-transcending reality ... [which]. .. is not 
a part of the human organism nor is it inserted into a process of organic development 
at some magic moment. "It is the human organism oriented towards its transcendental 
matrix. 111147 This question as to what constitutes the "person" is one that constantly 
infiltrates philosophical and theological debate, and ever more pressingly in the light of 
143 ibid., p.67 
144 ibid. 
145 ibid., pp.68-69 
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the increasingly complex developments which medical technology offers to medical 
ethics for consideration and which raise questions of life from its very inception to its 
extinction. Is the foetus to be considered a person? Is the child with a severe mental 
handicap capable of a relationship? Is the young adult, victim in a car accident and now 
lost to the conscious world, worthy of care? Is the spouse, companion for half a century 
and lost in Alzheimer's disease - no longer the person he or she once was - to be 
abandoned? Or is there still someone there who, in their very wordlessness, beckons us 
to responsibility? Such questions often seek the assurance of objective criteria by which 
the state and the status - the essence - of personhood can be adjudged. But perhaps the 
question needs to be asked in a more radical manner. When we relate to others, what is 
it we are actually relating to? When the objective and, in some way quantifiable marks 
fail the test of personhood, does the relationship thereby falter and fail, or is it possible 
that, from the beginning, the relationship is inaugurated and sustained by something, the 
essence of which is other than the image, and remains in the realm of the unknown and 
yet to be discovered, but ever beyond disclosure? When, after a lifetime, dialogue and 
discovery is still possible in a relationship, why should this be? Is it not the case that 
personal relationships have their origin beyond the persona in which the other is 
clothed, in the illeity which founds alterity? Ultimately, the quest to articulate the 
defining characteristics of "personhood" must fail, for the relationship with the other 
takes its origin in, and is constituted and sustained by something that goes beyond the 
phenomenon of the other and resides in the neutrality of what Levinas terms 'illeity,' and 
which, as Outler correctly indicates, is to be considered as 'a transempirical or self-
transcending reality.' With respect to such illeity, understood as the other person in his 
neutrality and divested of the form in which his subjectivity has become clothed, 
knowledge, understood as comprehensive mastery, provides an inadequate first tool to 
moderate the relationship and the response we make within the relationship, for the 
relationship is straightaway ethical. It is not so much the case that knowledge dictates 
the moral judgements that we make in respect of others, but rather that the ethical 
relationship with the other, which calls for a response, should guide the progress of 
understanding. As Levinas aptly puts it, 'Philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service 
of love.' 148 
Now, the illeity of the ii is the origin of the alterity of being, and its neutral 
148 E Levinas, OB, pp.161-162 
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presence distorts the relational field, preventing any direct communication or tendency 
towards unity. It is not simply a reduction to silence to allow the other to speak, which 
nonetheless remains dialectical and has the accomplishment of unity in view, but is 
rather a fundamental change in the form or structure of language, such that to speak or 
write, 'is to cease thinking solely with a view to unity, and to make the relations of words 
an essentially dissymmetrical field governed by discontinuity.' 149 Both these 
interruptions, corresponding to a dialectical and a non-dialectical demand, have an 
ambiguous relation to each other: falling silent to allow the other to speak is only a 
pause in the first degree, but already, in its alternance, it enables the work of interruption 
by which the unknown is indicated; that is, the pause allows exchange; the waiting 
measures the infinite distance. 
The difficulty, says Blanc hot, then becomes one of recognising the plural force 
of language, whereby a plural word (parole plurielle) can be uttered which is founded, 
neither on equality or inequality, nor on dominance and subordination, nor reciprocal 
mutuality, but on dissymmetry and irreversibility - in other words, how language 
constitutes a relation of infinity. The real question is the question of recognising how 
disruption overturns the continuity of speech or of writing, but, more profoundly, of 
recognising, in the question, interruption as meaning, and rupture as form 
('!'interruption comme sens et la rupture comme forme'). 150 Blanchet remarks that 'any 
language where it is a matter of questioning rather than responding is a language already 
interrupted - even more, a language wherein everything begins with the decision (or the 
distraction) of an initial void.1151 This leads Blanchet to conclude that human existence 
has more to do to with the demand for discontinuity than with the demand for unity. The 
received philosophical wisdom has always been a concern with unity, but, for Blanchet, 
the real question is the question of discontinuity. Man is 'a non-unitary possibility.' 152 
'It means that, through man, that is, not through him but through the knowledge he 
bears, and first of all through the exigency of speech that is in advance always already 
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challenges the notion of being as continuity or as a unity or gathering of beings; a 
relation that would except itself from the problematic of being and would pose a 
question that is not one of being. Thus, in this questioning, we would leave dialectics, 
but also ontology.' 153 In a footnote he writes that '[w]hen it is supposed (most often 
implicitly) that the "real" is continuous, and that only knowledge or expression would 
introduce discontinuity, it is first of all forgotten that the "continuous" is no more than 
a model, a theoretical form that, through this forgetting, passes for pure experience, pure 
empirical affirmation. But the "continuous" is itself only an ideology that is ashamed 
of itself (une ideologie honteuse d'elle-meme) ... .'154 Then quoting J Vuillemin, 'the 
infinite is the genus of which the continuous is a species.' 155 
3.4 The Ultimate Question 
What then is the deepest question, La question la plus profonde? According to 
Heidegger, it is the question of Being, which is the widest, deepest and most 
fundamental of questions. 156 Blanchet, however, questions the origin of the concern to 
question and the dignity which is accorded to this question. Questioning searches to the 
foundations of all things, but, beyond all things, the question's passion is directed 
towards a single central question or the question of all (tout). It is the question of the 
whole (la question d'ensemble) which embraces all questions. This would seem to be 
Rahner's approach - the question as the only 'must' which refuses to go away and which 
intends being in its totality. To question is to move towards the horizon of every 
question; it is to place in question the possibility of questioning through partial or 
particular questions, even though every question is in actuality a particular question 
posed from a particular position. The question, then, is that movement in which what 
is indeterminate holds itself back in the determination of the question, where what is not 
known proposes itself in the known as not known. 'A question is movement, the 
153 
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question of everything is a totality of movement and movement of everything.i1 57 But, 
there is the need for something other than the question, for the question is not 
everything, but only a part. The question is essentially partial; it remains unachieved. 
It is 'incomplete speech' ('parole inachevee'). 'Through the question we give ourselves 
the thing and we give ourselves the void that permits us not to have the it yet, or to have 
it as desire.' 158 The question is akin to desire, a possessing not-possessing. 'The question 
is the desire of thought.' 159 
Now, although the question is 'incomplete speech', the response which it evokes 
never does it justice, for although the question is an opening, the answer is always a 
closure which, once given, destroys the plenitude of possibility which the question 
opens. 'The answer is the question's misfortune, its adversity (La reponse est le malheur 
de la question).' 160 Between the question and the answer there is a 'strange relation,' as 
Levinas indicates when drawing attention to the discontinuity of manifestation in the 
movement from question to response, the need to radicalise the question by reducing the 
significance of the who who questions. In the response, the question fails to pursue 
itself; instead, the answer ends and encloses the question. Although the question awaits 
an answer, the answer fails to satisfy it, for, even if it brings it to an end, it does not 
extinguish the waiting which is the question of the question, the 'essence of the question' 
which is not extinguished by the response. 
What, then, does the question place in question? Whereas Heidegger speaks of 
a 'questioning advance' on Being, 161 and Rahner views Being as the absolute horizon 
which is intended by the question, Blanchet wishes to make the point that the question 
does not so much interrogate Being as place Being itself - as the object of the question -
in question. Indeed, as access to Being, the question is outwith Being, as Levinas has 
shown in his reflection on the phenomenological access to Being as part of the meaning 
of Being. In dialectical thinking, he says, the most fundamental question is a moment 
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question of God, or of Being, or of the ontological difference between Being and beings. 
But, even here, this is not the final question but a return to a beginning, for the 
epistemological thrust of the question finds that, in advancing on its ultimate object, it 
arrives back at the ontological origin which initially inspired it. The question of meaning 
and the question of being are thus inextricably and dialectically linked. Each calls for 
the other in the circularity of transcendental reflection. Thus it is, in a transcendental 
dialectic, that the starting point does not really matter, for, whatever is questioned, there 
is the presupposition of being already and always 162 in the presence of the totality. 
'Today every question is already the question of everything.' 163 Yet, says Blanchet, it is 
being itself which is placed in question and at risk. While Rahner, following Heidegger, 
advances the preoccupation of metaphysics beyond beings (Seiendes) to the question of 
Being (Sein) as such, Blanchet notes that the real significance of the Seinsfrage is that 
it is a question which places Being itself in question. One sees this, observes Blanchet, 
in the tendency of Germanic languages to 'promote' the verb in the interrogative form, 
something lost in French. Thus, 'Le ciel est bleu' becomes interrogatively 'Le ciel est-ii 
bleu?' whereas 'The sky is blue' becomes 'ls the sky blue?' and 'Der Himmel ist blau,' 
'!st der Himmel blau?' This is the significance of the question: by bringing being to the 
fore the possibility of its dissolution or suspension is given. The question is not simply 
the question of the meaning of Being, as in Heidegger's Seinsfrage, or 'the 
transcendental question, which does not merely place something asked about in 
question, but the one questioning and the question itself, and thereby absolutely 
everything.' 164 Rather, and more fundamentally, in the question, Being itself is 
questioned as to its own possibility or not. Is the question of Being the widest, deepest, 
and most fundamental of questions? As Blanchet says, 'when we arrive at the end-point 
that is the question of everything, this question once again dissimulates itself in the 
question of knowing whether the question of the whole is the most profound.' 165 
The most profound question, then, is not the question of Being, nor is it the 
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question which is not asked, which is kept in reserve, and this question, the most 
fundamental question, is 'the question of the neutral (fa question du neutre ),' which does 
not intend the unity and identity of the whole, but like a question raised in panic or in 
the depths of flight - a panic question (question panique) which intends no goal or 
object other than the fleeing itself - intends what is other than the 'all' (l'autre que tout), 
'what is absolutely other and has no place in the whole,' 166 and affirms the Wholly Other 
where there is no longer any possibility of a return to the same. 
But to question what is other than the whole is to question more than we are able 
to question, and to question more than the question of Being. The question is never 
finally accomplished, not because there is always more within the totality of being to 
question, but because the question relates us to the infinite; or, in terms of the Other 
(autrui), to the neutrality of illeity which, invested with no form, the question cannot lay 
hold of to divest. Within the question there is an excess which exceeds necessarily the 
power of questioning, and which confronts the one who questions with the impossibility 
of his own question, revealing 'the question as the impossibility of questioning.r1 67 'In 
the profound question, impossibility questions.r1 68 Every question which opens on to the 
whole finds its closure and fulfilment in the answer, which in tum opens on to a further 
ensemble of questions which also find fulfilment in the response. But, the question 
which questions what is other than the whole and beyond the totality, the question which 
is asked in the face of infinity, is a question which is asked by way of 'a detour that 
diverts questioning from being able to be a question, and from being able to bring about 
an answer,' 169 for this question relates us to that which withdraws from all questioning 
and exceeds all power of questioning. 
'Questioning places us in relation with what evades every question and 
exceeds all power of questioning. Questioning is the very attraction of 
this detour. What shows itself in the questioning of the profound 
question, even as it slips away in the detour of speech, is that which 
166 ibid., p.19; (Entretien, p.25) 
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cannot be seized by an affirmation, nor refused by an negation, nor 
raised up to possibility by interrogation, nor restored to being through a 
response. It is speech as detour. Questioning is this detour that speaks 
as a detour of speech.i1 7o 
3.5 Summary 
187 
Rahner privileges the question as the starting point of his transcendental enquiry, 
and proceeds to expose its conditions of possibility through a transcendental reflection. 
Ultimately, the supreme transcendental condition of possibility is absolute being which 
is demanded by and sustains the dynamism of the spirit. 
Whereas Kant's transcendental reflection was formal and static, Rahner, 
following Marechal, focuses on the act or performance (Vollzug) of knowledge which 
shows itself to be a constant movement of transcendence. Thus, although the ontology 
which sustains Rahnerian epistemology is one in which Being and knowing are 
essentially related, nonetheless, the finite spirit is less to be understood in terms of self-
presence, but rather, and more primordially, as transcendence towards what is other than 
the subject, towards the alterity of exteriority. 
Theologically, the relation with alterity is experienced in the proximity of grace, 
in which God communicates himself to the essentially open and receptive subject, while 
remaining himself uncompromised by his offer. 
Now, this paradoxical relation of proximity and distance in grace finds 
philosophical articulation in Levinas who stresses the absolution of the terms of the 
relation from the relation. The Other to whom the self relates is, with respect to the self, 
infinite and unencompassable. In fact, so infinitely distanced is the Other from the same 
that the Other does not constitute a horizon for the activity of the same. Horizons relate 
to a focal point which projects them. The Other, absolute with respect to the Same, 
maintains himself, beyond any horizontality of relation, in a position of verticality and 
metaphysical height. This, says Levinas, is the true meaning of transcendence. 
Now, for Levinas, the horizon of understanding against which the philosophical 
tradition has operated has always been Being. Hence, the deepest, widest and most 
fundamental philosophical question, as Heidegger indicates, has always been the 
question of the meaning of Being. Absolute alterity, however, finds its meaning in an 
170 ibid. 
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absolution from Being. Thus the need, as Blanchot points out, to rethink the question. 
The question does not intend Being; rather, it is the promotion and the privilege of 
Being within the question which is itself to be placed in question. The question is not 
Being, but whether Being is the question. The question does not find its fulfilment or 
completion in the complete presence which the possession of Being would offer. Rather, 
the response marks a closure of the question. The true significance of the question lies 
elsewhere than Being in the one to whom and of whom questions are asked, the 
interlocutor. The ontological question of the meaning of Being will thus become the 
ethical question of the significance of the Other, as interlocutor. 
4. 
Subjectivity and Infinity 
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B lanchot, in questioning the promotion of being in the question of all, indicated 
that what is actually placed in question by the question is Being itself, and hinted that 
the question of Being is not the most fundamental question. Rather, the question relates 
us to that which refuses to be present to the question, to that which withdraws from all 
questioning and exceeds all power of questioning. The most profound question is a 
question beyond being and other than presence, and carries us along by way of the 
detour of speech. Questioning is a detour, as Blanchot says, that 'speaks as a detour of 
speech.' What we wish to argue in this chapter is that subjectivity is not primarily to be 
understood as the being-present to itself of being, but as a relationship with infinity. 
Before it is ontological, subjectivity is fundamentally ethical. 
4.1 Subjectivity and Being 
Being, in the Western onto-theological tradition, has always been thought in the 
present tense, and it is always conceived in tenns of presence. The subject is one who 
stands in the presence of Being, one for whom to be is to be conscious of being. But this 
intentional directedness towards being, which then becomes represented in thought, 
does not fully measure the depths of subjectivity. Although the subject may be said to 
stand in the presence of Being, the relationship between the subject, as being (das 
Seiendes, l'etant), and Being (Sein, £tre) is never synchronic. It is, rather, always 
diachronic; the subject is always out of step with Being, 'otherwise than Being', whose 
universality and ontological priority is thereby contested. The fullness of being cannot 
fill the reality of human existence, and the adequation of Being and Knowing which 
would characterise human being-in-the-world proves inadequate to account for human 
existence and its relations. 
4.11 The metaphysical itinerary: beyond being 
Philosophy has two itineraries. The one, Abrahamic in nature, is essentially 
outgoing and transcendent; the other, Odyssean in intent, remains locked in immanence 
and its end is always a return to its starting point. 
Contemporary philosophies of modernity seem to be characterised by the 
dominance of a politics and economics of expediency. Economics and technology have 
become the providers both of the modem mind's categories of understanding and of the 
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language in which this understanding is expressed, a fact noted by Habennas in his 
critique of purposive-rational action in modernity .1 Cultural meaning and value finds 
its interpretation in economic and technological terms. Levinas also recognises this.2 
Interpreting in his own manner, he identifies the key note of the philosophy which 
underpins modem thinking as the absorption of otherness into the politics of identity 
and the same, a 'neutralisation of alterity.'3 Notwithstanding the fact that life precedes 
philosophical reflection, and existence is prior to essence, philosophy, like nature 
abhorring a vacuum, maintains an aversion to alterity, and develops itself as a refusal 
of engagement with what is Other (l'Autre); rather than involving itself in action and 
commerce with others, it is characterised by a latent attentiveness and indifference, 
which demonstrates, he says, that universal allergy of the philosopher's first childhood, 
caught up in its own concerns with no transcendent reference. In short, philosophy has 
not woken up to alterity; it is deaf to the Other (autrui). 'The itinerary of philosophy 
remains that of a Ulysses whose adventure in the world was only a return to his native 
For a summary of Habennas' thinking, see David Held, Introduction to 
Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habennas, (London: Hutchinson, 1987), pp.249ff. Held 
outlines Habermas' major concern as 'the spread of instrumental reason to many areas 
of social life' and the 'rise of technocratic consciousness' (p.254) which increasingly 
entails the definition of practical problems as technical issues in social theory. 
Epistemologically the instrumentalisation of reason has obscured the epistemic subject, 
reducing any autonomy and responsibility the subject might have. To counter technocratic 
and instrumentalised consciousness, Habermas advocates a communicative praxis, which 
frees language from the systematic distortion it has experienced in purposive rationality. 
Language is ordered towards consensus, but needs emancipated through 'the transcendence 
of such systems of distorted communication' (p.256). 
Habermas himself writes, '[b]y "work" or purposive-rational action I understand 
either instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction. Instrumental action is 
governed by technical rules based on empirical knowledge.... The conduct of rational 
choice is governed by strategies based on analytic knowledge .... By "interaction", on 
the other hand, I understand communicative action, symbolic interaction. It is governed 
by binding consensual norms, which define reciprocal expectations about behaviour .... 
Their meaning is objectified in ordinary language communication .... ' (Jiirgen Habermas, 
Technology and Science as "Ideology", in Toward a Rational Society, (London: 
Heinemann, 1980), pp.91-92). 
2 See E Levinas, HAH, p.42 
See also J Derrida's description of the economics of return in Given Time, pp.6-11. 
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island - a satisfaction (complaisance) with the Same, a misunderstanding of the Other,'4 
an effort 'where the adventure pursued in the world is but the accident of a retum.' 5 
Expressed philosophically, in the context of this present work, the Odyssean itinerary 
of philosophy is a reditio in seipsum, a folding back of being upon itself. It remains, too, 
the nostalgic mourning of Penelope, weeping for Odysseus, longing for that return and 
for unity with him once again.6 This Odyssey which traces out its past, and seeks to 
recollect and incorporate into the kingdom of the same whatever is outside and other, 
whether by assimilation or removal, has been the philosophical agenda of western 
metaphysics which, maintains Levinas, 'has most often been an ontology: a reduction 
of the other to the same,'7 where 'to know amounts to grasping being out of nothing or 
reducing it to nothing, removing from it its alterity.'8 The inherent intelligibility of a 
comprehensible reality capable of being brought to a unified synthesis, subjectively 
centred, is at the heart of this philosophy. But this philosophical effort at 
comprehensivity, based as it is on the identity of being and knowing, is not truly 
metaphysics whose term is beyond comprehension. 
Now, although affirming the ultimate adequation of being and knowing, Rahner 
nonetheless admits the inadequacy of the tradition's understanding of knowledge as 
4 ibid., p.43. 
Levinas writes, 'La philosophie se produit comme une forme sous /aquelle se 
manifeste le refus d'engagement dans l'Autre, l'attente preferee a /'action, /'indifference 
a l'egard des autres, l'a/lergie universe/le de la premiere enfance des philosophes. 
L'itineraire de la philosophie reste celui d'Ulysse dont /'aventure dans le monde n'a ete 
qu 'un re tour a son f le natale - une complaisance dans le Meme, une meconnaissance de 
l'Autre' (ibid.). 
idem, TI, pp.176-177 
6 When Penelope sits unpicking her weaving each night to delay her 
suitors, she longs for union with Ulysses. But such a longing remains in the realm of 
eros, the nostalgic desire for a lost union, a movement of return towards true Being. 
Such a desire is not the desire which fuels metaphysics, which should not be confused 
with eros. Maurice Blanchot, reflecting upon Simone Weil's words, '[l}e desir est 
impossible', comments upon this as meaning 'Desire is precisely this relation to the 
impossible, it is impossibility become relation.' He continues, '[m]etaphysical desire is 
desire for that with which one has never been united, the desire of a self not only 
separated but happy with the separation that makes it a self, and yet still in relation with 
that frokm which it remains separated and of which it has no need: the unknown, the ~ 
foreign, autrui' (Maurice Blanchot, IC, p.53; Entretien, p.76) 
7 E Levinas, Tl, p.47 
8 ibid., p.44 
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'comprehensive mastery.'9 He writes, '[w]hat is called knowledge according to the 
common usage originating in the western tradition of philosophy, i.e. comprehension 
and mastery, consists in the ordering of data in a horizon of understanding and system 
of coordinates which is evident to us as the object which we possess identically with 
ourselves. But it is this which is a defective form of the real nature of knowledge in 
which the mystery itself unfolds.' 10 Again, '[ c ]omprehensive knowledge is a deficient 
mode of knowing when measured by that knowledge which is beyond all doubt the 
highest, the most intensive, and that which bestows the deepest blessing upon us, that 
which takes place in the immediate vision of the incomprehensibility of God.' 11 For 
Rahner, knowledge as comprehensive mastery must always fail when it confronts the 
utter mystery and incomprehensibility of God, but such a confounding of knowledge's 
totalising tendency is not limited to the divine, for although 'creation strictly as such can 
contain no absolute mysteries,' 12 all beings as created 'partake of the mysterious 
character of God' and, insofar as they are referred to God, 'cannot be adequately 
understood without this relationship and hence in terms of this relationship.' 13 'Thus all 
understanding of any reality whatsoever is in the last resort always a reductio in 
mysterium.' 14 'The predominant desire for theoretical understanding' 15 which 
characterises classical theology approached the problem of the incomprehensible nature 
of God from the standpoint of the inadequacy and incapacity of the finite intellect. But 
'[t]he horizon of understanding which is assumed here, the criterion by 
which human knowledge is measured so that God remains 
incomprehensible, represents a conception based on a model of 
knowledge in which an object is penetrated and mastered. In comparison 
with this paradigm of knowledge, human perception of God on earth and 
even in the state of final fulfilment remains deficient.. .. In such an ideal 
9 K Rahner, The Hiddenness of God, p.234 
10 ibid., p.236 
II idem, Reflections on Methodology in Theology, p. l 04 
12 idem, The Concept of Mystery, p.62 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
It will be important later to address the question of the relationship between God 
and the other person, not only Rahner, but also in Levinas. 
15 idem, The Hiddenness of God, p.231 
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of knowledge the Greek desire of absolute gnosis and the modem 
understanding of knowledge as a process which leads to the mastery of 
an object come together, whether the mastery in question is conceived 
in terms of German idealism or of the natural sciences.116 
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Such a conception of knowledge fails, foundering on 'the alien and inhospitable rock of 
God's incomprehensibility'. 17 Rahner continues, '[i]f the fundamental sense of 
knowledge is understood, not in the sense of "seeing through" an object, but rather as 
a possible openness to the mystery itself, then the question becomes at once more 
straightforward. Knowledge in the traditional sense would then be regarded as a 
derivation of the basic meaning ofknowledge.' 18 Rahner writes, 
'[i]n contrast knowledge in the primary sense is the presence of the 
mystery itself. It is being addressed by what no longer has a name, and 
it is relying on a reality which is not mastered but is itself the master. It 
is the speech of the being without a name, about which clear statements 
are impossible.i1 9 
One sees this linking of the 'gnoseological adventure' with sight, which Rahner 
understands as a reduction of the basic meaning of knowledge, in Levinas too. Sight is 
contact at a distance, a 'theoretical receptivity from a distance (which is that of the 
look).'20 Sensibility is reduced to sight and finds its role in 'a synchrony of thematised 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid., p.233 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid., p.237 
Levinas, too, speaks of the namelessness of that by which we are 
addressed, when he notes that it is the the pronominal "ii" of illeity which enables the 
name of God to be uttered divested of its divinity. Divinity is the nominalisation of the 
noun insofar as it "participates" in being. 'But the name outside of essence or beyond 
essence, the individual prior to individuality, is named God. It precedes all divinity, that 
is, the divine essence which the false gods, individuals sheltered in their concept, lay 
claim to' (OB, p.190, n.38). For Levinas, '[a] word is a nomination ... a consecrating of 
the "this as this" or "this as that" by a saying which is also understanding and listening, 
absorbed in the said .... Identification is ascription of meaning' (ibid., p.37). But this 
already happens within a horizon. Entities ... are not first given and thematized, and 
then receive a meaning; they are given by the meaning they have ... in an already said' 
(ibid.). God is , ultimately accessible, not within Being, but as the counterpart of the O':) 
justice I render to my neighbour because in the opening of illeity one finds the trace of 
God. 
20 E Levinas, OB, p.75 
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elements and their simultaneity with the look.'21 Sensibility, however, is not to be so 
interpreted, says Levinas. Rather, like 'being addressed by what no longer has a name,' 
sensibility 'is being affected by a non-phenomenon, a being put into question by the 
alterity of the other.'22 And this, says Levinas, opens on to a 'notion of subjectivity 
independent of the adventure of cognition.'23 Now, insofar as Rahner asserts the finite 
spirit as capax infiniti, he actually contests the traditional understanding of subjectivity 
of origin, and recognises that any interiority requires as its founding moment an 
exteriority. Though expressed in the language of ontology, this surely is the aim of the 
transcendental deduction of the ontological affinnation undertaken by Marechal and 
pursued by Rahner. Rahner writes, '[e]xistentially, and for a theory of knowledge, 
[mystery] is at once a menace and a blessed peace. It can make him chafe and protest, 
because it compels him to leave the tiny house of his ostensibly clear self-possession, 
to advance in the trackless spaces, even in the night.'24 Like Abraham, his native land 
forsaking, Rahner's subject is summoned to go beyond the globe of comprehended 
familiarity in response to mystery's utter incomprehensibility and absolute alterity. 
Now, according to Levinas, the traditional approach - founded on the adequation 
of being and knowing, and funded by the economics of interest and return - which 
would place the understanding of being before the actuality of the existent needs to be 
reversed, and in its place a non-allergic relation with alterity, already appreciated in 
discourse and founded in the ethical relation, needs to be posited. This is not to abandon 
philosophy and its historical concerns of subjectivity, knowledge and truth, which is 
why Levinas writes of Totality and Infinity that it 'presents itself as a defence of 
subjectivity';25 rather it is to found them in the already given and lived experience of the 
relationship with the other. It is to affirm exteriority as the basis of subjective interiority. 
'The ethical relation, opposed to first philosophy which identifies freedom and power, 
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the very intention that animates the movement unto truth.'26 It is precisely in the 
relationship with the other person that philosophy is confounded, and yet enabled to go 
beyond its limits, by being attentive to its proper origin. 
Contrasted with the Odyssey, the Abrahamic itinerary is by way of a different 
terrain. If Odysseus is the model for philosophies of totality, Abraham is the archetypal 
ethical person who hears the command, 'leave your own country, your kindred and your 
father's house for a country which I shall show you'27 and who goes 'as Yahweh told 
him.'28 Abraham recognises the otherness of God's voice, and his own journey becomes 
one of response rather than initiative. Outgoing, he leaves his homeland and separates 
himself from what is his own. The movement is beyond self and the familiarity of the 
same into a language of dialogue with the extreme otherness of God - a dialogue, 
however, begun before ever anything is said (dit) in the strange (etrange) and foreign 
(etrange) paradoxical proximity of the extremely other, or as Rahner might describe it, 
'the absolute proximity of the mystery;'29 in his response to the call, Abraham's life 
becomes an acknowledgement of and a response to the existence and priority of the 
Other who is always and already there as interlocutor. 'The religious discourse that 
precedes all religious discourse is not dialogue. It is the "here I am" (me voici) said to 
the neighbour to whom I am given over.. . .'3° For Levinas, the philosophical enterprise 
is called to be 'like Abraham, his native land forsaking,' taking its origin and point of 
departure, not in a self-seeking sel~-se6kiRg to gather what is other into a gnoseological 0 \. 
and dominating act of identification, but in an Other, who accuses the egology of the 
same, and renders the self as the accusative of response. To say 'I' is to say 'me voici.' 
The nominative self becomes the accusative: me voici! Levinas notes, 'the accusative 
(me voici) here is remarkable: here I am, under your eyes, at your service, your obedient 
servant.'31 Abraham, obedient to the call of God, displaces himself and becomes 










K Rahner, The Concept of Mystery, in TI, IV,passim 
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which surrounded him is disrupted. The displacement (depaysement) he experiences 
takes him beyond his monadic world, closed in on itself, and sets him on a nomadic 
existence without an abode, wandering the desert, living in a tent, setting out for an 
unknown country. But, displacement - to be a refugee and homeless - does not simply 
signify the loss of one's place; more significantly, it is a way of residing which is more 
authentic, an inhabiting of a place without having any habitation; to be an exile is to 
have a new relation with that which is beyond or outwith (Dehors) our perspective. To 
be homeless is to relate to the world in a different way.32 
In philosophical terms, Levinas speaks of the priority of Ontology and 
immanence when, in God and Philosophy he writes that philosophy can be understood 
as 'the bearer of the spirituality of the West, where spirit is taken to be coextensive with 
knowing. But knowing - or thought, or experience - should not be understood as any 
kind of reflection of exteriority in an inner forum. 133 The tradition has preferred the 
theoretical relation, in which knowing is appreciated as letting the known manifest 
itself. But this is a reductive relation, for 'theory also designates comprehension 
[intelligence] - the logos of being - that is, a way of approaching the known being such 
that its alterity with regard to the known being vanishes.134 To know is to comprehend; 
comprehending is a taking (prendre) or a grasping.35 The known being is deprived of 
its alterity because a third term, not a being, but a concept thought or sensation is 
introduced, and this, says Levinas, is ontology, the dominant understanding of 
metaphysics in the tradition: 'a reduction of the other to the same by the interposition 
32 For a more detailed treatment of the significance of the home in Levinas' 
thought, see my article, Homelessness as a Theological Motif: Emmanuel Levinas and 
the Significance of the Home, Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, XV, 2, Autumn, 
1994, pp.88-104 
Levinas contends that the home is primarily extra-territorial in contrast to the 
terribly territorial dwelling which Heidegger's Dasein constructs for itself, part of that 
bald and cold pre-ontological world, 111 wherein" a factical Dasein can be said to 11 live11 •1 
(M Heidegger, Being and Time, p.93) Territoriality provides an ontological situation, 
whereas extra-territoriality, as a positive element, disrupts the primacy of the ontological 
order, and locates the significance of the home in its possibility of welcome and intimacy 
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cf. the pre-apprehension ( Vorgrijj) of Being in Rahner's transcenden.tal 
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of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being.' 36 Philosophy 
needs to reverse this situation, and with it theology,37 for it is not ontology which is 
prior, but the metaphysics which precedes it. Instead of ontology's all-embracing 
comprehension of what is other, Levinas advocates an ethical metaphysics, or a 
metaphysics as ethics, which is a non-allergic relation with alterity, which arises is 
discourse, and which is best articulated in terms of Desire. The reason why this reversal 
is needed is because the true origin of philosophy lies not so much in the wonder which 
gives rise to reflection, but 'in a cry of ethical revolt, a testimony of responsibility. It 
begins in prophecy .' 38 By ethics, Levinas envisages a primordial experience of 
responsibility for the other which precedes all reflection, which is prima philosophia, 
and which, as such, is to be distinguished from morality, understood as 'a series of rules 
relating to socio-political behaviour and civic duty.' 39 Historically, the problem with any 
philosophical consideration of ethics is that it has been dissimulated in the philosophical 
tradition, whence the need, as Critchley points out, to reformulate the question. 
'[R]ather than ethics being understood as a traditional and regional 
component of philosophical thinking, built upon the ground of an 
ontological or logocentric metaphysics, Levinassian ethics is first 
philosophy (TI, 34) that disrupts ontology or logocentrism. Accordingly, 
the first question for philosophy is not Hamlet's "To be or not to be" 
(OB,3) or Heidegger's Leibnizian question "Why are there beings at all 
and why not rather nothing?" but rather "How does being justify 
36 E Levinas, TI, p.43 
37 Levinas writes, '[t]he transcendence of God cannot be stated or conceived 
in terms of Being, the element of philosophy, behind which philosophy sees only night' 
(GP, p.142). 
38 ibid., p. 143 
Levinas views philosophy as prophetic, for philosophy's task today is essentially 
a placing in question of the dominance of ontology and asserting ethics as first philosophy. 
The assertion of the primacy of the ethical and the challenge to the totalising system is the 
role of the prophet. Writing of the power of and the nature of eschatological prophecy, he 
s_ays that its import lies in the 'institution of a relation with being beyond the totality or 
beyond history' TI, p.22). The prophet is related to 'a surplus always exterior to the totality, 
as though the objective totality did not fill out the true measure of being, as though another 
concept, the concept of infinity, were needed to express this transcendence with regard to 
totality, non-encompassable within a totality and as primordial as totality.' The prophetic 
experience is situated within the totality and history, but it disrupts that totality. 
39 R Cohen, Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas in Face to Face with 
Emmanuel Levinas, p. 29 
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itself?"'40 
And is this not akin to Kant's questions 'What must I do? and 'What have I the right to 
hope for?' which seek to provide a grounding and a justification for knowledge in the 
wider context of practical reason? And is such a reversal as proposed by Levinas not, 
as previously indicated, a recognition that there is a wider domain of (ethical) meaning 
'which inclusion cannot comprehend' and reasons that "reason" does not know, and 
which have not begun in philosophy.'41 
This need to go beyond the notion of the power and limit of reason understood 
as comprehension is called for by Rabner also when asks if 'the precise nature of "ratio" 
[is] so clear and obvious.'42 Reason is not to be understood in the positivistic and a 
posteriori sense of coming across objects in the world, such that any mysteries which 
lies beyond the world are to be relegated to faith, since although these 'should strictly 
speaking have come within the scope of reason with its power to see and comprehend 
... in this case [they] do not meet its demands.'43 Instead of this sense of ratio found in 
classical theology, Rabner maintains that 'reason must be understood more 
fundamentally as precisely the capacity of the incomprehensible, as the capacity of 
being seized by what is always insurmountable, not essentially as the power of 
comprehending, of gaining the mastery and subjugating. Reason must be understood ... 
as the capacity of excessus, as going out into the inaccessible .. .'44 Reason is thus more 
than reason. It is 'the faculty which welcomes the greater sight unseen, the faculty of 
simple rapture, of submissive dedication, of loving ecstasy. But this can only be if its 
most proper object is that sovereign and all-embracing exigence which cannot be 
mastered, comprehended, or challenged: in a word, the mystery.'45 The significance of 
what Rabner advocates in this expansion of reason is that he is essentially displacing the 
subject from its position of dominance and mastery, and attributing to mystery a priority 
40 S Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992), p.9 
41 E Levinas, GP, p.143 
42 K Rahner, The Concept of Mystery, p.38 
43 ibid., p.39 
44 idem, The Human Question of Meaning, p.97 
45 idem, The Concept of Mystery, p.43 
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and pre-eminence in the light of which the subject is constituted as a knowing subject. 
The fact of mystery's incomprehensibility becomes 'a positive characteristic of a 
relationship between one subject and another,'46 and incomprehensible mystery becomes 
'the primordial and fundamental which is the ultimate transcendental condition of 
possibility of knowledge.'47 
For Levinas, this mystery is the mystery of the other person who in the ethical 
confrontation with a subject witnesses to the fact that 
'[t]here is meaning testified to in interjections and outcries, before being 
disclosed in propositions, a meaning that signifies as a command, like an 
order that one signifies. Its manifestation in a theme already devolves 
from its signifying as ordering; ethical signification signifies not for a 
consciousness which thematises, but to a subjectivity, wholly an 
obedience, obeying with an obedience that precedes understanding. Here 
is a passivity still more passive than that of receptivity in knowing, the 
receptivity that assumes what affects it.48 
It involves a movement towards an alien outside-of-oneself (hors-de-soi) - without hope 
of an Odyssean return - towards a yonder that is termed other in an eminent sense. 'The 
metaphysical desire tends towards something else entirely, toward the absolutely 
other.'49 Its intention is not some object which might satisfy and fulfil it. Rather, 
metaphysical desire 'desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like 
goodness - the Desired does not fulfil it, but deepens it.'50 It is absolute desire, a relation 
to 'unanticipatable alterity':51 the desiring being is mortal; the Desired invisible. 'To die 
for the invisible - that is metaphysics.'52 
46 ibid., p.41 
47 ibid., p.42 
48 E Levinas, GP, p.143 
49 idem, TI, p.33 
50 ibid., p.34 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid., p.35 
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4.2 Metaphysics and Transcendence 
It is on account of this transcendent movement towards an absolutely exterior 
term that metaphysics is able to break ontological circle of totality 'The metaphysical 
movement is transcendent, and transcendence, like desire and inadequation is 
necessarily a transascendance.'53 Like the gulf between Dives and Lazarus lying in the 
bosom of Abraham, which one who has traversed may not retrace,54 the upward 
movement of transascendence is an irreversible relation, a 'radical separation between 
the same and the other,'55 who is and always remains radically heterogeneous and 
unassimilable by the I. How is transcendence as transascendence to be understood? 
Bernard Forthomme, in Une Philosophie de la Transcendence: La metaphysique 
d'Emmanuel Levinas ,56 begins his section on transascendence by taking recourse to 
Descartes who in his Third Meditation writes, 'I would not have ... the idea of an infinite 
53 ibid. 
Transascendence as a particular transcendence has to be understood in contrast to 
transdescendence. According to B Forthomme (Une Philosophie de la Transcendence: La 
metaphysique d'Emmanuel Levinas, Paris, 1979, pp.3 1-33), the term was first employed 
by Jean Wahl in Subjectivite et transcendance, Bulletin de la Societe fran9aise de 
Philosophie 1937, p. 162, who wanted to contrast the two directions which transcendence 
could take - the upward movement towards a transcendent superior, or a descent towards 
some demoniacal force, which could either be something elementary and elemental or the 
deep forces at play in being. Wahl, however, did not oppose the negativity of 
transdescendence to the positivity of transascendence: it was a matter of indifference 
whether the goal of transc.endence was angel or demon. Levinas, however, refuses any 
form of equivocation between the two. Transdescendence is always opposed to the 
metaphysical movement of transascendence. In Totality and Infinity, he writes that 
'Transcendence is not Negativity,' for, in negation, 'negator and negated are posited 
together, form a system, that is, a totality. The doctor who missed an engineering career, 
the poor man who longs for wealth, the patient who suffers, the melancholic who is bored 
for nothing oppose their condition while remaining attached to its horizons. The 
"otherwise" and the "elsewhere" they wish still belong to the here below they refuse' (TI, 
p.41 ). 
For Levinas, transdescendence is connected with the hyperbolic doubt already 
indicated in Descartes, which questions both the world and the self. It is a doubt which 
leads Descartes, according to Levinas, on a downward spiral into the ever deeper abyss of 
the ii y a, which is beyond both negation and affirmation (see TI, p.93), and whose only 
exit is the response which the approach of the other enables the self to make. 
54 cf. Luke 16:19-31 
55 E Levinas, TI, p.36 
56 B Forthomme, Une Philosophie de la Transcendence: La metaphysique 
d'Emmanuel Levinas, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J Vrin, 1979) 
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substance, I who am a finite being, if it had not been placed in me by some substance 
which was truly infinite.'57 Transascendence concerns the difference between true and 
false infinity, which also distinguishes true and false transcendence. F orthomme 
indicates that it is necessary to distance a philosophy of transascendence from any 
philosophy of 'evasive evasion' (!'evasion evasive). Unlike contemporary philosophies 
of transcendence, transascendence is not to be understood as a passage from a Sartrean 
nothingness to being nor as a conversion from a life of average everydayness to a 
Heideggerian authentic life; nor is it the exaltation experienced in liturgy, mystical 
ecstasy or spiritual enlightenment. Such transcendences approach the original 
relationship between the same and the other as a passage from the self towards an 
abstract totality, whether human or divine, which is able to gather into some unity both 
the same and the other. Further, a philosophy of transascendence is also to be 
distinguished from philosophies of immanence which, beginning from subjective 
interiority, lead on to an objective totality or a universal and anonymous reconciled 
history. All of these fail to take account of separation, and do not, therefore, represent 
true transcendence. A true philosophy of transcendence is a philosophy of 
transascendence for it recognises that the Other to whom the self is ordered does not 
approach us on the same plane or within the same horizon. A horizontal understanding 
of the other leads to a false transcendence. True transcendence, as transascendence, is 
characterised by a relationship with the Other in his or her verticality. The approach of 
the other is always from on high, and his appeal is always by way of command and 
injunction. 
Levinas illustrates false transcendence when, in Sur Maurice Blanchot, he 
addresses the relationship of the Same with the Other (autrni). Using the image of 
someone who steps back to allow a child's carriage to pass, he notes that 'the one draws 
back before the other,' and suggests the interpretation that 'the one is for the other.'58 
Now, such a natural, almost spontaneous, courtesy and recognition of the Other would 
seem to place us outwith the economy of being with its self-interested hope of return or 
profit, but, says Levinas, such an interpretation would be false. What really happens is 
that the self, solicitous for it own being and its perseverance in being - the conatus 
essendi - has shown a 'devotion' to others (autrui), even to the point of annulling its own 
57 Descartes, Meditations. 45 
58 E Levinas, SMB, p.68 
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egoism, but this happens in accordance with the expected courtesies of Western society. 
Altruistic consciousness always returns to itself. It is not enough 'to suffer for others 
(autrui) and in others (autrui)' for this is not 11 dis-inter-estedness 11 (des-inter-essement). 
'Suffering for and in others (autres)?' Levinas asks, 'It is the others (autres) who make 
me suffer!' 59 Suffering for or in others (autrui) is no more than a 'consolidation of the 
self or an 'abnegation which is only a detour of European individualism and hardening 
(durcissement) of the self, which admits to no more than the affirmation that '"I 11 am 
stronger than others.'60 Ultimately, altruism flows from the freedom of the self, and 
affirms the self in its freedom. The situation of giving way to others is more radical than 
a question of offering my self for and in others. In involves a transcendence towards the 
other which does not take its origin or find its initiative in the self. Forthomme 
concludes that, for Levinas, true transcendence is otherwise: 'la transcendence veritable 
se produit comme le dessaisissement de la surprenante solidite de /'existence soucieuse 
d'elle-meme. Se/on lui, la transcendance vraie ne peut se passer que comme un de-
rapage du conatus essendi ou de l'irremissible perseverance dans l'etre.'61 
Now, to affirm true transcendence as transascendence is to introduce the 
dimension of height. Contemporary philosophy, characterised by horizontalism, situates 
the other within a horizon, but horizons always demand a point of departure which is 
subject or subjectively centred. For Levinas, it is the vertical relation (dehiscence 
verticale) which is pre-original or pre-archic. Although this may have theological 
resonances, the transascendent move is not a theological movement. The other of whom 
Levinas writes is not, at this stage, a Divine Other but the other who is proximate as 
neighbour.62 Transcendence does not only involve ascension (scandere); it is also 
59 E Levinas, SMB, p.69 
60 ibid. 
61 B Forthomme, op.cit., p.168 
62 Levinas, however, finds the condition of possibility of the relationship 
with the other person in God, who is the excluded third in the relationship. The illeity 
of alterity is sustained by the trace of the Other (Autre) of the other (autrni). In the 
ethical relationship with the Other, 
'God is drawn out of objectivity, presence and being. He is neither an 
object nor an interlocutor. His absolute remoteness, his transcendence, 
turns into my responsibility - non-erotic par excellence - for the other. 
And this analysis implies that God is not simply the "first other," the 
"other par excellence," or the "absolutely other, 11 but other than the other 
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transitive (trans). It brings together two movements: the traversing of the emptiness of 
an interval and, at the same time, the enjambement (enjambement) of stepping over 
( enjambement) this while changing level. 
The model of height also entails a reversal. The relation between the higher and 
the lower does not first proceed from experience and then find metaphysical application. 
Rather, it is the approach of the other from on high which gives significance to any 
image of height or depth. Height is principally not a relation within geometric space, 
but is the experience of utter alterity. According to Levinas, height has a metaphysical 
status; it cannot be reduced to any experience of the body's own verticality. It is because 
I am ordered towards height in metaphysical desire that the human body finds its 
position in a space where one can distinguish between the low and the high. He writes 
in La Signification et Le Sens, stressing the anteriority of meaning in respect of the 
cultural situation in which people find themselves, that 
'before Culture and Aesthetics, signification is found in Ethics, the 
presupposition of all Culture and all signification. Morality does not 
belong to Culture: it allows it to be judged, and discovers the dimension 
of height. Height orders being. 
Height introduces meaning (sens) into being. It is already lived 
throughout human bodily experience. It leads human societies to erect 
altars. It is not on account of their bodies that human beings have an 
experience of the vertical which places the human under the sign of 
height. It is because being orders itself towardS height that the human 
body is placed in a space where the high and the low are distinguished 
and discovers the sky which, for Tolstoy's Prince Andrew - without any 
[autre qu'autrui], other otherwise, other with an alterity prior to the 
alterity of the other, prior to the ethical bond with another and different 
from every neighbour, transcendent to the point of absence, to the point 
of possible confusion with the stirring of the there is. In this confusion 
the substitution for the neighbour gains in dis-interestedness, that is, 
in nobility, and the transcendence of the Infinite arises in glory' (ibid., 
God and Philosophy, Collected Philosophical Papers, pp.165-166; see, 
'Dieu et la Philosophie,' in De Dieu qui vient, pp.114-115). 
God is accessible as the counterpart of the justice I render to my neighbour because in 
the opening of illeity one finds the trace of God. God, as pre-originary, God as excluded 
third, "assures the condition of possibility of ethics as the very possibility of the 
beyond." (Ibid., La Trace de l'autre, p.141). In transcendence, 'the distinction between 
transcendence towards the other man and transcendence towards God must not be made 
too quickly' (ibid., 'La Philosophie et L'Eveil, p. l 04) Although the Other 'is indispensable 
for my relation with God' (TI, p.78) for there can be no "knowledge" of God outwith the 
social relation, nevertheless and conversely, God is the indispensable other than the ot_her 
[autre qu'autrui] who, as absolutely excluded third, makes possible the relationship with 
true alterity - the illeity of the Other - which is maintained in his trace. 
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word of the text evoking colours - is utter height.' 63 
In other words, as already outlined in Existence and Existents, whose theme is 
the subject's 'position in Being,'64 the position of a subject in Being - the emplacement 
of the I - is to be understood as a condition and a base for any relationship with the 
world and things within the world rather than as that relationship itself, which is how 
localisation is normally understood. It is from a position as a subject, which is the 
positing of a subject, that any localised position of a subject is possible. 'The here we 
are starting with, the here of position, precedes every act of understanding, every 
horizon and all time.165 Position is not added to consciousness; rather it is a point of 
departure out of which consciousness arises. Position's antithesis is not the freedom of 
being suspended, of being 'off the ground,' but is the destruction or displacement of the 
subject, as when, for instance, great emotions overwhelm and destroy our equilibrium, 
dislocating us even though we are in a concrete place. 
True transcendence, then, as transascendence, acknowledges the utter separation 
between the self and the other. But this is to exclude any form of homogeneity, and 
admit a radical heterogeneity between the self and the other which contests the priority 
which philosophy traditionally ascribes to the I. It is this radical heterogeneity which 
lies at the heart of the ethical relation, making possible the reversal of the philosophical 
enterprise. The situation in which philosophy finds itself can be overturned, for it has 
already and always been overturned in the ethical relation. 'Metaphysics is enacted in 
ethical relations,'66 As Levinas writes, '[i]f ontology ... is impossible ... it is because the u '\. 
comprehension of Being in general cannot dominate the relationship with the Other.'67 
'[T]his relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this relation with an existent -
precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation in Being. Ontology presupposes 
metaphysics.168 
Now, like Rahner, Levinas sees metaphysics as involving transcendence in two 
63 E Levinas, HAH, p.58 
64 idem, EE, p.60 
65 ibid., p.71 
66 idem, TI, p.79 
67 ibid., p.47 
68 ibid., p.48 
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senses. There is the subjective experience of transcendence in which the confines of 
subjectivity are breached, and there is the objective transcendence of alterity. Rahner 
distinguishes the subjective 'original experience of transcendence,'69 an 'original basic 
realisation of man's transcendence as mind and freedom,' 70 and the Whither of 
transcendence, implicit in the human experience of transcendence as its counterpart and 
its transcendental condition of possibility. 'The Whither is not experienced in itself, but 
only in the subjective transcendence and it is known only unobjectivatedly.'71 The 
'Whither of transcendence can only be spoken of in terms of experience of 
transcendence as the limitless openness of the subject itself.'72 This 'Whither,' as 
absolute transcendence, is the source or attraction for the spirit's transcendence, 'the 
primordial and fundamental which is the ultimate transcendental condition of possibility 
of knowledge.'73 Although the Whither of human transcendence is, as Levinas might 
express it, 'absolutely other,' 'wholly infinite,' nonetheless it offers itself to the subject, 
in the self-communication of grace, in proximity, as the horizon which is 'the condition 
of possibility of all spiritual understanding and insight,' 74 and which 'gives [human] 
transcendence its reality .'75 This 'abiding mystery of God is not merely the asymptotic 
point of refuge which provides it with its goal.'76 Rather, the abiding mystery discloses 
itself 'to achieve a state of absolute immediacy and proximity to him, and in this act of 
self-communication itself sustains this transcendental movement on the part of man 
himself.'77 
Further, just as Levinas demands extenonty as a defense for subjectivity, 
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evidence independently, so subjectivity as understood by Rahner, following Marechal's 
thinking, demands the affirmation of an absolute if the subjective experience of 
transcendence is not to be frustrated, and the subject itself is not to be groundless. Act 
and its finality constitute a unity. For Marechalian dynamism, the transcendental 
reduction of spiritual dynamism ultimately demands the transcendental deduction of the 
ontological affirmation, that is the affirmation of an absolute towards which subjectivity 
is oriented. 
Now, to make the ontological affirmation (Marechal-Rahner) or to affirm 
exteriority as sustaining subjectivity (Levinas) is also to affirm a source of intelligibility 
beyond the subject. Levinas, albeit operating with an understanding of Being which 
does not coincide with that of Rahner, as we hope to show, expresses this by saying that 
'[t]he intelligibility of transcendence is not something ontological.'78 The phenomenality 
of what is other than the subject is interrupted by the transcendence which signifies 
phenomenally but whose proper meaning lies beyond the phenomenon. Rahner will 
indicate this by speaking of 'even our sublimest ontological ideals' as being 
'approximate' to the absolute,79 which, as absolute transcendence, always exercises 
mastery over the subjective. 
1The orientation of transcendence cannot be mastered but consists in the 
infinite, silent mastery over us in that moment and indeed always when, 
by making a judgement on it, we begin to master something by making 
it subject to the laws of our a priori reason. It is not merely given as the 
goal of transcendence itself (which means that, since this goal is not 
experienced in itself but is only known unobjectively in the experience 
of subjective transcendence, every thesis of ontologism is already 
avoided from this point of view alone) - and its presence, furthermore, 
is the presence of such a transcendence that it is always given only as the 
condition of possibility of a knowledge in categories and not by itself 
alone.180 
Thus, the unity of transcendental apperception, in which immanence always triumphs 
over transcendence'81 is broken up. Transcendence does not find its meaning within an 
ontological framework; it discovers it in ethics, for signification is contained in the 
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subject relates to what always and already exceeds the logic and meaning of being. To 
say that the ethical experience is an experience of transcendence and constitutes the first 
moment of philosophy is to recognise that subjectivity 
'is not, in the last analysis, the "I think" (which it is at first) or the unity 
of "transcendental apperception" ... [but] ... is, as a responsibility for 
the other, a subjection to the other. The I is a passivity more passive still 
than any passivity because it is straightaway in the accusative - oneself 
(soi) - and never was in the nominative; it is under the accusation of the 
Other, even though it be faultless. It is a hostage for the other, obeying 
a command before having heard it, faithful to a commitment that it 
never made, to a past which has never been present.'82 
Thus, the priority of the subject is contested, and the absolute significance of the Other 
asserted. 
4. 3 To be is to be conscious of .. 
Levinas seeks to place experience as the source of meaning in question, and 
assert the non-priority of the Same, that is, subjectivity as founded. He does so by 
contesting the representational understanding of consciousness, whereby consciousness 
is seen as constitutive of its object. In place of the stress on the act of being, Levinas 
draws attention to the essential passivity and receptivity of the subject, and to the fact 
that consciousness is already, in its very exercise, inadequate to its object. 
Within the tradition, 'Knowing is only understood in its proper essence when 
one begins with consciousness.'83 Consciousness is always specific. It has an 
intentionality which is always directed towards some object, although this specificity 
can be overlooked or forgotten in any theoretical consideration of it. Now, insofar as 
consciousness is intentional, it is linked to presence, and this presence is presence to 
being. 'The essential destiny of consciousness'84 would be the adequation of thought and 
being in knowledge. Now, insofar as consciousness intends being, it can, says Levinas, 
be articulated in terms of the intentionality of desire. But desire is not a purely conscious 
event, for it unconsciously goes beyond its object. The unconscious, however, says 




ibid., GP, p.136-137 
E Levinas, GP, p.129 
ibid., p.134 
SUBJECTIVITY 209 
compromises the sincerity of consciousness; consciousness has an ontological function, 
which philosophy has failed to recognise, in that it establishes a sincere relationship 
with the world which thereby becomes 'the field of a consciousness,'85 'a closed circle 
in which it stays by effacing every ulterior finality;' 86 the role of the unconscious is 
"before" the world arises. 
Levinas illustrates his understanding of consciousness by using the model of 
insomnia, and its relation to sleep and consciousness, and exposing it to a 
phenomenological reflection. Insomnia is a basic category or metacategory, which can 
be roused into consciousness or fall into sleep. Thus, consciousness is 'a modality or 
modification of insomnia. '87 While consciousness is consciousness of , an 
intentionality, insomnia is simply consciousness whose specificity has not been 
focused. It has no specific object, yet it is not an abstracted notion. Gathering into the 
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Maurice Blanchot writes of the 'experience of night' and insomnia when, in L'espace 
Litteraire. (The Space of Literature) he describes the writer's entry into 'nocturnal space' 
as the place of inspiration and the possibility of writing. Inspiration is an 'experience of 
night' (SL, p.163), but it is not an experience of that first night of welcoming and 
welcome sleep, that 'dear repose for limbs with travel tired' (Shakespeare, Sonnet 25), 
in which the day is surrendered and the burden of living laid aside. Such a night is really 
part of the kingdom of the day. Inspiration belongs to the other night, which is the 
appearance of 'everything has disappeared, when 'the dark does not seem dark enough, 
or death dead enough' (SL, p. 163). If the first night is the disappearance of everything, 
the other night is the appearance of disappearance. If the first night is the absence of 
presence, the other night is the presence of absence, an emptiness filled by a formless 
void. When all has disappeared what remains is the fact that the there is (ii y a) continues 
to rustle and murmur in the darkness, a 'muffled whispering, a noise one can hardly 
distinguish from silence' (p. 168), a wakefulness in the midst of the darkness, when there 
is no sound, no light, no self-awareness, but simply the oppressive presence, 'full of the 
nothingness of everything' (E Levinas, EE, p.58), which fills us with horror, and which is 
a trap impossible to escape. It is 'the long night of insomnia.' To sleep is to lay aside the 
day, but insomnia is a consigning to the night - the other night - when 'everything has 
disappeared' only to be replaced by a forceful absence. To sleep is to attempt to escape 
from existence, but insomnia is bare existence foiling this flight. Although every object has 
disappeared, there remains an impersonal presence which is 'neither a being nor 
consciousness functioning in a void, but the universal fact of the there is, which 
encompasses things and consciousness' (ibid., p.65). 
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terms the there is (ii y a). Insomnia is wakefulness and 'wakefulness is anonymous.'88 
The category of the substantive is disrupted and there is 'not only the disappearance of 
every object, but the extinction of the subject.'89 As insomniac, 'I am, one might say, the 
object rather than the subject of an anonymous thought.'9° Consciousness, however, 
modifies this anonymous relationship by giving the world. By the amplification of that 
resistance against anonymous and fateful being by which existence becomes 
consciousness... an escape from anonymity opens up and a subject is posited. 'To be 
conscious is to be torn away from the there is, since the existence of a consciousness 
constitutes a subjectivity, a subject of existence, that is, to some extent a master of 
being, already a name in the anonymity of the night.'91 The significance of 
consciousness and sleep is that it provides an escape from, and victory over, the 
anonymity of the ii y a, and the first affirmation of the self. 'Consciousness appeared to 
stand out against the there is by its ability to forget and interrupt it, by its ability to 
sleep,'92 and sleep, as a lapse from consciousness into unconsciousness 'is not a new life 
which is enacted beneath life; it is a participation in life by non-participation, by the 
elementary act of resting.'93 As wakefulness or vigilance, insomnia, 'far from being 
definable as a simple negation of the natural phenomenon of sleep, belongs to the 
categorial, antecedent to all anthropological attention and hebetude.'94 Insomnia is not 
the vigilance of the sentinel on the parapet peering into the shadows for some ill-defined 
figure which can be identified and 'clothed with a form'95 by which it would make its 
appearance to consciousness. Such a vigilance, exercised in the shadows, in the 
kingdom of the night, seeks ~ bring something into the kingdom of the day and its 6 \. 
light, to identify and thematise it and set it among the same. Such a 'watching for' is a 
88 E Levinas, EE, p.66 
89 ibid., p.67 
90 ibid., p.66 
91 ibid.,"p.60 
92 ibid., p.67 
93 ibid., p.69 
94 idem, GP, p.129 
95 idem, EE, p.40 
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seeking of the Same. The watchfulness of insomnia is different. It is simply 'watching'. 
The vigilance of insomnia is simply vigil; it is a waiting rather than awaiting (as waiting 
for). 'It is consciousness alone that is watching .... '96 Levinas distinguishes attention and 
vigilance. Attention is intentional; it is turned towards objects; vigilance, however is 
'absorbed in the rustling of the unavoidable being' .97 'Vigilance is quite devoid of 
objects.'98 It has no subject on which to focus. It is situated in the anonymous void left 
by absence, the there is (ii y a) which is not outwith presence, but is a bare, objectless 
presence in which watching has nothing to watch for. 'Insomnia or wakefulness is 
without intentionality; it is dis-interested. It has an indeterminateness which does not 
call for a form.... It is uncontained - infinity.'99 Now, it is this intentionality which 
distinguishes consciousness from insomnia. Consciousness is directed towards an object 
other than itself, and it is the presence of this radically alien object which disturbs 
. . 
msomma. 
'Consciousness has already broken with this dis-interestedness. It is the 
identity of the Same, the presence of Being, the presence of presence .... 
Presence is only possible as a return of consciousness to itself, outside 
of sleep - and it is thus connected with insomnia .... Presence is only 
possible as an incessant renewal of presence, as an incessant re-
presentation... It is representation which is the very possibility of a 
return.' 100 
As a category or metacategory, insomnia 'is disturbed in the core of its formal or 
categorical sameness by the Other which tears away at whatever forms a nucleus of, in 
insomnia, substance in the Same, a nucleus of identity, repose, presence, sleep. 
Insomnia is disturbed by the Other which breaks this repose.' 101 
96 idem, GP, p.130 
97 idem, EE, p.65 
98 ibid. 




4.31 Phenomenology and Ontology 
Levinas recognises in the new phenomenological method initiated by Husserl's 
Logische Untersuchungen, the 'soul of the phenomenological movement,' 102 but 
recognises also the need to go beyond a representational understanding of 
consciousness, linked as it is to presence. 'Husserl,' says Levinas, 'had an intuition of 
his philosophy before he made it a philosophy of intuition,' 103 and so, in his method, 
'anticipate[ d] the "meaning" of the being which is approached.' 104 The science of the 
meaning of being was in some way a priori to a knowledge of the properties of being. 
Husserl thus forged a link between method and ontology. It is this link which Levinas 
pursues in his Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology which seeks to show 
'how the intuition which [Husserl] proposes as a mode of philosophising follows from 
his very conception of being.1105 As Andre Orianne notes, one of the 'major theses' of 
Levinas' work is that 'phenomenology transcends its apparently epistemological starting 
point to develop into a fully fledged ontology.' 106 What Levinas finds significant in 
Husserlian phenomenology is that, in 'discovering the unsuspected horizons within 
which the real is situated, apprehended by representative thought...' 107 Husserl showed 
'that consciousness and represented Being emerge from a non-representative 
"context. "'108 
Now, like Rahner who seeks the philosophical event in Aquinas rather than 
undertake a historical approach, Levinas avoids a historical approach to Husserl in order 
to 'study and present Husserl's philosophy as one studies and presents a living 
philosophy.' 109 According to Levinas, the progress of the natural and historical sciences 
in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century had led to the belief 'that the 
102 idem, TIPH, p. xxxi 
103 ibid., p. xxxii 
104 ibid. 
105 idem, TIPH, p.xxxii 
106 A Orianne, Translator's Introduction, in E Levinas, TIPH, p.xiii 
107 E Levinas, Signature, in Difficile Liberte, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1976), 
p.406 
108 ibid. 
109 E Levinas, TIPH, p. xxxiii 
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sciences exhaust the totality of what can be known of being, so that, at first, philosophy 
seems to be without an object. 11 ' 0 Only epistemology, as a critique of the criteria 
employed by scientific and historical investigation, remained. Thus, 'the identification 
of philosophy and theory of knowledge, the latter being understood as a reflection on 
the sciences.' 111 The singularity of the scientific approach, however, led to a 
universalisation of its underlying naturalism at an ontological level. But, 'the structure 
of being which is the object of ontology is not everywhere the same: diverse regions of 
being (Seinsregionen) have a different constitution and cannot be thought of by means 
of the same categories.' 112 Further, this difference is not only essential, but also a 
difference in existence. 'To exist does not mean the same thing in every region." 13 It is 
this question regarding the existence of being forby its essence which is for Husserl, 
according to Levinas, the new ontological problem. The naturalisation of ontology gives 
rise to the naturalisation of consciousness. 'If to be is to be part of nature, then 
consciousness, through which nature is known, must also be part of nature inasmuch as 
it claims to exist. Otherwise it would be nothing." 14 The consequence of this is a 
categorial understanding of consciousness, like nature, in terms of causality, which 
explains its relation to reality. The path to knowledge supposes the mediation of the 
material basis of the world which, by acting upon the senses, causes knowledge, and so 
'[ o ]ne must start from what is immediately given and go back to that reality which 
accounts for what is given.' 115 
Now, to counter naturalistic ontology, Husserl proposes a phenomenological 
theory of being which asserts the absolute existence of consciousness, and which 
addresses the problem that '[i]f to be means to exist the way nature does, then everything 
which is given as refractory to the categories and to the mode of existence of nature 
will, as such, have no objectivity and will be, a priori and unavoidably, reduced to 
something natural.ti 16 Further, ethics, aesthetics and all that can be said to contribute to 
110 ibid., p. xxxv 
111 ibid. 
112 ibid., p. 3 
113 ibid., p.4 
114 ibid., p.13 
115 ibid., p.15 
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the meaning of human life, insofar as possessing any objectivity, are thereby called into 
question. 'As long as the naturalistic ontology is accepted, existence, including the 
existence of nature, is not determined by the meaning of life. Rather, life itself must, in 
order to exist, be conceived on the model of nature. 1117 To go beyond naturalism 
conclusively, the very notion of being had to be examined 'to show that the origin of all 
being, including that of nature, is determined by the intrinsic meaning of conscious life 
and not the other way round.ti 18 'We must therefore determine which theory of being 
may, negatively, detach itself from the naturalistic ideal of existence and may, 
positively, rely solely on the internal meaning of life.ti 19 In other words, 'the world of 
transcendent res necessarily depends on (ist angewiesen an) consciousness.' 120 
Now, because material reality extends beyond present perception, the concept 
of consciousness must include more than the central sphere of awakened and active 
consciousness; objects stand out against a horizon against which they are perceived, and 
this is a necessary part of the structure of consciousness - 'Each perception is an ex-
ception (jedes Erfassen ist ein Herausfassen).t1 21 'Cogitation makes the cogitatum its 
own by extracting it from a background which constantly accompanies it and which may 
become itself the object of an Herausfassen.' 122 This background does not, however, 
exist independently of the conscious subject, for although the marginal background 
against which objects make their appearance is always present, though not to actual 
conscious life, it nonetheless belongs to the sphere of possibilities implied in actual 
consciousness as the not-yet-actualised or potential consciousness. It is this opposition 
between actual and potential consciousness which enables any understanding of the 
independence of the material world with respect to subjectivity. 'It is an independence 
only with respect to actual consciousness. '123 In other words, and in sum, 'the existence 
117 ibid. 
118 ibid., p.18 
119 ibid. 
120 ibid., p.19, quoting Ideen, 49 
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of an unperceived material thing can only be its capability of being perceived.1124 
Physical objects exist relative to consciousness, but they are not exhausted by the 
multiplicity of their aspects. 'The aspects which we see at any given moment always 
indicate further aspects,' 125 - virtually infinitely. 'Things are never known in their 
totality; an essential character of our perception of them is that of being inadequate.1126 
Levinas maintains that Husserl's analysis places the problem on a new level 
because it does not make assertions about whether or not things exist, but rather about 
the very mode of existence of external things. He says, 
'the existence of material things contains in itself a nothingness, a 
possibility of not-being. This does not mean that things do not exist but 
that their mode of existing contains precisely the possible negation of 
itself.... [O]ne must take this possible negation as a constitutive element 
of the very existence of things.' 127 
In other words, things present themselves according to a duality: a being is intimated, 
but it is intimated in an infinite sequence of subjective phenomena. 'Contingency, here, 
is not a relation between the essence and the existence of an object but a determination 
of the existence itself. The purely phenomenal character of the existence of external 
things which Kant determines by opposition to the "things in themselves" appears here 
as an internal determination of this existence.' 128 Phenomenality is not in opposition to 
the noumenon, but the exposition of the noumenon. The traditional epistemological 
theory which debates how a subject and an object come into contact is seen as posing 
a fictitious problem, for 'the origin of the very idea of "an object" is to be found in the 
concrete life of a subject.' 129 
For Husserl, consciousness is to be posited as an absolute. It is that more original 
phenomenon of existence which alone makes possible traditional philosophy's 
distinction between subject and object, which according to the Husserlian concept of 
consciousness are two abstractions from the concrete phenomenon of intentional 
124 ibid., p.21 
125 ibid., pp.21-22 
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consciousness. 'For Husserl, consciousness is a primary domain which alone renders 
possible and comprehensible an 'object' and a 'subject', terms that are already 
derivative.1130 The fundamental intuition of Husserl's philosophy, says Levinas, 'consists 
of attributing absolute existence to concrete conscious life and transforming the very 
notion of conscious life.1131 Levinas writes, 
'We are taking as a starting point "consciousness" in the pregnant sense 
of the term, in the sense which first comes to mind and which can most 
easily be expressed as the Cartesian cogito, as "I think". As we know, 
Descartes understood the cogito in a wide sense, in such a way as to 
include any state such as: "I perceive, I remember, I imagine, I judge, I 
desire, I want" and similarly, all analogous ego states (Icherliebnisse) in 
their innumerable successive formations.1132 
In line with his rejection of a phenomenal understanding of reality, Husserl maintains 
that these Erliebnisse are not simply a region of reality alongside the world of nature. 
'Consciousness has in itself its proper being .... It constitutes a region of being original 
in principle.' 133 Again, '[t]here emerges an essential and fundamental difference between 
being qua consciousness and being qua thing . .i 34 'In this way is intimated a difference 
in principle between the modes of existence of consciousness and of reality, the most 
important difference that there is.1135 
Now, like the indubitably certain cogito which Descartes posited as 
foundational, Husserl, by positing consciousness as an absolute, sees consciousness as 
foundational. Husserl, however, goes further than Descartes, for the absoluteness of 
consciousness does not simply apply to the certainty of the truths of consciousness but 
to the very existence of consciousness itself. In fact, '[t]he absolute evidence of the 
cogito is founded on the mode of being of consciousness'136 which is not merely as an 
object of reflection, for conscious life exists even when it is not an object of reflection. 
Rather, 'the existence of consciousness reveals its independence with respect to internal 
130 E Levinas, TIPH, p.35 
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perception, as opposed to external objects, whose very existence refers us back to 
consciousness.' 137 'To summarise: consciousness presents itself as a sphere of absolute 
existence. This absolute existence not only expresses the indubitable character of the 
cogito but also, qua positive determination of the very being of consciousness, founds 
the possibility of an indubitable cogito.' 138 It is here that the difference between the 
Cartesian cogito and the Husserlian cogito is to be found. Descartes undertook an 
analysis of knowledge. 139 Since sensibility is subject to error, the external world could 
be doubted. Only the cogito is indubitable. However, Descartes does not question the 
evidence for the cogito; his analysis stops short of the ontological foundation of 
consciousness which renders this evidence possible. Husserl, on the other hand, holds 
that the necessary existence of consciousness does not follow from the cogito; rather it 
allows a cogito. Descartes halted too soon. 'Once he had reached, in consciousness, a 
domain of absolute existence, he did not see that the term 'existence' is used there with 
a quite different meaning from the one it has when applied to the world of spatial 
things.r1 4o Husserl's development lies in the fact that he sees that '[t]he evidence of the 





139 One needs to acknowledge at this stage that a more deconstructionist 
reading of Descartes would question whether or not Descartes' concern was simply 
epistemological. Andrew Benjamin, in The Plural Event: Descartes. Hegel. Heidegger 
(Routledge, London, 1993), writes, '[t]he Meditations open with doubt. An opening stated 
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within the wider strategy of the text there is more, as has been argued, than just the 
connection of doubt to narrowly epistemological concerns. Doubt is linked to the strategy 
of deconstruction and the possibility of philosophical inauguration; the inception of the 
transcendental' (p.37). 
140 E Levinas, TIPH, p.32 
SUBJECTIVITY 218 
appearing characterises the very being of external things.1141 The knowledge of an object 
cannot be separated from its being, and so Descartes theory of knowledge gives way to 
a theory of being in Husserl. What needs emphasised here is the primacy of 
consciousness and its absolute existence. Consciousness does not lie behind being but 
is itself being, and it is within the sphere of consciousness that the meaning of existence 
is to be sought, and naturalism overcome. Being is to be understood in tenns of 
subjectivity rather than substance. Naturalism depends on consciousness, which it 
presupposes as its source. 'The world of nature, from which naturalism derives its notion 
of existence, only exists in the measure in which it enters the life of consciousness.1142 
4.32 Levinas' Criticisms of Husserl: 
Levinas recognises that, 'by overcoming the substantialist concept of existence, 
[Husserl] was able to demonstrate that a subject is not something that first exists and 
then relates to objects.' 143 A subject is constituted in tenns of intentionality. 
'Intentionality is what makes up the very subjectivity of subjects,' 144 and' ... intentionality 
is constitutive of all forms of consciousness.' 145 For Husserl, intentionality is 'a genuine 
act of transcendence;' but more, it is 'the prototype of any transcendence. '146 The 
problem is that this intentional directedness towards an object has as its aim not simply 
the objectivity of the object with respect to the subject but the representation of the 
object to the subject. As Levinas writes, '[fJor him [Husserl], representation will always 
be the foundation of all acts.' 147 In other words, Being and knowing ultimately collapse 
into each other. 'For a theory of intuition, the primacy of theoretical consciousness is of 
the first importance .... The act of intuition, which brings us into contact with being, will 
141 ibid. 
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be first and foremost a theoretical act, an objectifying act, and it remains so despite the 
modifications that ldeen will try to introduce into the notion of an objectifying act.1148 
The transcendence of the subject remains, for Husserl, within the sphere of 
consciousness and continues to be the problem of knowledge. At the beginning of the 
Logische Untersuchungen. II, the problem is put thus: 'How are we to understand the 
fact that the intrinsic being of objectivity becomes "presented", "apprehended" in 
knowledge, and so ends up by becoming subjective?1149 'How does thought transcend 
itself? What does consciousness aim at when it transcends itself? In other words, 'the 
various problems of knowledge are reduced to the problem of how objects are 
constituted by consciousness.' 150 And it is this constitution of an object by subjective 
consciousness, which possesses its own inherent ontological value, which constitutes 
the meaningful existence of an object. 'To be is to be experienced or to have a meaning 
in life.1151 
Now, although Husserl asserts the primacy of theory, Levinas notes at the end 
of The Theory of Intuition that Husserl also locates being in a concrete life, which, 
besides being theoretical, is also intentional in its practical and aesthetic aspects. 
However, at the root of these, one continues to find 'the ontological activity of 
consciousness' whose investment seeks a comprehensive return as presence and 
representation. 152 Nonetheless, although always founded on a purely theoretical 
experience, these 'aesthetic and ethical categories are also constitutive of being and their 
mode of existing, and of meeting consciousness have a specific structure.' 153 The 
question can thus be asked whether the affirmation of the intentional character of 
practical and axiological life1154 provides a way beyond Husserl's confinement to 
theoretical consciousness, whether there is the possibility of 'another direction besides 
that of a tendency going to its term,' 'an affectivity which breaks with the form and 
148 ibid., p. 63 
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purpose of consciousness, and leaves immanence.1155 But this is to raise again Kant's 
questions, 'What must I do?' and 'What have I the right to hope for?' 
4. 4 The Idea of Infinity: Descartes and the Cogito: 
Levinas recognises in Husserl's positing of consciousness as absolute, the 
development of the Cartesian epistemological understanding of the cogito to an 
ontological understanding. Consciousness as absolute is, for Husserl, not simply 
expressive of the indubitability of the cogito but is the very possibility of the cogito. 
Levinas, however, returns to Descartes' understanding of the cogito to read it not 
ontologically, as Husserl does, but to re-read it in a cl6tural manner in order to overturn 
'the universal validity and primordial character of intentionality,' 156 which is Husserl's 
position. That Descartes should not be read ontologically, as in Husserl, but re-read with 
a view which is other than ontological, taken in Levinas' sense of the ontological as 
totality, is confirmed in Andrew Benjamin's deconstructive reading of the Meditations. 
155 idem, GP, p.132 
156 ibid. 
'Cl6tural reading articulates the ethical interruption of ontological closure, 
thereby disrupting the text's claims to comprehensive unity and self-understanding .... 
A cl6tural reading of a text would consist, first, of a patient and scholarly commentary 
following the main lines of the text's dominant interpretation, and second, in locating 
an interruption or alterity within that dominant interpretation where reading discovers 
insights within a text to which that text is blind. My governing claim is that these 
insights, interruptions or alterities are moments of ethical transcendence, in which a 
necessity other than that of ontology announces itself within the reading, an event in 
which the ethical Saying of a text overrides the ontological Said. This is very much the 
way in which Levinas reads the idea of infinity in Descartes' Meditations or the Good 
beyond Being (epikeina tes ousias) in Plato's Republic, texts from the ontological 
tradition which resist claims to totality and comprehension and adumbrate an ethical 
structure irreducible to ontology' (S Critchley, op. cit., pp.30-31 ). 
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Benjamin argues that Descartes' method of doubt is not purely epistemological 
but is 'part of the strategy that involves overcoming the totality - the "all" (omnia) - that 
has been handed downt1 57 in the philosophical tradition. When Descartes doubts, what 
is doubted is not simply the cogito 's knowledge of a particular object. In such a 
framework, the cogito, as 'that which is excluded from the doubt [becomes] the 
possibility of knowledge itself.' 158 Descartes' 'move to the transcendental,' away from 
the consideration of knowledge of specific objects, is a move which is not aimed at 
grasping the totality of known and knowable objects of which the cogito would form the 
ontological basis, 'but to the possibility, and thus the ground of possibility of knowledge 
itself.' 159 
Now, for Descartes, it is not simply the cogito which provides a foundation for 
knowledge and thus, in Husserl's reading, an ontological basis for epistemology. There 
is also the demand for the veracity of God, a need for a beyond to the system to whom 
the evidence can be offered and who will vouchsafe the evidence. In other words, being 
is already disrupted at its core by an alterity which sustains the ontology which being 
itself supports. Ontology as foundation is already and always founded. Thus, Levinas 
can say that what counts truly in Husserlian intentionality is not the defining character 
of thought but 'the idea of the overflowing of objectifying thought by a forgotten 
experience from which it lives.' 160 The formal structure of thought is already broken up 
'into events which this structure dissimulates, but which sustain it and restore its 
concrete significance.' 161 Levinas' methodological task will be to pursue this disruption 
of ontology which is always and already occasioned by the ethical intervention of the 
157 A Benjamin, op. cit., p.34 
Benjamin argues that the tradition operates by endless repetition which is 
established as the framework for understanding. Descartes, by asking 'Quid igitur erit 
verum?' (ll182), and not simply 'Quid est vernm?' refuses 'tradition's gift' and so raises 
the question beyond the purely epistemological in order to seek the grounds for the 
possibility of knowledge. 'The premise is that the conditions handed down for the 
acquisition and guarantee of such knowledge were no longer germane, and that therefore 
the enjoined task was to establish anew new conditions' (ibid., p.43). 
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other. With regard to Benjamin's deconstructionist reading of Descartes, the important 
point regarding Descartes' 'professed doubt concerning the existence of God,' 162 
concerns method. The question of the existence of God is not directly raised in the Third 
Meditation; rather, 'the force of this particular instance of doubt is to be located in how 
it is overcome; in other words in how God's existence is to be established and the 
knowledge of that existence presented.' 163 What matters is not the existence of the idea, 
but its coming to be clearly and distinctly perceived. As Descartes says, 'No one is able 
to deny that such an idea of God is in us' (l//,124), and that it can be had clearly and 
distinctly. It is the method which has priority, for, 'to the extent that it is this method that 
establishes, within and for philosophy, the existence of Go<L then, as has been 
suggested, it must be the method which has philosophical priority.' 164 God is only 
introduced post factum as the guarantor of the method, though, says Benjamin, this has 
no philosophical justification or necessity, for 'the use of method need make no 
reference to God.' 165 The existence of God only comes into play and can be linked to the 
faculty of knowledge when the method establishes God as being beyond doubt since 
clearly and distinctly perceived. 
Now for Levinas, the 'overcoming of the totality' as part of the inaugural event 
of philosophy, which Benjamin speaks of and recognises in Descartes' new method, is 
the overcoming of the ontological tradition of Western philosophy; for Levinas, it is 
Descartes' insight into the Cogito's relation to the idea of the Infinite which holds the 
key to this, for the idea of the infinite disrupts the power of consciousness and leads 
beyond ontology. He writes, 'what we find most distinctive is the Cartesian analysis of 
the idea of infinity, although we shall retain only the formal design of the structure it 
outlines.' 166 It might be useful at this stage to outline Descartes own thought in his Third 
Meditation to grasp better what Levinas says. 
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'principle argument for proving the existence of God.' 167 Descartes affirms himself as 
res cogitans - 'I am a thing that thinks,' - and of this he is certain: 'I am certain that I am 
a thinking thing.' Yet doubt belongs properly to thinking, and having doubted all else 
that is perceived, how is it possible not to doubt himself as a thinking being? It could 
well be that he, as res cogitans, is subject to deception for perhaps there is a deceiving 
God. In fact, it may be that God, whose veracity acts as co-foundation for what can be 
known clearly and distinctly, may not exist at all. So, 'in order to remove this slight 
reason for doubt, as soon as the opportunity arises I must examine whether there is a 
God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this, it seems 
that I can never be quite certain about anything else.' 168 
Descartes proceeds by classifying his thoughts in order to discern which might 
properly be called true and which false. Some can be described as ideas - such as man, 
angels or God; some take as their object the particular as in willing, fearing, affirming 
or denying and may be either volitional, emotional or judgemental, but 'include 
something more than the likeness of that thing.' 169 Now, emotions and volitions are non-
problematical for their objects, so willed or felt, need not necessarily exist other than for 
me as a thinking subject; judgement, however, is not only about an idea, but, as in 
Aquinas and pursued by Marechal, affinns the objective status of that idea, and 'the 
chief and most common mistake which is to be found here consists in my judging that 
the ideas which are in me resemble, or confonn to, things located outside me.' 170 The 
reason for this attribution of existence to external objects needs to be considered, for 
nature, as experience teaches, may be a false teacher. Perhaps a consideration of 
causality may help, for 'there must be at least as much [reality] in the efficient and total 
cause as in the effect of that cause.' 171 In other words, the effect cannot be greater than 
the cause, both formally and objectively, since 'for a given idea to contain such and such 








For judgement as affinnation in Aquinas, see K Rahner, Thomas Aquinas on Truth 
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much formal reality as there is objective reality in the idea.' 172 But there cannot be an 
infinite regress; 'eventually one must reach a primary idea, the cause of which will be 
like an archetype which contains formally [and in fact] all the reality [or perfection] 
which is present only objectively [or representatively] in the idea.' 173 If, then, there is an 
idea in me whose objective reality is such that I cannot be its cause, then my solitary 
existence in the world is contested and something other than my self needs to be posited. 
Now, of all the ideas that I have as a thinking thing, it seems that only the idea of God 
could not have originated in myself, since to have the idea of God is to have the idea of 
the infinite, whereas I am finite. Further, it is not that I perceive the idea of the infinite 
'merely by negating the finite;' the idea of the infinite is a true idea; further, since 'there 
is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite one ... my perception of the 
infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of the finite, that is 
myself.' 174 'It does not matter that I do not grasp the infinite, or that there are countless 
additional attributes of God which I cannot in any way grasp, and perhaps cannot even 
reach in my thought; for it is in the nature of the infinite not to be grasped by a finite 
being like myself.' 175 Descartes' conclusion, therefore, is that '[i]t is true that I have an 
idea of substance in me by virtue of that fact that I am a substance; but this would not 
account for my having the idea of an infinite substance, when I am finite, unless this 
idea proceeded from some substance which really was infinite.' 176 In other words, what 
is being discarded is the Socratic notion of maieutics whereby the role of the teacher is 
simply to draw out of the disciple what is already contained within. The idea of the 
infinite, insofar as it is a teaching, teaches by placing within us what would otherwise 
not be there. 'The idea of infinity ... has been put into us ... The thinker who has the idea 
of infinity is more than himself, and this inflating, this surplus does not come from 
within, as in the celebrated project of modern philosophers, in which the subject 
172 ibid., 41 
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surpasses himself by creating.' 177 
Now, although Descartes' addresses the question of the existence of this Infinite 
Being which is God - though, as Benjamin points out, not directly - and conceives of 
it 'as an eminent being, or that being that is eminently,' 178 what Levinas is concerned 
with is not any proofs of God's existence in the Cartesian Meditations - '[s]uch proofs,' 
says Benjamin, 'are henceforth for Descartes, not in God's gift; neither proof nor 
knowledge of God are God given1179 - but with 'the break up of consciousness .. .' 180 The 
force of the idea of the infinite is that it 'breaks up the unity of the "I think" ,' 181 and it is 
this which is 'unsurpassable' in the Cartesian Meditation, and provides a methodological 
egress beyond the totality. While Descartes considers a God 'that is eminently,' Levinas 
focuses a God 'that is eminently.' Eminence is not simply an indicator of a transcendence 
beyond finitude, but take us beyond being itself, 'otherwise than being, or beyond 
essence,' for '[w]e are outside the order in which one passes from an idea to a being.' 182 
The idea of the infinite, then, disrupts consciousness, interrupting its actuality 
as a first moment of consciousness, for the notion of the infinite, as Descartes says, is 
earlier than the finite and precedes any thought that the Cogito might actually think. 
Descartes reiterates this precedence of the infinite in his reply to the Fifth Objection to 
177 E Levinas, Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity, p.54. Levinas refers in a 
footnote to Heideggerian and Sartrean explanation of man as a project (Entwurf in Being 
and Time, pp.184-188, 263-266, 370-375; and pro-jet and pro-Jeter in Being and 
Nothingness, pp. 650-653). 
In Totality and Infinity, he writes that 'Socratic maieutics prevailed over a pedagogy 
that introduced ideas into a mind by violating or seducing (which amounts to the same 
thing) that mind' (p.171) whereas teaching is to be understood as a relationship with the 
'whole of infinity of exteriority.' 'Teaching is not a species of a genus called domination, 
a hegemony at work within a totality, but is the presence of infinity breaking the closed 
circle of totality' (p.171 ). It 'is a discourse in which the master can bring to the student what 
the student does not yet know. It does not operate as a maieutics, but continues the placing 
in me of the idea of infinity' (p.180). He continues by saying that '[t]his whole work 
[Totality and Infinity] seeks only to present the spiritual according to this Cartesian order, 
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the Third Meditation: 'it is false that the infinite is understood through a negation of a 
boundary or limit; on the contrary, all limitation implies a negation of the infinite . .i 83 
Phenomenologically speaking, the idea of the infinite 
'is an idea signifying with a signifyingness prior to presence, prior to all 
presence, prior to every origin in consciousness and thus an-archical, 
accessible in its trace. It signifies with a signifyingness from the first 
older than its exhibition, not exhausting itself in its exhibiting itself, not 
drawing its meaning from its manifestation, and thus breaking with the 
coincidence of Being and appearance in which, for Western philosophy, 
meaning or rationality lie, breaking with synopsia.' 184 
This priority of the infinite with respect to the finite contests an understanding of 
consciousness as origin. 'The idea of God breaks up the thought which is an investment, 
synopsis and synthesis and can only enclose in a presence, re-present, reduce to 
presence or let be.' 185 'The putting into us of an unincludable idea overturns the self-
presence which is consciousness .. .' 186 
Now, since the infinite precedes and founds any thought, the relationship of the 
finite Cogito to the Infinite cannot be one of that welcome and receptivity which derives 
from an already presupposed and constituted self; such a '[r]eceptivity is,' says Levinas, 
'a recollection that takes place in a welcome, as an assumption that takes place under the 
force of a blow received.' 187 With respect to the idea of infinity, the Cogito is passive. 
'The break up of the actuality of thought in the "idea of God" is a passivity more passive 
still than any passivity.1188 The idea of infinity is not thought, but is undergone. 
In fact, it is not possible for the idea of the infinite to be thought since thought 
is inadequate to the idea of the infinite, and it is here that the traditional understanding 
of knowledge, still evident in Husserl as the model of traversing a gap between the self 
and the Other in a representational act of consciousness and the consequent closing of 
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merging them,' 189 sustaining them rather as 'two distinct moments of evidence mutually 
founding one another.' 190 Distance is not closed, but maintained, and this is the essential 
meaning of separation. Again in his reply to the F!fth Objection, he responds to the 
criticism that 'the human intellect is not capable of conceiving infinity, and hence ... 
neither has nor can contemplate any idea representing an infinite thing,' and says that 
one must distinguish between 'an Wlderstanding which is suited to the scale of our 
intellect ... and a fully adequate conception of things.' 191 One can have the idea of the 
infinite without adequate comprehension of the infinite. In fact, it is the infinite's 
infinition, says Levinas, which is a constant opening up of distance and a maintenance 
of separation, which is known by the finite intellect. 'The distance between me and God, 
radical and necessary, is produced in being itself.' 192 At the core of finite being there is 
produced, as a foWlding moment, a transcendence towards alterity, a relationship 
between the self and the Other, which is not destroyed either by the radical 
transcendence of what is other or by any incorporation of the other into a whole. The 
relation is 'a relation with a reality infinitely distant from my own reality, yet without 
this relation destroying this distance, as would happen with relations within the 
same .. .' 193 It is a relation with what is radically outwith the possibility of relationship, 
but which, in its utter distance, makes the relation possible. This separation or 
transcendence of the Infinite with respect to the 11 I11 is the measure of the infinitude of 
the idea: 'the transcendence of the Infinite with respect to the I which is separated from 
it and which thinks it measures (so to speak) its very infinitude.' 194 Its infinition 
constitutes the content of the idea as incomprehensible and separate. 'The distance that 
separates ideatum and idea here constitutes the content of the ideatum itself.' 195 'Infinity 
does not enter into the idea of infinity, is not grasped; this idea is not a concept. The 
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the ego that is separated from it and thinks it constitutes the first mark of its 
infinitude.1196 
4. 41 The Agent Intellect and the Excess 
Levinas recognises that 'this presence in thought of an idea whose ideatum 
overflows the capacity of thought' 197 is given expression in the notion of intellectus 
agens in Aristotle, which Aquinas takes up, 198 and Rabner subsequently develops as the 
Vorgriff. 'The Aristotelian analysis of the intellect, which discovers the agent intellect 
coming in by the gates, absolutely exterior, and yet constituting, nowise compromising, 
the sovereign activity of reason, already substitutes for a maieutics a transitive action 
of the master, since reason, without abdicating, is found to be in a position to receive.' 199 
In de Anima, 430a 10 - 25, Aristotle recognises a potentiality and an actuality 
both in nature and in the soul.'200 The intellect can be said to be potential 'because it 
becomes all things' ( 6 7t ae'Tl nKo a v o u c;), but active 'because it makes all things' ( 6 
7t o i Tl nKo c; v o u c;) ( 430a 15-16). Now, although in the individual, potential knowledge, 
namely, the faculty of knowing, precedes actual knowledge, the priority is not 
absolute201 for the true nature of the intellect is to be separable, impassive, unmixed, and 
196 
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E Levinas, TI, p.49 
198 For Thomas' Commentary on Aristotle's teaching on the Agent Intellect, see 
In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium. Liber Ill Lectio X, 'Praeter possibilem 
inte/lectum, qui est omnia fieri, dari rursus in anima oportere alium agentum intellectum, 
qui est omnia facere, et qui est separabi/is, impassibilis, et immixtus actu, ostendit; 
conditiones item ponit ipsius inte/lectus in actu, concludens demum animae partem, 
intellectivam esse penitus a corpore separabi/em, cui compete! alius intelligendi modus, 
quam nunc habeat.' Marietti, Turin, 1925, pp.239 et seq. 
199 E Levinas, TI, p.51 
200 R D Hicks, Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1907), p.498 
201 In 43 0 a 21, Aristotle notes that, as potential knowledge does not precede 
actual knowledge in other respects, so neither does it precede in time, since before X 
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individual, but this potentiality was preceded by actuality in someone else. cf. the general 
temporal priority of evcpyux over 8cvtµcr in Metaph. I 049 b 17 f 
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therefore immortal and eternal. The faculty of knowing, as knowledge in potency, is 
surpassed by the act of knowing in which knowing and known are one. The active 
intellect, as cause, acts upon the passive intellect to bring it to actuality, in similar 
manner to an efficient cause acting upon matter, as potentiality, to realise its form, or 
actuality,202 as, for example, the iron in the hand of the artisan cannot pass from potency 
to act without some agency.203 In terms of intellect, the agency which realises 
knowledge is the active intellect. Hick renders a 14, 'the one intellect is passive, like 
matter, in that it becomes all objects, the other intellect is active, like the efficient cause, 
in that it makes all objects,'204 the sense being that 'passive intellect exists in so far as it 
becomes all objects, active intellect, in so far as it makes all objects.1205 Thus, in the 
same way that light makes potential colours actual colours, so v o u c; makes potential 
v OT} 't' a actual v 011 't'<X. Now, what is to be avoided is a drift from potency to actuality 
and vice versa in the intellect such that the active intellect at one time thinks and at 
another time does not think; the active intellect is always actually thinking - 'sua 
essentia est sua operatio.' Indeed, 'without the active intellect no thinking is possible.'206 
As Rahner will articulate it, the agent intellect is the 'a priori condition, inherent in 
thought itself, of the possibility of something actually intelligible.1207 
Rahner develops the Thomistic interpretation of the agent intellect in terms of 
the Vorgriff, or the excessus in Thomas. The key point of significance here is that 'the 
agent intellect is defined essentially for Thomas by the fact that it apprehends esse 
absolutely.1208 As already seen, the one human knowledge is both intellect and sense. 
'The one human knowledge is objective reception (Hinnahme) of the other, of the 
world ... [but] ... [i]n order to grasp the possibility of an intuitive reception of the other 
as such on the basis of the presupposition of the identity of knowing and being, 
202 See Aristotle, Metaph. 1045 a 30 
203 Aristotle, Metaph. 1071 b 29 f 
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sensibility as the act of matter was introduced.'209 Sensibility, however, does not yield 
an object. For this to happen, a further act whereby subject and object are differentiated 
and on acount of which the subject abstractively returns to itself is required. Such an act, 
'which sets the knower over against what exists in itself (das Ansichseiende) by the 
abstraction of being from the existent,'210 is the accomplishment of the agent intellect. 
Now, the agent intellect accomplishes intelligibility by recognising the material 
confinement of form liberating it. Such a recognition is possible because the agent 
intellect is already beyond the individual object in a pre-apprehensive grasp of esse 
absolutu.m. As Rabner notes, it is the spontaneity of the human spirit - the agent intellect 
- towards the horizon of absolute Being which 'offers the possibility of experiencing the 
forms of sensibility as limited.'211 One can note here also the fact that the agent intellect, 
as pre-apprehension, does not attain an object. 'Apprehension cannot be understood as 
representation (Vorstellung).' 212 Indeed, '[e]very represented (vorgestellte) object of 
human knowledge ... is able to be apprehended itself only in a pre-apprehension.'213 
Knowledge, as Levinas will stress, is not primarily representation. The agent intellect, 
as the tendency towards esse absolutum, or towards pure exteriority, beyond 
representation, as Levinas might say, is 'this presence in thought of an idea whose 
ideatu.m overflows the capacity of thought.'214 
Now, as 'always thinking', the thought which the agent intellect thinks is always 
m excess of its own capacity for thought and is to be thought in terms of the 
incomprehensible. Rabner writes, that 
'[f]or Thomas the incomprehensibility of God is present in an 
"excessus", in an "excedere." This "excessus" should not simply be 
identified with the "via eminentiae, 11 even though it is the latter's ultimate 
foundation. It is the primary movement of the spirit and of its activity 
(intellectus agens) directed to the unlimited being and 
209 ibid., pp.132-133 
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incomprehensibility of God, which is the ground of all knowing.'215 
The excessus, however, as transcendence towards the absolute presupposes the absolute 
as already having been given to the intellect in a transcendental experience, which is the 
experience of transcendence. This point is made by Rahner when, reflecting on 
veneration of the Sacred Heart, he notes that transcendental experience enables finite 
subjects to go beyond their limitations. 'They do this in virtue of the content implanted 
in them right from the very first by grace, the content in which their ultimate 
significance consists, and which is nothing less than the ineffable reality of God himself, 
and of his world permeated with himself.'216 It is this relation with a God already given 
in grace, understood as God's self-communication to the finite creature, which renders 
spiritual activity possible. 'This horizon, then, makes knowledge possible within its 
ambience, this ultimate point of reference towards which all knowledge tends, is itself 
radically beyond all comprehension, and its incomprehensibility is such that it is not 
removed even when... the absolutely original cause and the ultimate goal of this 
transcendental awareness, prior to all knowledge, actually imparts itself directly to 
man.'217 For Rahner, then, one can understand the infinite within us to which we are 
receptive and which contests the autonomy of subjectivity as grace. As Levinas says, 
the affirmation of the agent intellect is the affirmation that thought finds its origin not 
within the interiority of the self but in an exteriority 'which comes in by the gates, 
215 K Rahner, The Incomprehensibility of God in St. Thomas Aquinas, pp.253-
254 
216 K Rahner, Unity - Love - Mystery, p.239 
217 idem, Reflections on Methodology in Theology, pp. I 04-105 (Italics added). 
Rahner invests this self-communication of God with Trinitarian significance in the 
same article. He writes that 'Man constitutes absolute and limitless transcendentality' (p.94) 
which is historically explicitated and communicated and which is opened up and sustained 
by his orientation towards God as absolute mystery. The 'abiding mystery of God is not 
merely the asymptotic point of refuge which provides it with its goal' (p.94) but discloses 
itself 'to achieve a state of absolute immediacy and proximity to him, and in this act of self-
communication itself sustains this transcendental movement on the part of man himself 
(p.94) God's self-communication has its own history which finds its highpoint in Jesus 
Christ. 'Where the history of God's self-communication to the world attains its absolute 
highest point, its point of irreversibility, and where the offering of God's self-
communication to the world as a whole as endowing it with grace at the transcendental 
level has brought about the definitive acceptance of this offering on the part of the world 
itself, there is achieved that which is designated as the hypostatic union and also (naming 
it according to its concrete realisation in history) that which we call the absolute· bringer 
of salvation, Jesus as crucified and risen, the Son of the Father' (p.94). 
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absolutely exterior' in relation to which the subject is receptive.218 And the precise 
meaning of this receptivity, 'beyond any capacity of the I' is 'to have the idea of 
infinity.'219 
Reflecting on the relation described by Descartes, Levinas maintains that what 
Descartes describes is a 'situation ... in which the "I think" maintains with the Infinite it 
can nowise contain and from which it is separated a relation called "idea of infinity" .'220 
This idea of infinity is to be distinguished from ideas of things whose 'objective' or 
'formal' realities would have the possibility of a total coincidence; the idea of infinity 
is 'exceptional in that its ideatum surpasses its idea.'221 In comparison with other ideas, 
'[t]he transcendent is the sole ideatum of which there can only be an idea in us; it is 
infinitely removed from its idea, that is exterior, because it is infinite.'222 Again, '[a]s the 
idea of God, the cogitatum of a cogitatio which to begin with contains that cogitatio, 
signifies the un-contained par excellence; is it not the very absolution of the absolute? 
It overflows every capacity; the cogitatum's "objective reality" breaks open the "formal 
reality" of the cogitation.'223 The impossibility of grasping God in thought while having 
the idea of God in us points to an 'ex-ceptional relation ... as though the difference 
between infinity and what ought to include and comprehend it were a non-indifference 
of Infinity to this impossible inclusion, a non-indifference of Infinity for thought. There 
is a putting of the Infinite into thought, but this is a wholly different structure than a 
comprehension of a cogitatum by a cogitation.'224 To think the infinite is not to think an 
object; it is, says Levinas, 'in reality to do more or better than think,' 225 for what 
characterises thinking, as a mental act which represents an object, is essentially 'the 
218 E Levinas, TI, p.51 
219 ibid. 
220 ibid., p.48 
221 ibid., p.49 
222 ibid. 
223 idem, GP, p.132-133 
224 ibid., p.133 
225 idem, TI, p.49 
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possession of an object,'226 albeit at a distance, which is 'the suspension of its being.'227 
'The not-being-able-to-comprehend-Infinity-by-thought ts somehow a positive 
relationship with this thought... not yet hastening towards the adequation between the 
term of the spontaneous teleology of consciousness and this term given in Being.'228 
Now, the relationship with infinity as a positive relation rather than a negation 
of finitude highlights the 'arbitrary halt' within the Cartesian cogito. Besides methodic 
doubt, there is also the implication, in Descartes, that this doubt can be evidenced, and 
that this evidence, even though able to be denied, is yet affirmed in its very denial. 'In 
the cogito the thinking subject which denies its evidence ends up at the evidence of this 
work of negation.'229 However, the evidence of a self which doubts is not a final resting 
place which becomes the final or initial affirmation. Doubt continues, and, says Levinas, 
Descartes finds himself having embarked upon a journey which is a vertiginous descent 
beyond affirmation or negation towards an even more profound region, 'a work of 
infinite negation, which is indeed the work of the atheist subject that has broken with 
participation and that remains incapable of an affirmation.1230 This insight is taken up 
by Levinas who describes his own project as 'an analysis which feigns the disappearance 
of every existent - and even of the cogito which thinks it - [but] is overrun by the chaotic 
rumbling of an anonymous 'to exist', which is an existence without any existent and 
which no negation manages to overcome. IL y a - impersonally - like it is raining or it 
is night.'231 Consciousness, then, is ultimately incapable of any affirmation, for the self 
stands on the precipice of the il y a, which is the disappearance of all things. The 




228 idem, GP, p.134 
Compare Levinas' assertion of the positive nature of the relationship with infinity 
with Rahner when he writes, '[a]ny interpretation of the Thomist doctrine of the 
incomprehensibility of God should not overlook the fact that this doctrine is primarily a 
statement about man, about his finite nature and its positive quality' (K Rahner, The 
Incomprehensibility of God in St. Thomas Aquinas, p.252). 
229 E Levinas, TI, p.93 
230 ibid., p.93 
231 idem, Signature, in Difficile Liberte, p.407 
Again, 
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'The I in the negativity manifested by doubt breaks with participation, 
but does not find in the cogito itself a stopping place. It is not the I, it is 
the other that can say yes. From him comes affirmation; he is at the 
commencement of experience.'232 
'[t]he latent birth of negation does not occur in subjectivity, but in the 
idea of Infinity. Or, if you will, it is in subjectivity qua idea of Infinity. 
It is in this sense that the idea of Infinity, as Descartes affirms, is a 
"genuine idea" and not merely what I conceive "by the negation of what 
is finite" .1233 
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It is precisely this 'difference between objectivity and transcendence'234 which will guide 
his thinking on exteriority as a defence of subjectivity. Thought's comprehensive failure 
in the face of infinity, rather than being any negation of the subject, is its sustaining 
condition, by which subjective transcendence is enabled and subjectivity posited. To 
affirm Infinity in-finitude, the idea of the infinite in me, is to indicate that it is 'as though 
the psychic nature of subjectivity were equivalent to the negation of the finite by 
Infinity, as though - without wanting to play on the words - the in of Infinity were to 
signity both the non and the within.'235 The subject is constrained and negated but 
brought beyond limitation and confinement. As Rahner says, '[t]he most radical and 
ultimate statement of this anthropology is that man is a being who is endowed through 
the free self-communication of God in grace with the infinite incomprehensibility and 
incomprehensible infinity of God, and so shares in his own being in divine 
incomprehensibility. '236 
4.5 Summary 
Levinas contrasts two itineraries: the Ulyssean and the Abrahamic. The Ulyssean 
journey is by way of return. What is other and alien is brought home by thought to dwell 
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been the hallmark of western philosophy, 'a reduction of the Other to the Same.' In its 
place, Levinas proposes an Abrahamic ex-cendence which moves beyond the self in a 
relationship with true alterity. Such an ex-cendence is, for Levinas, an egress from the 
comprehension of Being. 
Rahner, too, recognises the transcending movement beyond the same, and the 
inadequacy of knowledge understood as the comprehension of Being. Ultimately, the 
relation to Being is not primarily comprehension, but mystery. It is mystery not mastery 
which guides subjective spirituality, and Rahner's reduction is finally a reductio in 
mysterium. 
Levinas expresses this relationship with true alterity or absolute exteriority as 
a relationship with infinity. Using the idea of the infinite which Descartes recognises as 
being placed within the cogito, but having its origin beyond the cogito, Levinas deepens 
the Husserlian phenomenological reflection to show that the idea of the infinite is a 
thought which breaks the unity of consciousness, for the idea of the infinite is an idea 
excessive to representational consciousness, and an idea to which the evidence of the 
cogito is inadequate. Husserl may have recognised this in pointing to the inter-
subjective reduction, but unfortunately failed to pursue this thought. 
Now, this idea of the Other in me finds its parallel in Rahner's understanding of 
grace as an ineffable content implanted in the finite subject from the very first, and 
which gives the subject significance. Transcendental experiences are experiences of 
transcendence 'in virtue of the content implanted in them right from the very first by 
grace, the content in which their ultimate significance consists, and which is nothing 
less than the ineffable reality of God himself, and of his world permeated with 
himself.'237 
237 K Rahner, Unity - Love - Mystery, p.239 
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Desiring the Other 
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To relate to the utterly excessive and absolutely other may seem impossible, on 
account of the 'theoretical incoherence of the notions of pure infinity and absolute 
otherness, or exteriority,' as Derrida has indicated. Indeed, Blanchet describes such a 
relationship as an 'impossible relationship.' Given the inability of comprehension to 
comprehend and mediate the immediate, how is a relationship with what is beyond 
mediation possible? Nonetheless, Levinas maintains the possibility and the significance 
of this 'impossible relationship.' To enter into a relationship with what is and remains 
beyond is to enter into an impossible relationship. It is a relationship which, for Levinas, 
is to be situated within the ethics of Desire, a relationship in which the power and 
possibility of the subject is called into question by the impossible relationship with 
infinity. 
For Levinas, the ontological relationship which Heidegger evidences in Being 
and Time is a relationship of power. 111 1 think" comes down to "I can" - an appropriation 
of being and an exploitation of reality. Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of 
power. 11 However, the ontological relationship is not the original relationship but is 
itself subjected to the ethical relationship with the other, who remains absolutely other. 
Insofar as the relationship with the absolutely other, the ethical relation, is primary then 
it is the premise of all being's possibilities.2 
5.1 Transcendence as Desire 
Levinas expresses transcendence towards Infinity in terms of the dynamic of 
'Desire.' Whereas Rahner understands human subjectivity as a dynamism of knowing 
and willing towards Being, Levinas deliberately views transcendence as an orientation 
beyond being.3 Knowledge, says Levinas, is always interested, that is, it is an interest 
in esse; desire, on the other hand, is disinterest; it has no concern for esse. 
'The negativity of the In of Infinity ... hollows out a desire which cannot 
be filled ... It is a Desire that is beyond satisfaction, and unlike a need, 
2 
E Levinas, TI, p.46 
cf. ibid., pp.45-48 
3 One will have to enquire whether Rahner and Levinas operate with the 
same understanding of Being. In brief, Levinas views the tradition as employing the 
concept of Being univocally; for Rahner, operating within his Thomistic perspective, 
Being can surely only be used analogously. 
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does not identify a term or an end. This endless Desire, for what is 
beyond Being is dis-interestedness, transcendence - desire for the 
Good.'4 
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Now, Levinas sees in the Cartesian notion of the idea of the Infinite 'a relation 
with a being that maintains its total exteriority with respect to him who thinks it,'5 a 
'contact with the intangible ... which does not compromise the integrity of what is 
touched,' 6 which does not render the Absolute relative through the contamination of 
contact. 'The absolute exteriority of the exterior being "absolves" itself from the relation 
in which it presents itself.t7 This may seem to present the impossible paradox of infinity 
in proximity, but the paradox produces itself as Desire. 'The infinite in the finite, the 
more in the less, which is accomplished by the idea of Infinity, is produced as Desire -
not a Desire that the possession of the Desirable slakes, but the Desire for the Infinite 
which the desirable arouses rather than satisfies. '8 It is a disinterested desire, a 
relationship with the Other in which the Other constantly absolves himself from the 
relationship, refusing possession, and thus maintaining the relationship. 
5.11 The Dynamic of Desire 
Desire demands separation as the condition for the non-fulfilment of desire, and 
thus as desire's own condition, for just as the answer brings the question to a close and 
is, as Blanchot says, le malheur du reponse, so the satisfaction of desire is its own 
extinction. Levinas contrasts the dynamic of eating with that of loving. Eating 
'is significant for us because of the place it occupies in everyday life, but 
especially because of the relationship between desire and its satisfaction 
which it represents, and which constitutes what is typical of life in the 
world. What characterises this relationship is a complete correspondence 
between desire and its satisfaction. Desire knows perfectly well what it 
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moment everything is consummated.9 
Hunger is a drive towards consumption; empty stomachs need filled with food. For 
Levinas, eating provides a model for that structure of solipsistic or pagan existence 
which often characterises life. A lack is felt, and in filling that lack we feel satisfied. 
Consumption is sincere; need targets and attains its object, with a complete 
correspondence between the intention and its fulfilment. But this economic model, with 
its language of interest and return, is ultimately destructive. Its ingestive approach 
envelops and swallows up what is other, incorporating it and destroying it by reducing 
it to the same. Eating, as the satisfaction of need, is 'the first movement of the Same.' 
The economic approach to the world is essentially centripetal, drawing what is other 
towards the self. 'The first movement of economy is in fact egoist.' 10 It is a life without 
transcendence, a pagan existence. 'In economy ... there is brought about the totalisation 
of absolutely singular beings.' 11 Economy is 'the hwnan totality.i1 2 
But, says Levinas, while it is true that '[n]o hwnan or interhwnan relationship 
can be enacted outside of economy ... ,' 13 ultimately, hwnan life 'occurs beyond economic 
activity and the world,' 14 and the economics of need finds its limit in the approach of the 
9 idem, EE, p.43 
Edith Wyschogrod, points out that whereas in his later works Levinas uses the term 
'desire' to 'designate an effect inadequate to its object' (op. cit., p.20) in his earlier works, 
such as Existence and Existents, 'desire', like need' is satiable. For a fuller treatment of the 
contrast between the consumptive approach to the Other and the Other's transcendence, see 
my article, Nee Tamen Consumebatur: Exodus 3 and the Non-Conswnable Other, Scottish 
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13 idem, TI, 172 
14 ibid., p.43 
Even money, the symbol of economics, has a significance beyond the economic 
sphere, says Levinas. In economy, every object has a price, and what is of value (always 
to the self and never inherent in the object) can be costed. Money is the 'ooiversal power 
of acquisition,' but it is also that power by which the reification and quantification of the 
person is effected within a system of exchange. The subject becomes a factor in an 
economic equation whose value and cost is derived from within that equation.--!ln 
transactions there occurs the action of one freedom on another. Money, whose 
metaphysical significance has perhaps not yet been measured ... corrupts the will by the 
power it offers it, and is thus a middle term par excellence. At the same time it maintains 
individuals outside of the totality, since it disposes of them, and includes them in the 
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other who is only attainable in Desire. 
'Compare eating with loving, which occurs beyond the economic activity 
of the world. For what characterises love is an essential and insatiable 
hunger. To shake hands with a friend is to express one's friendship for 
him, but it is to convey that friendship as something inexpressible, and 
indeed as something unfulfilled, a permanent desire. The very positivity 
of love lies in its negativity. The burning bush that feeds the flames is not 
consumed.' 15 
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At a fundamental level, the dynamic of need and its fulfilment ultimately fails to satisfy, 
for what the human person is oriented towards is a reality which cannot satisfy our 
hunger, not because that reality is inadequate to our emptiness, but because it is so much 
beyond our capacity to bear it. The other is not the satisfaction of all our hungers, but 
the pleasure (plaisir) of being continually hungry. The Other who can never be attained, 
who refuses every consumptive advance, actually feeds our desire by the very negativity 
of his or her presence. 
'The trouble one feels before the beloved does not only precede what we 
call, in economic terms, possession, but is felt in the possession too. In 
the random agitation of caresses there is the admission that access is 
impossible, violence fails, possession is refused.r1 6 
It is important to distinguish between desire and need. Desire (Le Desir) is not 
geared towards sensual enjoyment (la jouissance) but to pleasure (plaisir). Enjoyment, 
the first sign of subjectivity, flows from the satisfaction of need. Enjoyment can thus be 
viewed as an egoism, in which the subject is understood as the site of a manifold of 
sensual experience, a point made by Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1 when he notes that the 
human desire for knowledge can be seen, at a first level, in "the delight that we take in 
our senses; quite apart from the use we make of them, we take delight in them for their 
totality, since in commerce and transactions man himself is bought and sold; money is 
always to some extent wages. As exchange value of product it acts on the will it flatters, 
and gets a hold of the person. It is thus the abstract element in which is brought about the 
generalisation of that which has no concept, the equating of that which has no quantity' 
(idem, The Ego and Totality, pp.44-45). 
But, says Levinas, '[w]hat is possessed in money is not the object, but the 
possession of objects. A possession of possession ... ' (ibid., p.45), and here lies the 
redemptive possibility of money, whereby it asswnes the character no longer of being, as 
Sartre might say, 'pour soi' but 'pour l'autrui'. The other, by contesting money's power of 
possession and acquisition and rendering it powerless, redeems money from its solely 
economic and subjective circle. It can then become a refusal of my possession, and its 
worth derived from others. 
IS 
16 
idem, EE, p.43 
ibid. 
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own sake .... " 17 In enjoyment I am completely caught up with the object, which satisfies 
me, and this satisfaction is enjoyment. Levinas himself says: 'In enjoyment, I am 
absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to the Other, I am alone without 
solitude, innocently egotist and alone ... entirely deaf to the Other... without ears, like a 
hungry stomach.118 
But, human living is not simply enjoyment; it is pleasure and delight. The 
enjoyment of eating is complemented by the pleasure of good company. Whereas need 
is the anxiety which the 'I' has for itself ('l'anxiete du Moi pour soi'), desire is being 
called beyond our subjective concern by an Other. It is, as Valery says, a 'flawless 
desire' ('desir sans defaut),' referring to Plato, who in his analysis of pure pleasures, 
discovers an aspiration which is unconditioned by any lack. This is desire, 19 and it is a 
desire for what is beyond, a metaphysics, a movement towards an alien outside-of-
oneself (hors-de-soi), towards a yonder that is termed other in an eminent sense. 'The 
metaphysical desire tends towards something else entirely, toward the absolutely 
other.'20 It is a desire which, unlike 'hedonism or eudaemonism which would actually 
attain the Desirable and find satisfaction or fulfilment - an intention fully realised,' 21 
cannot be satisfied,22 for it has another intention; 'it desires beyond everything that can 
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'Le Desirable ne comble pas mon Desir mais le creuse, me nourrisant, en quelque 
maniere, de nouvellesfaims.' 
One can see this dynamic of constant deepening in Simone W eil's reflection on the 
relationship between desire and the good, which Blanchet adverts to in The Infinite 
Conversation. Commenting upon the 'disquieting rapidity' of such statements of Weil's as, 
'Therefore, God exists because I desire him: this is as certain as my own existence,' 
Blanchet explains that what Weil understands by this is 'that the desire for the good, being 
pure, is not a desire to possess it but only to desire it.. .. I am thus filled by my very desire: 
I constantly have the good when I desire it, since I desire only to desire it and not to have 
it' (IC, p.113). Now, there is some equivocation in Weil's understanding, notes Blanchet, 
for she speaks at the same time of desiring not to possess the good, but also of 'having the 
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Unlike the privation of need, 'the Desired does not fill it, but deepens it.'24 Desire feeds 
on itself, bringing, as it were, new hungers. It cannot satisfy itself for its term is 
'unanticipatable alterity .'25 The more we come to know and appreciate the Beloved, the 
more we can call the Beloved our own, then the more is our desire fed. Love is an 
insatiable force, ever deepening itself. In this sense, it is absolute. The desiring being 
is mortal; the Desired invisible. 'To die for the invisible - that is metaphysics.'26 One can 
perhaps hear echoes here of Augustine who, in his Confessions, enquires, "What do I 
love when I love my God?"27 and then replies: 
'Not material beauty or beauty of a temporal order; not the brilliance of 
earthly light, so welcome to our eyes; not the sweet melody of harmony 
and song; not the fragrance of flowers, perfumes or spices; not manna or 
honey; not limbs such as the body delights to embrace. It is not these 
that I love when I love my God.' 
Augustine, like Descartes at the beginning of the Third Meditation, excludes from 
consideration those things which appeal to his senses and bring him enjoyment. His 
desire does not seek these. 
'And yet, when I love him, it is true that I love a light of a certain kind, 
a voice, a perfume, a food, an embrace; but they are of the kind that I 
love in my inner self, when my soul is bathed in light that is not bound 
by space; when it listens to sound that never dies away; when it breathes 
fragrance that is not borne away on the wind; when it tastes food that is 
never consumed by the eating; when it clings to an embrace from which 
it is not severed by fulfilment of desire. This is what I love when I love 
good,' as is indicated in such statements as: 'If desire for the good equals possession of the 
good, desire for the good is productive of the good, that is to say, it produces the desire for 
the good. Outside me there is a good which is superior to me and which influences me for 
the good every time I desire the good. As there is no possible limit to this operation, this 
external good is infinite; it is God.' The contradiction is that if I am certain with regard to 
my possession of the Good, then by that very fact of grasping it, I have violated it, and it 
is no longer capable of being the lure to my disinterested desire, just as 'thought of the truth 
alone is enough to falsify the truth,' or 'knowing the rules required for salvation is enough 
to make one no longer capable of observing them' (IC, p.113). The resolution to the 
problem is that the good is not possessed in itself, but rather is possessed as desire. Just as 
my relationship with the Other will be articulated as responsibility, so my relationship with 
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my God.' 
For Augustine, the object of his desire is something which he can never possess or make 
his own: a food that can never be consumed, a desire which is never fulfilled. Such a 
desire finds its terminus in God, the infinite who can never be possessed or consumed 
by the one desiring. Elsewhere, he writes, 'You called me; you cried aloud to me; you 
broke the barrier of deafness. You shone upon me; your radiance enveloped me; you put 
my blindness to flight.. .. I tasted you, and now I hunger and thirst for you. You touched 
me, and I am inflamed with love of your peace.128 
The same priviliging of a speaking which overcomes the deafness of solitary 
subjectivity, or 'pagan existence' finds similar witness in Aquinas29 who, when writing 
of the eucharistic mystery of Christ's presence, needs to make the point that 1 Visus, 
tactus, gustus in te fallitur, Sed auditu solo toto creditur,' and that faith, as Paul says, 
which comes from hearing (jldes ex auditu) makes up for the defect of the senses. 
Praestet fides supplementum sensuum defectui. 
5.12 The disinterestedness of Desire 
Interest is an interest in esse. Need is interest; it has a care for its own being. 'Le 
besoin s 'ouvre sur un monde qui est pour moi - ii retourne a soi. Meme sublime, comme 
besoin du salut, ii est encore nostalgie, ma! du retour. Le besoin est le retour meme, 
l'anxiete du Moi pour soi, egoi'sme, forme originelle de !'identification, assimilation du 
monde, en vue de la coincidence avec soi, en vue du bonheur.'30 To be in the world is 
to be interested; intentionality directs itself towards a world, and as such, 'has already 
broken with this dis-interestedness,'31 which characterised the insomnia before there is 
world. 
Disinterest, on the other hand, disregards esse in favour of transcendence beyond 
essence; it is 'au-de/a de !'essence.' It is desire. Levinas writes, 
'The negativity of the in of the Infinite - otherwise than being, divine 
28 ibid., X, 27 
29 See the liturgical distillation of Aquinas' theology in his eucharistic hymns, 
Adora te devote and Pange lingua gloriosi 
30 E Levinas, Signification et le Sens, in HAH, p. 48 
31 idem, God and Philosophy, p. 156 
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comedy - hollows out a desire which cannot be filled, nourishes itself 
with its very augmentation, and is exalted as a desire, withdraws from 
its satisfaction in the measure that it approaches the desirable. It is a 
desire that is beyond satisfaction, and, unlike need, does not identify a 
term or an end. This endless desire for what is beyond being is dis-
interestedness, transcendence - desire for the Good.'32 
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Levinas asks though, 'ls not the disinterestedness of the desire for the Infinite an 
interestedness ?'33 For how can interestedness be excluded from desire? The human 
relationship with the other is a full of ambiguity and duplicity. 'It is the apotheosis of 
concern for self, yet is concern of the other pushed to its paroxysm.'34 It may seek to be 
disinterested, but who can believe such disinterest, for morality is not self-forgetfulness, 
nor uncompensated prodigality, nor symbolic and gratuitous generosity, nor an offering. 
Rather every gift is predatory, all our paths lucrative, and what we consider spontaneous 
and the transparent actually unmasks the omnipresent reality of egocentrism.35 The 
human person is not self-donation, but appropriating. 'The love of neighbour defines 
man as he ought to be, or as he will be tomorrow, once history has rid itself of its 
oppressive past.'36 But, despite the apparent pessimism which the past engenders, 
Levinas maintains that 'it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped 
by morality.'37 Despite interested humanity, there are still 'people who spend their whole 
lives together; yet they could not explain what they desire of one another.'38 What it is 
that one loves when one loves the other; 'why can the lovers themselves not say what 
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5.2 Proximity 
The proximity of the other is a prerequisite of the desire which characterises our 
love for the other, and is at the heart of Levinas' attempt to lay out 'the exposition of the 
ethical signification of transcendence and of the Infinite beyond being ... beginning with 
the proximity of the neighbour and my responsibility for the other.'40 But that proximity 
is not to be understood in terms of the exteriority of the other which presents itself to 
me and which I can thereafter represent to myself. The proximity of beings of flesh and 
blood is not their presence 11 in flesh and bone, 11 is not the fact that they take fonn for a 
look, present an exterior, quiddities, forms, give images, which they eye absorbs (and (--t 
whose alterity the hand that touches or holds, suspends easily or lightly, annulling it by 
the simple grasp, as though no one contested this appropriation.)'41 Proximity, rather, is 
an experience of the face, which, as we have shown, is linked to the irreducible illeity 
of the Other. 
'The face is not the mere assemblage of a nose, a forehead, eyes, etc.; it 
is all that, of course, but takes on the meaning of a face through the new 
dimension it opens up in the perception of a being. Through the face, the 
being is not only enclosed in its form and offered to the hand, it is also 
open, establishing itself in depth and, in this opening, presenting itself 
somehow in a personal way. The face is an irreducible mode in which c\ 
~being can present itself in its identity.142 
Flesh and blood may be the prerequisite for the giving of the other, but this does not 
mean that is it 'more originary than the origin.'43 Nor is proximity to be construed as 
derived from spatial contiguity or coincidence, for then it would be relativised. Rather, 
spatiality and contiguity, like height, are rendered intelligible by their relation to the 
11 humanity11 they presuppose.44 We do not have first space and nature, and thereafter 







idem, OB, p.78 
idem, Difficult Freedom, p.8 
idem, OB, p.78 
See ibid., p.81 
45 For Levinas' thinking on the relationship between meaning and culture, see 
Signification et le Sens in Humanisme de /'autre homme, where Levinas speaks of the 
ontolog"ical status of culture. See also, The Theory oflntuition in Husserl's Phenomenology 
where Levinas outlines Husserl's criticism of the naturalistic theory of being and the 
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proximity be viewed in terms of intentionality. It is not a "consciousness of.. .. " 'Not all 
spirituality is that of theoretical, voluntary or affective representation in an intentional 
subject.146 Just as Dasein breaks its fascination with objects in the world by interrupting 
its involvement to know them, a reductive move whereby they are rendered Vorhanden 
rather than Zuhanden, so to be conscious of proximity is already to have destroyed 
proximity and to have annulled its 'non-indifference or fraternity.' Rather, proximity 
arises in the other's approach to me and the establishment of 'a relationship in which I 
participate as a term, but where I am more, or less, than a term,'47 and in which the 
subject-object relation, in which I am a subject, is overcome. The other approaches in 
fraternity, but to make the relation conscious is to destroy that fraternal relationship, like 
the embarrassment of the embrace in which the caress becomes conscious of touching 
and being touched, and so becomes the subject's repossession of self. Consciousness of 
closeness is already a loss of proximity for it has already withdrawn and 'repressed in 
itself a subjectivity older than knowing or power.'48 Proximity refers to humanity, and 
consciousness, as ego and self-knowledge, is not the first mark of that humanity. 
Subjectivity is not primarily located in the 'indeclinable transcendental consciousness, 
which effects syntheses straightaway before itself, but is itself excluded from these 
syntheses, is implicated in them only through the detour of incarnation ... .'49 In other 
words, my subjectivity is neither original nor originary. It is the subjectivity of the other 
who approaches me in proximity that is 'preliminary, anarchic, prior to consciousness, 
an implication, a being caught up in fraternity. 15° Consciousness 'arises only on the 
ground of this antecedent relationship of obsession, which no consciousness could 
annul, and of which consciousness itself is a modification.'51 This means that proximity 
is never mutual; it is not a conjWlcture in being, nor a reflection in the unity of 
method of philosophy. 
46 idem, OB, p.82 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid., p.83 
49 ibid., p.85 
50 ibid., pp.82-83 
51 ibid., p.87 
DESIRE 247 
transcendental apperception but 'is in two times, and thus is a transcendence.'52 And this 
is the very impossibility of the relationship of which Blanchot speaks,53 and which 
Derrida takes up in his consideration of the madness of economic reason, a gift without 
present.54 'It temporalises itself, but with a diachronic temporality, outside, beyond or 
52 ibid., p.85 
53 For Blanchot, La pensee (de) /'impossible opens up the other relation (l'autre 
rapport), whose measure is the other (autre) (Entretien, p.61). What characterises the 
impossible relation is that there is 'not only the negative character of the experience that 
would make it perilous, but also the "excess of its affirmation" (what in this excess is 
irreducible to the power to affirm)' (IC, p.45), and thus, rather than being a negativity, 
impossibility exceeds every positivity. Secondly, impossibility is not a withdrawal from 
experience but rather the experience of 'what no longer allows itself to be withdrawn' 
(ibid.) yet is radically different such that what is disclosed in this movement of non-
withdrawing withdrawal is the very obscurity of what is other. Thirdly, "presence" 'is 
intimacy as the Outside, the exterior become an intrusion that stifles, and the reversal of 
both one and the other' (ibid., p.46). Impossibility 'indicates what in being has always 
already preceded being and yields to no ontology' (ibid., p.47). It is in desire, that an 
impossible relation with the Other who is excessive to my power is achieved. Recalling 
Simone Weil's words - 'La vie humaine est impossible. Mais le malheur seul le fait sentir' 
(ibid., p.47) - Blanchot interprets them not as denouncing the absurdity and unbearability 
of life, but rather as 'recognising in impossibility our most human belonging to immediate 
human life' (ibid.), that is, 'the naked presence of the other' which gives rise to an infinite 
passion of desire. This, says Blanchot, is what Simone Weil means when she goes on to say 
'Le desir est impossible,' for desire is precisely a relation to impossibility, to 'impossibility 
become relation;' in other words, it is a relationship with that which radically exceeds our 
capabilities; desire demands the unattainability of its object; it is an intentionality towards 
the infinite, which understanding cannot adequately render as concept, and it is precisely 
this excess to comprehension which feeds our desire, making the desired ever more 
desirable; in other words, with respect to the self and its possibilities, desire manifests a 
relationship with impossibility, an impossibility which actually founds and sustains the 
relation. It parallels what Levinas terms the thought of the infinite. 'The thought which 
thinks more than it thinks is Desire' (ibid., p.53). Unlike need, which is a lack waiting to 
be filled and satisfied, 
'[t]he desire that one might call metaphysical is a desire for what we are not 
in want of, a desire that cannot be satisfied and that does not desire union 
with what it desires. It desires what the one who desires has no need of, 
what is not lacking and what the one who desires has no desire to attain, it 
being the very desire for what must remain inaccessible and foreign - a 
desire of the other as other, a desire that is austere, disinterested, Without 
satisfaction, without nostalgia, unreturned, and without return' (ibid.). 
54 Derrida opens his reflection by saying, '[a]t the same time we are thinking 
the impossible, and it is at the same time' (Given Time, p.34). He lays out the difficulty by 
asking, '[w]hat does "at the same time" mean to say? Where could one ever place oneself 
in order to say "at the same time"? And to say what is meant, for example in some language 
or other, by "at the same time'" (ibid.). The characteristic of the gift is that it can never be 
offered in the same time. It is alogical, anomical, and also atopical because its inner 
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above, the time recuperable by rem1mscence, m which consciousness abides and 
converses, and in which being and entities show themselves in experience.'55 
Now, since it is the proximity of the other in his approach that evokes the 
subjectivity of the subject as response, for '[s]ubjectivity is not antecedent to proximity, 
in which it would later commit itself,' 56 proximity's signification is the experience of 
responsibility in which the subject is 'one-for-the-other' - which means that no longer 
can subjectivity be spoken in the nominative, but is, from the first, 'set up as it were in 
the accusative form, from the first responsible and not being able to slip away.'57 It is the 
'me voici' spoken in response to other. 'The proper signification of subjectivity is 
proximity, but proximity is the very signifyingness of signification, the very establishing 
of the-one-for-the-other, the establishing of the sense which every thematised 
signification reflects in being. '58 
dynamic is essential outwith symmetry and synchrony. The gift introduces time as 
diachrony into the relation; it is 'impossible simultaneity of two times, of two events 
separated in time and which therefore cannot be given at the same time' (ibid.). It is looking 
for midi d quatorze heures. Derrida expands: 'The gift is not a gift, the gift only gives to 
the extent that it gives time. The difference between a gift and every other operation of pure 
and simple exchange is that the gift gives time. There where there is gift, there is time. 
What it gives, the gift, is time, but the gift of time is also a demand of time. The thing must 
not be restituted immediately and right away. There must be time, it must last, there must 
be waiting - without forgetting [l'attente - sans·oubli]' (ibid., p.41). 
55 E Levinas, OB, p.85 





5.3 Rahner on Desire 
The natural dynamism of the human spirit towards the absolute in knowing and 
willing which Rahner exposes through transcendental reflection finds its articulation in 
terms of desire when he addresses the relationship between nature and grace. This 
transposition to the theological helps bring to clearer focus the priority and initiative of 
the Other in Rabner's schema, a priority obscured when the philosophical propaedeutic 
of the knowing subject is taken as the phenomenological starting point. The often 
acrimonious debate regarding the relationship between nature and grace between those 
who held to the traditional view and those who, like de Lubac, espoused la nouvelle 
Theologie,59 provoked response by Rabner. 
The traditional division between nature and grace whereby, on the one hand, 
grace is understood extrinsic to nature, 'a mere superstructure ... imposed upon nature by 
God's free decree,'60 communicated by Revelation, and, on the other hand, nature is 
understood as 'that which we know about ourselves without the word of revelation,'61 
found its critics among those who espoused la nouvelle Theologie. Rabner, too, 
criticises '[t]he correctness or adequacy of the standard view' and notes 'how an 
apparently minor thesis in St. Thomas' - namely, the human subject as one who is to be 
considered 'in the inmost heart of his being as "desiderium naturale visionis 
beatificae11162 - becomes, under the influence of Marechal, 'the essential and central 
concept for the understanding of a spiritual nature.'63 Rabner, however, also criticises 
la nouvelle Theologie for its failure to sufficiently safeguard the gratuity of grace, since 
to posit a natural desire for the beatific vision within the human subject is to 
compromise the unexacted character of grace. 
59 For a fuller exposition of the relationship between Rabner's 
understanding of the relationship between nature and grace and its possible expression 
in terms of Desire, as understood by Levinas, see my article, 'The Natural Desire for the 
Beatific Vision: Desiring the Other in Levinas and "La Nouvelle Theologie",' in 
Philosophy and Theology, 10, 1-2, (1996). 
60 K Rahner, Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace, p.298 
61 idem, Nature and Grace, p.167 
62 ibid., p.169 
63 ibid. 
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5.31 Desire as Intellectual Dynamism 
Man~chal had raised the question of man's supernatural destiny in 
Cahier V of Le Point de depart de la metaphysique. The subject's perfect beatitude 
consists in the intuition of absolute Being, but, in the light of Kant's Critique, the subject 
faces the embarrassing situation whereby his 'absolutely ultimate end depends upon the 
free bestowal of supernatural grace.'64 The nature of the hmnan intellect is such that, in 
itself, it is incapable of attaining absolute Being as its ultimate end for, though the desire 
is real, '[t]he fact that we desire an end is not an evident sign of its real possibility.'65 
'[T]he full satisfaction of our higher faculties cannot be discovered in the offer of our 
purely natural possibilities,'66 but 'stands in total dependence on .... the free bestowal by 
the absolute Being of the intuitive knowledge of himself,'67 which is only made known 
through Revelation. What, then, can a rational critique gather from desire? 
According to Marechal, Thomas offers some positive indications regarding the 
supernatural destiny of man when he writes, 
'Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae 
substantiae visionem. Naturale autem desiderimn non est inane. Quilibet 
igitur intellectus creatus potest pervenire ad divinae substantiae 
visionem, non impediente inferioritate naturae' (Contra Gentiles, 111,57; 
cf. S.T ., I, 12, 1 c ).68 
Although only faith can inform us as to whether or not God wishes to becomes our 
supernatural beatitude, nonetheless, 'we deduce legitimately, from the radical disposition 
of our faculties, the absolute (positive) possibility of this beatitude, that is, the existence 
of the remote objective causes which render its realisation possible.'69 Given the 
scholastic axiom, 'Desiderium naturae non potest esse inane,' and, since 'it would be 
logically contradictory to hold that a natural impulsion should move a being towards 









68 'Every intellect desires naturally to see the divine substance. Now the-
natural desire cannot be void. Therefore, every created intellect can arrive at the vision 
of the divine substance, the lowliness of its nature being no obstacle.' 
69 J Marechal, Le ooint de depart, V, p.421 
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nothingness' and non-being would become the principle of being, man's natural finality 
'reveals at least the possibility in se of the end towards which it strives.'70 Once 
this principle is accepted, two hypotheses remain: 
firstly, natural dynamism might be occasioned by blind and necessary forces, 
which would mean that, other extrinsic factors notwithstanding, the ultimate end would 
not only be possible but also be realised; or secondly, natural dynamism is effected by 
a free agency, which would mean that, although there might be an initial orientation 
within the subject, a further free intervention would be required in order for the initial 
orientation to be fulfilled. 71 Thus desire's fulfilment is in the realm of the possible rather 
than the actual, being dependent on 'the existence of all the factors required for this 
possibility .m It is to this second category that the 'natural desire' for the vision of God 
belongs. Marechal thus preserves the gratuity of grace while, at the same time, insisting 
upon a natural desire, by stressing a double gratuity on the part of God whereby he 
freely creates and thereafter, but not necessarily, freely grants the fulfilment of the 
desire in the vision of God. As Marechal writes, 'No logical incompatibility exists 
between the "possibility in itself' of the ultimate end, towards which our desire orients 
us, and the absence of every proximate possibility of realising this rigorously 
supernatural end, without an entirely free and gratuitous gift on the part of God. Further, 
there is moreover no moral incompatibility .. .'73 
The question remains, however, how our 'desire for the vision of God' can be 
properly called a 'natural desire,' or, in Rahner's terminology, how man's 'existential' can 
properly be called 'supernatural.' Marechal seeks the answer in the intrinsic dynamism 
of the intellect. However, as Thomas indicated, one must distinguish between the 
implicit dynamism of our intellect, which can only find its ultimate satisfaction in the 
vision of God, and the explicit interpretation of this dynamism. Thomas, having asked 
whether every person truly aspires towards beatitude, replies, 
'Respondeo dicendwn quod beatitudo dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo 
secundwn communem rationem beatitudinis, et sic necesse est quod omnis homo 
beatitudinem velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis est ut sit bonum 
perfectum, sicut dictwn est... Cwn autem bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, 
perfectwn bonwn est alicuius quod totaliter eius voluntati satisfacit. Unde 
70 ibid. 





appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur: quad 
quilibet vult. Alio modo possumus loqui de beatitude consisit: et sic non 
omnes cognoscunt beatitudinem, quia nesciunt cui rei communis ratio 
beatitudinis conveniat...' (S.T., Ia, Ilae, 5,8, c; cfr. Ibid, ad 2)74 
Thus, following Thomas, Marechal concludes 
'that the natural impulsion of our intellectual faculties drives them 
towards the immediate intuition of the absolute Being. It is true that this 
intuition exceeds the power and the exigencies of every finite 
intelligence, left to its sole natural resources. Yet the radical impulsion 
which drives it to this intuition is not conceivable without the objective, 
at least remote, possibility of reaching it.'75 
And this implies two necessary conditions, firstly, 'the existence of an absolute Being, 
capable of communicating itself, and secondly, 'the capability of our intelligence for 
receiving this communication.'76 
Rahner sums up Marechal's thought thus: 
'[t]his desire is conditional and so there is no necessity for the actual call 
to the vision by grace. But it is a real longing for the absolute being and 
one which is present in every spiritual act as its raison d'etre. Without 
being expressly and conceptually present, it is the a priori condition of 
all knowledge where a finite object is grasped.m 
Rahner, however, develops Marechal's thinking, and proclaims his own kerygma on 
grace. 'God wishes to communicate himself, to pour forth the love which he himself is. 
This is the first and the last of his real plans and hence of his real world too.'78 To 
achieve this, God creates a creature not only whom he can love but also who can receive 
this Love which is God himself, and who can and must accept it as 'the unexpected, 
unexacted gift.' In other words, the capacity for grace as grace in man is a hypothetical 
necessity of his nature. Put theologically, Rahner argues that a perduring ability and 
74 'Beatitude can be considered in the abstract and in the concrete. Take it 
in its general meaning, then everybody is bound to wish for happiness. For it signifies, 
as we have said, complete goodness. Since the good is the object of the will, the perfect 
good is that which satisfies it altogether. To desire to be happy is nothing else than to 
wish for this satisfaction. And each and everyone wishes it. Take it, however, to the 
point where happiness lies, then all do not recognise it, for they ~re ignorant about the 
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congeniality for grace belongs to man as an absolutely defining existential, but that 
grace can only be accepted as grace, that is as supernatural, when the existential itself 
is accepted as unexacted. 
'Where man knows of the visio beatiflca by the word of revelation, and 
experiences it as a marvel of the free love of God in his longing for it, he 
has to say that it is not due to him (by nature), even as an existing nature 
- so that the gratuitousness of creation, as a free act of God, and grace as 
a free gift to the creature, as something already existing, are not one and 
the same gift of God's free act.'79 
Again, '[t]he possibility of experiencing grace and the possibility of experiencing grace 
as grace are not the same thing.' 80 In other words, it is one thing to affirm a natural 
orientation or desire for absolute Being, a supernatural existential, but quite another to 
identify that with the gratuity of God's self-communication as grace. As a potentia 
oboedientialis, man has 'an inner ordination' or 'an openness for this supernatural 
existential' which is not merely a non-repugnance, but, '[t]o be ordained to grace, and 
to be so constituted that there is an exigence for grace which would render the whole 
ordination to grace futile if grace were not actually imparted, are by no means the same 
thing.' 81 
5.32 Natural Desire in de Lubac 
Now de Lubac agrees with Marechal that, 'in the context of his time,' Thomas 
had to 'defend the possibility of the beatific vision,' and 'to explain above all else how 
the order of grace envelops and completes the order of nature.'82 However, while 
admitting that Marechal, along with Rousselot, initiated a new era in scholastic thinking, 
he criticises them because 'the position that they hold or that they suggest appears to 
us ... a little too timid, founded on a historical enquiry which is insufficient.'83 Further, 
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approach remains 'a little too dependent on conceptions or points of view which are too 
modern.'84 'It happens frequently that one reasons as if the whole mystery was on the 
side of God, while nothing in man escaped being grasped in common experience or 
natural reason. All our nature would be in us, at least in right, transparent, and we would 
hold the key to all that manifests itself to us.' 85 This is some (transcendental) illusion! 
Nonetheless, de Lubac recognises the value of Marechal's return to the tradition, and 
proposes his own study 'undertaken from a theological point of view and on an enlarged 
base [which] can lead more quickly to more complete results,' 'not to contradict such an 
effort, but to help accomplish it.'86 
De Lubac notes 'a certain deficit of method' in the Marechalian school, for, 
although, fortuitously, they generally hold to the Thomistic axiom "desiderium naturae 
nequit esse inane" 'the interpretation which they give to it is only half exact.'87 In their 
critical concern, the problem of the desire for the beatific vision 'was less studied for 
itself, than as a function of problems of another nature, and one was forced to discover 
an intellectual dynamism apt to found the absolute value of our knowledge, more than 
to place in relief and analyse directly the desire of the spirit: an enterprise perfectly 
legitimate, but which imposed a perspective a little narrow.'88 De Lubac points out that 
Marechal rightly could say that "'the Absolute has placed its mark on the basic tendency 
of our intelligence," "the natural impulsion of our intellectual faculties orients them 
towards the immediate intuition of absolute Being," since this intuition "goes beyond 
the powers (puissances) and exceeds the demand of every finite intelligence given over 
to natural resources;"' but de Lubac wants to add, but not by way of contradiction, that 
the legitimate deduction of the need of the absolute from the radical disposition of our 
faculties 'considerably limits the plan of knowledge.' 89 
De Lubac, therefore, seeks to go further. Like Marechal, he argues that the 
human subject is constituted as a natural desire for God, which is absolute, and not mere 
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incapable by itself of realising its own intention. The desire, then, must be, not the work 
of the subject, but the work of God, and so can rightly be called supernatural. But since 
it is a desire which is found in human nature, it can also rightly be termed 'natural.' God 
fulfills the desire which he has implanted in us, and in so doing, he responds to his own 
call. The problem of the unexactedness of grace is a pseudo-problem which rests on the 
false dilemma created by an extrinsicism of first positing a desire for God, and 
thereafter a supernatural calling. 90 The reality of concrete human experience is 
otherwise, however. A purely natural existence devoid of supernatural finality is an 
abstraction. One does not first of all live a natural existence and then uncover a desire 
for the supernatural. One already lives in the midst of this desire. 
5. 3 3 Rahner's Criticism of "La Nouvelle Theologie" 
Rahner criticises de Lubac's position, fearing that it compromises the teaching 
that 'grace is absolutely unexacted,'91 and the theological value of the concept of pure 
nature. It seems to Rahner that de Lubac too readily identifies the experience of human 
transcendence as the experience of the supernatural, failing to recognise that such 
experience remains transcendental, and as such, is 'never to be absolutely and 
exhaustively analysed.'92 Although grace permeates human experience, nonetheless it 
retains a certain transcendentality with respect to human experience's representation of 
itself. For Rahner, '[t]he only question then is whether this axiom [the absolute 
unexactedness of grace] is objectively consistent with the theorem of an unconditional 
reference to grace in virtue of nature as such.'93 The 'new theology' espoused by de 
Lubac, which regarded a supernatural orientation 'as on the one hand an intrinsic, 
inamissable constituent of man's nature, and on the other so conceived that the 
withholding of the end of this directedness was expounded as being incompatible with 
God's wisdom and goodness and in this sense unconditional' is inconsistent, and so, says 
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This dilemma perdures, says Rahner, even when one tries to understand the 
paradoxical relationship between nature and grace on the model of inter-personal love. 
One might argue that the human person cannot be understood as being fulfilled other 
than in a loving, personal communion with God, which, by its nature, cannot be coerced 
but can only be freely given and received. One might argue that the essence of a person 
is that he 'must accept personal love as unexacted if it is not to lose its own meaning, 
and that hence its unconditional ordination to this love and the unexactedness of the love 
not only do not exclude each other but mutually condition each other.'95 To such 
arguments, however, one must reply, and decisively so, says Rabner, that 'that person, 
who has himself created such an ordination to the personal and intimate communion of 
love between two persons (in our case man and God)' ... [cannot] ... 'once this has been 
presupposed still simultaneously refuse this communion without offending against the 
meaning of this creation and his very creative act itself.'96 But if this is so, then 'it 
follows that on the supposition of such an ordination (in sensu composito with it) the 
actual granting of the end of this ordination can no longer be free and unexacted. Thus 
if the ordination cannot be detached from the nature, the fulfilment of the ordination, 
from God's point of view precisely, is exacted. And, as all admit, just this is false, and 
so must the presupposition be.'97 
In other words, one can say, given the operation of grace in man's innermost life, 
that either this disposition to grace is impossible in terms of man's nature, or that the 
disposition already belongs to the supernatural order. But one cannot say both that the 
disposition is natural and that grace remains unexacted. 
De Lubac had sought to bridge the gulf between nature and grace in terms of the 
paradoxical nature of the natural desire for the supernatural. This is conceivable, says 
Rahner, if one understands desire as 'openness', a potentia oboedientialis, for the 
supernatural (though this has often been interpreted in theology in a 'too purely formal 
and negative way as a mere non-repugnance.'98 However, 'a "desire" which is natural 
94 ibid. 
95 ibid., p.306 
96 ibid. 
97 ibid. 
98 ibid., p.309 
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and at the same time, even if only objectively, inevitably attracts grace to itself (the 
desire itself, not just God's wisdom and his promise but the latter through the former!), 
is a desire which 11 demands 11 grace, demands precisely because it would otherwise be 
meaningless. But this is incompatible with the unexactedness of grace.'99 
5.34 De Lubac's Criticism of Rahner 
Now, Rahner criticises de Lubac on account of his 'ontological presuppositions 
and conceptions,' but do these criticisms not flow directly from his own 'ontological 
presuppositions and conceptions' which, as indicated, de Lubac has himself already 
pointed out in his criticism of the inadequacy of the critical approach adopted by 
Marechal? 
First of all, with regard to the notion of the 'unexactedness' of grace, de Lubac 
observes that 
'he [Rahner] believed himself to be discussing us [de Lubac], in the 
study here mentioned, while he discusses an article in German which not 
only is not by us, but whose very existence we have long ignored. It 
seems moreover that he has not read (other than in an article of 1949) 
what we have ourselves written on the subject. Let us be equally clear 
that we have only 'scorned' the concept of 'oboediential potency' in the 
precise sense which he himself resolutely takes distance from it.1100 
Rahner says in the same article, that his concern was chiefly with D., 'because his essay 
is perhaps the clearest, and also the most extreme position of the standpoint here 
rejected.' 101 'Apart from H de Lubac's essay, Le mystere du surnaturel in RSR XXXVI 
( 1949), pp.80-121, most of the essays from this circle were primarily historical in 
character, and consequently not easily to be interpreted as regards their theoretical and 
99 ibid., pp.309-310 
100 H de Lubac, Le mystere du Surnaturel, p.142, n.l; Cf. Rahner, 
Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace, p.315) The article in question 
is Ein Weg zur Bestimmung des Verhiiltnisses van Natur und Gnade. Orientienmg, 14 
(1950), 138-141, by the anonymous 1D.1 whom U Kuhn, in Natur und Gnade: 
Untersuchungen zur deutschen Katholischen Theologie der Gegenwart, (Berlin: 
Lutherisches Verlaghaus, 1961, 116,) identifies as Pierre Delaye. 
101 K Rahner, Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace, 
p.304, n.3 
DESIRE 258 
systematic intentions.1102 Rahner maintains that D. applies the same thinking to the 
created order as to grace, although the gift is by far greater. Creation is unexacted, 
insofar as God had no obligation to create and so to create. Having so created, according 
to D., God is under no similar obligation to endow the creature with his grace. As 
Rahner points out, for D. 'grace is distinguished from other created things only in 
respect of the greatness of the gift but not in respect of the unexactedness itself; for 
these other created things may also be said in a certain sense to be "unexacted, 11 in so 
far as they arise out of God's freedom.' 103 
More constructively, De Lubac points out that Rahner himself recognises the 
insufficiency of the world for the human spirit, which opens out onto the horizon of 
absolute being. By its very nature, spirit possesses an 'unlimited transcendence,' which 
gives 'an infinite character' to the human horizon, and this kind of infinitude constitutes 
precisely the 'definition' of man and his 'frontier.' Rahner questions the scholastic 
concept of 'nature' as being modelled on 'what is less than human,' indicating that human 
nature cannot be assigned an end which is perfectly defined materially. 'One has only 
to ask why a supernatural end can be set for man without annulling his nature, and why 
God cannot do this with the nature of something below man. Then it becomes apparent 
at once that however universally the formal ontology of nature, end etc. may extend, 
these concepts can only be pursued in a highly analogical way.' 104 The reality, however, 
says de Lubac, is that 'the "scholastic" concept of nature, too much copied on the model 
of the infra-human, is more the concept of a modem scholasticism,' 105 and the analogical 
corrections desired by Rahner are already to be found in Thomas, who did not content 
himself with the universal aptitude for knowledge, but, instructed by faith and the 
tradition, understood the human soul to possess "'a centre from which the spiritual 
faculties pour out, a tendency towards the whole of being and towards God, to 
the vision of which it is also wholly naturally incapable of attaining. 111106 Whereas 
natural being displayed a vestigial and distant reflection of divinity, human being 
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itself' in him, is drawn towards its Model: "fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum (S. T., I, 
q.93, a.8)'" 101 'Sic igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitude per modum imaginis 
secundum mentem, sed sucundum alias partes eius per modum vestigii' (S.T., I, q.93, 
a.6). 'Cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur' (S.T., 
I, q.93, a.4) - 'id in quo principialiter ratio imaginis consistit, scilicet quantum ad 
intellectualem naturam' (ad lm). 
Now, if we ho Id on to Thomas' notion of 'the intellectual nature in itself being 
drawn towards its model, and juxtapose to this Rahner's claim that 'a "desire" which is 
natural and at the same time, even if only objectively, inevitably attracts grace to itself... 
is a desire which "demands" grace, demands precisely because it would otherwise be 
meaningless,' and that 'this is incompatible with the unexactedness of grace,' 108 then we 
can perhaps begin to see that the problem of the unexactedness of the divine gift centres 
on the interpretation of desire. De Lubac argues that God creates in the creature a desire 
for its fulfilment in the beatific vision, a fulfilment which cannot be refused. Rahner 
maintains that this amounts to an exigence for grace. However, the very character of 
desire, as Levinas has already shown, is that Desire is Desire precisely because it is 
incapable of being satisfied, not on account of an incapacity of the one who experiences 
the desire, but on account of the absolute otherness, or infinity, of the Desirable. De 
Lubac gives some indications for this aspect of Desire when he writes, 
'As "natural" and as "serious" as it is, the desire for the divine vision is 
in no way something which would detennine the effective gift on the 
part of God. God is not regulated by our desire! Between the two terms, 
the relationship can only be inverse: it is the free will of the giver which 
awakens the desire in the one who wants to attain it. This point is beyond 
contest. All question of demand on the part of the creature is banished. 
But it remains nonetheless, one might say, that such an existing desire 
in the creature becomes the sign, not only of a possible gift on the part 
of God, but of a certain gift. It is the attestation of a promise, inscribed 
and read in being itself. In the knowledge acquired of this desire, would 
it not be right to conclude to the effective reality of this gift?' 109 
Further, one must also say that '[o]nce the natural desire for the vision ... has been able 
to be recognised, discerned, analysed, its term is never known other than "aliquo 
107 ibid., p.143 
108 K Rahner, Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace, 
pp.309-310 
109 H de Lubac, Le mvstere du Sumaturel, p.257 
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mo do 11 • r1 10 It is no longer that it is never truly desired 'in a sufficient manner;' rather, it 
is not conceived in a truly adequate manner. 111 The sufficiency of desire is that it is the 
very insufficiency and inadequacy of the Desire to the Desirable which sustains the 
Desire and renders it sufficient - like the very positivity of love lying in the negativity 
of possession of which Levinas speaks112 - but its conceptualisation inadequate. Contrast 
this with Levinas who writes, 'desire is an aspiration that the Desirable animates; it 
originates from its "object"; it is revelation - whereas need is a void of the Soul; it 
proceeds from the subject.1113 Like the inversion of the relationship of which de Lubac 
speaks, Levinas argues that '[t]he same and the other at the same time maintain 
themselves in relationship and absolve themselves from this relation, remain absolutely 
separated.' 114 As previously indicated, there is no coming together into an ensemble, nor 
any notion of desire being the result of any lack or privation in the subject which would 
demand fulfilment. Desire, as we have said, is 'the need of him who lacks nothing, the 
aspiration of him who possesses his being entirely, who goes beyond his plenitude, who 
has the idea oflnfinity,' 115 but that idea takes its origin beyond the subject. The problem 
with the narrow intellectual approach which, according to de Lubac, is adopted by 
Marechal and sustained in Rahner is that Desire is interpreted in terms of finite spirit 
which opens on to the dilemma of reconciling a natural desire with a supernatural 
object, whereas, according to Levinas, '[w]hat is essential to created existence is not the 
limited character of its being, and the concrete structure of the creature is not deducible 
from this finitude. What is essential to created existence is its separation with regard to 
the Infinite.' 116 
How, then, can the 'desiderium naturale visionis beatificae' be interpreted within 
Levinas' ethical understanding of Desire? 
110 ibid., pp.271-272 
Ill cf. ibid., p.272 
112 Cf. E Levinas, EE, p.43 
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5. 4 Levinas on Desire, and graced existence 
'Creatures, and more especially humans, are the grammar of God's potential Self-
utterance,11 17 remarks Stephen Duffy. Levinas' exposition of desire enables the language 
of grace to be spoken not in the language of ontology and logical coherence, but rather 
in the language of proximity, ethical summons and responsibility. 
Levinas distinguishes between 'pagan existence,' devoid of a transcendent 
reference, and life as transcendence. '"The true life is absent." But we are in the 
world.i1 18 Pagan existence is, for Levinas, 'an existence which takes itself to be natural, 
for whom its place in the sun, its ground, its site, orient all signification - a pagan 
existing.i1 19 It is concerned for itself, 'building and cultivating, in the midst of a familiar 
landscape, on a maternal earth.1120 Levinas, of course, is attacking Heidegger and his 
understanding of Dasein as care, concern, and comprehension; Dasein as the 'ultimate 
"for-the-sake-of-which" in the light of whose project and possibilities all else is 
comprehended. What characterises Dasein, for Levinas, is essentially a lack of 
transcendence, an atheism. Dasein has its own preoccupation with itself. Care for its 
own Being - a solitary solicitude for self - is its existential. 'In Heidegger atheism is a 
paganism.' 121 
Such an existence, we want to argue, however, functions, for Levinas, like 
Rahner's understanding of pure nature as a Restbegriff, or 'remainder concept,' whose 
function serves to safeguard the gratuity and unexactedness of grace, as can be seen in 
Levinas' invitation to perform a notional, imaginative removal of 'all beings, things and 
persons' until there is nothing left but the impersonal no-thing-ness of the there is (ii y 
a). 'The impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable "consummation" of being, which 
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Levinas points out that 'Heidegger's Miteinandernsein also remains a collectivity_ 
of the with, and it is around truth that its authentic form is found. It is a collectivity 
formed around something common. And like in all philosophies of communion, in 
Heidegger sociality is completely found in the solitary subject. The analysis of Dasein, 
in its authentic form, is carried out in terms of solitude' (EE, pp.94-95). · 
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there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is "being in general" .' 122 It is against this 
background of anonymous, impersonal 'being in general' that Levinas' subject emerges 
and, as if wakening, 123 overcomes bare existence to posit itself at a first level in the 
happy enjoyment of the world - 'the very pulsation of the I,' 124 - and affirm itself as an 
existent, as a hypostasis of existent and existence such that one can say that 'it is not 
just that one is, one is oneself (on n'est pas, on s'est).i125 Hypostasis, however, is an act 
without transcendence, for, although it is the assertion of the mastery, power or virility 
of the existent over the there is, nonetheless the existent still carries the weight of 
existence as a definitive ontological burden. 'Transcendence is not the fundamental 
movement of the ontological adventure; it is founded in the non-transcendence of 
position.' 126 Because the subject still has a foothold in existence, it 
Again, 
'finds itself again to be a solitude, in the definiteness of the bond with 
which the ego is chained to its self .... The I always has one foot caught 
in it own existence .... It is forever bound to the existence which it has 
taken up. This impossibility of the ego not to be a self constitutes the 
underlying tragic element in the ego, the fact that it is riveted to its own 
being.' 127 
'The enchainment to oneself is the impossibility of getting rid of 
oneself.. .. To be an ego is not only to be for oneself; it is also to be with 
oneself.' 128 
However, Levinas' subject does not remain at this first level of awakening to pagan, 
'natural' existing. Like Rahner's historical subject whose 'nature' always and already has 
a history in which grace is offered, Levinas' subject is already and always constituted 
as transcendence towards what is excessively other, and to which there is no prior claim. 
Pagan existence, as a notional first level of awakening, has the function of preserving 
122 ibid., p.57 
123 A Levinassian consideration of the nature-grace debate can also be 
developed employing the notion of a two-fold wakening whereby the subject first 
awakens to 'pagan existence' and thereafter to a relationship with alterity. See my article, 
Gloria Dei, Homo Vigilans: Waking up to Grace in Rahner and Levinas, Louvain 
Studies, Autumn, 1996. 
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the utter initiative of the other in respect of the subject. The transcendence of 
intersubjectivity is not the work of the subject which might be achieved through some 
Pelagian effort, but the utter initiative of the Other, as grace and glory. Like the thought 
of infinity, its 'movement proceeds from what is thought and not from the thinker.r1 29 
Now, although Levinas presents the relationship with alterity within a 
chronology of need and desire, the actual situation is that need and enjoyment already 
operate within an implicit, ethical horizon of alterity, that is, of desire. 'Let us note 
again,' he says, 'the difference between need and Desire: in need I can sink my teeth into 
the real and satisfy myself in assimilating the other; in Desire there is no sinking one's 
teeth into being, no satiety, but an uncharted future before me.' 130 He continues, '[i]ndeed 
the time presupposed by need is provided me by Desire; human need already rests on 
Desire. Need has thus the time to convert this other into the same by labour.' 131 In other 
words, it is because the personal other has opened up a time ahead of me that the present 
time of need and enjoyment is possible. Paradoxically, my attempt to create a place for 
myself and enclose the home as my own totality within which I can be happily shut up 
in my self, demands an openness to what is other, which, in turn, is the possibility of an 
egress beyond the world towards the real infinity of the absolutely Other; 'within this 
very inferiority hollowed out by enjoyment there must be produced a heteronomy that 
incites to another destiny than this animal complacency in oneself.' 132 If one might 
render this in terms more theologically familiar, the finite spirit is not such that its 
dynamic orientation towards what is other originates in its own lack, but because it 
always and already operates within the transcendental horizon of an absolute - a 
'supernatural existential,' as Rahner expresses it - which evokes transcendence, and 
because it is 'so' constituted as an 'openness,' a potentia oboedientialis, to alterity. 
Transcendence is not an act of the subject; it is a responsive move towards alterity. 
Indeed, this is why Levinas can describe the relationship with the other as liturgy, for 
any work which I might undertake, or any expression I might make, presuppose an 
other, 'independent of my initiative and my power,' 133 to whom the work is offered. 
'Said otherwise, expression, before being a celebration of being, is a 
129 idem, TI, p.61 
130 ibid., p.117 
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relation with the one to whom I express the expression and whose 
presence is already required in order that my cultural gesture of 
expression might be produced. The Other (Autrni) who opposes me (me 
fait face) is not included in the totality of expressed being. He rises up 
beyond an assembling of being, as the one to whom I express what I 
express. I find my self facing (en face) the Other. He is neither a cultural 
signification, nor a simple given. He is, primordially, meaning. '134 
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In other words, my existence as a separated being implies 'a first revelation of the 
Other' 135 by which my place in the sun is opened in hospitable welcome to the Other. 
Simple, though sincere, enjoyment of the elemental world is not yet habitation, nor is 
it transcendence. '[T]he idea of infinity, revealed in the face, does not only require a 
separated being; the light of the face is necessary for separation.' 136 What is 
ontologically definite for the existent, namely the relationship with Existence which 
manifests itself in need and enjoyment, is acted out within the context of the ethical 
relation with alterity. As 'unanticipatable alterity,' 137 eminently other, ungraspable 
(insaissible) and infinite, the Other provokes Desire. The text of Being is always to be 
read within the context of ethics. In terms of a natural desire for the absolute, one can 
perhaps say that in his pagan existing the subject already experiences the gracious 
summons to ethical responsibility, but just as Marechal indicates no logical or moral 
incompatibility between a natural desire and the failure of its fulfilment, one can say 
that there is no ethical incompatibility between the summons and the failure of response. 
Ethical imperatives do not thereby become ontological necessities. 
One must further say that Desire distinguishes itself from need in terms of 
responsibility, both in its primordial sense of an a priori openness - an oboediential 
potency - which enables response, and in the sense of assuming responsibility for the 
needs of the other. 'Before the Other (Autrni) the self is infinitely responsible.i138 In 
other words, Desire, as an experience of utter alterity, manifests itself in the fact of the 
self being rendered as responsible by the Other for the Other. The idea of the Infinite 
finds its correlate not in the Infinite but in the infinite responsibility which the self 
experiences in the presence of the infinite Other. Whereas objects within the world can 
134 idem, HAH, p.50 
135 idem, TI, p.151 
136 ibid., p.151 
137 ibid., p.34 
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satisfy my intentional appetite, as in need and enjoyment, the Other, though I am related 
to him, is always able to slip out of the relationship, to extricate himself from its 
demands, whereas I experience all the weight and obligation of him on my shoulders. 
The signification of self is the excess of responsibility felt in the presence of the 
excessiveness of the other; it is as if the whole of creation rested on my shoulders. Such 
a responsibility is humbling. Its weight bends me. 'In front of the face I always demand 
more of myself.i1 39 
5.5 Summary 
The possibility or otherwise of sustaining a relationship with the absolute, and 
of experiencing that absolute is the question which has been addressed in this chapter. 
While Heidegger understands Dasein in terms of its own possibilities which are brought 
to an end in death, the final impossibility, but to which nonetheless authentic Dasein can 
comport itself resolutely, thereby making death its own possibility, Blanchot returns to 
the notion of impossibility and affirms it as the sustaining ground of all human 
possibilities. The subject is ultimately impossible, and all its possibilities are to be seen 
against this background. The subject is constituted by an impossible relation which is 
a relationship of transcendence and desire. 
Both Rahner and Levinas view the subject as a transcendence towards the 
absolute. For Rahner, this is absolute Being which is both source and goal of human 
transcendence; for Levinas, the absolute lies beyond Being and its categories and is 
encountered in the ethical relationship with the Other. Both Rahner and Levinas share 
the conviction that this aspiration towards the absolute is not the work of the subject but 
is inspired by the Other who is original. Spiro - Spero. Both in their own way express 
this transcendence towards the Other is terms of Desire. For Levinas, what characterises 
Desire is an insatiable longing for the Other who, on account of his excess, sustains the 
Desire as radically and always unfulfilled and unfulfillable; for Rahner, although his 
language is often the language of spiritual dynamism in knowing and willing, the 
subject is also to be understood in the grammar of grace as a natural desire (desiderium 
naturale) for the beatific vision. 
Now, such an impossible relation with the absolute is criticised by Derrida when-
139 idem, Signature, in Difficult Freedom, p.186 
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he accuses Levinas of an incoherent thought. Nonetheless, the paradoxical relationship 
of proximity with the Other and the ethical challenge which issues from that defies the 
logic of contradiction. Just as the phenomenon of suffering discloses a self which has 
been rendered devoid of the power and mastery which accompanies subjectivity, and 
just as the phenomenon of fear and panic reveals an object devoid of form, so the 
relationship with the Other is a situation in which both the position of the subject as 
origin and initiative is placed in question, and the Other, though proximate, is affirmed 
as infinitely distanced from the subject, not simply on account of an incapacity of 
comprehension, but primarily because of the positive excess or infinity of the Other with 
respect to the Same. Such a relationship, though seemingly impossible for thought, is 
nonetheless experienced as Desire and as Responsibility, and expressed as Language. 
Like the experience of grace, the Other draws close in proximity, but maintains himself 
as absolute mystery. 
6 
The Face and its Sacramentality 
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Desire is aroused in the relationship with an absolute alterity which defies 
possession, and it is sustained in its very insatiability. As we have said, the relationship 
with this absolute, unanticipatable alterity is experienced as desire. The absolute draws 
near, in paradoxical proximity, as desire. There is another revelation of the Other in 
proximity, and this is in the experience of obligation. Desire reveals my subjectivity to 
be obsessed by the neighbour to whose difference I cannot remain indifferent. 1 The 
neighbour is different, but, as Levinas points out, in the face of the neighbour my 
difference from him 'shudders as non-indifference.'2 Desire becomes demand, and in 
respect of the neighbour, my 'community with him begins in my obligation to him.'3 It 
is a relationship of responsibility. Before ever I am able to designate the other as other 
than myself, which would be an act of a self-constituted and self-conscious self entering 
into a subsequent relationship with alterity, I am already assigned by him as responsible 
for him, and 'this is a modality not of knowing but of an obsession, a shuddering 
(<Pp t K11) of the human quite different from cognition. '4 
Now, this summons towards responsibility issues from the face which, in its 
proximity, speaks, and, hearing, I am constituted as responsible. How then does the face 
speak? Such a question can perhaps finds its initial response in a consideration of the 
notion of image which takes us to the heart of the philosophical questioning of the 
privilege of presence. Sign, image and reality, for finite beings who, as Rahner 
expresses it, are essentially symbolic, are each implicated in the other, and the 
relationship between them raises a variety of problems, philosophical and theological, 
which have a relevance in the present discussion. Theologically, there is the distinction 
between sacramentum and res sacramenti - 'the duality of sign and what it signifies'5 -
between mystery and its ikon; philosophically, there is the problematic of immediacy 
and its mediation, of spirit and matter, of act and concept. In terms of the ethical 
relationship with the Other which Levinas privileges, such a problematic translates into 
the relationship between the Saying (le Dire) and the Said (le Dit). For Rahner, it will 
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6. 1 Sign, Image and Reality 
Blanchet questions our understanding of image. Using the language of poetry 
as a model, he notes that poetry is often compared with ordinary language 'as the image 
compares to the thing.'6 Poetry is deemed to be full of images. Yet, its 'particular 
character is that nothing in i~ functions as an image.'7 One can note here Rahner's article 
on Poetry and the Christian. What the poetic word gives, says Rahner, is forever 
repeatable, or supplementary, for although it does have the power to express, designate, 
distinguish, demarcate, define, compare, determine and arrange, it nonetheless, in so 
doing, opens on to what is silent and nameless. Words fall and fail before the mystery 
which is beyond naming. Calling us 'into the strangeness of the night that is our real 
home .... they all speak of the unknown God, who only reveals himself to give himself 
as the abiding mystery.' 8 Rahner notes the distinction between signified and signifier, 
reality and its sign, and speaks of 'recognising the inexpressible mystery in the word ... 
inseparable from the word but not confused with it.'9 However, the word, as incarnate 
reality, that is, a signifier, and possible even first signifier, is not so much placed at a 
distance from its signified such that it has the character of 'a sort of silently signalling 
finger, pointing away from what it delimits and illwninates into the infinite distance.' 10 
Rather, the incomprehensible itself belongs to the word. 'In the region encompassed by 
the human word, infinity has built itself a tent, infinity itself is there in the finite.' 11 In 
other words, it is of the nature of the poetic word to be sacramental - it effects what it 
signifies, though its signified is beyond any signification. The poetic word 'evokes and 
presents the eternal mystery which is behind expressible reality ... it conjures up the 
inexpressible in its utterance ... it fascinates and sets free ... it does not speak about 
something but creates in its utterance what it calls ... .' 12 Rahner concludes - like Blanc hot 
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to impossibility which leaves questions unsatisfied13 - that it is 'no accident, but in the 
nature of things' that great human poetry is obscure, and mostly dismisses us with our 
question unanswered' for '[p]oetry must speak of the concrete ... [b]ut the individual and 
the concrete is a mystery which will only be unveiled by the judgement, which is God's 
and God's alone, but which the poet presents as mystery.114 
Compare this with Blanchot's reflection on Mallarme's experience of "digging 
into the verse" ("En creusant le vers'') which, says Blanchot, is 'that time of distress 
caused by the gods' absence.115 To enter into poetry is no longer to enjoy the certainty 
of Being, but is to encounter 'the absence of the gods,' which is the renunciation of all 
idols, the images of hidden reality. It is the same experience which Holderlin undergoes: 
the poetic time is 'the time of distress when the gods are lacking,' 16 but it is the very the 
fall of God, his default, which helps the work; Gottes Fehl hilft. Blanchot writes, 
'when art is the language of the gods, when the temple is the house 
where god dwells, the work is invisible and art unknown. The poem 
names the sacred, and men hear the sacred, not the poem. And yet the 
poem names the sacred as unnameable; in this silence it speaks the 
unspeakable .... The poem shows, then; it discloses, but by concealing, 
because it detains in the dark that which can only be revealed in the light 
of darkness and keeps this mystery dark even in the light which the dark 
makes the first dawn of all. The poem is effaced before the sacred which 
it names; it is the silence that brings to the word the god that speaks in 
silence - but since the divine is unspeakable and ever speechless, the 
poem, through the silence of the god which it encloses in language, is 
also that which speaks as poem, and shows itself, as a work, at the same 
time that it remains hidden. The work is thus both hidden in the god's 
profound presence and visible through the absence and obscurity of the 
divine.' 17 
Now, Blanchot's insistence that nothing in poetry functions as an image raises, he says, 
13 Cf. M Blanchot, Entretien, p.68 
14 K Rahner, Poetry and The Christian, in TI, IV, p.366 
15 M Blanchot, SL, p.38; EL, p.34 
16 ibid., p.177 
17 ibid., p.230 
Foucault identifies the same in the various forms of negative theology and 
recognises in their speaking of the absence of God a 'thought from the outside.' 
Holderlin's poetry, he says, 'manifested the shimmering absence of the gods and-
pronounced the new law of the obligation to wait... for the enigmatic succour of "God's 
failing". Holderlin had discovered that 'the gods had wandered off through a rift in 
language as it was in the process of losing its bearings' (M Foucault, Maurice Blanchot: 
The Thought from Outside, p.17). 
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a further question of whether any language functions as an image representing presence, 
and 'which issues from its own absence, the way the image emerges upon the absence 
of the thing,' 18 for if the nature of language is to be image then, says Blanchot, it would 
seem that the happily abandoned position 'which used to define art as imitation, a copy 
of the real' is regained. Blanchot notes, 
'According to the common analysis, the image comes after the object. It 
is the object's continuation. We see, then we imagine. After the object 
comes the image. "After" seems to indicate subordination. We really 
speak, then we speak in our imagination, or we imagine ourselves 
speaking. Wouldn't poetic language be the copy, the dim shadow, the 
transposition - in a space where the requirements of effectiveness are 
attenuated - of the sole speaking language? But perhaps the common 
analysis is mistaken. Perhaps, before going further, one ought to ask: but 
what is the image.' 19 
A similar critique is taken up by Derrida who, like Levinas, recognises the logocentrism 
and phonocentrism of the tradition and the need to take distance from it, and expresses 
a 'foreboding that phonocentrism merges with the historical determination of the 
meaning of being in general as presence. '20 According to Derrida, the tradition privileges 
logos which finds its first expression as phone, the essence of which is 'immediately 
proximate to that which within "thought" as logos relates to "meaning", produces it, 
receives it, speaks it, "composes" it,'21 - like the voice which, according to Aristotle, 
produces words as the first symbols of mental experience, and is thus the 'first 
signifier'22 because it enjoys the transparency of 'a relationship of immediate and 
essential proximity with the mind.'23 'In every case the voice is closest to the signified ... ,' 
wed 'indissolubly to the mind.'24 Levinas, in fact, also recognises the link between logos 
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ontology become otology.25 In a tradition which had fallen out of Being and reduced it 
to its substantial expression,26 Heidegger, says Levinas, enables us once again to hear 
the sound of Being. 
Now, Derrida's concern is the relationship between speech and writing; in 
relation to speech, he says, writing assumes an instrumental relation of secondarity, 
being the 'signifier of the signifier,' the 'translator of a full speech that was fully present 
(present to itself, to its signified, to the other, the very condition of the theme of 
presence in general), technics in the service of language, spokesman, interpreter of 
ordinary speech itself shielded from interpretation.127 Writing is 'a sign signifying a 
signifier itself signifying an eternal verity, eternally thought and spoken in the proximity 
of a present logos.'28 Compared with phone, 
'[t]he written signifier is always technical and representative. It has no 
constitutive meaning. This derivation is the very origin of the notion of 
the "signifier". The notion of the sign always implies within itself the 
distinction between signifier and signified.... This notion remains 
therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a 
phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the 
meaning of being, of voice and ideality of meaning.'29 
Now, this has implications for the understanding of sign, for '[t]he sign is always 
a sign of the Fall.'30 As soon as one asks: 'what is the sign?' the inevitable response is 
that '[t]he formal essence of the signified is presence, and the privilege of its proximity 
to the logos as phone is the privilege of presence.131 Further, since the signified is the 
25 Levinas writes, 'Avec Heidegger, dans le mot etre s'est reveillee sa 
"verbalite ", ce qui en lui est evenement, le "se passer" de l'etre .... C'est a cette so no rite 
verbale que Heidegger nous a habitues' (.Ethique et Infini: Dialogues avec Philippe 
Nemo. Paris,1982, p.34). 
Heidegger himself links logos and phone when he reflects on the concept of the 
Logos in Being and Time. He writes, '[ w ]hen fully concrete discoursing (letting 
something be seen) has the character of speaking [Sprechens] - vocal proclamation in 
words. The 'Aoyocr is <\>COVl'\, and indeed, <\>COVT\ µe'ta q>av'tamac; - an utterance in which 
something is sighted in each case' (p.56). 
26 Heidegger writes, 'With all our effort, with all our chasing after the 












intelligible face of the sign, '[t]he "formal essence" of the sign can only be determined 
in terms of presence.'32 It is this formal element which renders the sign intelligible: 
before its 'fall' and expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible, the sign refers to the 
signified in its intelligibility. There is here the notion of what Blanchot has already 
pointed out, namely, that of the sign or the image coming 'after' the reality. 
'Fallen secondarity', however, is not only a characteristic of writing, says 
Derrida, but is at the heart of the understanding of all language. The notion of a fall 
from a prior situation of immediacy into language 'as mediation of mediation and as a 
fall into the exteriority of meaning'33 needs to be re-thought, which 'strictly speaking, 
amounts to destroying the concept of "sign" and its entire logic.'34 It is to contest a 
metaphysics which privileges presence. As Hart comments on Derrida's project, 
'A discourse is metaphysical, then, if the concept is fashioned as a 
moment of pure presence, and the sign as representing the concept in its 
absence. Within these terms, the sign fails to represent the concept 
purely and simply; it introduces the complicating elements of materiality 
and difference which serve to delay and defer the expected recovery of 
the concept. This, accordingly, is the basis of the case for valuing the 
concept over the sign. However, argues Derrida, the sign's failure is 
structurally determined, and this is the starting-point for his case against 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid., pp.12-13 
34 ibid., p.7 
Kevin Hart (The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction. Theology and Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)) recalls the encounter between Dante 
and Adam (Paradiso, Canto XXVI, I 06) in which prelapsarian Adam is presented as a 
'model of perfect understanding' (ibid., p.3), the master of language who recovers 
intentions directly and enjoys immediate knowledge within the limits set by God, and 
without any hermeneutical difficulty; he stands outside language, the determiner of 
language who himself escapes those determinations. Adam, however, desired immediate 
knowledge outwith the God-imposed limits, and fell. The significance of this fall, 
however, was not only its moral trespass, but also its 'trespass of the linguistic sign' 
(ibid., p.3), which thereafter is forever mutable. Postlapsarian Adam 'is no longer the 
master of signs but is frequently mastered by them' (ibid., p.3). The world now is 'a 
chiaroscuro of presence and absence' (ibid., p.4); God has withdrawn and is now 
revealed only through signs which must be interpreted. It is here that philosophy's 
original fall takes place, for the interpretation of signs presupposes that 'timeless truths 
wait behind them and can be separated from them' (ibid., p.4), that behind the concept 
of "sign" lurks the concept of presence such that '[t]he sign is always a representation 
of a presence which precedes it, a passage from one presence to another, from infinite 
to finite mind' (ibid., p.4). Thus, the rudiments of a common theory of communication 
are evident: 'a presence represents itself by means of signs which are then recovered by 
another presence. 
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the metaphysics of presence.'35 
The consequence of this, says Hart, is that the repeatability of the sign is a structural 
characteristic, and its meaning is 'what it is in the absence of its animating presence.'36 
Now, Derrida focuses on the materiality of the sign whose meaning can never be 
isolated independently of context. In so doing, he forges a distinction between the 
intelligible and the sensible, and recuperates intelligibility on the side of expression. 
Hart notes that '[s]ince it always functions in the absence of a presence, the sign has no 
self-presence by which its intelligible content can withstand the accidents of empirical 
differences.' 37 But does this not compromise the absolute intelligibility of the Other, and 
reassert experience as the source of meaning? While a person must necessarily express 
himself symbolically, or while Saying must always issue in a Said, it is not the 
signification of the Said which sustains the ethical relationship, but the encounter with 
the Other beyond his expressed image. It is this we must now explore. 
6.11 The Ambiguity of the Sign 
Blanchet continues his reflection m an appendix, 'Two Versions of the 
Imaginary';38 at the heart of the relation between the object and its image is distance. To 
say that the image comes "after" the object means that the object must remove itself 
some distance to be grasped. 
'But this remove is not the simple displacement of a moveable object 
which would nevertheless remain the same. Here the distance is in the 
heart of the thing. The thing was there; we grasped it in the vital 
movement of a comprehensive action - and lo, having become image, 
instantly it has become that which no one can grasp, the unreal, the 
impossible. It is not the same thing at a distance but the thing as 
distance.' 39 
Citing the example of death, and the tripartite relation between corpse, deceased, and 
mourners, Blanchet reflects that '[t]he quiet that must be preserved in the room when 
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position par excellence is.'40 The presence of the corpse witnesses a strange ambiguity -
in its solitude, it becomes the appearance of 'that which has disdainfully withdrawn from 
us'41 so as to destroy the sense of human relationship. But, at the very moment 'when the 
cadaverous presence is the presence of the unknown before us, the mourned deceased 
begins to resemble himself.'42 A doubling of person and image takes place such that the 
deceased himself is 'more beautiful, more imposing... already monumental and so 
absolutely himself as if he were doubled by himself, joined to his solemn impersonality 
by resemblance and by the image.'43 As cadaver, 'he is ... perfectly like himself: he 
resembles himself. The cadaver is its own image .... the likeness, like to an absolute 
degree, overwhelming and marvellous.'44 But it is like ....... nothing. It is for this reason, 
says Blanchet, that no living person can bear any resemblance to self, for image and self 
relate as distance.45 
What the strangeness of the cadaver's resemblance teaches is that to say a person 
is made in his image needs first to be understood as 'man is unmade according to his 
image.'46 In other words, the image is beyond signification and sense as they are usually 
understood philosophically or 'by the world's existence,' for the image is not the object's 
sense, nor does it offer access to understanding; rather, the image is that which separates 
or withdraws the object from understanding by maintaining it purely as 'a resemblance 
which has nothing to resemble.'47 Although the image can be captured and presented to 
support some truth, this is to reverse the relationship and once again establish the image 
as 'after' the object. 
It seems, then, that the image has two possibilities, that 'there are two versions 
40 ibid., p.256 
41 ibid., p.257 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid., p.258 
44 ibid. 
45 Or the tool which is hidden in its use, and which, when damaged 
becomes its image, being brought into relief, its readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) being 
transformed into presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). Or art, in which the object 
abandons itself to the image. 
46 
47 
M Blanchet, SL, p.260 
ibid. 
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of the imaginary.'48 In its ambiguity, the image is that which can with all duplicity 
present an ideal reality beyond the object presented, but it can also exclude us, 
relegating us to a place outside its presence, to its absence as presence. But this duplicity 
'refers us back to a still more primal double meaning.'49 
At one level, the ambiguity of the image shows itself in the perpetuation of 
double meanings, whereby one meaning gives way to another meaning, and thus 
'misunderstandings serve comprehension by expressing the truth of intelligibility which 
rules that we never come to an understanding once and for all.' 50 Yet, a more primal 
meaning is that what speaks in the image "sometimes" speaks of the world, "sometimes" 
introduces us into 'the undetermined milieu of fascination;' "sometimes" gives us the 
power to control absent things, "sometimes" removes us to a level where signification 
and affection do not hold. In other words, ambiguity "always", to some extent, says both 
one thing and another. Although in fascination it is significant, its meaning 
'does not escape into another meaning, but into the other of all meaning. 
Because of ambiguity nothing has meaning, but everything seems 
infinitely meaningful. Meaning is no longer anything but semblance; 
semblance makes meaning becomes infinitely rich. It makes this 
infinitude of meaning have no need of development - it makes meaning 
immediate, which is also to say incapable of being developed, only 
immediately void.'51 
6.2 The Symbolism of the Face 
The relation between image and reality and the failure of the sign to realise 
presence purely and simply is relevant to a consideration of the face as trace in Levinas. 
Although the Other expresses himself phenomenally, one cannot move from the 
phenomenon back to the Other who is its principle. The exact meaning of the 
phenomenon is 'the being that appears, but remains absent' from its apparition.52 Thus, 
'the phenomenon is not deduced from him; one does not rediscover him by tracing back 
from the sign the thing would be to the interlocutor giving this sign, in a movement 
48 ibid., p.261 
49 ibid., p.263 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 E Levinas, TI, p.181 
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analogous to that leading from the appearance to the things in themselves.'53 The Other's 
expression in the sign remains 'forever indecipherable.' 'He who signals himself by a 
sign qua signifying that sign is not the signified of the sign - but delivers the sign and 
gives it.' 54 'Expression does not manifest the presence of being by referring from the sign 
to the signified; it presents the signifier. The signifier, he who gives the sign, is not 
signified.'55 
Like Derrida, Levinas says, 
'[t]he signified is n·ever a complete presence; always a sign in its turn, it 
does not come in a straightforward frankness. The signifier, he who 
emits the sign, faces, despite the interposition of the sign, without 
proposing himself as a theme .... The Other, the signifier, manifests 
himself in speech by speaking of the world and not of himself; he 
manifests himself by proposing the world, by thematising it.'56 
Levinas uses the term "face" to indicate '[t]he way in which the other presents himself, 
exceeding the idea of the other in me. '51 The face, as the expression of the Other, goes 
beyond, or even trespasses, its phenomenal image in the same way that the Cartesian 
idea of the infinite exceeds its ideatum. The face is Ka e · au -r 6. Although the face 
'expresses itself,'58 that expression is not a phenomenal representation which the I might 
give to itself, like some 'plastic image' which can be assigned its place as a theme in the 
world. The face presents the beyond (/'au-de/a), but the au-de/a is not "another world" 
behind the world, but the au-de/a of the "world", beyond any disclosure. 'Autrni est un 
pur trou dans le monde. II procede de l'absolument Absent. '59 The face signifies, beyond 
signification, a relation with an absolutely absent, an 'au-de/a de /'etre' and it does this 
as a trace. 'L'au-dela dont vient le visage signifie comme trace. Le visage est dans la 
trace de /'Absent absolument revolu, abso/ument passe, retire ... dans ... ''profond Jadis, 
Jadis Jamais assez" (Paul Valery) .... '60 
Levinas describes this in terms of the trace. The face signifies as a trace. Now, 
53 ibid., p.92 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid., pp.181-82 
56 ibid., p.96 
57 ibid., p.50 
58 ibid., p.51 
59 idem, HAH, p.63, quoting Sartre 
60 ibid., p.64 
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a trace is essentially ambiguous; it is duplicitous; it is an enigma. Although in the face 
the other person seems to present himself, and place himself under my own gaze and my 
own power of looking, nonetheless, enigmatically, the face presents the infinite, the 
non original and anarchic, which has no present nor historiography. Although a 
physiognomy which indicates a signified, the face is not 'an appearance or sign of some 
reality ... present as an invisible theme,'61 but a sign of departure. It is not the sign of 
some hidden reality which would hide behind it, and which would be open to 
ontological interpretation. Although it plays the same role as a sign the trace is not a 
sign like any other. Signs refer to persons absent, like the detective who seeks the 
evidence of presence. The trace, however, does not relate to an absent which can be 
presented; rather it refers to what is beyond all intention and project. It breaks up the 
order of the world. Its original significance is that it seeks to remove the signs of its 
having been present, like the thief who leaves a sign of his presence in the very act of 
removing signs. In this sense, the face carries its own effacement, just as all signs are 
traces, not of a present now past, but of a past that has never been present. 'Dans la trace 
a passe un passe absolument revolu.'62 'La trace est /'insertion de l'espace dans le temps, 
le point oil le monde s'incline vers un passe et un temps.'63 Only a being capable of 
transcending the world is capable of leaving a trace, only an ab-solute being. The trace 
is the presence, properly speaking, of that which has never been there, who is always 
past. 'La trace comme trace ne mene pas seulement vers le passe, mais est la passe 
meme vers un passe plus eloigne que tout passe et que tout avenir, lesquels se rangent 
encore dans mon temps - vers le passe de l'Autre oil se dessine l'eternite - passe absolu 
qui reunit to us /es temps. '64 
61 idem, OB, p.93 
62 idem, HAH, p.67 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid., pp.68-69 
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6. 3 Sacramentality 
In a way which seems to fly in the face of Levinas' distinction between the 
dynamic of desire which has love as its prototype, and the dynamic of need whose 
model is consumption, we find in the Christian tradition an act of eating which is 
proclaimed as the source and summit of its life. As Aquinas hymned it, 0 Sacrnm 
convivium in quo Christo sumitur. 65 It is as if, in order to sustain itself, the Christian 
community embarks upon an agape of eating, and sees this as a necessity for its own 
life. Eucharist is destructive and assimilative, yet, by a strange logic, the hope is not that 
the otherness of the Sacrament will be reductively incorporated into the Same, but that 
the one who eats will become other than he is. 
The convergence between Rahner and Levinas can be brought into clearer relief 
if we take the eucharist, the 'great sacrament,' as a focus for our consideration between 
sign and reality, sacramentum and res sacramenti. To recap somewhat: we noted that, 
for Levinas, eating corresponds to the fulfilment of a need; it is a relationship in which 
there is complete correspondence between an intention and its fulfilment, an 'intuitive 
fulfilment (as) the accomplishing of a teleological intention ... .'66 This in fact forms the 
basis of Levinas' criticism of Husserl, for 'despite the extension which phenomenology 
gives the word intention, intentionality bears the trace of the voluntary and the 
teleological. Signification as signifying out of a lack, a certain negativity, an aspiration 
which aims emptily, like a hunger, but in a determinate way, a presence which is to 
satisfy it. '67 Eating is an essentially totalising act in which the alterity of what is other 
is destroyed and incorporated into the same; and, flowing from this elementary model 
65 In Foundations, Rahner indicates the same themes which Aquinas pens 
in 0 Sacrnm Convivium: 'The reality which is designated by the term "Eucharist" has 
its foundation in the Last Supper of Jesus ... [O Sacrnm Convivium]. There, according to 
his own words, Jesus gives his "body" and his "blood" to be eaten and drunk under the 
appearance of receiving bread and wine ... [in quo Christo sumitur]. The idea of death is 
of decisive importance: Jesus accepts his fate consciously and connects it with the 
central content of his preaching [Recolitur memoriam passionis eius]. Moreover, Jesus 
understands this meal in an eschatological way as an anticipation of the joy of the final 
and definitive banquet [Pi gnus faturae gloriae nob is datus]. Finally, at this meal with 
Jesus, the idea of community is constitutive, that is the union of Jesus with his friends 
and the foundation of the community of these friends among themselves [Mens impletur 
gratia]' (p.425). (Italicised comments added). 
66 
67 
E Levinas, OB, p.96 
ibid. 
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of alimentary epistemology, one can say that '[i]n conformity with the whole tradition 
of the West, knowing, in its thirst and its gratification, remains the norm of the spiritual, 
and transcendence is excluded both from intelligibility and from philosophy.'68 Loving, 
on the other hand, contests this tendency, being constantly thwarted in its consumptive 
attempt upon the Other for the Other, as other, is always in excess of the subject's power 
of appropriation. Occurring 'beyond economic activity and the world,'69 love is 
characterised by 'an essential and insatiable hunger170 whose 'very positivity ... lies in its 
negativity.'11 At a fundamental level, the dynamic of need and its fulfilment ultimately 
fails to satisfy, for what the human person is oriented towards is a reality which cannot 
satisfy our hunger, not because that reality is inadequate to our emptiness, but because 
it is so much beyond our capacity to bear it, which, says Levinas, is to suggest that there 
is 'a signification where the for of the-one-for-the-other, outside of any correlation and 
any finality, is a for of total gratuity, breaking with interest,'72 a proximity 'which does 
not turn into knowing'73 nor form 'an ontological conjunction of satisfaction.'74 Yet, 
paradoxically, the Christian community, each time it gathers for its eucharistic agape, 
celebrates a Lord who gives himself to be eaten as food. Rabner writes, '[p ]art of the 
constitution of the sign, under which alone Christ is present, is the relationship of the 
bread and wine to a meal, their character of nourishment,'75 and, while Trent rejects the 
presence of Christ only in usu, dum sumitur, it concedes readily that the sacrament was 
instituted ut sumatur. 
A further seeming divergence between Levinas and Rabner presents itself. The 
eucharist is understood as the memorial of the salvific event of the passion and death 
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recollection of a past into a representable present must always fail for the Other, 
absolutely other in itself and not simply with respect to me, is beyond all representation, 
revelation and dissimulation and only gives itself in a trace of itself which is absolutely 
past, Valery's 'profond Jadis, Jadis Jamais assez, '76 an immemorial past. But, since as has 
already been said, pure presence has only ever been given to consciousness as a trace 
of presence, what is given is 'a trace of a trace.m The ability of consciousness to 
recuperate the presence of the Other into the present of its own time is always and 
already contested by the Other who is anachronistic with respect to consciousness, and 
with whom, therefore, any relationship is necessarily diachronic. The 'recuperable time 
of history and memory in which memory continues'78 is sundered. The approach of the 
Other always belongs to a past in the face of which my present welcome is always late 
and delayed, and by which I am accused and accusative. 'The past is not in the present, 
but is a phase retained, the past of this present, a lapse already lost which marks ageing, 
escaping all retention, altering my contemporaneousness with the other.'79 In so far as 
the face in its trace is 'anachronous immediacy' ,80 its proximity is a disturbance of the 
rememberable time.' 81 
However, evoking the priority of the word which is addressed to us (le Dire), 
Levinas speaks of proximity as 'hearing a command come as though from an 
immemorial past which was never present.'82 But the notion of Word is at the heart of 
Sacrament, and, in particular respect of the eucharist, it is fidelity to a command which 
justifies the action. Might the eucharistic presence of Christ be understood primarily in 
his perduring words of institution, coming from that immemorial past, which command 
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face is not an appearance or sign of some reality ,'83 nor 'the absence of a yet non-
revealed,'84 'an invisible theme' awaiting ontological interpretation, nor a 'sign of a 
hidden God who would impose the neighbour on me'85 but is 'the anarchy of what has 
never been present, of an infinity which commands in the face of the other,'86 then might 
its proper interpretation be not so much the strictly theoretically theological 
interpretation of sign and meaning, but rather the practical and ethical response which 
finds its Christian articulation in the Johannine mandatum?81 
6.31 Sacrament as Word 
Rahner explains the significance of the Sacrament in terms of its similarity to 
the word to which it is essentially related. 'We are,' he writes, 'accustomed to consider 
the "word" as a constitutive and indeed formal, that is to say, decisive element of the 
sacramental sign.'88 The Eucharist is to be considered as 'word' because it is the presence 
of the incarnate Logos; firstly, it is the absolute proclamation of the entire mystery of 
salvation as anamnesis, which, secondly, actualises the presence here and now of God's 
gift of himself in the Son and our acceptance of that gift, and which, thirdly, anticipates 
sacramentally as pignus faturae gloriae the coming of Christ in glory. 89 God's "verbal" 
communication of himself, however, cannot be adequate alone for its acceptance by the 
human subject, for, in its immediacy, it would render reflective consciousness 
redundant. 'For if the verbal communication of God was already complete within the 
inner world of grace, in the "illumination" by interior grace alone, then man would 
always and essentially accomplish his salvation only in the non-reflective, 
unobjectivated transcendence of his being, while the dimension of worldly objects and 
83 ibid., p.93 
84 ibid., p.97 
85 E Levinas, OB, p.94 
86 E Levinas, OB, p.97 
87 In La trace de l'autre, Levinas draws attention to the liturgical sense of 
CEuvre which ultimately expresses itself as diakonia. See DEHH, p.194 ff. 
88 K Rahner, The Word and the Eucharist, p.254 
89 See ibid., p.281 
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categories remained outside the scope of salutary acts .... '90 The word, then, demands 
expression, and indeed, the supreme realisation of the word is 'the sacrament and only 
the sacrament.'91 This means that sacraments are essentially verbal. 'A sacrament is and 
remains an efficacious word.'92 'The sacramental action has the character of a word. It 
designates something, it expresses something, it reveals something that is of itself 
hidden.'93 If one can use Levinas' terminology, one can cautiously say that the sacrament 
is the Said (le Dit) in which an original Saying (le Dire) is expressed as inexpressible 
mystery. 
Now, if one accepts the priority of the Word and the essentially verbal nature of 
the sacrament - the sacrament as the supreme realisation and expression of the word, 
one might ask whether Rahner is not in fact part of that logocentric and phonocentric 
heritage criticised by Derrida in which there is 'absolute proximity of voice and being, 
of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and ideality of meaning'94 and, in which the 
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Rahner outlines the historical justification for understanding the nature of 
sacrament as word. The Council of Trent affirms that 'Christ is present by virtue of the 
panis vinique benedictio' (Denzinger 874). The Council of Florence, in its 'Decree for 
the Armenians, affirms that 'forma huius sacramenti sunt verba salvatoris, quibus hoc 
fecit sacramentum,' where forma is not the efficient cause of the sacrament in fieri but 
its permanent constitutive element 'by which the sacrament exists and abides.' Pesch, 
he says, also confirms this thinking when he writes, 'nun verba sint forma constitutiva 
huius sacramenti. Species eucharistiae per se non significant quod continent, i.e., 
Christum, nisi in quantum ad hanc sanctificationem determinatae sunt per verba. Neque 
enim intelligimus has species esse consecratas et signifiare Christum, nisi in quantum 
scimus circa eas prolata esse verba. Unde relatio signi est in speciebus, ut sunt 
determinatae verbis et hoc sufficit ut verba dicantur in genere signi constituere hoc 
sacramentum (Praelectionis, VI, n.785). 'Are the words the constitutive form of J;it€ this f\ 
sacrament? The Eucharistic species do not signify what they contain, Christ, except in 
so far as they are given this signification by the words. We do not know that the species 
are signified and signify Christ except in so far as we know that the words have been 
pronounced about them. Thus the species contain the relation of the sign, in so far as 
they are determined by the words. With this it can be said that the words, being in the 
nature of a sign, constitute this sacrament' (See: K Rahner, The Word and the Eucharist, 
TI, IV, pp.283-84). 
94 J Derrida, Of Grammatology, p.12 
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the word dwelling in the immediate presence of a transcendental signified which 
safeguards and guarantees the intelligibility of the signifier in its 'absolute and 
irreducible' difference from the signified. Derrida grounds the difference between 
signified and signifier in the difference between the sensible and the intelligible, a 
difference at the core of Rahner's metaphysics and epistemology. Before its 'fall' and 
expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible, the signifier refers to the signified in its 
intelligibility, and the sign, 'as the face of pure intelligibility' 'remains turned towards 
the word and the face of God.'95 Thus, says Derrida, '[t]he age of the sign is essentially 
theological.'96 Now, Rahner admits the importance of the intelligibility - the signified -
of the sign when he says that 'it is not true and cannot be true that the material element 
of the sacrament (water, ablution etc) is decisive .... a purely natural thing in the nature 
of an object can never function as a sign in such a way that the supernatural reality could 
be attained through it alone.'97 Signs only indicate supernatural reality for man in his 
spiritual transcendence to the infinite which becomes 'an intrinsically constitutive 
element of this sign.'98 In other words, a sign requires the intelligible word in order that 
it be able to function as sign. However, it would be a mistake to interpret Rahner's 
emphasis on the spiritual or intelligible pole of reality as a devaluing of the material 
element of the sign and its relegation to the level of secondarity. The spirit's immersion 
in the world of sensibility is not a fall from a more original state but is a transcendental 
necessity for finite spirit. One need only recall Rahner's positive deduction of sensibility 
which confirms the worldliness of the finite spirit not as limitation and restriction, but 
as an ontological necessity for a finite spiritual nature. Spirit is not finite because it is 
worldly; it is worldly because it is finite. 'Man is spirit in such a way that, in order to 
become spirit, he enters and has ontically always and already entered into otherness, 
into matter, and so into world.'99 In other words, the conversio is an ontological 
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letting-self-be-encountered by another which 'is essentially conceivable only as ... 
sensibility.1100 Receptivity demands materiality through which the subject is 'essentially 
and ontologically being-away-from-itself-with-the-other (Weg-von-sich-beim-andern-
Sein).r1oi Translating this framework of understanding to Rahner's understanding of 
sacrament, one can say that the word which is uttered achieves its fullest expression not 
merely in sacrament but as sacrament, and rather than viewing the symbolism of the 
sacrament as the necessity of fallen secondarity, the result of hwnan finitude and 
sensibility, the sensibility of sacrament participates in its meaning. Whereas Derrida 
emphasises the difference between the intelligible and the sensible, Rahner, like 
Heidegger before him, stresses a difference in unity; for Heidegger, Dasein is the 
unitary phenomenon of Being-in-the-World; for Rahner, the hwnan person is the unita1y 
phenomenon of Spirit-in-World. Now, it is the sundering of the relationship bet\veen the 
intelligible and the sensible which enables Derrida, focusing on the materiality of the 
sign, to say that 'there is a mode of repetition which is held to be prior to presence,' 102 
and that, therefore, since presence is no longer the ground upon which the sign 
functions, then the transcendental condition of both sign and concept is modified in a 
determined way. 103 Because the sign transgresses its assigned limits, any qualitative 
distinction between the intelligible and the sensible becomes impossible. Meaning is 
not fixed but is forever contextualised. Now, this has a positive advantage. The inherent 
repeatability of the sign ensures that what it signifies can take root and be inculturated 
in a variety of contexts, which can, recursively, modify the signified in a determined 
way. Hence, theology is essentially open and responsive to new situations which prompt 
it to new and deeper reflection. More negatively however, the inherent repeatability of 
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103 The problem here is that Derrida repatriates meaning on the side of the 
subject. Rather than emphasising the repeatablility of the sign, Blanchot's notion --0f 
ambiguity is perhaps more theologically useful; the sign, rather than escaping into 
another meaning, relative to the subject, escapes into the other of all meaning, into an 
infinity of meaning, or meaning as infinite. This has the advantage of retaining meaning 
on the side of the object. See M Blanchot, SL, p.263 
FACE 286 
'transcendental signified' 104 - means that contextualisation risks becoming totalisation, 
for, cut off from the possibility of an absolute meaning, as Levinas understands it, the 
sign is forever relativised. The reduction of the sign to its context also constitutes a 
reduction in its meaning. With Rahner we would want to say that the meaning of the 
symbolism of the sign becomes apparent when it is first appreciated that the word 
"symbol" has no clear and definite meaning; 'the concept is much more obscure, 
difficult and ambiguous than is usually thought.r1os However, this is not only on account 
of it inherent repeatability, but also on account of the transcendental signified to which 
it points, and with which it is united. One sees this in Rahner's understanding of the 
Church as the fundamental sacrament, 'the one abiding symbolic presence, similar in 
104 The notion of a 'transcendental signified' is important here. Derrida, 
differentiating between the sensible and intelligible, notes the expulsion of intelligibility 
'into the exteriority of the sensible here below' (Of Grammatology, p.13 ). In its 
fallenness, the sign points to the intelligible which, before its fall, was an absolute self-
presence. The sign, '[a]s the face of pure intelligibility ... refers to an absolute logos to 
which it is immediately united.' This absolute logos, 'an infinite creative subjectivity,' 
is the 'transcendental signified', 'an imagined fixed point outside the system of 
signification,' as Hart explains it (Hart, op. cit., p.8, n.9). This point, Derrida argues, has 
historically been taken as God. Thus, 'the intelligible face of the sign remains turned 
towards the word and the face of God' (Grammatology, p.13). 'The sign and divinity 
have the same place and the same time of birth. The age of the sign is essentially 
theological' (ibid., p.14). 
Now, Derrida later argues that meaning and sign are related. 'From the moment 
there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs' (ibid., p.50). No 
sign, however, is absolute. It is, as noted, repeatable. The sign can be played again and 
again, but this 'play' - 'though as the absence of the transcendental signified' (ibid.) - is 
given limitless scope by the very absence of the transcendental signified. The 
'destruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics' of presence means that no path is 
closed off to the game. And here the opportunity and the danger. 
Hart points out that, for Derrida, as for Levinas, God can function as a totalising 
concept, a transcendental signified, the paradigmatic instance of 'a purported 
Archimedian point outside all textual determinations' (Hart, op. cit., p.47). 
Deconstruction, in its criticism of philosophies of totalisation, must, therefore, with 
regard to this particular transcendental signified, adopt an atheistic stance. (Cf. E 
Levinas, TI, p.58) In this sense, it can become liberator theologiae as Hart points out 
by freeing God from a fixed theological apparatus which constrains him. However, 
Levinas argues that God is only ever given with the ethical relationship with the Other, 
'as the other of the Other.' The refusal of God as a transcendental signified might be 
philosophically significant, but ethically may not be very consequential. The refusal of 
any transcendental signification in relation to the Other, however, while possibly 
opening on to the inexhaustibility of the Other, also relatives the meaning of the Other, 
and, once relativised, renders him vulnerable to the extremes of whatever totality is 
operative in a particular time and place. 
105 Karl Rahner, The Theology of the Symbol, TL IV, p.222 
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structure to the incarnation, of the eschatological redemptive grace of Christ; a presence 
in which sign and what is signified are united inseparably but without confusion.i1°6 And 
again, when, outlining his understanding of the symbolic nature of sacrament, he writes 
of natural symbols in which 'the sign or symbol as a phenomenon is intrinsically linked 
to what it is a phenomenon of, and which is present and operative, even though really 
distinct.t1°7 Derrida's criticism does have value: the age of the sign is essentially 
theological inasmuch as it belongs to an onto-theological epoch which privileges 
presence. However, if one inverts this and affirms, with Rahner, that theology is 
essentially the age of the sign, then rather than the sign being reduced in the onto-
theological tradition to an instrumental secondarity with respect to the word which 
enjoys close proximity to the signified, (which is Derrida's criticism of the onto-
theological tradition which responds to the question of the sign by affirming '[t]he 
"formal essence" of the sign can only be determined in terms of presence',) 108 or the 
common analysis in which the image is seen as coming 'after' the reality as its 
continuation, (which is Blanchot's criticism of the 'happily abandoned previous 
position,) it assumes a priority. Its relevance is its ability to bear a plenitude and 
diversity of signification; its privilege, however, is that it indicates a transcendental 
signified, which is accessible not as a sign, but only ever as a trace within that sign. For 
Levinas, it is to be called face; for Rahner, it is sacrament. This is, of course, to 
deconstruct the sign, and although this is at the heart of Derrida's project, it is a task no 
less evident in Rahner's own thinking. 
6.32 Symbolic Reality 
Rahner begins by arguing the ontology of symbolic reality in general, and sets 
his task as discovering, from the formal ontological perspective, 'the highest and most 
primordial manner in which one reality can represent another,' 109 or, in other words, the 
essential relationship between a signified and its signifier. Such a relationship 'in which 
106 idem, The Church and the Sacraments, in RR, p.280 
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one reality renders another present (primarily "for itself' and only secondarily "for 
others")' 110 is at the heart of an understanding of symbol. 
Now, '[a]ll beings are by their nature symbolic, because they necessarily 
"express" themselves in order to attain their own nature.rt 11 But this means that a being, 
in its nature, is not to be considered as simplex and homogeneous but as different and 
distant from its self, and it is this which gives the possibility of symbol. Because finite 
creatures are by nature multiple, they 'are or can be essentially the expression of another 
in this unity of the multiple and one in this plurality, by reason of its plural unity.' 112 
However, this situation, says Rabner, is not simply a characteristic of a finite spirit 
being placed at a distance from itself in some delusory post-lapsarian fall from full 
presence, which preceded any difference, into exile of sensibility .113 The plurality of 
being is at the core of infinite being, as a theological consideration of the 'traces' and 
'reflexions' within the Trinity shows. Plurality is not the consequence of finitude; 'being 
is plural in itself,' 114 and the plurality of the finite is 'an allusion - disclosed only in 
revelation - to a plurality which is more than indistinguishable identity and simplicity.' 115 
This plurality is already shown in the transcendence of God who nonetheless draws 
mysteriously close to us in proximity. 'It is therefore true: a being is, of itself, 
independently of any comparison with anything else, plural in its unity.' 116 However, 
since, as Aquinas says, non enim plura secundum se uniuntur, inner agreement among 
the pluralities is called for in order that there be a true unity and not simply a 
110 ibid. 
I I I ibid., p.224 
Rabner writes, 'Really genuine symbols' or 'symbolic realities' which are 
expressive are to be distinguished from 'merely arbitrary "signs" or "symbolic 
representations" which have no intrinsic relation to their signified and hence any reality 
can stand for any other reality. However, 'it is not easy to say where the function of 
being merely a sign and indicator so predominates over the "function of expressiveness" 
that a symbol loses its "overplus of meaning" (Fr. Th. Vischer) and sinks to the level of 
a sign with little symbolism' (ibid., p.225). 
112 ibid., pp.225-26 
113 See Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, p.10 




'subsequent conjunction of separate elements which once stood only on their own.r1 17 
Rahner argues his understanding of plural unity thus: 'the "one" develops, the 
plural stems from an original "one", in a relationship of origin and consequence; the 
original unity, which also forms the unity which unites the plural, maintains itself while 
resolving itself and "dis-closing" itself into a plurality in order to find itself precisely 
there.' 118 And this original unity is not abstract or merely apparent, 'a hollow, lifeless 
identity' 119 but is a differentiation which is in itself "perfectio pura" ... , not provisional, 
but something absolutely final, an ultimate of the self-communicating unity itself as 
such, which constitutes this unity itself.' 120 
This means that each being, as a unity, 'possesses a plurality' in agreement with 
its original unity and expressive of it. 'Since this holds good for being in general, we 
may say that each being forms, in its own way, more or less perfectly according to its 
degree of being, something distinct from itself and yet one with itself, "for" its own 
fulfilment.' 121 Unity and distinction are correlatives. 'And this differentiated being, 
which is still originally one, is in agreement because derivative, and because 
derivatively in agreement is expressive.' 122 Hence, Levinas assertion of existence as a 
duality and a lack of simplicity in existence seems to be confirmed in Rahner. The verb 
'to be' is a reflexive verb. Being always and already and as such has a relationship to 
itself such that one can say that 'it is not just that one is, one is oneself (on n'est pas, on 
s'est).' 123 As Blanchot notes, no living person can bear any resemblance to self, for the 
relation between the ego and its self is always a relation of distance. 
Rahner continues: it is this agreement with its origin that constitutes the 
derivative as an expression. 'Every being as such possesses a plurality as an intrinsic 
element of its significant unity; this plurality constitutes itself, by virtue of its origin 
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perfect), in such a way that that which is originated and different is in agreement with 
its origin and hence has (at least in a "specificative", if not always in a 11 reduplicative 11 
sense) the character of expression or "symbol" with regard to its origin" 24 - which is to 
return to the opening statement: 'being is of itself symbolic, because it necessarily 
"expresses" itself.r1 25 
Now, although plurality often indicates finitude and deficiency, it also has a 
positive aspect which perdures at least as a "trace" in the formal givenness of the 
plurality. The positivity of being's plurality is 'the possibility of the possession of self 
in knowledge and love.' 126 But this does not only apply to self knowledge for it follows 
that 'if beings are of themselves symbolic, in so far as they realise themselves in a 
plurality, and possess themselves in this derivative agreement of the "other" with its 
primordial origin, the same holds good for the knowledge of these beings by others. A 
being can be and is known, in so far as it is itself ontically (in itself) symbolic because 
it is ontologically (for itself) symbolic.r127 The primordial meaning of symbol and 
symbolic is thus: 'as a being realises itself in its own intrinsic "otherness" (which is 
constitutive of its being), retentive of its intrinsic plurality (which is contained in its 
self-realisation) as its derivative and hence congruous expression, it makes itself 
known.' 128 'The symbol strictly speaking (symbolic reality) is the self-realisation of a 
being in the other, which is constitutive of its essence.' 129 
Levinas, employing his own particular understanding of ontology as 'theory as 
comprehension of beings,' 130 recognises that the reduction of alterity and the 
construction of totality arises ab extra. He writes, 'This mode of depriving a known 
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neutral term, which is itself not a being.1131 Again, '[ w ]estem philosophy has most often 
been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and 
neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being.r1 32 Hence, for Levinas, 
communion with the Other, is not achieved 'around some third term.' 133 Rather, the 
relationship with the Other arises in the encounter with the symbolism of face of the 
Other. Now, the equivocity with which the term 'ontological' is used by Rahner and 
Levinas is problematical; the reality they seek to express, beyond the term, is similar. 
Human being is essentially self-relational. The human person is essentially symbolic; 
'on n'estpas; on s'est.' 
Rahner further argues that, because a being comes to possession by expression, 
"symbol" is not to be understood as 'a secondary relationship between two different 
beings, which are given the function of indicating one another by a third, or by an 
observer who notes a certain agreement between them.' 134 
This ontological understanding of symbol has theological implications. The 
thought of the mystery of the Trinity is the constant background to Rahner's ontological 
consideration of symbol, and express appeal to this mystery was made in his method. 
The Trinity reveals itself theologically as plural unity. 'The Father is himself by the very 
fact that he opposes to himself the image which is of the same essence as himself, as the 
person who is other than himself; and so possesses himself.' 135 This means that the 
Logos is the symbol of the Father - 'the inward symbol which remains distinct from 
what is symbolised, which is constituted by what is symbolised, where what is 
symbolised expresses itself and possesses itself.' 136 'It is because God "must" "express" 
himself inwardly that he can also utter himself outwardly.' 137 Thus Christology is central 
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6. 4 Language as Responsibility 
Rahner acknowledges the disproportion between what is said and the person who 
is being spoken of when he writes that, in a pluralistic society, 
'dialogue must bear the motto of Anselm of Canterbury: consideratio 
rationabiliter comprehendit incomprehensibile esse: reflection 
comprehends rationally that the incomprehensible exists and holds 
sway .... But the dialogue must remain surrounded by that silent respect 
for the fact that what is being spoken about transcends by far everything 
that is said: the man who, as Pascal says, infinitely transcends man, and 
his secret which is God.' 138 
The conversation about the Other is, in Blanchot's words, 'an infinite conversation,' for 
the Other is utterly excessive to any thought or thematisation. The inscription of the 
infinite Other defies the descriptive ability of thought and the categories within which 
I would expose the Other, for the Other is essentially ex-position. For Levinas, the focus 
is not so much conversation about the Other - though this, too, for Levinas has the 
dimension of infinity and inexpressibility on account of the illeity which is the source 
of the alterity of the Other, - but conversation with the Other who, in his Saying (le 
Dire), is excessive with respect to what is Said (le Dit). For Rahner, then, the 
incomprehensibility of alterity derives from the relationship which a person has with the 
mystery of the divine to whose self-communication he is open, a relationship which, 
Rahner indicates, is 'a constitutive element of his being both in his natural state and in 
his supernatural elevation.' 139 Although, strictly speaking, only God is truly a mystery 
for the created spirit, 'all beings, and above all the created spirit in its transcendence 
towards absolute being, partake of the mysterious character of God, in so far as all 
beings are referred to God, and cannot be adequately understood without this 
relationship and hence in terms of this relationship.' 140 Thus, he can affirm that, because 
created by God, 'all understanding of any reality whatsoever is in the last resort always 
a reductio in mysterium.' 141 Further, '[t]he mystery is self-evident,' 142 communicating 
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mystery,' does not remam at the level of the transcendental horizon of human 
transcendentality but communicates inter-personally in the love of neighbour, a 
relationship, beyond reflection, in which a person finally 'catches up with himself' in the 
continual confrontation with 'the silent, absolute mystery which embraces his 
existence.' 143 The potentia oboedientialis of a person for grace 'is precisely the 
transcendentality towards the other who is to be loved and who is first of all one's fellow 
man.' 144 Again, '[t]he love of neighbour is not something which everyone always already 
knows reflexively in the depth of his being; rather, it is that which is sent to man only 
through the experienced and suffered wholeness of life and still remains even then, 
indeed especially then, a nameless mystery.' 145 Further, the relationship with the mystery 
of the Other is the basis of human subjectivity. It is 'the all-embracing basic act of man 
which gives meaning, direction, and measure to everything else;1146 it is an act which, 
though exhibiting a transcendentality towards the Other, is experienced concretely. The 
a priori openness of a person to what is other attains its fullness and fulfilment in an a 
priori openness to another human being, and this is always an experience of a concrete 
encounter with another person. 
Now such an encounter in which the mystery of the Other affects the subject at 
the juncture with the concrete is described by Levinas when he writes that '[t]he 
dehiscence of proximity' acquires its force, not in any abstract or natural immediacy, but 
in the more determinate immediacy of contact, like the touch of skin or the look from 
a face, which in its closeness does not annul the alterity of the other nor a unification of 
myself in the Other, for contact always entails the separation of touching and being 
touched. But touch is already frustrated by distance, for '[i]n the random agitation of 
caresses there is the admission that access is impossible, violence fails, possession is 
refused,' 147 for '[b]eyond disclosure and exhibition of the known alternate ... an enormous 
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(autrui) is 'strangely mysterious.' The force of the other's proximity does not derive from 
the plasticity of his form or image but is undergone as the experience of obligation, the 
experience of my being-assigned by the other as 'one-for-the-other', an assignation 
outwith any cognitional framework in which the phenomenon of the appearing of the 
other would arise as a noema of a noesis, for '[a]dequation is impossible.1149 It is the 
obligation I experience, my experience of having-been assigne~The proximity of the ~ 
Other obliges me; faced with the Other, I am obligated to respond, but to respond not 
to the plastic represented image, in which the Other as neighbour seems to draw near, 
for this is representation happening in common time, and can easily become an image 
made in my own image and likeness. Rather, the obligation I have towards the 
neighbour 'concerns me before or otherwise. Such is the sense of the non-phenomenality 
of the face;' 150 it is 'inconvertible into forms,' 151 'an anachronous immediacy,' 152 and is 
thus situated beyond my comprehending vision. Were I to relate to the face in its plastic 
form and image, then my activity as a subject and my possibility of domination would 
be established. 
The significance of the diachrony of the Other is that the Other always precedes 
me and obliges me to respond. Proximity is the 'hearing a command come as though 
from an immemorial past which was never present.' 153 Before ever I take to myself the 
power to decide to be responsible, I am already assigned by the other as responsible for 
him. I do not even have the freedom to decide to welcome him for 'to take hold of 
oneself for a present of welcome is already to take one's distance, and miss the 
neighbour.' 154 Rather, I must undergo and suffer the neighbour through 'a surplus of 
passivity which is no longer conscious of ... ' but is .... 'as though I had heard before he 
spoke.' 155 And the response I make to this command does not flow from my freedom, 
149 ibid., p.88 
150 ibid., p.89 
151 ibid., p.90 
152 ibid., p.91 




but is the context within which my freedom operates. 156 It precedes my freedom. I am 
not first free, and then responsible; I am responsible, then free, for both are 
diachronically opposed, and responsibility is prior. I am not 'condemned to be free,' as 
Sartre claimed when he wrote, 'L'homme, etant condamne a etre fibre, porte le poids du 
monde tout entier sur ses epaules: ii est responsable du monde et de lui-meme en tant 
que maniere d'etre' (.L 'Etre en le Neant). I am not responsible en tant que free. I am 
condemned to be responsible, and condemned because this is my responsibility, not one 
another can assume on my behalf. Condemned, because responsibility cannot be 
delimited. 'To be oneself, otherwise than being, to be dis-interested, is to bear the 
wretchedness and bankruptcy of the other, and even the responsibility that the other can 
156 Such a framework for freedom is not lost to Rahner's own thinking. 
Arguing from 'the a priori structure of the one whole man (in knowledge and will),' 
Rahner reminds us that knowledge is 'a return to oneself, and freedom is not simply the 
capacity to do this or that but (formally) a self-disposing into finality.' Because the 
subject is always concerned with itself (from a formal point of view), 'it must 
necessarily be the secret a priori law imposed on the multiplicity of the possible objects 
for man that they can be concerned with and ordered for man's knowledge and freedom' 
insofar as they serve this self-presence and self-disposal. But, from this it follows 
(against the Heidegger of Being and Time, we note, for whom the instrumentality of 
tools open onto the presence of other people) 'that the world of things can be a possible 
object for man's concern only as a moment of the world of persons' as is also evident in 
the axiom that 'being and good are identical,' and in the teaching that 'the objective 
moral good is given in a personal being.' But Rahner goes on: 'it must be added 
immediately that this formal nature of knowledge and freedom, understood as self-
possession and self deed, refers to the formal nature from a certain point of view and 
must not be misunderstood in an egocentric sense.' Materially, the personal Other - (a 
posteriori) in this framework - is the 'necessary mediation of the knowing subject to 
itself and so ... the known personal Thou is the mediation, the 'being-with-oneself of the 
subject.' Further, '[t]his condition is even clearer and more radical in the case of 
freedom: the free self-disposal, when morally right and perfect, is precisely the 
loving communication with the human Thou as such (not as a mere negation of nor as 
something different from the 'ego' which wants merely to find itself, even though in the 
other.) Knowledge achieves itself only in the act of freedom 'and therefore must lose 
and yet keep itself in freedom in order to be completely itself.' Knowledge has a fully 
human significance 'only once it is integrated into freedom, i.e., into the loving 
communication with the Thou.' Rahner concludes, '[i]f this is correct, then the essential 
a priori openness to the other human being which must be undertaken freely belongs 
as such to the a priori and most basic constitution of man and is an essential inner 
moment of his (knowing and willing) transcendentality. This a priori basic 
constitution ... is experienced in the concrete encounter with man in the concrete' (See, 
K Rahner, Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of God, TI, 
VI, pp.240-41 ). Now, as the a priori, basic constitution of the person, openness to the 
other is not only an posteriori material necessity for finite subjectivity, but belongs to 
its formal constitution. One is subject precisely and insofar as one is transcendental and 
concrete openness to the Other, before whom knowledge and freedom have significance. 
FACE 296 
have for me. To be oneself, the state of being a hostage, is always to have one degree 
of responsibility more, the responsibility for the responsibility of the other.' 157 The self 
is sub-jectum, under the weight of the universe, responsible for everything. Condemned, 
because this responsibility cannot be other than my responsibility. Though I can 
substitute myself for the Other, and am called upon so to do, in my assignation of 'one-
for-the-other' I cannot myself be substituted. Though my relationship with the Other is 
called to be one of vicarious substitution, my responsibility for him cannot be 
vicariously substituted, for 'the responsibility to which I am exposed in such a passivity 
does not apprehend me as an interchangeable thing, for here no one can be substituted 
for me; in calling upon me as someone accused who cannot reject the accusation it 
obliges me as someone irreplaceable and unique, someone chosen.' 158 Were I able to 
thematise the Other and clothe him in a form, not only should I be objectivating him and 
introducing him into an economical relation of commerce in which he might be traded, 
but it would also be possible to trade my own responsibility towards him since it would 
have been universalised and thus assumable by another than myself. 
Thus Levinas concludes that, with respect to the Other, I am 'always late, and 
guilty for being late,' 159 not only addressed in the accusative, but also accused. The 
neighbour has always and already approached me as a past, and the present of my 
welcome always involves a lapse of time, an irrecuperable delay for which I stand 
accused, for when I confront his image, 'it is precisely in his image that he is no longer 
near.'160 
Now, it might be objected that this responsibility is too much of a condemnation, 
and the overturning of my freedom is too perilous. 'It is because I am wholly free that 
I am totally responsible and because I am truly responsible for every act and for others 
that my freedom is constantly in question and thus in peril.' 161 It might be objected that 
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be charged with the task of Atlas shouldering the entire world. This is surely the point 
to which Derrida draws attention, when recognising that, in being attentive to the Other, 
'at this very instant, you hear me, I have just said it:' "He will have obligated (ii aura 
oblige). 111162 But, having been obligated, the marches of this obligation are so discrete 
as to be illimitable. Derrida writes of the phrase, 'ii aura oblige,' that it overflows with 
discretion. 'But precisely, nothing surrounds it sufficiently to assure us of its limits. The 
sentence is not evasive but its border lies concealed.' 163 'I myself no longer know where 
to stop them.' 164 This, though, is not because of the distance of obligation, but on 
account of its very excessive and weighty proximity. It is not because the Other, in his 
dimension of infinity, is so far distanced from me that I must pursue my obligation to 
the ends of the earth, but because, in his simple me voici, he is so proximate as to be 
inescapable. I cannot stand back enough so as to contextualise the Other, and not being 
able to contextualise the Other, I find my responsibility outwith all contextualisation 
also. 
'Here at this very moment, when I am trying here to give you to 
understand, the border of a context is less narrow, less strictly 
determining than one is accustomed to believe. 11 11 aura oblige": there 
you have a phrase that may appear to some terribly indeterminate. But 
the distance that is granted to us here would not be due so much to a 
certain quite apparent absence of an edge .. , but rather because of a 
certain inside of what is said and of the saying of what is said in the 
phrase, and which, from within, if this may still be said, infinitely 
overflows at a stroke all possible context.' 165 
Further, if all are responsible for all others - and L most of all - then is responsibility not 
just a condemnation, but is also empty of meaning? For, if everyone is responsible, then 
no one is responsible. However, to limit the scope of responsibility seems a dangerous 
avenue to pursue. For, if the extent of my own responsibilities can be delimited, there 
will always be situations and individuals for whom I can say that I bear no 
responsibility, and to whom my world is closed - Auschwitz revisited, and the need in 
an other time for the inscription made by Levinas at the beginning of Otherwise than 
162 J Derrida, At this very moment in this work here I am, R Berezdivin (tr.), 
in Re-Reading Levinas, R Bernasconi & S Critchley (eds.), p.11 
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Being: 'to the memory of those who were closest among the six million assassinated by 
the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations, 
victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-Semitism.' It may be that the 
ability to respond responsibly is curtailed through finitude and incapacity but, 
nonetheless, the obligation to be responsible remains. The ethical imperative may not 
be an ontological necessity and may not even be an ontological possibility for an 
individual, but it does remain nonetheless an ethical imperative. The choice, it would 
seem, is that we must either embrace Markel's insight in Dostoievsky's Brothers 
Karamazov that we are all of us responsible for one another in every way, and I most 
of all, 166 or deny that any of us is responsible for anything. But, does this not require a 
link between ethical metaphysics, which is the situation of responsibility, and ontology, 
as a structure wherein a responsible commitment to justice can be realised? 
6. 41 Signification as the 'one-for-the-other' of substitution 
Now, for Levinas, the weight of responsibility I bear towards the Other is 
excessive because of the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the I. Responsibility to the 
point of substitution is the very meaning of subjectivity. To be subject is to be 'for you.' 
To say such is to give the self a eucharistic signification. One need only recall Paul's 
handing on of the eucharistic formula he himself received, ''tou'to µou ccrn v 'to crco µa 
'tO u 7tcp u µrov' (1 Cor. 11 :24). This signification of the self as 'for you' is not a 
transubstantiation whereby the self would simply become another identity. It is a 
substitution, 'the normative structure of intersubjectivity,' 167 which lies outwith the 
ontological order and 'rests on appeal and obedience rather than causation and 
comprehension.' 168 Levinas writes, 
Signification, saying ... cannot be understood as a modality of being; the 
disinterestedness suspends essence. As a substitution of one for another, 
as me, a man, I am not a transubstantiation, a changing from one 
substance into an other, I do not shut myself up in another identity, I do 
not rest in a new avatar. As signification, proximity, saying, separation, 
166 'Chacun de nous est coupable devant tous pour tous et pour tout, et moi 
plus que !es autres.' (Les Freres Karamazov) 
167 S Smith, Reason as One for Another, p.65 
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I do not fuse with anything.' 169 
He then goes on to ask, 'Must we pronounce the word expiation, and conceive the 
subjectivity of the subject, the otherwise than being, as an expiation?r17o 
Signification always takes place in the ethical encounter between human 
persons, and since the intersubjective relationship is essentially diachronic, the structure 
of signification refuses the disposal of the truly transcendent originary agreement by 
intuition or the play of being. Ceci is not offered for cela in a representative or 
significative manner as in Derrida's structure of meaning as ceci en tant que cela, but 
as a personal, ethical signification which coincides with the moral event of substitution 
in which one is for the other. In the significative structure of this for that, my 
responsibility is the for of the relationship, one-for-the-other, 'the very signifyingness 
of signification.' 171 The self "stands for" the neighbour as does the sign for the signified, 
one for another. Language as representation is only 'a mode of its primordial work of 
opening interlocutors to each other for mutual service.' 172 
Now, by beginning with the experience of proximity, and its allied notions, 
Levinas avoids the quest for a consciousness which would be transcendental to 
thematising consciousness, and which would continue to understand ipseity as an 
essence modelled on the intentionality of the for-itself and yielding 'a new ipseity 
behind the ipseity that one would like to reduce.' 173 Such a transcendental reduction of 
thematising consciousness in order to discover the self behind the self which the for-
itself expresses would yield a transcendental ego as 'first a non-quiddity, no one, clothed 
with purely borrowed being, which masks its nameless singularity by conferring on it 
a role.t1 74 This ego, though a demand of speculative reason, would be 'an abstract point, 
the centre of a rotation, identifiable on the basis of the trajectory traced by this 
movement of consciousness.' 175 Levinas contends instead of this that a "subjective 
169 E Levinas, OB, p.14 
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condition," other than 'an identity that one calls ego or 1' 176 or the 'for-itself of 
consciousness'
177 
already exists as the support for consciousness, saying that, if the 
return to self proper to cognition, the original truth of being, consciousness, can be 
realised, it is because a recurrence of ipseity has already been produced from without, 
an ipseity 'not having to identify itself in the present nor to state its identity, already 
older than the time of consciousness.' 178 In other words, the return to self is made 
possible because there is already a self constituted by the other than the self. What 
establishes the self, the very subjectivisation of the subject, is always and already other 
than the self, and cannot be identified in-itself by appropriating comprehension. How 
subjectivity happens is in 'an upsurge in me of a responsibility prior to commitment, that 
is, a responsibility for the other' ... [in which] ... 'I am one and irreplaceable, one 
inasmuch as irreplaceable in responsibility.' 179 The responsibility I experience (in my 
'soul') when faced with the other in proximity, sensibility and vulnerability establishes 
my identity, not as a 'for-itself but as the 'onefor-the other' - the definite article is 
important - and insofar as this responsibility is something which I can neither evade nor 
escape, but is a persecution, it provides my identity with its own constancy and 
recurrence. 'Persecution is not something added to the subjectivity of the subject and his 
vulnerability; it is the very moment of recurrence.' 180 This means, though, that the 
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The continuity of the Same, the event of its recurrence, is not supported, says Levinas, 
by a transcendental ego, or by a consciousness which is able, independently of alterity, 
to link together the various moments of a subject's personal history. Joseph Libertson, 
in La recurrence chez Levinas, (Revue philosophique de Louvain, 79 (1981), pp.213 -
251 ), speaks of 'a latent differential moment in the economy of subjectivity' (un moment 
differentiel latent dans l'economie de la subjectivite). He argues that 'a positive unicity 
of the separate being is produced by the movements of differentiation and 
communication, although this unicity lacks totality. Subjectivity appears as an 
ontological event by virtue of the economy's inability to totalise its discontinuity' (ibid., 
p.251 ). At the core of subjectivity is a heteronomy which gathers the subject together 
under the aegis of responsibility. The subject is constituted as the one-for-the-other of 
responsibility, and perdures as the one-for-the-other ofresponsibility. 
179 E Levinas, OB;p.103 
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becomes paralysed by its absolute passivity in respect of the other. The proper sense of 
the oneself, then, is the birth of the other in the self. 
'The one is hypostatised in another one. It is bound in a knot that cannot 
be undone in a responsibility for others .... In the exposure to wounds and 
outrages, in the feeling proper to responsibility, the oneself is provoked 
as irreplaceable, as devoted to the others, without being able to resign, 
and thus incarnated in order to offer itself, to suffer and to give. It is thus 
one and unique, in passivity from the start, having nothing at its disposal 
that would enable it not to yield to provocation.r1 81 
Consciousness is not the identity of ipseity. The subject rather is a term in a hypostasis 
with the other, and cannot be adequately expressed as an ego, an I or a oneself. 
Responsibility, then, is an original experience; it is not to be derived from some 
underlying principle which would account for it, provide its justification and endow it 
with meaning. In this sense, the proximity which evokes the self as the one-for-the-other 
is an an-archy whose 'me-ontological and metalogical structure' takes form 'in a 
responsibility that is justified by no prior commitment, in the responsibility for another -
in an ethical situation.' 182 This anarchic ethics, however, is not disorder, 'the content of 
a consciousness gone mad,' 183 but rather 'an other order,' 184 in which 'the ontological play 
which, precisely as play, is consciousness,' 185 is brought to a halt. As original, 
responsibility is not of my own choosing, but 'is an assignation of me by another, a 
responsibility with regard to men we do not even know,' 186 'an obligation, anachronously 
prior to any commitment,' 187 an anteriority '"older" than the a priori,' 188 a 'relationship 
with exteriority "prior" to the act that would effect it,' 189 and in which I find myself 
obsessed and persecuted. 
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Now, obsession and persecution are two moments of my relationship with the 
other. In obsession, 'a relationship with the outside which is prior to the act that would 
open up this exteriori1 9o is opened up. Captivated by the other, obsession 'strips the ego 
of its pride and the dominating imperialism characteristic of it,' 191 and declines it, as 
accused, in the accusative case, where such a declining (de-clinare) is not a turning 
away from a prior nominative to the accusative objectivity of verbal transitivity. The 
return to self does not yield an /, which can thereafter freely be declined as me. Rather 
the ego is from the start undeclinable in 'the irremissibility of the accusation.i1 92 I am 
already declined in such a way that, as accusative, I cannot decline the other. But 
captivation is also captivity. 'The word I means here I am, answering for everything and 
for everyone.' 193 To be one's self is passively to 'undergo from the other,' where this 
undergoing 'from-the-other' is already the for-the-other of responsibility, or subjectivity. 
Of course, this means that responsibility for others can never mean a simple altruism, 
which is a decision by the self on behalf of the other. 'For under accusation by everyone, 
the responsibility for everyone goes to the point of substitution. A subject is a 
hostage. 1194 Like the vicarious suffering of the servant of whom Isaiah writes, 
subjectivity is always 'accused of what the others do or suffer, or responsible for what 
they do or suffer. The uniqueness of the self is the very fact of bearing the fault of 
another.r1 95 
190 ibid., p.110 
191 ibid. 
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This is a substitution which extends to the whole of humanity, for, since the 
Other can be indicated only as if, then, in the relationship with the illeity of the Other 
which is the source of his alterity, others (autres) who are other (autre) than the Other 
(autrui) and who also lay claim to my responsibility and also demand justice, are 
implicated. '[T]he epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity' (TI, p.213). '[T]he 
epiphany of the face ... attests the presence of the third party, the whole of humanity, 
in the eyes that look at me' (ibid.). 
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6. 5 The face of the Other and the trace of God 
Now, the phenomenon of the face as an ethical happening has a theological 
significance, for it opens on to the mystery of the transcendent and infinite God. 196 In 
fact, the way of theology can only be pursued from within the situation of the ethical 
encounter with the Other. The step, however, is not to be undertaken hastily. Although 
representation and thematisation transform the trace into a sign of a departure, 'this,' 
says Levinas, 'opens the dangerous way in which a pious thought or one concerned with 
order, hastily deduces the existence of God.' 197 But the neighbour is not a 'sign of a 
hidden God who would impose the neighbour on me1198 However, this is not to say that 
the movement from the Other to God is untraversable. On the contrary, the relationship 
with the Other and the relationship with God are intimately linked in the experience of 
transcendence which the ethical proximity of the Other evokes. The event of 
transcendence, writes Levinas, shows itself in a responsibility for the Other, but, in this 
very transcendence, 'the distinction between transcendence towards the other man and 
transcendence towards God should not be made too quickly.' 199 
Levinas situates the way in which Infinity or God refers to the non-desirable 
proximity of Others in the detour of tertiality, or, as already indicated, 'illeity.' God is 
an excluded third, offered only as a trace in the relationship with the Other, 'a detour 
196 See A Dondeyne, Inleiding tot het denken van E. Levinas, Tijdschrift 
voor Filosofie, 25, 3 - 4, 1963 
One can note here that Marechal has been criticised in similar vein for making O"\ 
the leap from esse commune to esse absolutum too readily, a criticism which some also 
make of Rahner. See our earlier note on the shift between Spirit in the World in which 
the spirit intends esse commune and Hearers of the Word where its goal is esse 
absolutum, now identified with God. See particularly, with reference to Hearers, the 
criticism of W Hoye who argues that the openness to being which Rahner's 
transcendental analysis concludes 'differs radically and unreconcilably from an openness 
to divine being .... What Rahner has disclosed in HW is equivalent to an openness merely 
to being in general (ens commune), not to absolute Being (Sein, esse) as it is legitimately 
predicated of God' (W Hoye, art. cit., p.511). The difficulty, of course, as Hoye presents 
it, flows from Rahner's limitation in Hearers of reality to cognitive reality, a limitation 
which we have hopefully shown is transcended in the wider Rahnerian corpus. 
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from the face.' 200 'The Desirable is intangible and separates itself from the relationship 
with Desire which it calls for; through this separation or holiness it remains a third 
person, the He in the depth of the You.1201 God remains the absent third in the 
relationship between the self and the other. Thus Levinas can differentiate between 'God' 
and 'divinity'. 'Divinity' is always in the manner of a 'said,' the fruit of cognition and 
thematising consciousness, whereas 'God' is utterly other, eminently other. Atheism, 
then, is not a refusal of God, but of the God-concept. 
'The atheism of the metaphysician means, positively, that our relation 
with the metaphysical is an ethical behaviour and not theology, not a 
thematisation, be it a knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God. 
God rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as correlative to the 
justice rendered unto men. The direct comprehension of God is 
impossible for a look directed upon him, not because our intelligence is 
limited, but because the relation with infinity respects the total 
Transcendence of the other without being bewitched by it, and because 
our possibility of welcoming him in man goes further than the 
comprehension that thematises and encompasses its object.'202 
God is inaccessible to thought, but accessible in the justice I show to the Other. Here is 
the truth of the anonymous author of the Cloud of Unknowing: 'By love may he be 
gotten and holden; by thought never.' But love is the doing of justice, and thus '[ e ]thics 
is the spiritual optics.'203 This is not to say that the Other is in some way the incarnation 
of God, or that God finds expression in the materiality and historicity of the Other to 
which we then respond. The trace of God offers itself in the face, which is supra-
categorial, 'disincarnate.' The face is not the incarnation of the Other, but, in terms of 
illeity, rather the 'disincarnation' of the Other, his transcendence and infinity. And it is 
precisely on account of this that the Other offers the trace of God. 'The Other is not the 
incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincamate, is the 
manifestation of the height in which God is revealed.'204 Thus, though the Other 
provokes desire in me, and is thus desirable, what draws me ever further into the infinite 
20° Cf. M Faessler, L'lntrigue Du Tout-Autre. Dieu dans la pensee 
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relationship with him is that quality of tertiality, or illeity, which renders the Other 
appealing, his very non-desirability. The desired is referred to the non-desirable, and 
in this ethical reversal, 'GOD is tom up from objectivity, presence and Being.'205 
'His absolute remoteness, his transcendence turns into my responsibility 
- non-erotic par excellence - for the Other. And this analysis implies that 
God is not simply the "first Other" or the "Other par excellence" or the 
"absolutely Other," but other than the Other (autnti), other otherwise, 
other with an alterity prior to the alterity of the Other, prior to the ethical 
bond with another, and different from every neighbour, transcendent to 
the point of absence, to the point of a possible confusion with the stirring 
of the there is .'206 
Because of this remoteness, God is only accessible in ethics, as the other of the Other. 
Now, the proximity of God and the Other is also addressed by Rahner when he 
enquires whether my obligation towards the neighbour derives from a command issued 
by God, and whether the love of neighbour as caritas 'is ultimately only a secondary 
moral act (one among many) which more or less proceeds objectively from the love of 
God as an "actus imperatus" .'207 Is God the motive for loving neighbour? 'Or is there a 
more radical unity between the love of God and of neighbour (taken as caritas) in such 
a way that the love of God itself is always also already love of neighbour in which our 
neighbour is really loved himself?'208 Indeed, Rahner affirms that the question of caritas 
'must always be a question of real love and that it is therefore not just a matter of 
fulfilling a commandment which guards and defends the other against our brutal 
egoism.'209 Love of neighbour is not a secondary moral activity of man which is 
subsequent to the love of God which is primary. Rather, love of neighbour constitutes 
the basic moral activity of man. It is 'the basis and sum total of the moral as such.'210 
'The act of love of neighbour is the only categorised and original act in which man 
205 idem, God and Philosophy, p.137 
206 ibid. 
207 K Rahner, Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of God, p.247 
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attains the whole of reality given to us in categories, with regard to which he fulfils 
himself perfectly correctly and in which he always already makes the transcendental and 
direct experience of God by grace.'211 
Rahner believes that reflection on the unity between love of God and love of 
neighbour is a task which has assumed an urgency on account of the situation of 
contemporary philosophy which speaks of 'the end of metaphysics,' and questions 'the 
transcendental philosophy of the pure subject, with it openness to the Absolute,'212 and 
where philosophy itself is being subverted by the sociological move towards an 
ontology of intercommunication. 
Rahner's interpretation of this seems to operate within a Heideggerian 
framework. The human environment is an environment of persons in which '(t]he world 
of things is of significance only as a factor for man and his neighbour.'213 The other 
person, a Co-Dasein is thus part of the ontological disclosure which happens in the 
process of Dasein 's concemful dealings with Zeuge which manifests Dasein's Being as 
Mitsein, and Dasein as Mit-Dasein. Rahner, however, reverses the relationship: the 
world of things does not lead on to the disclosure of the world of persons; rather, 'the 
world of things can be a possible object for man's concern only as a moment of the 
world of persons.'214 This is because the subject is not simply constituted as knowledge 
but also as freedom which finds its disposition in 'precisely the loving communication 
with the human Thou as such,' which becomes 'the all-embracing basic act of man which 
gives meaning, direction, and measure to everything else.'215 In other words, the a priori 
openness of the subject to what is other attains its fullness and fulfilment in an a priori 
openness to another human being, which is always an experience of a concrete 
encounter with another person. This loving commerce with the other, as caritas, is not 
restricted to the obviously and transparently ordinary everyday events but 'gives this act 
the quality of mystery.'216 Love is not a 'regional' happening in the life of man but is an 
211 ibid., p.246 
212 ibid., p.232 
213 ibid., p.240 
214 ibid. 
215 ibid., p.241 
216 ibid., pp.241-242 
FACE 307 
act which embraces 'the whole of himself in which alone he possesses himself 
completely, meets himself completely and falls into the ultimate abyss of his nature.'217 
'[T]he whole incalculable mystery of man is contained and exercised in this act of love 
of neighbour.'218 In the light of reflection's failure to comprehend human reality, the love 
of neighbour confronts man with 'the silent, absolute mystery which embraces his 
existence.'219 Further, this love of neighbour is not to be appreciated as a power of the 
subject; 'rather, it is that which is sent to man only through the experienced and suffered 
wholeness of life and still remains even then, indeed especially then, a nameless 
mystery. ,220 
To those who would argue that 'the religious act directed towards God is the 
basic act of human existence' rather than 'the love of neighbour as the one all-embracing 
basic act of human existence,'221 Rahner would say that 'the categorised explicit love of 
neighbour is the primary act of the love of God'222 and that they operate with a basic 
misunderstanding, for God is not thought as one object among others, whether in his 
own objectivity or in subjective human intentionality, but, prior to any reflection, is 
'always given as the subjectively and objectively all-bearing ground of experience, a 
ground which is beyond this world'223 that is, as transcendent and transcendental with 
respect to the world. Because the human spirit realises itself incamationally in the world 
as knowledge and love, it necessarily and must necessarily embrace other persons. It is 
only in this way that God is given, 'in and through man who has already (in logical 
priority) experienced the human Thou by his intramundane transcendental experience 
(of his a priori reference to the Thou) and by his categorical experience (of his concrete 
encounter with the concrete Thou) and who only in this way can exercise the (at least) 
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transcendental experience of his reference to the absolute mystery (i.e. God).'224 The 
primary basic human act is love of neighbour, and 'in this the original love of God is 
realised in so far as in this basic act are also accepted the conditions of its possibility, 
one of which is the reference of man to God when supernaturally elevated by grace.'225 
This is surely why Levinas can write that what is at stake in the relationship with the 
Other is not egoism or altruism, but the very 'religiosity of the self.'226 
6.6 Summary 
Derrida criticises the privilege of presence whereby the signifier, whether the 
spoken word or, more particularly for him, the written word is viewed in its fallenness 
or secondarity with regard to the signified. The sign has always, he says, been regarded 
as a fall from an original situation of full presence. Derrida's criticism of the devaluing 
of the sign invites a reflection on the relationship between signified and signifier, reality 
and its image, res sacramenti and sacramentum. The problem with Derrida's 
attentiveness to the signifier and his refusal of a transcendental signified to which this 
ultimately points as the intelligible face of the sign risks not only relativism but also 
opens a way towards totalitarianism. 
Both Rabner and Levinas assert the transcendental value of the signified, 
refusing its compromise by the sign, while nonetheless affirming the necessity of the 
signifier. For Levinas, the face is the cipher of the alterity of the Other, which offers the 
Other as an ikon of mystery, beyond thematisation and excessive with regard to 
thematising or representative consciousness. The face effects its own effacement, and 
though it enables a relationship, the Other is discrete in his face, being present only in 
the illeity of the trace; for Rabner, the symbolism of the sacrament offers the reality of 
an absolute experience, effecting what it signifies, without thereby reducing it to the 
visible or audible expression in the signifier. 
Neither Rabner nor Levinas devalue the sign by relegating it to a position of 
secondarity in respect of the signified. Rather, as Blanchot points out, the ambiguity of 
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misunderstanding if not duplicity. However, the more primal meaning of the sign is that 
its meaning is reduced to a semblance; the sign is not the mediation of the meaning of 
the signified, but opens rather on to an infinity of meaning, and ultimately to the other 
of all meaning, namely, the Other who is his own meaning. 
Derrida regards the age of the sign as essentially theological. Rahner, however, 
recognises that theology is essentially the age of the sign, and necessarily so on account 
of the symbolic nature of reality. Being, for Rahner, is multiple in itself and thus 
relational. One sees this clearly in finite being which must necessarily express itself in 
order to realise itself; hence the necessity of the conversio. But here, too, is the truth of 
Levinas' insight that it is not the case that one is, but rather that one is oneself; on n'est 
pas; on s'est. 'To be' is a reflexive verb (s'etre). But Rahner continues. Relationality is 
also a mark of absolute Being as is seen in the Trinitarian relations immanent within the 
Trinity. 
This theological dimension of the relational Being of the Godhead and its 
relation to finite being raises the question of the place of God within the philosophical 
and theological frameworks offered by both Rahner and Levinas. Both in their own and 
not irreconcilable ways bring the relationship with the personal other and the 
relationship with God together. For Rahner, 'the whole incalculable mystery of man is 
contained and exercised in this act of love of neighbour'227 who remains a nameless 
mystery. The relationship with God is realised in the love of neighbour. For Levinas, 
God is recognised in the tertiality of the Other. God is the other (autre) of the Other 
(autrui). Since God is accessible in the ethical encounter, that is, in justice, God remains 
uncontaminated by Being, and thus, for Levinas, Wholly Other. 
Now this juxtaposition of God and neighbour brings us to a problem which has 
perdured throughout this ongoing enterprise. Levinas must, in order to safeguard the 
absolute alterity of the Other, absent the Other from the domain of Being and establish 
the relation in terms of an ethical metaphysics. This leads to the difficulty of, having 
managed an excendence from Being in the ethical encounter with the Other to find 
oneself summoned to responsibility, how then does one manage to do justice to the 
Other within the ontological structures which regulate human society? Rahner, however, 
risks conflating God and neighbour within the kingdom of the Same - a kingdom also 
inhabited by the subject - and so of compromising, not only God and neighbour in their 
227 K Rahn er, Love of God and Love of Neighbour, p. 242 
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relation to the subject, but also God and neighbour in their relation to each other. 
Rahner, however, affinns the difference between God and neighbour when he writes that 
God is not thought of as one object among others but is 'always given as the subjectively 
and objectively all-bearing ground of experience, a ground which is beyond this 
world.' 228 Whereas Levinas fears ontological identity, Rahner affinns ontological 
difference and an analogical understanding of being. It is to the understanding of Being 
that we must now direct our attention. 
228 ibid., p.244 
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A recurrent difficulty which has accompanied this work so far is the question of 
the meaning of being. Heidegger may have sought to answer the question through 
overcoming the tradition's Seinsvergessenheit, awakening us once again to the sonority 
and the verbality of Being, and pointing to the ontological difference. For Levinas, 
however, such an answer is inadequate for it compromises alterity by emphasising 
ontological comprehension and comprehensivity. It fails to pay due regard to infinity, 
expressed in Totality, or to the otherwise than being of Otherwise the· Being. Dondeyne, 
as we saw, stressed the importance of both totality and infinity, pointing out that, for 
Levinas, the philosophical road had to disclaim the disjunction of both concepts, and, 
rather than choosing between totality or infinity, strive to hold both concepts together 
without confusion. Both are indispensable for a genuine philosophical thinking if human 
experience is to be fully explained. 1 The significance of Heidegger, for Levinas, is not 
so much that he marks the beginning of a renewed understanding of ontology, but rather 
that, by allowing Being once more to speak clearly in his phenomenological clearing, 
he marks the closure of ontology and the possibility of, having heard, leaving such a 
climate. With Heidegger Being re-asserted itself as fundamental and absolute, such .that, 
as Dondeyne points out, notions such as 'subjectivity,' 'interiority,' 'aseity as aus sich und 
far sich sein,' and 'infinity' are just so many ways of naming Being.2 Thus, against the 
tradition which culminates in Heidegger, as Levinas writes in the Preface, Totality and 
Infinity 'will proceed to distinguish between the idea of totality and the idea of infinity, 
and affirm the philosophical primacy of the idea of infinity.'3 
Now it is this very attempt to distinguish infinity and totality, without reducing 
the former to the latter which Derrida highlights as problematical, as we have seen. 
Levinas proposes an absolute alterity, but, according to Derrida, alterity, otherness, can 
only be understood in terms of being other than, that is, in its relation with the Same, 
a relation which Levinas is keen to exclude, for to be related to the Same, and to be 
judged other in terms of a relation to the Same is to be contaminated and compromised 
by the Same, and hence, not to be truly other. Derrida argues, however, that the 
A Dondeyne, Inleiding tot het denken van E. Levinas, in TUdschrift voor 
Filosofie, 25, 3 - 4, 1963, p.555 
2 Dondeyne writes, 'In andere woorden: subjectiviteit, interioriteit, aseitas 
( = 'aus sich undfii.r sich sein ') en oneindigheid zijn slechts zoveel manieren om het Zijn 
als dusdanig, het absolute en allesfunderende Zijn to noemen' (art. cit., p.556). 
3 E Levinas, TI, p. 26 
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transcendence of which Levinas speaks demands 'as one of its essential meanings'4 that 
the self, as self-identical or Same, knows itself to be the other of the other, that the self 
is already implicated in the notion of alterity, otherwise the violence which the Same 
inflicts upon the other would not only be without a victim; it would be a violence 
without a perpetrator - 'the violence without victim would also be a violence without 
author.'5 Same and other, for Derrida, are in relation, and the only way in which 
absolution is achieved from the relation between them is if the other is the other not of 
the Same, but of the other, other than other; according to Derrida, for Levinas, 'the other 
is what it is only as the absolute infinitely other absolved of its relation to the Same.'6 
Derrida illustrates the problem by way of a Parmenidean muse which is not just 
'verbiage' or 'dialectical virtuosity in the play of the Same:' 
'(1) The infinitely other ... can be what it is only if it is other, that is, other 
than. Other than must be other than myself. Henceforth, it is no longer 
infinitely, absolutely other. It is no longer what it is. If it was absolved, 
it would not be the other either, but the Same. (2) The infinitely other 
cannot be what it is - infinitely other - except by being absolutely not the 
same. That is, in particular, by being other than itself (non ego). Being 
other than itself, it is not what it is. Therefore, it is not infinitely other, 
etc.'7 
What this means, says Derrida, is that 'the expression "infinitely other" or "absolutely 
other" cannot be stated and thought simultaneously; the other cannot be absolutely 
exterior to the same without ceasing to be other.'8 The corollary is that 'the same is not 
a totality closed in upon itself9 but includes, as part of it meaning, alterity. Further, in 
the wake of Levinas' excendence from Being, and notwithstanding Dondeyne's stress 
on the need to hold on to totality and infinity, one still wants to ask Heidegger's 
question, 'How does it stand with being?' 10 What we want to suggest is that the problem 






10 M Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1959), p.32 
THE GOODNESS OF BEING 314 
indicated by Derrida, namely the rejection of Being as foundational, and the assertion 
of an absolute alterity outwith Being, derives from Levinas' understanding of Being as 
univocal rather than analogical. And that, further, in the same way that Levinas helps 
us to draw Rahner beyond a purely cognitive understanding of Being, so Rahner, 
drawing on an analogical understanding of Being, enables us to overcome the Derrida's 
criticism of Levinassian incoherence. 
7.1 The Analogy of Being in Rahner 
Rahner, addressing the dilemma posed, on the one hand, by an understanding of 
knowledge as the self-presence of being with, on the other hand, the concomitant 
ignorance which accompanies human being, expresses the being/non-being polarity of 
human being in terms of analogy. An inquirer is in possession of being (Seinshabe), 
hence the possibility of the question, yet he also lacks being, hence the necessity of the 
question. This admixture of being and non being, or presence and absence, gives rise to 
the doctrine of the analogy of being in which the 'fluctuating' nature of being is 
addressed. I I Formally expressed, since knowledge is the self-possession of being, a 
being only knows itself, or is self-luminous, to the extent or degree that it possesses 
itself. Rahner writes, 'the luminosity of being applies only with the restriction that a 
being is self-present and constitutes a unity of knowing and being only to the extent that 
being belongs to it,'I 2 an extent which is 'intrinsically variable.' Infinite or Absolute 
being in which a total coincidence of being and essence occurred would be absolutely 
self-luminous, in full possession of itself. Finite being, however, lacking complete self-
presence, calls for otherness to complete itself. Thus, 'Being is an analogous concept. 
I l One can note here a nascent point of convergence with Levinas. Graham 
Ward, (Barth. Derrida and the Language of Theology, Cambridge University Press, 
1995), notes that Levinas castigates binary oppositions, and opposes the reconciliation 
of opposites in terms of analogy. Ward, however, indicates, despite Levinas' express 
refusal of the doctrine of analogy and participation, that Levinas nonetheless 'wishes to 
construct analogies through a presence-by-absence' (ibid., p.131 ). It is precisely on this 
point, as we hope to show, that he comes into contact with the neo-Thomistic theory of 
the analogy as proposed by such as Rahner and Norris-Clarke. The Derridaean 
problematic finds a resolution in the Thomistic doctrine of analogy. Levinas, however, 
fails to address properly Thomas's developed understanding of analogy, and therefore, 
dismisses analogy too readily. 
12 K Rahner, HW (RR), p.12 
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And this analogy shows in the purely analogical way in which each single being returns 
to itself.' 13 
Now, W Hoye criticises Rahner on this very point, saying that the understanding 
of analogy presented in Hearers is inconsistent with the Thomistic doctrine of analogy. 
Rahner's philosophy of religion undertaken in Hearers, says Hoye, fails to distinguish 
between creature and Creator. 'God is no longer absolute Sein, but rather has absolute 
Sein. In other words ... God is now quite explicitly regarded as a being, characterised as 
all beings (albeit in a unique fashion, i.e. as fulfilled) by the "ontological difference" .' 14 
God is the 'being of the absolute possession of Being.' 15 Hoye continues, '[i]f God is to 
be located within reality, then Rahner is left with no alternative but to call him the being 
whose "ontological difference" culminates in absolute "ontological identity;" in other 
words, the Aristotelian v 011 aic; v 011 aewc;.' 16 Rahner's notion of God thus fails to be 
true to Thomas who had perceived and expressed the notion of absolute Being (esse) 'as 
emergent intensive act and transcending every formal order, whether it be categorical 
or, indeed, transcendental.' 17 For Hoye, Rahner's difficulty stems from his failure to 
distinguish the act of Being (Sein, esse) from beingness (Seiendheit, entitas), and so, 
consequently, fails to grasp adequately the thoroughgoing transcendence (and 
concomitant immanence) of God with respect to the world of beings. 
The root of such a 'total obliviousness to the ultimate structure of reality118 is, 
maintains Hoye, Rahner's commitment to cognitive reality (the Rahner of SW and HW). 
Taking as his starting point in Hearers, the metaphysical question about the Being (Sein) 
of beings, Rahner asks, 'What is the meaning of Being (der Sinn von "Sein'')?' and finds 
the answer in terms of the inherent knowability of Being. Between being known and the 
act of knowing, an original unity prevails, but, says Hoye, this unity is not beingness 
(Seiendheit), but Being (Sein). As Rahner writes, 'The essence of Being (Sein, not 
13 ibid. 
14 W Hoye, op.cit.,p.527 
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Seiendheit) is knowing and being known in an original unity" .' 19 
Now, in view of this understanding of Being as Sein, Rahner runs into 
difficulties with the Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of Being, for '[i]n order to explain 
why any being whatsoever, by virtue of its Being, does not necessarily enjoy perfect 
self-consciousness (for Being has been interpreted as self-luminosity 
[Selbstgelichtetheit] and, more pointedly, why we can ask the question about Being 
without already possessing the response ... Rahner resorts to the notion of analogy.'20 
But, whereas in the first edition of HW, Rahner spoke of the analogy of Being, in the 
second he refers to an analogy in regard to the possession of Being (Seinshabe). Hoye 
thus can say that: '[i]n one edition he [Rahner] can say that Being is analogical and in 
another that it is univocal.'21 In other words, in the first edition Being is analogical, 
whereas, following Metz's revisions in the second edition, it is the possession of Being, 
or, if one might put it, Being's relation to itself which is analogical, with Being as such 
remaining uni vocal. Hoye commends Rahner for the consistency of his thought, for, '[i]f 
being is understood as knowability, then it must be meaningless to conceive of it as 
analogical; thus it is not Being that is different, but the grades in which Being belongs 
to beings.'22 He concludes, 
"'It is not 'Being' that is analogical," we read in a footnote appended by 
Metz with Rahner's expressed approbation (HW, 47-48, n.l), "but rather 
the rising of the difference between Being (Sein) and being (Seiendes) 
in their relationship to each other, in self-luminosity, in the cognition of 
Being, and in this sense in being's 'possession of Being.' Being 'is' not 
'something' 'next to' or 'above' being, but rather being as relationship 
(and thereby also as 'ontological difference') to itself, as self-luminosity, 
as unity ... of knowing and being known." Thus, being remains univocal, 
while the "ontological difference" is held to be variable.'23 
The conclusion of the first edition which stated that "'Being must be considered 
basically not as a fixed quantity, having always and everywhere the same meaning ... " 
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not...etc. (HW, 47).'24 
Now, Hoye is correct both in drawing attention to Rahner's limitation of reality 
to the cognitive and to the shift from the terminology of the analogy of being to the 
analogy of Seinshabe, but is wrong to conclude from this that Thomas' analogical 
understanding of Being has given way to a univocal understanding of Being itself in 
Rabner. Hoye writes that, '[i]n reducing Being to knowing, Rahner has impoverished the 
very category that could have offered a solution to his succeeding endeavour.125 But it 
is in his very development of the understanding of Being as involving an (analogical) 
relationship with itself that Rabner manages to overcome any univocity. Rahner does 
not fall away from the position of the first edition which refused Being as 'having 
always and everywhere the same meaning.' Rather, he points out that Being cannot be 
uni vocally considered because Being in itself is never simply the simplicity of the Same. 
What we mean by this has already been seen in the understanding which Rahner 
gives to Being when he considers the nature of Symbol, the possibility of which derives 
from the plural unity of Being. At the core of finite Being is distance, not homogeneity -
as one has already seen in Levinas' assertion that on n'est pas, on s'est. However, 
plurality is not only a mark of finitude. A consideration of the theology of the 'traces' 
and 'reflexions' within the Trinitarian plurality opens onto the cautious and candid 
assertion that 'being is plural in itself.'26 '[Al being is, of itself, independently of any 
comparison with anything else, plural in its unity.'27 
Rabner then proceeds to argue thus: 'the "one" develops, the plural stems from 
an original "one," in a relationship of origin and consequence; the original unity, which 
also forms the unity which unites the plural, maintains itself while resolving itself and 
"dis-closing" itself into a plurality in order to find itself precisely there.'28 But this 
original unity, as a consideration of the Trinity shows, 'may not be reduced to an 






ibid., p.517, n.20 
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K Rahner, The Theology of Symbol, p.227 
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lifeless identity.'29 One already sees this expressed in Hearers in the very footnote which 
Hoye quotes: 'When God is here designated as "pure being," it is meant in the sense that 
God is the existent of the absolute "having-being" and therefore pure self-clarification. 
The absolute identity of God may not be thought of as a lifeless indifference of that 
"being" with itself...; rather it must be thought of as the "ontological identity" of 
absolute "having-being," in which at the same time the "ontological difference" is 
perfected, in which, then, the existent relates "absolutely" to itself, stands totally before 
itself.'30 'There exists a differentiation which is in itself "perfectio pura" ... is not 
provisional, but something absolutely final, and ultimate of the self-communicating 
unity itself as such, which constitutes this unity itself.'31 
This means that each being, as a unity, 'possesses a plurality' in agreement with 
its original unity and expressive of it. 'Since this holds good for being in general, we 
may say that each being forms, in its own way, more or less perfectly according to its 
degree of being, something distinct from itself and yet one with itself, "for" its own 
fulfilment.' 32 Unity and distinction are correlatives. 'And this differentiated being, which 
is still originally one, is in agreement because derivative, and because derivatively in 
agreement is expressive.'33 
Rahner goes further: although plurality often indicates finitude and deficiency, 
there is also a positive aspect which remains at least as a "trace" in the formal givenness 
of the plurality. The self-constitution of a being as plural is 'the condition of the 
possibility of the possession of self in knowledge and love.'34 Using the language of 
symbolic expression, one can then say that, 'as a being realises itself in its own intrinsic 
"otherness" (which is constitutive of its being), retentive of its intrinsic plurality (which 
is contained in its self-realisation) as its derivative and hence congruous expression, it 
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This is given theological grounding in the very mystery of the Trinity, in which 
Being is revealed as plural unity. '[T]he Father is himself by the very fact that he 
opposes to himself the image which is of the same essence as himself, as the person who 
is other than himself; and so possesses himself.'36 This means that the Logos is the 
symbol of the Father - 'the inward symbol which remains distinct from what is 
symbolised, which is constituted by what is symbolised, where what is symbolised 
expresses itself and possesses itself.'37 'It is because God "must" "express" himself 
inwardly that he can also utter himself.'38 
Now, one of Hoye's criticisms of Rahner is that he moves from an analogical 
understanding of Being in the first edition of Hearers to a univocal understanding in the 
second edition, and hence, in the present conext, would fa11 under Levinas' criticism too. 
However, What Hoye fails to recognise is that Being is essentia11y relational, and that 
it is in terms of this relationality - the sense of Seinshabe - that analogy is to be 
understood. Rahner, critical of school philosophy's misunderstanding of analogy, 
emphasises that analogy is not a mid-point between univocity and equivocity, 'as a 
hybrid between univocation and equivocation.'39 He notes that 
'[i]n the school philosophy the so-ca11ed analogy of being is frequently 
presented as though it were a subsequent midpoint between univocation 
and equivocation. It is as though one had to say something about God, 
but then would see that he cannot rea11y say that because the original 
understanding of the content of the statement comes from elsewhere, 
from something which has not much to do with God. Hence analogous 
concepts have to be formed which are a middle ground between the 
univocal and the equivocal.'40 
Rahner rejects such an understanding, however, indicating that the very notions of 
univocity and equivocity are already grounded in the prior experience of transcendence, 
that is, the relationship with the alterity of exteriority, which 
'is precisely the condition of possibility, the horizon, and the basis and 
ground by means of which we compare individual objects of experience 
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the spirit is the more original, and this is what is designated as analogy 
in another sense. Analogy, therefore, has nothing to do with the notion 
of a secondary, inexact middle position between clear concepts and those 
which designate two completely different things with the same phonetic 
sound.'41 
320 
Rather, to be human is already to be in an analogical way, for, as transcendence, man 
already lives, as original analogy, the existential tension 
'between a categorical starting point and the incomprehensibility of the 
holy mystery, namely, God. We ourselves, as we can put it, exist 
analogously in and through our being grounded in this holy mystery 
which always surpasses us. But it always constitutes us by surpassing us 
and by pointing us towards the concrete, individual, categorical realities 
which confront us within the realm of our experience. Conversely, then, 
these realities are the mediation of and the point of departure for our 
knowledge of God.'42 
The 'analogous statement signifies what is most basic and original in our knowledge.'43 
Human experience is not a uni vocal experience of Being, but rather the tension between 
totality and the absolute exteriority of infinity. Man is analogously, and is originally 
analogously .44 
Now, a number of things flow from this 'fluctuating' or analogical concept of 
being, and which help better to understand the relation between the same and the other. 
The notion of the totaliter aliter is an absurd notion, as Tallon, in line with Derrida's 
criticism, indicates.45 According to Tallon, what Levinas must means by 'same' when 
he speaks of the other being outwith the same is 'same person' not 'same nature'. 'Human 







44 One can draw attention once again to Levinas' dictum in Existence and 
Existents that 'on n'est pas; on s'est.' To be is to be relational, for 'to be' is a reflexive 
verb; 'is' relates one to oneself, a relation which, on account of its variability, is 
analogical; again, ultimately, subjectivity, for Levinas, is 'the-other-in-me' as 
responsibility, and the relationship which one has to one's responsibility is discreet 
rather than direct. 
45 A Tallon, Nonintentional Affectivity, in A T Peperzak (ed.), Ethics -as 
First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy. Literature and 
Religion, (New York & London: Routledge, 1995), pp.107-121 
46 ibid., p.118, n.6 
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as absolutely other, totaliter aliter, Levinas is denying the possibility of encompassing 
the other within the same, and indicating that alterity is 'on another plane, having the 
intelligibility of judgements of existence rather than that of essence, concepts, 
definitions, that is, having the meaning of the saying not of the said, of actuality not 
possibility, of person not nature, of who not what.'47 In other words, to affirm the other 
as absolute is not thereby to affirm it as non-relational. Rather, it is to situate that 
relationality outwith an ontology of the same, where the understanding of being which 
would sustain that ontology is univocal. Absolution, like relationality, is an analogical 
term. 
Now, if one turns to Marechal, one sees him argue for an analogical relationship 
between creature and Creator. Marechal asks how it might be possible to attain God 
other than by an objective concept.48 Human understanding is conceptually mediated, 
and, with regard to the human understanding of God, this must also be the case. But 
since God is supracategorical, any objective content of our concepts must be, when 
attributed to God subject to correction. But, since God is unknowable directly, nothing 
of God which would allow a comparison with the creature is available to thought in 
order to make the correction. The correction must, therefore, proceed by way of 
analogy, for, writes Marechal, 'we can, in a very real sense, compare God to the creature 
without knowing him immediately in himself.'49 Marechal explains it thus: 'Let us 
suppose, in effect, that a definite relation attaches the creature to God, and that this 
relation, as such, manifests itself to us in its inferior term: well, knowing the inferior 
term as relative, we would have, by the very fact and in this very measure, some notion 
of the superior term: somewhat like seeing an arrow leave the bow, we find, from the 
very direction in which it flies, an indication of the position of the target. And so, in 
effect, we conclude: we know creatures as relative to an absolute Principle, as 
contingent, and by that - by that alone - we know God.'50 
But does such a way of speaking about God analogically not also hold for 
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7.2 An Uncompromised Alterity 
Derrida recognises in Levinas a rigorous attempt to obviate the ontological 
compromising of alterity by Being and its aliases by liberating alterity 'from the Greek 
domination of the Same and the One.' 51 Rather than embracing an ontological 
philosophy of original identity, Levinas 'will move toward a thought of original 
difference.'52 One is drawn to ask, 'different from what?' This daring plan to escape from 
Being, as one might dare to escape the perimeter of a totalising stalag to experience the 
beyond of exteriority again, is prefaced by Levinas in Existence and Existents, a 
preparatory study outlining 'a departure from Being and from the categories which 
describe it: an ex-cendence.'53 The renewal of ontology which Levinas noted in 
contemporary philosophy in the l 940's was preoccupied with the burdensome 
'relationship between the self and its existence' and as such, says Levinas, manifested 
a basic lack of transcendence, a forgetfulness of the other. Since the selfs concern is an 
existence (Existenz) which is existentially mine (Jeimeinigkeit), and since this existence 
is finite, the self has within itself no possibility of escape; its project is beset with the 
tragic fact of ultimate failure, anxiety and death. Now, while Levinas notes the 
inspiration which Heidegger's concept of ontology provides in its working out of the 
relationship which man sustains with Being, and which is articulated in terms of the 
ontological difference, he is nonetheless convinced of 'a profound need to leave the 
climate of that philosophy,'54 not by returning to a pre-Heideggerian situation but by 
going beyond it towards a relationship with true exteriority. The 'one sole thesis' of 
Being and Time, says Levinas, is that 'Being is inseparable from the comprehension of 
Being.'55 The tradition has always valued Being and its relationship with knowledge. 
'Knowledge or theory designates first a relationship with being such that the knowing 
being lets the known being manifest itself while respecting its alterity and without 
51 J Derrida, op.cit., p.83 
52 ibid., p.90 
53 E Levinas, EE, The Hague, 1978, p.15 
Levinas remarks at the beginning that study that it was written down 'for the 
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marking it in any way whatever by this cognitive relation.'56 Such a respect, however, 
is transitory for 'theory also designates comprehension [intelligence] - the logos of being 
- that is, a way of approaching the known being such that its alterity with regard to the 
known being vanishes.'57 This deprivation of alterity is effected through the interposition 
of a middle, neutral term, whether concept, or sensation, or Being as such, 'that ensures 
the comprehension of being.'58 To affirm the primacy of the ontological relationship of 
a being with Being and the priority of Being within that relationship, however, is to fall 
prey to a forgetfulness of the existent, and to abandon or subordinate the ethical 
relationship with other people in favour of an ontological, gnoseological comprehension 
of the Being of the existent. It is to understand the existent in terms of its Being, and 
thus to subordinate the justice owed to the other to the freedom and power of 
subjectivity. Because '[o]ntology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power,'59 it is 'a 
philosophy of injustice'60 deaf to the need and the cry of the other whose existence has 
been neutralised 'in order to comprehend or grasp [Being]. It is hence not a relation with 
the other as such but the reduction of the other to the same.'61 Levinas graphically 
illustrates the extreme outcome of such a subordination of ethics to ontology and his 
enduring fearfulness of ontological thinking, in his description of his own Stalag 
expenence. 
'There were seventy of us in a forestry commando unity for Jewish 
prisoners of war in Nazi Germany .... The French uniform still protected 
us from Hitlerian violence. But the other men, called free, who had 
dealings with us (qui nous croisaient) or gave us work or orders or even 
a smile - and the children and women who passed by and sometimes 
raised their eyes - stripped us of our skin. We were subhuman, a gang of 
apes. A small inner murmur, the strength and wretchedness of 
persecuted people, reminded us of our essence as thinking creatures, but 
we were no longer part of the world .... We were beings entrapped in 
their species; despite all their vocabulary, beings without language .... 
Social aggression ... shuts people away in a class, deprives them of 
expression and condemns them to being "signifiers without a signified" 
56 ibid., p.42 
57 loc. cit. 
58 ibid., p.43 
59 ibid., p.46 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. pp.45-46 
THE GOODNESS OF BEING 324 
and from there to violence and fighting.' 62 
Then, Bobby, 'the last Kantian in Nazi Germany,'63 a dog with an ethical sense but 
'without the brain needed to universalise maxims and drives,' - and no doubt also lacking 
the capability of ontological comprehension, - appears and recognises, beyond the 
reductive totality of imprisonment, men with a language, exterior to the totality, and like 
the dogs who in Exodus (Ex.11,7) remained silent to aid the flight of the oppressed in 
Egypt, and for the same reason - the recognition of humanity - 'barked in delight.' 
'And then, about halfway through our long captivity, for a few short 
weeks, before the sentinels chased him away, a wandering dog entered 
our lives. One day he came to meet this rabble as we returned under 
guard from work. He survived in some wild patch in the region of the 
camp. But we called him Bobby, an exotic name, as one does a 
cherished dog. He would appear at morning assembly and was waiting 
for us as we returned, jumping up and down and barking in delight. For 
him, there was no doubt that we were men .... 
He was a descendent of the dogs in Egypt. And his friendly 
growling, his animal faith, was born from the silence of his forefathers 
on the banks of the Nile.'64 
Bobby, himself impervious to the totality, responded to the exteriority of others 'with 
a growl' and demonstrated that totality is not the ultimate situation. Exteriority undoes 
the totality. Philosophically, Levinas attempts to reverse the relationship between 
totality and exteriority. Ontology must surrender its comprehensive position of 
dominance in the face of the Other who, simply by his presence, contests the power of 
Being by being radically beyond being and its categories. Ontology presupposes 
(ethical) metaphysics. 
Now, since the other is able to contest the power of Being by existing beyond 
its grasp, the relationship between the same and the other can be asked in terms of the 
relationship between being and beyond being. How does being relate to beyond being? 
How does being relate to the otherwise than being? This is the difficulty which Derrida 
has already indicated. Part of the problem, we contend, is the narrow understanding of 
Being which Levinas employs, and his apparent refusal of the notion of the analogy of 
being. The question we wish to highlight as the proper question centres on the difference 
62 idem, Difficult Freedom, p.153. Italics added. Note the Heideggetj~n 
notion of having dealings (Umgang) with things in the world. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
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between an otheiwise than being and a being otherwise. What we wish to show here is 
that it is possible meaningfully to relate being and being otheiwise in the context of the 
doctrine of the analogy of the concept of being, which is not so much an otheiwise than 
being as an otheiwise than knowledge, which ultimately is to be ethically .65 
7. 3 Alterity and Analogy 
In Totality, Levinas reacts vigorously against Heideggerian ontology, and, in one 
small phrase, dismisses analogy.66 Ethics, not ontology, or even theology as ontology 
65 Levinas indicates, in Autrement que Savoir, (Paris: Editions Osiris, 
1988), in response to a question from F Marty, that he takes distance from the 
philosophical notion of knowledge as foundational. He says, 'En evoquant la possibilite 
d'une pensee qui ne soit pas savoir, j'ai voulu affirmer un spirituel, qui avant tout -
avant tout idee - est dans le fait d'etre proche de quelqu'un. La proximite, la socialite 
elle-meme, c'est "autrement" que le savoir qui l'exprime. Autrement que le savoir n'est 
pas le croyance. Ce d quoi mene une pensee qui "met en valeur" ce que j'appelle le 
visage est une vie spirituelle - mot dont on se mefie beaucoup - une vie de la proximite 
humaine. C'est etre d plusiers. ttre par consequent avec quelqu'un d'etranger, ii y a Id 
une non-indifferance .. .. C'est le fait de ne pas etre indifferent d la mo rt de l'autre' (ibid., 
pp.90-91 ). To be otherwise than knowledge is to be ethically. It is to be not-indifferent. 
To be otheiwise is to be close to the other, proximate, social. 
We recognise that Levinas expressly refuses this understanding when he notes 
that '[t]ranscendence is passing over to being's other, otherwise than being. Not to be 
otherwise, but otherwise than being' (OB, p.3). But this makes sense, strictly speaking, 
only if being is taken to be always and everywhere the same, that is, uni vocal, whereas, 
what we want to argue is, following Rahner's analogical understanding of being, is that 
being is not everywhere and always the same for, in its 'having-being' (Seinshabe), it is 
variable and can only be understood analogically. But does Levinas not perhaps indicate 
this when, speaking of language, he points out that 'to be' does not simply signify the 
nominalisation of a noun such that 'this' is identified with 'that.' Rather, the qualitative 
variations which sensibility introduces into the relations between the same and the other 
'make the how of the verb stated in it understood?' (ibid., p.35). He continues, 'Do not 
the sensations in which the sensible qualities are lived resound adverbially, and, more 
precisely, as adverbs of the verb to be? But then tf they could be surprised on the hither 
side of the said, would they not reveal another meaning?' (ibid., p.35). That is, to the 
extent that adverbs modify the verb 'to be,' does being not speak otherwise than in the 
language of essence, concept, definition, said, nature and what, as Tallon has already 
indicated above? 
66 For Levinas, analogy is grounded in a univocal understanding of Being 
as comprehension. Hence, along with Heidegger, it is to be rejected since it does-not 
respect difference. However, what Levinas focuses on is the Heideggerian emphasis on 
the ultimate ontological identification between Being and beings, rather than a 
·scholastic emphasis on the ontological difference which is at the heart of analogy. J B 
Metz notes in Heidegger 'an ontological identity between Being ( o v) and the 
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(for theology is the archetypal doctrine of relatedness), describes the relationship 
between the same and the other. 'Theology imprudently treats the idea of the relation 
between God and the creature in terms of ontology.'67 Thus, Levinas argues, as Derrida 
indicates, for a 'metatheology, metaontology, metaphenomenology.' In place of the 
theism of theology, a relationship with absolute alterity calls for metaphysical atheism, 
that is, for a God divested of the trappings of Being, a God irrepresentable. 'Only an 
atheist being can relate himself to the other and already absolve himself from this 
relation.'68 The absolution of the terms of the relation from the relation entails for 
Levinas the exclusion of any notion of participation which would achieve a union with 
the transcendent. 'The comprehension of God taken as a participation in his sacred life, 
an allegedly direct comprehension, is impossible, because participation is a denial of the 
divine, and because nothing is more direct than the face to face, which is 
straightfoiwardness itself.'69 Theism is essentially a doctrine of participation, which, by 
vesting God in concept, brings God too close, and so avoids the ethical demand of the 
encounter with the face. The 'bonds of participation' must therefore be broken. If God 
is to be free to reveal himself, to speak, separation is required, an absolute separation 
which is an a-theism. 'Atheism conditions a veritable relationship with a true God kath 
auto, 170 a relationship 'as distinct from objectification as from participation.'71 In place 
of the ontothe9logical God, who is not the true God, Levinas seeks the relationship with 
understanding of Being () .. o yo c;) in the specified sense of the transcendental 
phenomenologically developed "ontological concept'" (Heidegger und das Problem der 
Metaphysik, in Scholastik, XXVIII (1953), p. l ). A scholastic, analogical understanding 
of human knowledge, however, is based on ontological difference rather than identity. 
Metz writes, 'In the antic identity of analogical identities the ontological difference, 
upon which the principles are established, "is" located "between" the actually existing 
entities and the principles of their ontological constitution. The analogical (finite) entity 
does not cease to exist in what is merely constituted formally and identically. Rather it 
"is" in the "difference" between the ontological foundation (which constantly 
predominates and cannot be abrogated) and that which is constituted' (ibid., p.18, n.16). 
67 E Levinas, TI, p.293 
68 ibid., p.77 
69 ibid., p.78 
70 ibid., p.77 
71 ibid. 
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God in an ethics founded in a discourse which 'suspends participation'72 and is enacted 
in the social relation. The metaphysical relation with God cannot be accomplished 'in 
the ignorance of men and things.'73 God can only be reached through the detour of 
illeity. 'The atheism of the metaphysician means, positively, that our relation with the 
Metaphysical is an ethical behaviour and not theology, not a thematisation, be it a 
knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God. God rises to his supreme and ultimate 
presence as correlative to the justice rendered unto men.' 74 
A first question presents itself. To what extent has Levinas been successful in 
Totality and Infinity in surmounting the Heideggerian concept of Being? Robert 
Manning points out that 'Levinas's philosophy is a constant attempt to answer differently 
and in his own way distinctively Heideggerian questions,' 75 and insofar as Heidegger is 
so often his point of departure one can ask whether his thought ever lifts itself from its 
necessary 'foothold in Being.'76 E Feron notes that by applying such energy to the 
resolution of the profound ambiguity of being, and by concentrating on being as event, 
one can ask if Levinas really manages to extricate himself from the Heideggerian 
understanding of Being as Ereignis which, says Feron, is the concept, along with 
mineness, 'which allows the most adequate analysis of the critique addressed by Levinas 
to German philosophy .'77 The possibility of taking the transcendental reduction of being 
further by working back to a situation in which being, as totality, breaks up is 
occasioned by the event (Ereignis/evenement) of being in relationship with what is 
otherwise, that is in the face (en face) of the face (visage). The totalitarian stasis falls 
before the eventful dynamism of the encounter with the other. Whereas ontological 
totalitarianism tends to speak being univocally, its break up in the face of another being 
being otherwise shows the inadequacy of uni vocalism, and already suggests, in its place, 









R JS Manning, op. cit., p.17 
cf. E Levinas, EE, p.15 
77 E Feron, De l'idee de transcendance a la question du langage: 
L 'itineraire philosophique d'Emmanuel Levinas, (Grenoble: Editions J Millon, 1992), 
p.169 
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relationship between the same and the other. 78 
7. 4 Analogy in Levinas 
Feron's study is useful for it shows that, although Levinas disregards the 
universality of Being on account of his insistence on transcendence, and more 
specifically rejects the doctrine of the analogy of the concept of being, nonetheless 
Levinas actually operates with an analogical understanding of the concept of Being. In 
Totality he argues that the relationship with the Transcendent is achieved not by 
theology or thematisation 'be it a knowledge by analogy,' but as ethical behaviour.79 
Thus his summary criticism of the tradition when, at the end of Totality, he writes that 
'[t]hematisation does not exhaust the meaning of the relationship with exteriority.'80 
Since Aristotle, he says, the term of the analogy of being has been subject to 
thematisation or objectification, 'as a relation with the solid, with the thing.' 81 One 
wonders what understanding of the analogy of being Levinas is employing in his refusal 
of it as a way to resolve the problem of the relationship between the same and the other 
in favour of the preferred schema of being and beyond being. Feron asks why Levinas 
does not make reference to Aristotle and the analogy of the concept of being rather than 
'the astonishing Platonic idea of the Good beyond being', and finds the answer in 
Levinas' understanding of the analogy of being as essentially equivocal. Levinas writes, 
'Across the theory of the analogous attributes of the Middle Ages this thesis [of the 
application of the term being to God and to creation in an equivocal sense] goes back 
to the conception of the only analogical unity of being in Aristotle.'82 Aristotle, in 
Metaphysics, r, 2, addressed the problem of metaphysics of a science recognising that 
there are many senses in which a thing may be said to be, but that there can be no 
science of homonymous (equivocal) terms, for though they have a common name, there 
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synonymous (univocal) for the terms are not predicated secundum unum, that is, with a 
common meaning. If being is only homonymous or synonymous then ontology as the 
science of Being is excluded. Aristotle's solution is to say that all that 'is,' in its many 
senses, is related to one focal meaning, or arche, which lies somewhere between 
univocity and equivocity, and which brings about some kind of unity, namely, substance 
(ousia). All other meanings of being are related to this one primary sense of being as 
substance, and, on the basis of this, relate to one another analogically. Although there 
are many ways in which things may be said to be, all these ways of attribution depend 
on one basic kind of meaning: to be is to be substance. Now since being is understood 
substantially, the relations within Being and between beings are to be described 
categorially. This creates the difficulty, which Levinas rightly recognises, of relations 
which, like the relationship with a transcendent other, are supra-categorial. Aristotle's 
analogical unity of being tends towards a 'unity of number' and an integration into a 
totality, whereas '[t]he relations that the separated being maintains with what transcends 
it are not produced on the ground of totality' 83 - Being - for, were this the case and they 
crystallised into a system, the idea of transcendence would be compromised. It is this 
tendency towards totality which causes Levinas also to dismiss participation theories, 
as R te Velde indicates when he notes that 'Levinas speaks of participation in the sense 
of an entry into an undifferentiated totality .'84 Feron notes, consequently, that only two 
possible avenues open up: firstly, the approach of Totality which, 'by way of an extreme 
schematisation,' limits the concept of being in order to accommodate an other 
transcendental meaning beyond being. Being is thus definitively divided and henceforth 
equivocal. Such a hypothesis, however, leads to the problem, already indicated by 
Derrida, of how to think being and beyond being, the same and the other, without 
employing a new, enlarged concept of being which would serve as a common measure 
but which would render the very idea of transcendence as 'infinitely other' or 'absolutely 
other' inconsistent. Secondly, the approach of Otherwise than Being which proposes a 
meaningful concept of being encapsulating the whole of reality and poses the beyond 
being as 'a hole or a fissure in being,' an enigma which defies the logic without being 
necessarily unreasonable. 
83 ibid. 
84 R te Velde, Repliek to V Kal, Van Participaiie tot Se/t:fimitatie: over 
Thomas' Filosofie van de Schepping, Tijdschr{ft voor Filoso,fie, 57 (Juni 1995), p. 326 
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Now, Feron argues that, although Levinas seeks an excendence from Being 
towards the transcendent beyond being, 'the passage from the one to the other is 
commanded by a latent comprehension of being as "event" .'85 Levin as presents a double 
understanding of being both as totality and exteriority but beneath this distinction there 
is 'an initial and global comprehension of being which renders this difference possible 
and, in some manner, measures it,'86 namely the event of Being. The impoverished and 
formal sense of Being as totality enables the convergence and identification of notions 
of the self, objectivity and history under the concept of the Same. But the second, fuller 
sense of Being as exteriority introduces a meaning of existence 'in another dimension 
than that of the perduration of the totality. It can go beyond being.'87 Being is not simply 
totality, nor is it totality simply. It is also exteriority. 'Being is exteriority: the very 
exercise of its being consists in exteriority.'88 Exteriority, however, is not to be 
understood according to 'a lateral view' whereby one being would simply be alongside 
another (exterior) being within the totality; the true meaning of exteriority is 
transcendence. Now, while Levinas seeks an egress from the totality of Being, Being 
nonetheless perdures not simply as totality but also as exteriority. It is not an 
undifferentiated simplex, but a complex of what can be grasped and what lies beyond 
reach. It is the affirmation of the self (totality), in the etymological sense of affirmation, 
as a movement of exteriority or transcendence. In other words, to be is already to be in 
an analogical sense. 
85 E Feron, op. cit., p.166 
86 ibid., p.167 
87 E Levinas, TI, p.301. 
Feron misreads the quote, substituting 'la production de la totalite' for '~q, 
perduration de la totalite.' (Feron, p.166; Cf. Totalite et I~fini, p.278) His point, 
however, is not compromised. One exists in the totality, with a foothold in being, and, 
without letting go, is able to go beyond being. 
88 ibid., p.290 
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Now, Feron carelessly but adventitiously links perduration in Being and 
production of Being; both are to be taken in an active, dynamic sense rather than as 
static accomplishments already enacted. Being moves as a totality inadequately realised 
towards an exteriority irrealisable adequately. Being's act is essentially incomplete, and 
so the drama of its dynamism perdures as a constant production. (It is difficult to refrain 
from an allusion to Thomistic transcendentalism and affirm the ontological relationship 
between finite being and the Transcendent beyond or horizon, the explanation of which 
can only proceed analogically!) Thinking Being produces itself (se produire); it is a 
process of production. Totality and Infinity 'will recount how infinity is produced in the 
relationship of the same with the other.'89 Such a production, however, is not a matter 
of erecting the edifice of being as a voracious and consuming totality and thereafter 
opening the window onto absolute exteriority which becomes, as it were, food for 
thought. Rather, the ambiguity of the production of being is that it is both 'the 
effectuation of being' and 'its being brought to light or its exposition.'90 Being's self-
production is revealed as and in its relationship with infinity. In other words, as Feron 
says, 'the revelation of a being constitutes the very being of this being.'91 'The event of 
the being of a being coincides with the revelation of this being.'92 All the descriptions 
of Totality display 'the more or less latent comprehension of being as revelation.'93 
Now, as indicated, the difference between being as totality and being as absolute 
exteriority, or infinity, finds its support in an implicit understanding of being as event, 
that is, being as the event of presence. Presence, however, is neither univocal nor 
equivocal, but is a matter of degree. When Levinas employs the notion of being, he does 
so in terms of an analogical use of presence. Like Aristotle's statement that 'being can 
be said in many ways' (Metaphysics, I', 2, 1003a21), being is said in many ways in the 
thought of Totality: Being is realised maximally in the community of beings in which 
the subjectivity of being 'exists for another'94 in a relationship of exteriority rather than 
89 ibid., p.26 
90 ibid. 
91 E Feron, op. cit., p.167 
92 ibid. 
93 ibid. 
94 E Levinas, TI, p.182 
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being caught up within subjective interiority. This 'return to exterior being'95 is, for 
Levinas, the univocal sense of being, 'the sense which hides no other sense,'96 which 
situates a being's centre 'outwith that being,' beyond being. Likewise, Desire inverts the 
anteriority and interiority of a being's own spontaneity, placing its origin in exteriority, 
undoing a being's own process of identification by situating its source elsewhere.97 
Inspiration precedes respiration. In the Desire for the other the self 'exists in an eminent 
sense,'98 above being, 'at the apogee of being.' In Desire, 'preoccupied with another 
being,'99 a being is 'above being.' Now, when Levinas speaks of being beyond being, it 
is being as totality which is transcended. Transcendence, as transascendence, is a 
moving beyond the totality in which the self embarks upon the work of identification, 
to a relationship with the exteriority of the other, which is a relationship of metaphysics. 
The presence of the other augments impoverished interiority, lifting it from its foothold 
in the enjoyment of worldly being, and establishing it, not as an otherwise than being 
as such, but as an otherwise than totality, which is a being otherwise. It is the difference 
between being and being ethically. The point to be stressed is that ethical existence - the 
relationship with the absolute exteriority of the other - is not an otherwise than being, 
but a being otherwise. To be ethically is to be otherwise. The presence of the other, as 
face, is always a surplus of being, rather than surplus to being. Such a comparison of 
beings, in terms of their degree of presence, demonstrates, according to Feron, the 
manner in which 'Levinas remains faithful to the Aristotelian principle of the analogy 





97 One sees this in Aquinas who In Ethicorum 1,1,9, is guided by Aristotle's 
dictum that 'The Good is what all things desire' (Nie. Ethics, I, i, 1094a). Unknowable 
in itself, the good is experienced positively in the movement of the appetite or will, that 
is, in the phenomenon of desirability. Cf. Plotinus: 'The good must be desired; but it is 
not good because it is desirable; it is desirable because it is good' (Enneads, VI, 7,25). 
Thomas, however, wishes to proceed beyond the ratio bani by which the good is 
recognised to the natura bani, which is being considered in its actuality (S.T ., I, 5, 1 ). 
For a study of the relationship between being and the good in Aquinas, see Fran 
O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, (Leiden, New York, 




E Levinas, TI, p.63 
ibid. 
E Feron, op. cit., p.168 
THE GOODNESS OF BEING 
'Consequently, all the positive terms of Totality and Infinity - face, 
desire, exteriority, infinity etc - still participate in a metaphysics of 
presence which, in the end, has no other option than to create a hierarchy 
of beings - the object, the self, the other as face, God - on the scale of 
presence with, at the basis of the hierarchy, the idea of a maximum or a 
plenitude of presence. In Totality and Infinity, then, the expression 
"beyond being" would only signify existing from the point of being, 
being maximally or possessing a plenitude of presence.r1oi 
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A second level of analogical thinking, hinted at by Derrida, can be mentioned 
in passing. The relationship between the same and other, between being and beyond 
being, is achieved through discourse. But, in Levinas, the concept of discourse is 
analogical. Levinas writes that '[ d]iscourse is discourse with God and not with equals ... 
Metaphysics is the essence of this language with God; it leads above being.r1°2 Derrida 
comments that 'the common root of humanism and theology' is to be found in 'the 
resemblance between man and God,' 103 and, on account of this, 'man's speech can be 
lifted up towards God, an almost unheard of analogy which is the very movement of 
Levinas's discourse on discourse. Analogy as dialogue with God.1104 As Levinas notes, 
'discourse is conversation with a god who is not our "'fellow-servant" .' 105 Inter-human 
discourse finds its prime analogue in the divine-human relationship. The other does 
resemble God, and this is 'the original metaphorr1°6 on which Levinas founds his 
metaphysics: thus, 'on the basis of a doctrine of analogy, of "resemblance," the 
expression "human face" is no longer, at bottom, as foreign a metaphor as Levinas 
seems to wish.' 107 '[I]t is the analogy between the face and God's visage that, in the most 
classical fashion, distinguishes man from animal.. .. Man's substantiality, which permits 
him to be face, is thus founded in his resemblance to God, who is therefore both The 









ibid. A Plenitude which is, however, enacted ethically. 
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7.5 The event of Being 
The Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of being offers a context for Levinas' 
beyond being without subjecting his ethical perspective to ontological compromise. A 
number of points can be usefully highlighted. 
First of all, as Feron claims, being as event is the overarching understanding of 
Being in Levinas which holds together being as totality and being as exteriority in their 
difference. Being is constituted in its totality as a drive for absolute exteriority. This 
means that the 'system' of Being has always and already been disrupted. As Levinas has 
said, the Reduction of Being, as totality, has already taken place. Such a dynamic 
resonates with Aquinas' stress on actus essendi, within which context he develops his 
own understanding of participation. For Thomas, esse is actus essendi. The act is a 
perfection in se, and potency, therefore, becomes a capacity to receive a perfection. 
Further, by stressing esse as actus essendi, the notion of esse as simply signifying being 
as presence is overcome. Esse is also a virtus essendi, a dynamic 'presence-with-power' 
in virtue of which a being is able to be present, to perfect its own potential according to 
its own degree of being. As Rahner points out, 'Esse is no longer mere presence 
(Vorhandensein), the indifferent ground, as it were, upon which identical and indifferent 
ground the different essences must stand, if in addition to their real ideal being they also 
wish to be really. Esse is not a 11 genus, 11 but appears rather as intrinsically variable, not 
as statically definable, but oscillating, as it were between nothing and infinity.1109 Now, 
since being is the first perfection, the ratio boni, and the act of all acts (S.T ., Ia, 4.1, ad 
3,2), then pure perfection must be unique, that is, one, and this is to be equated with God 
'whose essence is to be.' In relation to this pure actus essendi, creatures, 'whose essence 
is not to be,' have a relationship of participation; they share in the life of the other.110 
109 K Rahner, SW, p.162 
110 Levinas rejects Aristotle's principle of analogy but this is a rejection of 
the analogy of proportionality which, he says, developed from Aristotle to the Middle 
Ages (see TI, p.80), and which, under the influence of Cajetan continued as the central 
understanding of analogy in Aquinas for some four hundred years. W Hill notes, 'the 
prejudice of Cajetan [is] that analogy is ultimately proportionality' (W J Hill, Knowing 
the Unknown God, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1971), p.122). However, after 
De Veritate (1256) the analogy of proportionality is abandoned by Aquinas in favour 
of an analogy of participation. (cf. P A Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities: How Words 
Refer to God, (Atlanta: Scholars Press,1993), p.46). Rolnick takes as his guide G 
Klubertanz1 chronological arrangement of Aquinas' teaching on analogy chronologically 
(St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis, 
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960)). De Veritate seems to consider 
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Aquinas, therefore, relates the infinite and the finite by way of participation. But 
Levinas rejects participation. What exactly does he reject however? 
Cornelio Fabro helps provide an answer. Fabro points out - and the similarity to 
Levinas is apparent - that '[t]he speculative tradition of the West has made of ens a 
"concept," in fact the concept of concepts, at the farthest limit of abstraction.rt 11 Further, 
like Levinas, who recognises the great contribution of Kant's First Critique to modern 
philosophy as its lack ofreference to being, and sees in this 'a meaning to the human 
without measuring it by ontology and outside of the question "What is there here ... ?" ,' 112 
Fabro notes that 'what is surprising in the position of Kant is the absence of any interest 
in being as fundamental.' 113 What interests Kant is the derived transcendentals: the one, 
the true and the good, and 'only much further on' and 'in passing,' says Fabro, when 
discussing the impossibility of the ontological argument for the existence of God, does 
Kant raise the question of being. The attraction which Kant's neglect of being has for 
Levinas is an attraction which is founded on an understanding of being which is not that 
proportionality as the most important form of analogy. God's knowledge and human 
knowledge are predicated analogously according to an agreement of proportionality 
(proportionalitatis) (an agreement in the likeness of two proportions, as 6:4 because 6 
= 2x3 and 4 = 2x2) rather than of proportion (proportionis) (2:1). Proportion involves 
a determinate relation between the terms of the analogy; hence, nothing can be 
predicated analogously of God and the creature according to the analogy of proportion. 
Proportionality, however, involves no determinate relation, and so the analogy of 
proportionality can be used of God and creature (cf. De Ver. II, 11, c ). 
'As the infinite is to the infinite, so the finite is ... to the finite. In this way 
there is a likeness between the creatures and God, because as He is 
related to the things which belong to Him, so the creature is related to 
what is proper to it' (De Ver. XXIII, 7 ad 9). 
The problem with the analogy of proportionality, however, is that it relates God and the 
creature in a trivial and extrinsic manner. According to Klubertanz' analysis, therefore, 
Aquinas drops proportionality completely after De Veritate (1256), although it persists 
in Cajetan's interpretation for a further 400 years. According to Rolnick, Klubertanz 
shows that Aquinas came to understand that 'analogy must express more than extrinsic 
attributions (as proportionality does) but must actually express some degree of intrinsic 
commonality (as the analogy based on participation does) (ibid., p.46). Chronological 
analysis shows that Aquinas turns to analogy based on participation, noting its incidence 
some 126 times in the entire span of the Thomistic corpus, 'in order to express a more 
profound relation between God and creatures' (ibid.). 
111 C Fabro, The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of 
Metaphysics, in International Philosophical Quarterly. 6. (1966). p.389 
112 E Levinas, OB, p.129 
113 C Fabro, Ens-Esse, p.391 
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of Thomas. It will be worthwhile to outline Fabro's argument. 
Fabro argues that the Thomistic understanding of ens has been overlooked in the 
tradition and, on account of this, all being, possible and real, 'has slipped into 
transcendental subjectivity,' 114 and has become a 'positing' in relation to the formal 
conditions of experience. This, says Fabro, constitutes a 'regressive or reductive 
explanation of knowing.' 115 'To define with Kant, and like Kant, that being is a 
"positing" is, despite all efforts to the contrary, to enclose oneself in a labyrinth without 
a way out.1116 It is when one returns to Thomas that one finds 'the authentic "radical 
beginning" ,' 117 and 'an original doctrine, totally unknown to Kant who was the initiator 
of the new a priori transcendental.' 118 Thomas, says Fabro, apprehends the real as ens, 
not as essentia or esse. 'Primum quad in intellectu est ens (De Pot. q.9, a.7, ad 15);' 
'Primum quad cadet in intellectu est ens (S. T., 1-11, q.55, a.4, ad l);' 'Primum quad cadit 
in imaginatione intellectus est ens, sine quo nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu ... (Jn 
I Sent., d.8, q.l, a.3). '119 Avicenna, whom Thomas partly follows, insists, says Fabro, on 
the immediate and self-evident character of ens, 'that is, the absolutely first and 
immediate correspondence between the verbal sign and the "grasp of meaning" that is 
expressed in the adverb statim.' 120 It is in the light of this immediacy and self-evidence 
that the reductio follows thereafter. In other words, 'the esse of ens does not stand of 













See B Mondin, op. cit. 'Ens is the originary datuin; it precedes all others' 
12° C Fabro, art. cit., p.405, referring to Avicenna: 'Dicemus igitur quad ens 
et necesse talia sunt quae statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione quae non 
acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se, sicut credulitas quae habet prima principia ex quibus 
ipsa provenit per se et est alia ab eis sed propter ea.' (Metaphysica, Lib. I, c.5' ed. 
Venice, 1508,fol.72 rb) 
See, too, John Caputo: 'In Thomas' realism ens reale is the primary meaning of 
Being in reference to which every other mode is determined' (Heidegger and Aquinas: 
An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 
p.199). 
121 C Fabro, Ens-Esse, p.406 
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doctrine, three moments: 'the appearing of ens, the all-comprehensive activating of 
itself, and its intentional expansion both in the univocal predication and in the properly 
analogous transcendental sphere.1122 
Now, remaining with the principal meanmg of being as ens, and not its 
conceptual derivation as essentia, or its intentional positing, as for example in Husserl's 
doxic thesis, one might say that the force of the Other, who is his own meaning, which 
strikes the subject is precisely the force of the Other as ens, the Other as actualitas, 
immediate and self-evident. Levinas' pursuit" of the inter-subjective reduction is faithful 
to the method which Fabro says is proper to metaphysics - outwith the metaphysical-
ontological distinction which Levinas employs - which does not indicate so much a 
merely logical process of clarification or explicative resolution (resolvit) as rather the 
"return to the fundament" and therefore a process of intensive and comprehensive 
foundation that the rationalistic tradition in the West has completely forgotten.' 123 What 
needs to be stressed here is that comprehensivity and the intentional expansion in the 
transcendental sphere lies not on the side of a constituting transcendental consciousness, 
but on the side of being, as ens. As Fabro says of ens (against Heidegger): 'Note well: 
here, by means of the esse of ens, it is ens that makes itself present to consciousness 
and it is consciousness that is actuated as the presence of ens. 1124 In other words, ens, 
beyond the constituting consciousness of the subject, awakens consciousness, as has 
already been indicated in reference to Levi.nas' pursuit of the phenomenological 
reduction as an awakening to life. Thus, one can 'speak of a "transcendental efficacy" 







125 ibid., p.414 
F O'Rourke notes, 'Being is the primary and ultimate object of knowledge; 
existence grounds all cognition. It is the foundation and horizon of the intentional order. 
What it is for something to be a cause is understood only because it is first affirmed that 
it is. Quia est is the first fruit of knowledge; aliquid est is the foundation and primary 
principle of all cognition: being is, and must be affirmed. Being is the cradle of all 
meaning and from it emerges the intelligibility of all subsequent objects of thought. To 
a phenomenology of desire, being is revealed, moreover, as the first goal of all pursuit. 
Existence, implicitly, is what is first sought by all things, a fact witnessed by the 
impulse of all things towards self-preservation and the actualisation of what is possessed 
in potency .... That "something should be" is the first principle in the order of desire, of 
the will in its encounter with reality. Being is good and is to be loved: such is the 
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primum cognitum, with 'a constitutive priority in every direction of intentionality and 
throughout the entire sphere of consciousness.' 126 The alterity of ens, the act and 
actuality of the Other, strikes us. 127 As Fabro says, '[j]ust as /oquens is one who speaks ... 
so, and primarily, the participle ens signifies the act of being.' 128 
Elsewhere, Fabro outlines the development of the philosophical notion of 
participation. Plato, arguing that all things exist by participation, had used it to explain 
the relationship between contingent forms and eternal, unchangeable Ideas. Aristotle 
rejected such an understanding in which the forms would merely imitate a 
transcendental ideal, and stressed the concreteness of forms and the physical causality 
of particular causes on particular effects. Fabro summarises it when he writes that, '[t]he 
Platonic theory of vertical imitation and the Aristotelian theory of horizontal causality 
of universals and particulars tend to emphasis formal univocity.' 129 And again, 'Whereas 
Platonic vertical participation is actualised merely as imitation of the Idea and hence as 
a fall, as it were, into non-being and the phenomenon, the Aristotelian horizontal 
causality is like an endless repetition of universal essence in the singulars. The result is 
that both theories tend to emphasise formal univocity.' 130 As indicated it is precisely this 
tendency which Levinas criticises. Aristotle's analogy of being is ultimately grounded 
in the one, univocal meaning of being: substance (ousia). In the light of such formal 
univocity one can perhaps, then, understand Levinas' criticism of participation theories. 
Creator and creature are brought within the same ontological structure and relate by 
means of a causality. For Levinas, the prospect of relating the same and the other, the 
finite and the infinite, by means of some common feature, univocally comprehended, 
principle in the dynamic order of ends and value' (op. cit., p.113) 
126 Fabro, art. cit., p.416 
127 cf. J Caputo's remark: 'To the structural quality of the real (essentia), the 
intellect responds by conceptual circumscription, with which it is entirely at ease. But 
to the active upsurge of the real, the intellect responds with affirmation, acclamation' 
(op.cit., 258). 
128 C Fabro, art. cit., p.412 
129 C Fabro, Participation, in New Catholic Encyclopaedia, X, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1967), p.1044 
13° C Fabro, The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The 
Notion of Participation, B M Bonansea (tr.), Review of Metaphysics, 27, (1973-74), 
. 81 
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would compromise the utter and absolute alterity of the other and run the risk of 
reducing the other to the same. However, just as Levinas' own thought proceeds by way 
of a philosophical via eminentiae and has 'a superlative intention' expressed by way of 
superlation, 131 so the relationship between Creator and creature, by which the one shares 
life with the other, can only be expressed analogically in terms of a via eminentiae. 
Aquinas accepts neither the Platonic nor the Aristotelian understandings of 
participation. The creature does participate in the divine in a real way which is based on 
an ontological though analogical commonality between the analogates, a commonality 
which, says Rolnick, 'is warranted by God's causal eminence and its corollary, 
creaturely participation.' 132 Since God is the perfection of Being, the pure actus essendi, 
and so unique, the creature can only share in this one perfection. 'God is the given 
perfection ... , and the creature has the perfection to a relative degree.' 133 Fabro continues, 
'[t]he Thomistic notion of participation, founded in esse as supreme intensive act, makes 
it possible to pass from finite to Infinite Being through analogical discourse,' 134 'which 
has in participation its beginning, middle, and conclusion.' 135 This 'vertical principle' 
becomes 'one in which finite and infinite can be meaningfully related.' 136 
Now, what this means is that God and creature are related in a real way, a 
possibility realised in the Incarnation. As Rolnick points out, the language of analogy 
is underpinned by 'a prior ontological communication of God to his creation,' 137 namely, 
as Rabner indicates, incarnation and grace, in both of which God 'communicates 
himself, as himself, ad extra.' 138 What this does not mean, however, is that 'both God 
and the creature share being in the participation structure, or, that the creature 








See S G Smith, Reason as One for Another, pp.62-63 
P Rolnick, op. cit., p.48 
ibid. 
C Fabro, Participation, p. l 045 
C Fabro, Intensive Hermeneutics, p.481 
P Rolnick, op.cit., p.52 
ibid., p.42 
138 K Rahner, Nature and Grace, p.176. Rahner draws attention to the 
'radically Christological nature of grace.' 
139 P Rolnick, op.cit., p.63 
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'The divine essence itself remains uncommunicated... remains 
unparticipated; but its likeness, through those things which it 
communicates to creatures, is propagated and multiplied in creatures. In 
this way, therefore, divinity may be said to proceed into creatures and to 
be multiplied in them, that is, by likeness, but not by its very essence.1140 
340 
The impossibility of univocal predication is further seen in the actus essendi, for finite 
being is never static and complete. Any attempt to delimit esse is confronted by the fact 
that it is already and always constituted as a movement or an excessus towards the 
infinite, and this means that esse, in its intrinsic variability, cannot be taken as a specific 
content nor as a limited concept, but as 'that which enlivens content and concept.1141 Esse 
in other words, as virtus essendi unravels the static formalism to which ontology is 
prone. Being is event. Expressed in Levinas' language, being, as totality, is always and 
already thwarted in its attempt at comprehensive expansion on account of its de facto 
relationship with an exteriority which summons it and constitutes it as so summoned. 
What then can be said of Levinas' refusal of analogy and participation? Perhaps 
this: his analysis has halted too soon, and he has failed to address adequately the 
doctrine of analogy and participation as developed by Aquinas. In his criticism of a 
comprehensive understanding of Being, he has failed to be comprehensive in his 
criticism. In the same way that Levinas argues the need for a phenomenological 
awakening to the deeper meaning of being as intersubjectivity in Husserl's 
transcendental reduction, so Rolnick speaks of this awareness of the active 
understanding of Being in terms of awakening; one - and here we cannot exclude 
Levinas - 'must 11 awaken11 to the central import of existence and try to grasp something 
of what it means as the common bond of all things and the possibility of community.1142 
Levinas recognised in Husserl's criticism of philosophical naturalism an attack 
140 ibid., p.65, quoting J Wippel, Aquinas and Participation, in Studies in 
Mediaeval Philosophy, (Washington: Catholic University of America Press), pp. 146-
14 7, paraphrasing Aquinas' Commentary on the Divine Names, IL 3 
141 ibid., p.27 
142 loc. cit. 
Attention is drawn to the recent study of Battista Mondin ( vide supra) on 
'Hermeneutics, Metaphysics and Analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas.' Mondin, recognising 
the separation between metaphysics and ethics in Kant, and acknowledging Levinas' 
avowal of ethics as first philosophy, nonetheless attempts to illustrate the metaphysical 
foundation of the moral, not by placing them in opposition but by associating them 
within a Thomstic understanding of the relation between good and being. See, 
especially, chapter 9, 'I Rapporti tra Etica e Metafisica: Lafondazione metafisica de/la 
morale.' 
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on the scientific reification of reality. Phenomenology reveals that access to being 
constitutes part of being's meaning, and so the notion of the brute fact of existence is 
rendered redundant. Husserl, however, according to Levinas, still maintained himself 
within an ontological framework: intentions still aimed at objects considered as things. 
What Levinas ca11s for is an 'awakening' to that event by which being as totality is 
sundered, an event which is brought about by the advent of the personal other, in his 
exteriority, revealing himself in excess of Being's comprehensive acquisition. The 
unifying tendency of Being is contested by the fact that it has a communitarian basis. 
Being is drawn beyond itself, is forced to be otherwise in its community with the 
personal other, who is perceived as a value outwith or beyond the totality. The problem 
with Levinas is that he wishes to situate the personal other outwith or beyond being, 
whereas the Thomistic understanding has no need of such a move beyond being, since 
the good and being are linked. Rolnick expresses it thus: 'being and value are similarly 
inseparable, because every action, consciously or unconsciously, is ordered to a goal or 
an end.' 143 Like a magnet, the good constitutively draws being out of itself towards 
action, and as such, is 'virtually the inner cause of intelligibility.' 144 Now, it is important 
to understand this link in Levinas between being and value properly. Being, for Levinas, 
is not the source of value on account of some inherent tendency on the part of Being 
towards an end; rather it is on account of Being's relationship with the good that there 
is value; the good values being. The explosion (eclatement) of this thought is evident 
throughout Levinas. Although he situates the good beyond being, its import with regard 
to being is that it is 'a supra-ontological source of value prior to ontology.' 145 With 
regard to being as totality, the good is utter exteriority, and '[j]ust as being is illumined 
in the light of the good, the meaning of the self is brought to ethical fulfilment in the 
presence of the other.' 146 Levinas makes this point when he speaks of the responsibility 






E Wyschogrod, op. cit., p. 2 
146 ibid. 
O'Rourke, however, commenting upon Aquinas', 'lntantum est autem peifectum 
unumquodque inquantum est actu' (S.T ., I, 5, I), points out that '[a]ctuality alone 
fundamentally endows or grants value' (op.cit., p.86). One would want to stress here that 
it is the actuality of the existence of the Other. 
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good, is before being - 'The Good is before being"47 - and assigns the subject towards 
itself in a non-indifferent way as responsibility. 'Responsibility is what first enables one 
to catch sight of and conceive of value.' 148 
The problem with the transcendence of the good in Levinas is that it tends to 
devalue the ontological structures within which life is lived rather than revaluing and 
animating them. Plato argued that 'what gives the objects of knowledge their truth and 
the knower's mind the power of knowing is the form (idea) of the good. It is the cause 
of knowledge and truth' 149 because it is 'more splendid than they are;' and that '[t]he 
good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects 
of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is 
beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power;' 150 likewise, Levinas creates a chasm 
between good and being, a chasm which may well be traversed in terms of a 
responsibility for the other, but which nonetheless seems to provide no motive for the 
ontological actualisation of a common world. It runs the risk of engendering a 
metaphysical responsibility without an ontological commitment. The difficulty of the 
separation of being and beyond is not only the problem Derrida indicates regarding the 
impossibility of the thought of the absolute other; it is also the problem of incarnating 
responsibility without ontology. Levinas' stress on the other beyond being to whom the 
subject is always and already responsible may affirm the absolute uncompromisable 
value of the other, but it offers no way of linking responsibility with practical 
commitment to the other. 
147 
148 
E Levinas, OB, p.122 
ibid., p.123 
149 Plato, Republic, 508e 
150 Republic, 509b 
H-G Gadamer associates Plato's discussion of the good with an understanding 
of knowledge as techne. In placing the good 'beyond,' Plato argues that it is beyond 
'what is generally accepted as knowledge' (The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian 
Philosophy, P Christopher Smith (tr.), (New ~aven: Yale University Press, 1986), p.23). 
Gadamer argues that knowledge has been taken as techne (art). In the Apology, the 
artisans have a specialist knowledge but fail us when considering the most important 
thing of all (ta megista) (Apology, 22d), towards which knowledge ultimately strives. 
'Knowledge of the good is exactly what is not asked about in the technai (arts) and the 
technites (artisan-handworkers)' (ibid., p.22). To catch sight of the good one must 'see 
past all else (apoblepein pros).' Does Levinas not unnecessarily isolate his 
understanding of Being from the good by understanding Being in a specifically 
Heideggerian way and by viewing Dasein as a technite? 
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7. 6 The Goodness of Being 
Whereas, for Levinas, the good and being are to be maintained in their 
separation, for Aquinas, being and the good belong together, without absolute 
distinction. 151 Aquinas, emphasising a metaphysics of participation places 'the good 
within being itself,' 152 'thoroughly integrating its value within being.t1 53 The separation 
of being and good, evident in Plato, is disavowed by Aquinas. 
'Goodness is no longer something other than or higher than being. 
Rather, existential being itself, of its very nature, is good, and thus has 
a self-diffusive character to it, from the highest to the lowest. Thus God 
for St. Thomas is at once the supreme Act of Existence and by that very 
fact supreme Goodness also.' 154 
The problem of maintaining being and the good in absolute distinction is that, whereas 
the good might be the drive towards transcendence and the evocation of responsibility, 
of itself it provides no forum within which this responsibility might be enacted. The 
good beyond being calls for ontological structures within which justice might be done 
for others. It is not sufficient that goodness be diffusive of itself. The passivity of 
contemplatio needs, for justice' sake to be resolved into praxis. One cannot simply seek 
respite from one's ontological labours by raising one's eyes to gaze on the face of the 
other and find inspiration. Commitment to the other, the incarnation of responsibility, 
needs to be enacted as ontology. As Rolnick, quoting Clarke, points out, the weakness 
of the neo-platonic tradition is that, in separating the good and being, it renders the self 
impotent in respect of the other; 'ideas cannot of themselves act.' 155 They can however 
participate in the real by becoming active forms, 'the intelligible structure of action.i1 56 
151 Dicendum quad bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt 
secundum rationem tantum. (S.T., I, 5,1) 
152 P Rolnick, op. cit., p.5 
153 ibid., p.3 7 
cf. 'Unde manifestum est quad intantum est aliquid bonum inquantum est ens: 
esse enim est actaalitas om is rei' (S.T ., I, 5, 1 ); 'Esse igitur actu bani rationem 
constituit ... naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et perfectio eius' (Contra 
Gentiles, 1,37); 'Esse enim actu in unoquoque est bonum ipsius' (Contra Gentiles, 1,38). 
154 ibid., p.38, quoting W Norris Clark, The Universe as Journey: 
Conversations with W Norris Clarke, G McCool (ed.), (New York: Fordham University 
Press), p.80 
155 ibid., p.38 
156 ibid., p.38, quoting Clarke, Journey, 71 
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With regard to Levinas, the assertion of the philosophical primacy of the good over 
being not only, positively, delivers the ethical impossibility of violence, according to 
the basic command, 'tu ne me tueras point,' it also delivers the impossibility of doing 
justice to the other. The ontological structures of society are not all bad, though they can 
be instruments of violence and evil, and submerge the individual; if they possess the 
good as 'the intelligible structure of action' they can become the incarnation of goodness 
and a common world in which the same and the other can be meaningfully related can 
be established. 
7. 7 The Problem of the Social 
If both Rahner and Levinas are committed to an absolute otherness, and infinite 
which has philosophical primacy in the order of the metaphysical (Levinas) or the 
ontologico-metaphysical (Rahner) if not in the educational order of epistemology or 
logic, one area in which both seem to be under-developed is in the relevance of the 
social. 
Rahner has been criticised for the lack of significance accorded to the personal 
and material world within his transcendental framework, although, as has been seen, his 
later writings point towards a conversion towards the personal Other, a conversion 
which R D Johns attributes to the close collaboration between Rahner and his student 
and friend, Johannes Baptist Metz. 157 Metz recognises that in Rahner's schematisation 
of the spirit's pre-apprehension of being, the alienation of the material world and a 
radical spiritualisation of the subject, as already indicated. Metz, therefore, develops a 
'critical position with regard to the spiritualising and ontologising tendencies in Rahner's 
thought,' 158 and stresses the need for a political commitment. Such a commitment, for 
Metz, is not to be founded in the pre-apprehension of God, as absolute Being, in the 
flight to whom the world is encountered almost acaccidentally, but rather 'in the 
consummation of all things beyond historical existence in God's future kingdom.' 159 The 
eschatological perspective, for Metz, is the undoing of the ontology of spirit, and the 
157 For an outline of the influence of Metz on Rahner's theological 
development, see R D Johns, Man in the World: The Political Theology of Johannes 
Baptist Metz, (Missoula, Scholars Press, 1976) 
158 ibid., p.2 
159 ibid., p. vi 
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possibility of categorical concreteness. Now, the importance of the eschatological is also 
evident in Levinas who, right at the beginning of Totality and Infinity remarks that the 
mark of the eschatological prophet is his ability to stand outwith the judgement of 
history while subjecting that history itself to judgement. For Levinas, ontology, and the 
politics it supports, finds it judgement in the Face of the Other who summons the subject 
and institutions not primarily to political action but to ethical responsibility. But this 
creates a similar problem as was seen in Rahner. Whether it is expressed as 'love of 
neighbour' or as 'responsibility for the Other,' there is a lack of categorical concreteness. 
Finkielkraut articulates the problem when he writes, 
'II existe, dans nombreuses langu,es, un mot qui designe a la fois l'acte 
de donner et celui de prendre, la charite et l'avidite, la bienfaisance et 
la convoitise - c'est le mot: amour. Le desir ardent qu'a un etre de tout 
ce qui peut le comb/er et !'abnegation sans reserve convergent 
paradoxalement dans un meme vocable. On parle d'amour pour 
l'apotheose du souci de soi, et pour le souci de l'Autre pousse a son 
paroxysme. 
Mais qui croit encore au desinteressement? Qui prend pour 
!'argent comptant !'existence de comportements benevoles? Depuis 
l'aube des Temps Modernes, toutes !es genealogies de la morale font 
deriver la gratuite de la cupidite, et !es actions nobles du desir 
d'acquisition. II n'y a pas d'oubli de soi qui ne s'avere payant pour le soi, 
pas de prodigalite sans compensation, pas de generosite qui ne soit en 
sous-main et symboliquement gratifiante, pas d'offrande, enjin, qui ne 
trahisse le besoin imperialiste d'agir sur l'Autre et de le posseder. Tout 
don est predateur, et toutes nos conduites sont lucratives: voila ce que 
nous pensons spontanement, et la lucidite est pour nous l'acte qui 
devoile, sous le devouement apparent, l'omnipresente realite de 
l'egocentrisme. L'homme tel qu'il est, c'est l'homme mains le don. 
Debarassee des preceptes religieux ou moraux, attachee exclusivement 
aux fails, la pensee positive ne retient de !'amour que !'instinct 
d'appropriation; c'est la pensee normative qui oppose a la voracite 
universelle et au regne du chacun pour soi, la valeur du 
desinteressement: !'amour du prochain definit l'homme tel qu'il devrait 
etre, ou tel qu'il sera demain, une fois que l'Histoire aura fait table rase 
de son passe d'oppression. '160 
In other words, the problem of love and responsibility for the Other as neighbour is the 
problem of making historical, categorical and concrete that love and that responsibility, 
such that it defines man, not simply as he should be or will be tomorrow, but as he 
actually is. Roger Burggraeve recognises that the role of society as an institution is 
poorly developed in Levinas when he notes that '[i]t is true that Levinas here 
presupposes and posits this "institutional mediating" more than he systematically 
160 A Finkielkraut, op.cit., pp.11-12 
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develops it,1161 and that the love of the Other which is the prime relation for Levinas 
'denies the factual structure and dynamism of interhuman reality. 1162 Burggraeve, 
however, attempts an outline of an ethical social theory, inspired by Levinas, which can 
be briefly outlined: the ethical relationship with the Other dethrones the subject from 
his position of dominance and establishes the self as unconditioned responsibility. Since 
this relationship is asymmetrical, a heteronomy of rights develops. It is the Other, not 
the self, who has rights; the I is only responsibility and obligation. This responsibility, 
however, expresses itself in the justice I show to the neighbour, a justice which, for 
Levinas, is superior to love. I must do good to the Other who is my neighbour. Now, 
were the world characterised by the closed society of two alone, 'there would be no 
problem. The Other would be my responsibility completely.' 163 My relationship with 
the Other, however, is not simply two. There is the third person who is always present, 
and not simply as another self with whom I might share the responsibility I bear for the 
Other, for I cannot be substituted. 'Personne ne peut se substituer a moi, en tant que 
moi. '164 The third person, rather, is the other (autre) of the Other (autrui), to whom I 
may also, and certainly do, have responsibilities. Since the third party is always present, 
what I do to the Other has ramifications for the third party. What I intend, therefore, no 
longer coincides exactly with what I do; 'the intention cannot accompany the act to its 
most distant ramifications and yet the I knows it is responsible for those distant 
results.' 165 Thus, the Other who is present in the neutrality of the Face is both proximate 
and distant. My relationship is one, not only with the Other in the verticality of his 
height, but also in his horizontality insofar as in my relationship with the Other there are 
always present the others of the Other. The face opens on to a society. "The epiphany 
of the face qua face opens humanity.' 166 
161 R Burrgraeve, From Self-Development to Solidarity: An Ethical Reading 
of Human Desire in its Socio-Political Relevance according to Emmanuel Levinas, 
(Leuven: Centre for Metaphysics and Philosophy of God, 1985), p. l 05 
162 ibid.,p.101 
163 ibid., p.106 
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Now, this leads to a tension. On the one hand, I am responsible for the Other and 
am summoned to do him justice, but justice for the one Other may also be injustice for 
the other as third party. Further, I, as responsible, am finite. Hence the need for the 
mediation of responsibility in the practical and economic sphere. As Burggraeve notes, 
Levinas does not fully develop what this means in practice, though he does speak in 
positive terms of work, productivity and money, recognising their exchange value in 
terms of the good they might achieve and the justice which might be done to others. He 
speaks of the need for social (ontological!) institutions which facilitate and respond to 
the need for justice, and the role of conscious reflection which leads to theory, 
understood as contemplation, and philosophy and science. 167 In the end, though, he will 
admit that his concern is not the construction of an ethics, but merely the quest for its 
meanmg. 
For Levinas, then, as for Rahner, the question of categorical concreteness and 
its place within an ethical metaphysics remains as a lacuna. 
167 For a fuller treatment of these themes, see my article, Pastoral Ministry 
as Theology in Contact: The Interdisciplinary Journal of Pastoral Studies, 116, (1995), 
pp.16-22, where the notion of theory as contemplatio is addressed; and Nee Tamen 
Consumebatur: Exodus 3 and the Non-Consumable Other in the Philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas, in The Scottish Journal of Theology, 48, (1995), pp.92-94, which 
addresses the metaphysical significance of money. 
8 
The Mystery of the Other 
MYSTERY 349 
8.1 Philosophy and Theology 
'What is a philosopher?' asks Blanchot, and responds by saying that, '[i]n the past 
one might have said it is a man who stands in wonder; today I would say ... it is someone 
who is afraid.r1 For, as indicated, in fear, says Blanchot, 'we leave ourselves, and, thrown 
outside, we experience in the guise of the frightening what is entirely outside us and 
other than us: the outside itself (le dehors meme. )'2 This is not to regard philosophy as 
a movement into the irrational, for 'we are past the point of reducing philosophy to 
reason, or reason to itself.'3 Philosophy is a relationship with the unknown, not that it 
gives a knowledge of the unknown, for - such 'is a monster that critical philosophy 
exorcised long ago.'4 Rather, philosophy's unique dignity is that it maintains itself as 
thought in the face of the Other whom thought cannot contain. Philosophy is a relation 
with the absolute in which it is itself not absolutely lost. It is a question of 
transcendence. It is a question, says Blanchot, which one finds spoken with utmost 
sobriety in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas where, 'by entertaining precisely the idea 
of the Other (autrui) ... it is as though there were here a new departure in philosophy and 
a leap that it, and we ourselves were urged to accomplished.'5 Philosophy on the 
precipice of the abyss - a strange idea. Philosophy maintaining itself in the face of 
mystery, for 'this Other is strangely mysterious (Cet Autrui est etrangement 
mysterieux).'6 Philosophy on the verge of theology! 
The distinction between philosophy and theology is less clear than it perhaps has 
ever been. Rabner notes that '[t]he unity of philosophy and theology within their 
theological distinction is much closer than has been suggested' on account of the co-
existence of 'the universal, serious and efficacious salvific will of God towards the 
whole of humanity' and 'the whole personal history of mankind,' on account of the 
M Blanchot, IC, p.49 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid., p.50 
ibid., pp.51-52 
6 ibid., p.52 
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spatio-temporal co-incidence of salvation history and world-history.7 Vatican I was 
correct, though by way of norma negativa, to affinn 'the duality of knowledge by 
natural reason and by revelation supported by grace' and the non-contradiction of the 
two because of their ultimate common source in God, and that neither philosophy nor 
philosopher 'can emancipate themselves from the higher norm of revelation.'8 One can 
no longer distinguish between philosophy and theology according to the classical 
distinction between nature and grace, whereby philosophy would concern itself with the 
natural sphere and theology with the supernatural. The one human existential is, as 
Rahner says, a 'supernatural existential' and both philosophy and theology strive to 
account for that human phenomenon. 'The depth of the human abyss, which in a 
thousand ways is the theme of philosophy, is already the abyss that has been opened up 
by God's grace and which stretches into the depths of God himself.'9 To be human is to 
be beyond oneself in transcendence, and, if one cannot name the term of transcendence 
as God, one can, at least, acknowledge that both philosophy and theology take their 
origin in a relationship with alterity. 
Now, although Levinas does not concern himself explicitly with theology, since, 
for him theology is implicated in and contaminated by the onto-theological tradition 
which dominates Western thought, he nonetheless recognises the importance of 
Scripture and the value of the model and the language which it employs to speak of 
alterity. Key to understanding the relationship with the Other is the notion of revelation, 
a concept with which Rahner concerns himself in Hearers. Whereas Heidegger's task 
was the disclosure (de-voilement) of Being, Levinas stresses that disclosure is an 
inappropriate model to describe the approach of the other as face. 'L'experience absolue 
n'est pas devoilement mais revelation.' 10 An object comes into the light from a certain 
perspectival context, 'dans une lumiere empnmtee;111 the face, however, is its own light, 







K Rahner, Philosophy and Theology, p.77 
ibid., p.72 
ibid., p.78 




totalite.' This is why Levinas describes the face as nudity. It is not clothed in any fonn, 
but approaches as a stranger, in the most radical sense of the word. Nakedness, as the 
essential phenomenon of the face thus indicates the radical similarity of all people, and 
universality of humanity. 'The epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity.' 13 'The 
presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third 
party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at us ). 14 It is precisely this ethical 
sense of the face, says Levinas, which was formulated in the Biblical injunction of 
hospitality to the stranger. The noteworthy aspect of the biblical ethic is that one's 
responsibility does not simply extend to one's family and relations but to the stranger, 
the widow and the 01phan who must be received with respect and treated with most 
concem. 15 The revelation of the Other is an ethical experience. However, insofar as God 
is implicated in that relation as the Other (Autre) of the Other (autrui), the ethical 
relationship contains within itself the possibility of theology. 
This thesis, then, has been concerned with the relationship with alterity as the 
constituting moment of human subjectivity. It has sought, following Levinas project in 
Totality and Infinity, to defend subjectivity by referring it to exteriority; it has sought, 
further, and more particularly to offer some deepening and defence of transcendental 
subjectivity which is so much intertwined in Rahnerian theology by reading Rahner with 
Levinas' thought of the reduction to ethical inter-subjectivity in mind. A happy 
consequence of this has hopefully been, not only a clearer focus on Rahner's ownmost 
aim as disclosing the human subject as a relationship with absolute mystery, and thought 
as ultimately a reductio in mysterium, but also of showing that Levinas' philosophical 
approach can be developed theologically, and in a manner which is not inconsistent with 
the tradition. 
8.2 Summary 
We began by outlining the methodological problematic. Methodology stands 
under the aegis of alterity. If, as Levinas says, 'philosophy is the work of love in the 




idem, TI p.213 
ibid. 
See Ex.22,21; Is.1,17;55,3; Jer.21,3 
MYSTERY 352 
and extend its endeavours to render an account of the relationship with the Other to the 
Other. The Other is a question, the answer to which is always inadequate. Methodology 
is thus subverted in two ways: firtsly, it seeks to disclose what is, in itself, excessive to 
disclosure, and, secondly, it can only proceed dialogically and diachronically; the Other 
whose very excess sustains the philosophical relationship between the Same and the 
Other can neither be said nor situated in the same time or the same place. Thus, 
methodology finds itself robbed of a stable ground which would provide a sure footing 
for its quest for transparency. Jacques Pohier was certainly correct when he indicated 
that 'transparency is only a quality for window panes' not of human beings. 16 
The philosophical articulation of such a relationship, however, does not need to 
proceed simply by a via negativa which would demand a constant unsaying of what is 
said with regard to the Other, but by a via eminentiae in which the Other is spoken of 
in an eminent and superlative way in which the language of theory is pushed to its limit, 
and beyond, by the glory of the Other to whom such language is inadequate. Thought 
may fail to comprehend the Other because, aiming at critical grounding, it is forgetful 
of original difference. Nevertheless, thought finds itself always and already in the 
context of alterity. For Levinas, this context is the proximity of the Other in the ethical 
encounter; for Rahner, it is the theological reality of the supernatural existential; both 
in their own ways will link the theological and the ethical. 
Now, while the idea of the Other in me is clearly the thought which animates 
Levinas' own thinking, it is also to be found in Rahner, though in a less developed way. 
Rahner's philosophy advances itself in response to an alterity, initially affirmed as Being 
in its comprehensibility, but ultimately understood as the proximity of incomprehensible 
mystery. Both Rahner and Levinas proceed phenomenologically: the contents of 
consc10usness - the phantasmata of Aquinas - provide a point of departure for the 
phenomenological reduction. Both employ a transcendental metho~ seeking to expose 
the transcendental conditions of possibility of thought, and both find the ultimate 
transcendental condition in an alterity which is excessive to the subject. Rahner, 
responding to the Kantian problematic regarding the question of the possibility of 
metaphysics, discovers this alterity as the source and goal of the dynamic tendency of 
the finite intellect, yet acknowledges the weakness of a purely intellectual approach 
which fails to do justice to the personal and inter-subjective character of subjectivity. 
16 See 1 Pohier, God in Fragments, p.267 
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Levinas straightaway acknowledges that metaphysics can only be undertaken as ethics. 
Rahner is anthropocentric in his approach without being egocentric. At the core of his 
subject, and constitutive of the subject, is a revelation of and a receptivity to alterity. His 
anthropological reflection, transcendentally pursued, opens onto and ontologically 
affirms alterity. Thus, as Levinas expresses it, subjectivity finds its defence and its 
inviolability in terms of its relationship to an incomprehensibility excessive to the 
subject, and which is ultimately to be reduced as mystery. 
We then sought to show how the transcendental reflection upon which both 
embark is pursued. Rahner, following Marechal, goes beyond the static formalism of the 
Kantian Critique and demonstrates the dynamic activity of the intellect. Levinas, too, 
traces a transcendental reduction but, recognising the inadequacy of intellection, will 
follow it beyond the subjective to the inter-subjective, begun but not completed by 
Husserl, and nascent but not developed in Rahner. Rahner, following Marechal, seeks 
an answer to Kant's question regarding the possibility and the scope of metaphysics -
'what can I know?' - by undertaking a transcendental analysis of the inherent dynamism 
of the human spirit. As 'power to know,' the finite spirit intends being, since, following 
Aquinas' dictum, 'whatever is can be known.' Being knows itself insofar as it possesses 
itself. The corollary of this is that not-knowing is a lack of self-presence. Knowledge 
is thus essentially comprehension, a unified and unifying grasp of Being. Questioning 
and acquisition go hand in hand. The fulfilment of Rahner's inquiry is the acquisition 
of Being. But, acquisition is inquisition. 
It is this latent violence within Being's quest for comprehensivity and 
comprehension which is at the heart of Levinas' criticism of the western ontological 
tradition, the violence of comprehension which fails to give due regard to difference 
and otherness, but seeks instead to reduce the other to the same, enclosing it within an 
egological totality of understanding. Levinas will thus seek to pursue the totalising 
apparatus of thought to its limits, to the very point at which the event of thinking breaks 
down before the unassailable excess of the Other. 
Now, although contained within and constrained by an ontological framework 
of understanding which would forge an essential link between Being and knowing, 
Rahner, attentive to a more metaphysical (in Levinas' sense of the term) strand in his 
thought, nonetheless recognises the limits of the ontological structure, and moves from 
an emphasis on human knowledge in the limiting philosophical propaedeutic of Spirit 
and Hearers to an acknowledgement of wider human experience, writing later that 
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'experience of God and experience of self... in a real and fundamental sense stand for 
the totality of human experience and human knowledge.117 Again, even later in 
Foundations, he refers to knowledge in the wider sense of human experience pointing 
out that 'every transcendental experience is mediated by the categorical encounter with 
concrete reality in our world, both the world of things and the world of persons.' 18 
Knowledge is inadequately understood when it is understood as concept and only finds 
its perfection and realisation as freedom and love which are ultimately to be situated 
within the orientation towards Mystery, categorically realised in the love of the other 
person. 
Levinas, too, will emphasise the manner in which knowledge is disturbed by the 
proximity of the other. 'Cet Autrni est etrangement mysterieux.' The dominant and 
dominating position of knowledge as comprehension is always and already called into 
question because, with regard to it, the Other is ex-position. 
Now, the relationship with alterity happens within the secular, and this calls for 
a proper understanding of the world and sensibility. For Rahner, the finite spirit 
demands the receptivity of materiality, a 'pure openness for absolutely everything.' 19 
Only in a conversion to the world can the spirit realise itself. But this material world in 
Rahner is an impersonal material world. Rahner himself, recognising the limitation of 
his early works in this regard, seeks to redress it in his later writings by stressing the 
subject's essential openness to the personal other and will link the loving experience of 
God with the loving experience of neighbour, and do so essentially. Ultimately, the 
redemptive role of the world for the finite spirit is achieved in the personal world of 
intersubjectivity. 
Levinas, too, stresses the salvific role of secularity. Sensibility is not so much 
a staging post along the way of the ontological adventure, as in Rahner's propaedeutic, 
but is the locus of passivity and essential receptivity where the self is exposed to and 
rendered vulnerable to the incursion of the Other. 
We next raised the question of the question as the starting point of Rahner's 
transcendental inquiry, and sought its significance. Rahner privileges the question as the 
starting point of his inquiry, and proceeds to expose its conditions of possibility through 
17 K Rahner, Experience of Self, p.122 
18 idem, Foundations, p.52 
19 ibid., p.20 
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a transcendental reflection. Ultimately, the supreme transcendental condition of 
possibility is absolute being which is demanded by and sustains the dynamism of the 
spirit. However, although the ontology which sustains Rahnerian epistemology is one 
in which Being and knowing are essentially related, nonetheless, the finite spirit is less 
to be understood in terms of self-presence, but rather, and more primordially, as 
transcendence towards what is other than the subject, towards the alterity of exteriority. 
Theologically, this relation with alterity is, for Rahner, experienced in the proximity of 
grace, in which God communicates himself to the essentially open and receptive subject, 
while remaining himself uncompromised by his offer. Such a paradoxical relation of 
proximity and distance in grace finds philosophical articulation in Levinas who stresses 
the absolution of the terms of the relation from the relation. The Other to whom the self 
relates is, with respect to the self, infinite and unencompassable. In fact, so infinitely 
distanced is the Other from the same that the Other does not constitute a horizon for the 
activity of the same, for horizons relate to the source which projects them. The Other, 
absolute with respect to the Same, maintains himself, beyond any horizontality of 
relation, in a position of verticality and metaphysical height, which, says Levinas, is the 
true meaning of transcendence. 
Now, for Levinas, the horizon of understanding against which the philosophical 
tradition has operated has always been Being. Hence, the deepest, widest and most 
fundamental philosophical question, as Heidegger indicates, has always been the 
question of the meaning of Being. Absolute alterity, however, finds its meaning in an 
absolution from Being. Thus the need, as Blanchet points out, to rethink the question. 
The question does not intend Being; rather, it is the promotion and the privilege of 
Being within the question which is itself to be placed in question. The question is not 
Being, but whether Being is the question. The question does not find its fulfilment or 
completion in the complete presence which the possession of Being would offer. Rather, 
the response marks a closure of the question. The true significance of the question lies 
elsewhere than in Being, in the one to whom and of whom questions are asked, the 
interlocutor. The ontological question of the meaning of Being becomes the ethical 
question of the significance of the Other, as interlocutor. 
Now, if the question as such is an inappropriate point of entry to the relationship 
with the Other, how else is transcendence experienced? This led us to a consideration 
of the relationship between Infinity and Desire. Levinas contrasts two itineraries: the 
Ulyssean and the Abrahamic. The Ulyssean journey is by way of return. What is other 
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and alien is brought home by thought to dwell in the confines of the Same. It is this 
movement of return to full presence which has been the hallmark of western philosophy, 
'a reduction of the Other to the Same.' In its place, Levinas proposes an Abrahamic ex-
cendence which moves beyond the self in a relationship with true alterity. Such an ex-
cendence is, for Levinas, an egress from the comprehension of Being. Rahner, too, 
recognises a transcending movement beyond the same, and the inadequacy of 
knowledge understood as the comprehension of Being. Ultimately, the relation to Being 
is not primarily comprehension, but mystery, and it is mystery not mastery which guides 
subjective spirituality. 
This relationship with true alterity or absolute exteriority is articulated by 
Levinas as a relationship with infinity. Using the idea of the infinite which Descartes 
recognises as being placed within the cogito, but having its origin beyond the cogito, 
Levinas deepens the Husserlian phenomenological reflection to show that the idea of 
the infinite is a thought which breaks the unity of consciousness. The idea of the infinite 
is an idea excessive to representational consciousness, an idea to which the evidence of 
the cogito is inadequate. Husserl may have recognised this in pointing to the inter-
subjective reduction, but unfortunately failed to pursue this thought. Such an infinite 
idea in me finds its parallel in Rahner's understanding of grace as an ineffable content 
implanted in the finite subject from the very first, and which gives the subject 
significance. Transcendental experiences are experiences of transcendence 'in virtue of 
the content implanted in them right from the very first by grace, the content in which 
their ultimate significance consists, and which is nothing less than the ineffable reality 
of God himself, and of his world permeated with himself.'20 
Such an impossible relation with an absolute, which remains absolute despite 
its communication, is considered by Blanchot. Ultimately, the subject is not to be 
understood in terms of possibility, as with Heidegger, but as radically impossible since 
it is the Other who offers and sustains all possibility. The subject is constituted by an 
impossible relation which is a relationship of transcendence and desire. Now, both 
Rahner and Levinas view the subject as a transcendence towards the absolute. For 
Rahner, this is absolute Being which is both source and goal of human transcendence; 
for Levinas, the absolute lies beyond Being and its categories and is encountered in the 
ethical relationship with the Other. Both Rahner and Levinas, however, share the 
20 K Rahner, Unity - Love - Mystery, p.239 
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conviction that this aspiration towards the absolute is not the work of the subject but is 
inspired by the originality of Other. Respiration follows inspiration. Further, bo_th in 
their own way express this transcendence towards the Other is tenns of Desire. For 
Levinas, Desire is an insatiable longing for the Other who, on account of his excess, 
sustains the Desire as radically and always unfulfilled and unfulfillable; for Rahner, 
although his language is often the language of spiritual dynamism in knowing and 
willing, the subject is also to be understood in the grammar of grace as a natural desire 
(desiderium natura/e) for the beatific vision. 
Such an impossible relation with the absolute, however, is not without its critics. 
Derrida accuses Levinas of an incoherent thought. Nonetheless, the paradoxical 
relationship of proximity with the Other and the ethical challenge which issues from that 
defies the logic of contradiction. Just as the phenomenon of suffering discloses a self 
which has been rendered devoid of the power and mastery which accompanies 
subjectivity, and just as the phenomenon of fear and panic reveals an object devoid of 
form, so the relationship with the Other is a situation in which both the position of the 
subject as origin and initiative is placed in question, and the Other, though proximate, 
is affirmed as infinitely distanced from the subject, not simply on account of an 
incapacity of comprehension, but primarily because of the positive excess or infinity of 
the Other with respect to the Same.21 Such a relationship, though seemingly impossible 
for thought, is nonetheless experienced as Desire and as Responsibility, and expressed 
as Language. Like the experience of grace, the Other draws close in proximity, but 
maintains himself as absolute mystery. 
Derrida, however, is one who, like Levinas, also criticises the privilege of 
presence whereby the signifier, whether the spoken word or, more particularly for him, 
the written word is viewed in its fallenness or secondarity with regard to the signified. 
The sign has always, he says, been regarded as a fall from an original situation of full 
presence. Derrida's criticism of the devaluing of the sign invites a reflection on the 
relationship between signified and signifier, reality and its image, res sacramenti and 
sacramentum. However, Derrida's attentiveness to the signifier and his refusal of a 
transcendental signified to which this ultimately points as the intelligible face of the sign 
is problematical for it risks not only relativism but also opens a way towards situational 
totalitarianism. Both Rahner and Levinas, on the other hand, affirm the transcendental 
21 See M Blanchot, IC, pp.43-45, 49-51 
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value of the signified, refusing its compromise by the sign, while nonetheless affirming 
the necessity of the signifier. For Levinas, the face is the cipher of the alterity of the 
Other, which offers the Other as an ikon of mystery, beyond thematisation and excessive 
with regard to thematising or representative consciousness. The face effects its own 
effacement, and though it enables a relationship, the Other is discrete in his face, being 
present only in the illeity of the trace; for Rahner, the symbolism of the sacrament offers 
the reality of an absolute experience, effecting what it signifies, without that thereby 
being reduced to its visible or audible expression in the signifier. Neither Rahner nor 
Levinas devalue the sign by relegating it to a position of secondarity in respect of the 
signified. Rather, as Blanchot points out, the ambiguity of the sign may open on to a 
multiplicity of double meanings and the possibility of misunderstanding if not duplicity, 
but, the more primal meaning of the sign is that its meaning is not so much the 
mediation of the meaning of the signified, but rather an opening on to an infinity of 
meaning, and ultimately to the other of all meaning, namely, the Other who is his own 
meanmg. 
Derrida regards the age of the sign as essentially theological. Rahner, however, 
recognises that theology is essentially the age of the sign, and necessarily so on account 
of the symbolic nature of reality. Being, for Rahner, is multiple in itself and thus 
relational. This can be seen clearly in finite being for whom the conversio is a necessity. 
But here, too, is the truth of Levinas' insight that it is not the case that one is, but rather 
that one is oneself; on n'est pas; on s'est. 'To be' is a reflexive verb (s'etre). But Rahner 
continues. Relationality is also a mark of absolute Being as is seen in the Trinitarian 
relations immanent within the Trinity. 
This theological dimension of the relational Being of the Godhead and its 
relation to finite being opens on to the question of the place of God within the 
philosophical and theological frameworks offered by both Rahner and Levinas. Both in 
their own and not irreconcilable ways, bring the relationship with the personal other and 
the relationship with God together. For Rahner, 'the whole incalculable mystery of man 
is contained and exercised in this act of love of neighbour'22 who remains a nameless 
mystery. The relationship with God is realised in the love of neighbour. For Levinas, 
God is recognised in the tertiality of the Other. God is the other (autre) of the Other 
(autrui). Since God is accessible in the ethical encounter, that is, in justice, God remains 
22 K Rahner, Love of God and Love of Neighbour, p. 242 
MYSTERY 359 
uncontaminated by Being, and thus, for Levinas, Wholly Other. 
Now this juxtaposition of God and neighbour in justice leads to a critique. 
Levinas must, in order to safeguard the absolute alterity of the Other, absent the Other 
from the domain of Being and establish the relation in terms of an ethical metaphysics, 
which leads to the question: having managed an excendence from the ontological 
through the ethical encounter with the Other to find oneself summoned to responsibility, 
how then does one manage to do justice to the Other within the ontological structures 
which regulate human society? Rabner, too, has been criticised for conflating God and 
neighbour within the kingdom of the Same - a kingdom also inhabited by the subject -
and so of compromising not only God and neighbour in their relation to the subject, but 
also God and neighbour in their relation to each other. Rabner, however, affinns the 
difference between God and neighbour when he writes that God is not thought of as one 
object among others but is 'always given as the subjectively and objectively all-bearing 
ground of experience, a ground which is beyond this world.'23 Whereas Levinas fears 
ontological identity, Rabner affirms ontological difference and an analogical 
understanding of being. 
Levinas refuses analogy, seeing its ultimate ground in univocity. Yet, the 
understanding of Being which Levinas employs is an understanding which is not 
constant in the tradition. Thomas has already provided an excendence from Being as 
comprehension through his affirmation of the priority of ens and his doctrine of analogy. 
The problem of relating being and its beyond finds a certain resolution in Thomas who 
manages to bring together being and the good. This establishes the possibility of linking 
the metaphysical and the ontological, as Levinas understands them, by closing the gap 
between ethical ideal and ontological reality. Ethics is the prototypical experience of 
alterity which both implores and commands response. Response, however, calls for 
categorical commitment. It is this sphere which, in both Rabner and Levinas, requires 
further development, but such is outwith the scope of the present work. What Levinas 
has affirmed is the priority of the ethical relationship with the Other which must be the 
inspiration of all ontological endeavours to incarnate justic_e. What Rabner reminds us 
of is that ultimately philosophical reflection which gives rise to the ontologies which 
support inter-subjective life is ultimately a reflection which is a reduction in mysterium, 
for 'cet autrui est etrangement mysterieux.' 
23 ibid., p.244 
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8.3 'Cet autrui est etrangement mysterieux.' 
The question of mystery is addressed directly by Rahner in The Concept of 
Mystery in Catholic Theology, and this article, perhaps more than any other, 
concentrates the themes pursued in this thesis. Against the background of what has 
preceded, it is now presented in summary for re-reading. 
Ultimately, says Rahner, 'mystery' describes the relationship between God and 
the human person, and any reflection on mystery is a reflection on the possibility of 
what, following Blanchet, might be termed 'an impossible relationship' in which the 
subject is placed in relation to what is and remains in excess of his capacities - a God 
who, in radical and absolute proximity communicates himself, and whose proximity and 
self-communication are 'not merely a logical and notional possibility124 but are rendered 
'ontologically valid' in the experience of incarnation, grace and glory. 
'In what we call incarnation, grace and glory, God does not create ex 
nihi/o sui et subiecti something different from himself, but imparts 
himself to the created nature. What is given in grace and incarnation is 
not something different from God, but God himself. He does not use the 
creature to impart himself, as when it points to God by its created reality: 
God imparts himself immediately of himself to the creature.'25 
The 'conventional notion of mystery,' upheld by Vatican I, understood mystery 
as being applied to formulations of faith; '(t]ruths and statements have the quality of 
mystery;' 'it is the truths which are mysterious.'26 These truths, however, are only 
24 K Rahner, Concept of Mystery, p.72 
25 ibid., p.66 
26 ibid., p.38 
Vatican I affirms vera et proprie dicta mysteria, which can only be known 
through divine revelation, in its Canons against liberal philosophical and theological 
schools (Cf. DS304 l ), but the provisional incomprehensibility of such mysteries, of 
which Rahner speaks, is also affirmed in DS3015. Knowledge manifests a twofold 
order, both in principle and object. In principle, because the human subject knows by 
faith and by reason; in object, because there are mysteries which can be probed by 
reason, and those which are hidden by God until and unless he chooses to reveal them. 
Such a limitation of reason, however, is linked to our pilgrim state, and will eventually 
be overcome. Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie et sobrie quaerit, aliquam 
Deo dante mysteriornm intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur tum ex 
eorum, quae naturaliter cognoscit, analogia, tum e mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter 
se et cum .fine hominis ultimo.- numquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda 
instar veritatum, quae proprium ipsius obiectum constituunt. Divina enim mysteria 
suapte natura intel/ectum creatum sic excedunt, ut etiam revelatione tradita et fide 
suscepta ipsius tamen .fidei velamine contecta et quadam quasi caligine obvoluta 
maneant, quamdiu in hac mortali vita "peregrinamur a Domino: per .fidem enim 
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'provisionally incomprehensible.'27 There is, says Rahner, the 'silent presupposition ... 
that we are dealing with truths which should strictly speaking have come within the 
scope of reason with its power to see and comprehend but in this case do not meet its 
demands.128 Such an approach, however, is founded on a notion of ratio which views as 
mysterious whatever is not disclosed to reason, and to make ratio the 'criterion of 
mystery'29 in this way leads to a reduced understanding of mystery as statement, 
accessible only to faith. But is 'the precise nature of "ratio" so clear and obvious?130 
Mystery is not so much related to ratio as to revelation, and its proper nature is to be 
sought not principally in truths and statements, but in revelation itself, which though 
often communicated in truths and statements, is not the statement itself, but the reality 
so spoken. 'Revelation is not a preliminary substitute for the thing'.31 It is the 
communication of the reality. As Levinas might say, it is the saying (le Dire) rather than 
the said (le Dit) which is revealed as infinite mystery, excessive to comprehension. 
The notion of ratio needs to be re-appraised. Rahner, as do Levinas and 
Blanchot, situates ratio in the context of the relationship with the unknown, and asks, 
'What if there is an "unknowing", centred on itself and the unknown, 
which when compared with knowledge, that is, with any knowledge not 
really aware of itself, is not pure negation, not simply empty absence but 
a positive characteristic of a relationship between one subject and 
another?'32 
Knowledge, as a relation between a subject and an object, would then become not the 
fording of a distance between subject and object and the forging of a unity between 
them, but rather, the maintaining of distance and difference, for '[t]he supreme act of 
knowledge is not the abolition or the diminution of the mystery but its final assertion, 
ambulamus et non per speciem" (2 Cor 5, 6s) (DS3016; Constitutio dogmatico "Dei 
Filius" de fide catholica Session III, 24 April, 1870) 
27 ibid., p.37 
28 ibid., p.39 
29 ibid., p.40 
30 ibid., p.38 
31 ibid., p.39 
32 ibid., p.41 
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its eternal and total immediacy.'33 'Supreme knowledge is knowledge of the supreme 
mystery as such.' 34 Mystery is not at the limits of knowledge, but at its heart as 'an 
intrinsic constituent;' 35 and the conventional understanding of mystery is 'basically 
reduced to a defective mode of knowledge which is essentially oriented to the mystery 
as such.' 36 To situate mystery at the core of the epistemological adventure is to affirm 
it as the source and goal of the spirit's transcendence in knowledge and freedom and, in 
its very incomprehensibility, as 'the primordial and fundamental which is the ultimate 
transcendental condition of possibility of knowledge.'37 It is also to recast ratio as the 
faculty of mystery, not simply incidentally and secondarily, but originally and basically. 
Its proper object then becomes not being as knowable, but mystery as incomprehensible. 
The comprehensibility of being falls before the incomprehensibility of mystery. 
The relationship with alterity, however, is not only a function of knowledge 
alone. Love, too, merits consideration, and not only, or even principally, in its relation 
to what is other, but in its relation to knowledge. Simply to juxtapose knowledge and 
love would result in an 'unreconciled dualism.'38 Love, says Rahner, is to be conceived 
as the fulfilment of knowledge, which 'can only exist in a being when and insofar as it 
realises itself by an act of love.'39 Rahner summarises the relationship between 
knowledge, love and mystery thus: 
'the self-transcendence of knowledge, the fact that it comes to be only in 
so far as it passes over into something else, must be understood in this 
way: knowledge, though prior to love and freedom, can only be realised 
in its true sense when and in so far as the subject is more than 
knowledge, when in fact it is a freely given love. This is only possible 
if knowledge is ultimately a faculty ordained to an object attainable only 
because the object is greater than the faculty. And what but the 
incomprehensibility of mystery can be such an object of knowledge, 
since it forces knowledge to surpass itself and both preserve and 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid., p.59 






transform itself in a more comprehensive act, that of love?'40 
The privileged position which knowledge appears to occupy within the transcendental 
schema gives way to the pre-eminence and greater comprehensivity of love. Mystery, 
however, is more eminent still, for 'being essential to the "object" to which the intellect 
is primarily ordained, [it] forces it either to consume itself in protest or to transform 
itself in the self-surrender by which it accepts the mystery as such, that is, in love, and 
so to attain its proper perfection.'41 Reason is thus more than reason. Not simply to be 
understood cognitively, it is 'the faculty which welcomes the greater sight unseen, the 
faculty of simple rapture, of submissive dedication, of loving ecstasy. But this can only 
be if its most proper object is that sovereign and all-embracing exigence which cannot 
be mastered, comprehended, or challenged: in a word, the mystery.'42 It is mystery 
which is prior, for, in its proximity, it predisposes and divinises the hearer. 'Mystery 
demands, as the condition of possibility of its being heard, a hearer divinised by grace.'43 
Levinas might argue it thus: the subject is related to infnity, a relationship in which 
thought actually thinks more than it thinks. The infinity of the Other has a priority, for 
the Other has always and already approached the subject, in proximity, as grace; has 
awoken the subject to a life other than a self-enclosed pagan existence; and has given 
the time wherein an address might be heard. 
The human person, then, is the object of an address, and this both directly and 
indirectly. Not only is the subject the one spoken to, but the one, who in this being 
spoken to, is constituted as a subject. The very subjectivity of the subject is effected in 
so far as mystery draws near and speaks to him. Rabner proceeds by enquiring about 
this subject who is confronted, or addressed, by the mystery, and examines the 
relatedness of his created finite intellect to that mystery, for 'mystery is always 
understood as something relative, something which is mysterious to a given finite 
intellect.'44 Now, as absolute and unlimited transcendence in knowing and willing, man 
is 'the being who is orientated to the mystery as such, this orientation being a 
40 ibid., p.43 
41 ibid., p.44 
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constitutive element of his being both in his natural state and in his supernatural 
elevation.'45 The 'finite spirit's transcendence ... is directed to absolute being.'46 However, 
just as the relationship with the infinity of the Other is, for Levinas, the experience of 
infinity in its very inflnition, and manifests itself as the experience of Desire and 
Responsibility, so, for Rahner, Absolute being, as the 'Whither of transcendence, can 
only be spoken of in terms of experience of transcendence as the limitless openness of 
the subject itself.'47 The act and its finality, thus constitute a unity. The question, 
therefore, follows, if 'the most primordial, underivative knowledge of God ... is given in 
the experience of transcendence,'48 how does the Whither relate to transcendent 
experience? 
One must distinguish, says Rahner, between immediate experience and reflection 
upon this experience. As with other transcendental experiences, the experience of God 
is prior to conceptual elaboration of that experience. 'God is known through and in this 
transcendence previous to such concepts .... '49 He is the always present 'nameless, 
indefinable, unattainable.'50 'All conceptual expressions about God, necessary though 
they are, always stem from the unobjectivated experience of transcendence as such.'51 
Although the experience is proximate in its immediacy of presence, the transcendent 
reference - the Whither - is absent and aloof. 'The Whither of transcendence is there in 
its own proper way of aloofness and absence. It bestows itself upon us by refusing itself, 
by keeping silence, by staying afar.' 52 'The Whither is not experienced in itself, but only 
in the subjective transcendence and it is known only unobjectivatedly.'53 The Whither 
is the holy and we name it mystery. 




49 ibid., p.50 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid., p.52 
53 ibid. 
MYSTERY 365 
Now, the presence of the abiding mystery, which remains forever mystery, and 
therefore, aloof and absent with respect to the subject's comprehensive knowledge, is 
grace. By grace, the subject is ontologically oriented towards the mystery as such. He 
intends the beatific vision. This is so because mystery, as grace, always and already 
communicates itself to the subject, who always and already finds himself in the 
presence of mystery. 'Grace does not imply the promise and the beginning of the 
elimination of the mystery, but the radical possibility of the absolute proximity of the 
mystery, which is not eliminated by its proximity, but really presented as mystery' .54 The 
removal of distance and aloofness in holy mystery which grace achieves through God's 
self-communication to the human spirit does not render the mystery no longer a 
mystery, for 'even in the beatific vision that which is known of God is known as the 
incomprehensible.'55 'Grace is therefore the grace of the nearness of the abiding 
mystery: it makes God accessible in the form of the holy mystery and presents him thus 
as the incomprehensible.' 56 Man is thus to be considered properly as capax Dei, or capax 
infiniti, as a capacity for that which is always greater than his possibility to contain. 'As 
long as we think that comprehension is greater than being overwhelmed by light 
inaccessible, which shows itself as inaccessible in the very moment of giving itself: we 
have understood nothing of the mystery of the true nature of grace and glory.'57 It is this 
'possibility of the finite being endowed with the infinite ... (which) ... constitutes the 
incomprehensibility of incarnation and grace.' 58 
Rahner proceeds to enquire whether such a philosophical concept of mysterycan 6"-
.~ 
be transposed to the level of the theological. 
(, 
The relationship between the subject and God is a paradoxical relationship of 
absolute proximity. The subject is 'made for the absolute proximity of the mystery,'59 
and God is 'the god of the absolute proximity of self-communication.'60 God, as mystery 
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draws close, yet is absolute (absolutum). This paradox raises the question of 'the 
possibility of an absolute self-communication of the mystery by which it enters into a 
radical proximity.'61 'Need the holy mystery remain always the unattainable Whither of 
transcendence, given only in the experience of finite categories, that is, always mediated 
by the finite? Or can it communicate itself, as such, immediately to the creature, while 
still of course remaining essentially a mystery?'62 Rahner notes that revelation, not 
philosophy, provides the answer: 'this revelation cannot be confined to words, but must 
be also the giving of grace, as inner, objectless though conscious dynamism directed to 
the beatific vision.'63 However, one would want to add that philosophy cannot be content 
to remain silent. As was said previously, philosophy is now to be considered as a 
relation with the unknown, and its unique dignity is that it maintains itself as thought 
in the face of the Other whom thought cannot contain. Philosophy on the verge of 
theology! 
The possibility of a relationship with a reality in excess of the subjects capacity 
to contain it, of a thought thinking more than it thinks, is at the core of mystery. Strictly 
speaking, the created order of finite beings is not mysterious in an absolute sense, for 
as finite and thereby confined to the categories, there is, says Rahner, always the 
possibility of a finite mind adequate to them. 'In the region of the finite as such, there 
can be no absolute mysteries among the objects of categorised knowledge.' Only God 
can be mystery absolutely for the finite spirit. However, since 'all beings, and above all 
the created spirit in its transcendence towards absolute being, partake of the mysterious 
character of God ... [and] ... are referred to God ... [they] ... cannot be adequately 
understood without this relationship and hence in terms of this relationship.'&i 'Thus all 
understanding of any reality whatsoever is in the last resort always a reductio in 
mysterium'65 - because created by God. This reduction, however, calls for ethical 
articulation. Ethics is the new name, not only for philosophy, but also for theology. The 
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the mystery of the neighbour and the justice which is offered to him. God is accessible 
in the justice I show to the Other, for God is the other (autre) of the Other (Autrui). As 
Rahner says, 
'The act of love of neighbour is, therefore, the only categorised and 
original act in which man attains the whole of reality given to us in 
categories, with regard to which he fulfils himself perfectly correctly and 
in which he always already makes the transcendental and direct 
experience of God by grace. '66 
'Cet Autrui est etrangement mysterieux. I 
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